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Corporate Financing Decisions: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing 
decisions. Overconfident managers tend to overestimate the mean of future cash flow 
and underestimate the volatility of future cash flow. We propose a novel time-varying 
measure of overconfidence, which is based on computational linguistic analysis of 
“what the managers said” (i.e. Chairman’s Statement). The overconfidence of CEO and 
CFO is also constructed based on “what the managers did” (i.e. how they trade their 
own firms’ shares). We conduct three empirical studies that offer new insights into the 
roles of managerial overconfidence in the leverage decision (i.e. debt level), pecking 
order behaviour (i.e. the preference for debt over equity financing) and debt maturity 
decision (i.e. short-term debt vs. long-term debt). Study 1 documents a negative 
overconfidence-leverage relationship. This new finding suggests that debt conservatism 
associated with managerial overconfidence might be a potential explanation for the low 
leverage puzzle: some firms maintain low leverage, without taking tax benefits of debt, 
because overconfident managers believe that firm securities are undervalued by 
investors and thus are too costly (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011). Study 2 finds 
managerial overconfidence leads to reverse pecking order preference especially in small 
firms, which sheds light on the pecking order puzzle that smaller firms with higher 
information costs surprisingly exhibit weaker pecking order preference. This new 
evidence is consistent with Hackbarth’s (2008) theory that overconfident managers who 
underestimate the riskiness of earnings tend to prefer equity to debt financing. Study 3 
finds managerial overconfidence leads to higher debt maturity. This evidence supports 
our proposition that overconfidence can mitigate the underinvestment problem (which is 
often the major concern of long-term debt investors) (Hackbarth, 2009), which in turn 
allows overconfident managers to use more and cheaper long-term debt. This evidence 
also implies that overconfidence may mitigate the agency cost of debt. Overall, our 
empirical analysis suggests that managerial overconfidence has significant incremental 
explanatory power for corporate financing decisions.  
 
Key words: time-varying managerial overconfidence, disclosure tone, Chairman’s 
Statement, content analysis, insider trading, capital structure, pecking order, debt 
maturity.  
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Corporate Financing Decisions: The Role of Managerial Overconfidence 
 
Extended Abstract 
This thesis contributes to the growing behavioural corporate finance literature by 
investigating the effects of managerial overconfidence on various aspects of corporate 
financing decisions including the capital structure decision, pecking order preference 
and debt maturity decision, which sheds new light on several major puzzles in the 
standard corporate financing literature namely the capital structure puzzle (particularly 
low leverage puzzle) and pecking order puzzle (size anomaly). We propose a novel 
time-varying measure of overconfidence based on computational linguistic analysis. 
The overconfidence of CEO and CFO is also constructed based on how they trade their 
own firms’ shares. This thesis consists of six main chapters plus an introduction and 
conclusion. Chapter 2 reviews behavioural financing theories. Chapter 3 compares 
various measures of managerial overconfidence and describes how we gauge 
overconfidence. Chapter 4 discusses important panel data econometric techniques/issues 
related to our empirical analysis. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are three self-contained empirical 
studies summarized below.  
 
Empirical study 1: managerial overconfidence and low leverage puzzle 
Chapter 5 examines the impact of managerial belief (i.e. overconfidence) on capital 
structure. Computational tone analysis of Chairman’s Statement is used to gauge time-
varying managerial overconfidence. We find that optimistic tone is negatively related to 
leverage. This finding provides initial empirical evidence consistent with Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan’s (2011) proposition that managerial overconfidence may lead to debt 
conservatism. The negative tone-leverage relationship is similar across firms with 
different degree of information asymmetry and information environment, ruling out two 
alternative explanations of tone (i.e. information asymmetry and impression 
management). We further investigate the joint effects of insider trading, as another 
window into managerial belief, and tone on leverage. As expected, high insider 
purchase (selling) confirms (contradicts) optimistic tone, which in turn enhances 
(weakens) the negative tone-leverage relationship. Overall, this study establishes a link 
between managerial optimistic words and conservative debt policy, which may help to 
explain the low leverage puzzle: some firms maintain low leverage, without taking tax 
benefits of debt, because of overconfidence-induced debt conservatism. 
 
Empirical study 2: managerial overconfidence and pecking order puzzle/size anomaly 
Chapter 6 examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens pecking 
order preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-based (i.e. tone of 
Chairman’s Statement) and action-based (i.e. insider trading and firm investment) 
measures of overconfidence. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment 
have significant and negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) regression framework, suggesting that managerial 
overconfidence leads to a reverse pecking order preference. This new evidence is 
consistent with Hackbarth’s (2008) theory that overconfident managers with a “risk 
perception bias” tend to believe that their debt (equity) is undervalued (overvalued) and 
therefore prefer equity to debt financing. This observed overconfidence-induced reverse 
pecking order preference also corroborates our earlier finding that optimistic tone is 
negatively associated with leverage. We also find that the effect of managerial 
overconfidence on the reverse pecking order preference is particularly stronger for firms 
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with higher earnings volatility, which confirms that “risk perception bias” is the 
underlying channel through overconfidence weakens the pecking order preference. 
Furthermore, we find that the effect of overconfidence on reverse pecking order 
preference is particularly strong for small firms. In other words, overconfident managers 
in those small firms are reluctant to follow standard pecking order behaviour, in which 
case managerial overconfidence contributes to the pecking order puzzle/size anomaly 
(i.e. small firms with higher information asymmetry surprisingly exhibit weaker 
pecking order preference relative to large firms). In addition, the effects of insider 
trading-based measures of managerial overconfidence are, however, relatively weak and 
less consistent, which is probably because insider (especially CEO) trading is driven by 
information asymmetry and thus is not a perfect proxy for managerial overconfidence. 
Overall, this study supports the proposition that managerial overconfidence is an 
underlying driver of reverse pecking order preference especially for small firms, which 
partly explains the pecking order puzzle/size anomaly.  
 
Empirical study 3: managerial overconfidence and higher debt maturity  
Chapter 7 examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate debt 
maturity. We hypothesize that overconfidence can increase debt maturity. The intuition 
is that overconfidence can mitigate the underinvestment problem (Hackbarth, 2009) 
which is often the major concern of long-term debt investors. The reduced agency cost 
of debt, in turn, allows overconfident managers to use more and cheaper long-term debt. 
Our empirical evidence is based on time-varying overconfidence measures (i.e. first 
person pronouns and optimistic tone) constructed using computational linguistic 
analysis. Interestingly, the changes of both first person singular pronouns and optimistic 
tone are positively related to the change of debt maturity consistent with our main 
hypothesis. Further support for our main hypothesis is provided by showing: 1) that the 
overconfidence-debt maturity relationship is strongest for the director who most 
influences investment decision, the CEO and 2) that overconfidence-debt maturity 
relationship strengthens for firms with high growth opportunities that exacerbate the 
underinvestment problem. Overall, this study provides initial and consistent evidence 
for a positive overconfidence-debt maturity relationship via overconfidence mitigating 
the agency cost of long-term debt.  
 
To sum up, Study 1 documents a negative overconfidence-leverage relationship. This 
finding suggests that debt conservatism associated with managerial overconfidence 
might be a potential explanation for the low leverage puzzle. Study 2 shows that 
managerial overconfidence may lead to reverse pecking order preference especially in 
small firms, which sheds light on the pecking order puzzle/size anomaly that smaller 
firms exhibit weaker pecking order preference. Study 3 finds that managerial 
overconfidence increases debt maturity and implies that managerial overconfidence 
does not always cause suboptimal/value-destroying decisions but can mitigate the 
agency cost of debt.  
 
Key words: time-varying managerial overconfidence, disclosure tone, Chairman’s 
Statement, content analysis, insider trading, capital structure, pecking order, debt 
maturity.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Motivations: Economic Man vs. Bounded 
Rationality 
Standard corporate finance models assume that managers and investors are rational 
utility maximisers (i.e. economic man or homo economicus). However, in Simon’s 
(1955) view, the “economic man” assumption made by traditional economic theories is 
overly simplistic. Consequently, traditional economic theories are often more related to 
normative (i.e. “how they should rationally behave”) rather than actual (i.e. “how firms 
do behave”) decision processes. In particular, he argues that  
 
“Because of the psychological limits of the organism (particularly with respect to 
computational and predictive ability), actual human rationality-striving can at 
best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation of the kind of global 
rationality that is implied, for example, by game-theoretical models.”  
 
Therefore, to have a better understanding of “how firms do behave”, behavioural 
corporate finance theories incorporate well-established findings from psychological 
studies and are built upon a more valid and realistic assumption of “bounded rationality” 
(Simon, 1957)
1
. Most of the existing behavioural corporate finance theories and 
empirical evidence can be broadly categorised into either of the following two 
approaches, namely irrational manager-rational investor approach and rational manager-
irrational investor approach (Baker and Wurgler, 2013). Among a wide range of human 
irrationalities (e.g. see Table 2.2 in Bazerman (2002) for a review on various 
behavioural biases
2
), existing behavioural finance studies suggest that investors and 
managers are particularly prone to two similar irrationalities including investor 
                                                          
1
 The concept of “bounded rationality” is first proposed by Simon (1957) in his Nobel 
Prize-winning book “Models of Man”. He describes the “principle of bounded 
rationality” as: “The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is 
required for objectively rational behavior in the real world – or even for a reasonable 
approximation to such objective rationality.”  
2
 Bazerman (2002) provides a good review on thirteen common biases (including 
overconfidence) that influence managerial decision making. Those biases are mainly 
caused by three heuristics (i.e. rule of thumb), namely availability heuristic, 
representativeness heuristic and anchoring and adjustment heuristic.  
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sentiment and managerial overconfidence/optimism respectively. Overconfidence is not 
only a well-established but also an important bias that is relevant to managerial decision 
making. Plous (1993) argues that “no problem in judgement and decision making is 
more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than overconfidence” (cited in Glaser 
and Weber, 2010).  
 
1.1.1 The importance of irrational manager approach  
This thesis focuses on the irrational manager-rational investor approach because of the 
importance of managerial (especially CEO) effects on corporate decisions (e.g. Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003; Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon, 2011; Frank and Goyal, 
2007). Roll (1986) proposes hubris hypothesis in the context of merger and acquisitions. 
However, behavioural corporate finance is still under-researched, as mentioned in 
Heaton (2002) that “behavioral approaches are now common in asset pricing, of course, 
but little work in corporate finance has dropped the assumption that managers are fully 
rational. This is somewhat surprising considering that the common objections to 
behavioral economics have less vitality in corporate finance than in asset pricing”.  
 
Heaton (2002) provides several reasons why it is more plausible to assume that financial 
markets are more rational or less optimistic than managers. First, arbitrage against 
market mispricing due to investors’ irrationality is easier than against managerial 
irrationality. For example, corporate takeover, as an arbitrage of managerial irrationality, 
is associated with high transaction costs and idiosyncratic risks (Heaton, 2002). Second, 
it is less likely for managers to learn from past experience to be more rational. This is 
because corporate decisions (e.g. financing and investment) are much less frequent than 
investors’ trading decisions. More importantly, the outcome of a particular managerial 
decision is much more difficult to be observed. Therefore, the learning process of 
managers is less effective in reducing irrationalities than that of investors.
3
 Third, agents 
tend to be more optimistic if they are highly committed to the task and they believe that 
outcome is under their control. This is particularly true for senior managers who are 
responsible for firm decisions and whose personal portfolio is less diversified.  
 
                                                          
3
 Hackbarth (2008) also argues that many managerial decisions are not well suited for 
learning since the feedback on the quality of their decisions is often “delayed and 
vague”.  
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Besides, regarding drivers of overconfidence, both the process of CEO selection and 
high executive compensation may contribute to managerial overconfidence. In terms of 
CEO selection, Goel and Thakor (2008) develop a model showing that overconfident 
managers are more likely to be promoted to CEO than their rational counterparts. On 
the other hand, Paredes (2004) models managerial overconfidence as a product of 
executive compensation. The rationale is that managers attribute recent “success”, as 
signalled by high compensation, to their own abilities, which in turn leads to higher 
level of confidence (see section 3.1.7 for more discussions on the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and compensation).  
 
 
1.2 Theoretical Foundations: Managerial Overconfidence and 
Corporate Financing 
This thesis also provides a rigorous review of existing behavioural capital structure 
theories (see chapter 2). Besides, we propose a more comprehensive version of market 
timing theory, namely Market Timing Matrix (MTM). The main objective is to show 
how managerial overconfidence can be incorporated into standard financing models, 
which in turn generate testable predictions on the roles of overconfidence in various 
aspects of financing decisions.
4
  
 
Major implications of behavioural capital structure models can be outlined as follows:  
 
 Heaton’s (2002) model provides a reinterpretation of information asymmetry-based 
pecking order theory. His model suggests that managerial overconfidence can be an 
alternative explanation of the preference for internal over external financing and the 
preference for debt over equity;  
 
 Hackbarth’s (2008) model distinguishes between the roles of optimism (i.e. growth 
perception bias) and overconfidence (i.e. risk perception bias). In particular, 
optimism is associated with enhanced pecking order preference
5
, while 
                                                          
4
 Hypotheses tested in this thesis are developed in subsequent empirical studies (see 
chapter 5, 6 and 7).  
5
 Pecking order preference refers to a preference for internal over external financing and 
a preference for debt over equity financing.  
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overconfidence leads to reverse pecking order preference. In addition, he shows 
that, in a trade-off framework, overconfidence causes underestimation of bankruptcy 
cost, which in turn increases leverage and therefore mitigate agency cost of equity 
(i.e. free cash flow problem). 
 
 Consistent with Heaton’s (2002) model, Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) model 
also predicts a relationship between managerial overconfidence and the standard 
pecking order. A unique prediction of Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) model is 
that overconfidence is associated with debt conservatism, meaning that 
overconfident managers may be reluctant to use debt or retain more earnings and 
therefore avoid using debt. 
 
 Hackbarth’s (2009) model shows that, in a real-options framework, 
optimism/overconfidence can mitigate agency costs of debt including both the 
underinvestment problem (i.e. debt overhang) and asset substitution and risk 
shifting. 
 
 Existing behavioural capital structure theories incorporate managerial 
overconfidence into either the pecking order or trade-off framework. However, we 
argue that managerial overconfidence can be easily incorporated into Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory which assumes that managers are rational. 
We propose a more comprehensive version of market timing theory, namely the 
Market Timing Matrix (MTM). The key prediction of MTM is that managerial 
overconfidence may lead to perceived mispricing which induces overconfident 
managers to repurchase their firms’ shares which they believe are undervalued by 
the market. 
 
1.2.1 Research questions  
We contribute to behavioural capital structure literature by examining the impacts of 
time-varying managerial overconfidence on various corporate financing decisions 
including (1) capital structure, (2) pecking order behaviour and (3) the debt maturity 
decision. Importantly, our empirical analysis is based on some new theoretical 
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frameworks and modified empirical models. More specifically, this thesis attempts to 
address the following main questions: 
 
1.2.1.1 Empirical study 1: capital structure decision (chapter 5) 
 Can managerial overconfidence help to explain the capital structure puzzle? In 
other words, whether managerial overconfidence has incremental explanatory 
power for capital structure decision?  
 Empirically test Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) competing propositions on 
the relationship between managerial overconfidence and leverage, i.e. whether 
managerial overconfidence has a positive or negative effect on leverage?  
 Is managerial overconfidence associated with debt conservatism and therefore a 
potential explanation of the low leverage puzzle? 
 
1.2.1.2 Empirical study 2: pecking order preference (chapter 6) 
 Is managerial overconfidence a potential driver of the pecking order preference? 
More specifically, does managerial overconfidence enhance or weaken pecking 
order preference?  
 What is the impact of managerial overconfidence on firms’ financing 
(repurchase) decisions when there is a financing deficit (surplus)? 
 Can managerial overconfidence help to explain the pecking order puzzle (size 
anomaly)? 
 
1.2.1.3 Empirical study 3: debt maturity decision (chapter 7) 
 Is managerial overconfidence a determinant of the corporate debt maturity 
decision?  
 Empirically test competing theories on the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and debt maturity, i.e. whether managerial overconfidence has a 
positive or negative effect on debt maturity? 
 Is managerial overconfidence favourable from debt investors’ perspective? 
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1.3 Empirical Challenges and Managerial Overconfidence Measures 
However, managerial biases are not directly observable. The major challenge of 
empirical examination of managerial overconfidence is therefore to develop clean and 
valid proxies for this bias. In contrast to existing studies, we articulate the importance of 
using a time-varying rather than a static measure of managerial overconfidence for the 
following two reasons. First, existing behavioural finance studies tend to examine 
managerial overconfidence in isolation and assume that overconfidence is static. 
However, in the presence of another common managerial bias (i.e. self-attribution bias), 
managers may “learn to be overconfident” (Hirshleifer, 2001; Gervais and Odean, 2001). 
Self-attribution bias is regarded as “endogenous overconfidence”. Thus, the level of 
managerial overconfidence tends to be time-varying.
6
  
 
Second, behavioural corporate financing theories suggest that the effects of 
overconfidence can be non-linear, e.g. mild overconfidence is beneficial while 
excessive overconfidence may be detrimental. For example, in Hackbarth’s (2009) 
behavioural capital structure model, mild overconfidence is associated with reduced 
agency costs of debt (underinvestment problem). Time-varying measures allow 
empirical testing of the non-linear effect of overconfidence. Furthermore, another 
challenge is to empirically distinguish between managerial overconfidence and two 
alternative perspectives including information asymmetry and agency problem. Chapter 
3 provides a comprehensive review of various measures of managerial overconfidence.  
 
1.3.1 Our measures of managerial overconfidence  
We attempt to gauge the biased beliefs of managers based on their words (i.e., what 
managers said) and actions (i.e., what managers did). A key difference between our 
measures of overconfidence and commonly used stock option-based and press-based 
                                                          
6
 One may argue that only “selected events” (see Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998) will lead to time-variations in the level of overconfidence. 
However, the main purpose of this thesis is not to identify the events that may lead to 
time-variations in managerial overconfidence. Put differently, the focus of the analysis 
is not on the events or outcomes that boost managerial overconfidence. In particular, we 
are not suggesting that financing decisions are the source of time-varying 
overconfidence rather the financing decision could be a consequence of it. In addition, 
DHS (1998) are mainly concerned with investor overconfidence while this thesis 
focuses on managerial overconfidence. 
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overconfidence measures is that we capture time-variation in the level of managerial 
overconfidence.  
 
1.3.1.1 Managerial words-based measure of overconfidence 
The words-based overconfidence measures are constructed by conducting 
computational linguistic analysis (content analysis) of Chairman’s Statement in the UK 
annual report. More specifically, we create over six language dimensions that are 
closely related to the construct of optimism, which allows us to check the validity of our 
measures by constructing a composite index using principal component analysis (PCA). 
The idea is that overconfident managers are more likely to use optimistic words in their 
accounting narratives.  
 
1.3.1.2 Managerial action-based measure of overconfidence 
The action-based overconfidence measures are based on the insider trading of UK 
managers (i.e. how managers trade their own firm’s shares). The rationale is that 
overconfident managers who are optimistic about firm’s future performance are more 
(less) likely to buy (sell) their firm’s stocks. We have the insider trading data of CEO, 
CFO and Chairman, which enable us to compare the effects of overconfidence of 
different senior managers.  
 
 
1.4 Empirical Tests and Contributions 
As mentioned above, the main objective of this thesis is to examine to what extent 
managerial overconfidence, as a key element of the irrational manager approach of 
behavioural capital structure, can help explain firm financing decisions. This section 
summarizes testable hypotheses developed based on behavioural capital structure 
theories and our major empirical findings and contributions.  
 
1.4.1 Empirical study 1: capital structure decision 
This chapter examines the impact of managerial belief on capital structure. 
Computational tone analysis of Chairman’s Statement is used to gauge time-varying 
managerial overconfidence. We find that optimistic tone is negatively related to 
leverage. This finding provides initial empirical evidence consistent with Malmendier, 
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Tate and Yan’s (2011) proposition that managerial overconfidence may lead to debt 
conservatism. The negative tone-leverage relationship is similar across firms with 
different degree of information asymmetry and information environment, ruling out two 
alternative explanations of tone (i.e. information asymmetry and impression 
management).  
 
We further investigate the joint effects of insider trading, as another window into 
managerial belief, and tone on leverage. As expected, high insider purchase (selling) 
confirms (contradicts) optimistic tone, which in turn enhances (weakens) the negative 
tone-leverage relationship. Overall, this study establishes a link between managerial 
optimistic words and conservative debt policy, which may help to explain the low 
leverage puzzle: some firms maintain low leverage, without taking the tax benefits of 
debt, because of overconfidence-induced debt conservatism. 
 
1.4.2 Empirical study 2: pecking order behaviour 
This chapter examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens 
pecking order preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-based (i.e. tone 
of Chairman’s Statement) and action-based (i.e. insider trading and firm investment) 
measures of overconfidence. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment 
have significant and negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) regression framework, suggesting that managerial 
overconfidence leads to reverse pecking order preference. This new evidence is 
consistent with Hackbarth’s (2008) theory that overconfident managers with “risk 
perception bias” tend to believe that their debt (equity) is undervalued (overvalued) and 
therefore prefer equity to debt financing. This observed overconfidence-induced reverse 
pecking order preference also corroborates our earlier finding that optimistic tone is 
negatively associated with leverage.  
 
We also find that the effect of managerial overconfidence on the reverse pecking order 
preference is particularly strong for firms with higher earnings volatility, which 
confirms that “risk perception bias” is the underlying channel through which 
overconfidence weakens pecking order preference. Furthermore, we find that the effect 
of overconfidence on the reverse pecking order preference is especially strong for small 
28 
 
firms. In other words, overconfident managers in those small firms are reluctant to 
follow the standard pecking order behaviour, in which case managerial overconfidence 
contributes to the pecking order puzzle (or pecking order size anomaly i.e. small firms 
with higher information asymmetry surprisingly exhibit weaker pecking order 
preference relative to large firms). In addition, the effects of insider trading-based 
measures of managerial overconfidence are, however, relatively weak and less 
consistent, which is probably because insider (especially CEO) trading is driven by 
information asymmetry and thus is not a perfect proxy for managerial overconfidence. 
Overall, this study supports the proposition that managerial overconfidence is an 
underlying driver of reverse pecking order preference especially for small firms, which 
partly explains the pecking order puzzle (or size anomaly).  
 
1.4.3 Empirical study 3: debt maturity decision 
This chapter examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate debt 
maturity. We hypothesize that overconfidence can increase debt maturity. The intuition 
is that overconfidence can mitigate the underinvestment problem (Hackbarth, 2009) 
which is often the major concern of long-term debt investors. The reduced agency cost 
of debt, in turn, allows overconfident managers to use more and cheaper long-term debt. 
Our empirical evidence is based on time-varying overconfidence measures (i.e. first 
person pronouns and optimistic tone) constructed using computational linguistic 
analysis. Interestingly, the changes of both first person singular pronouns and optimistic 
tone are positively related to the change of debt maturity consistent with our main 
hypothesis.  
 
Further support for our main hypothesis is provided by demonstrating: i) that the 
overconfidence-debt maturity relationship is strongest for the director who most 
influences investment decision, the CEO, based on their insider trading behaviour and ii) 
that overconfidence-debt maturity relationship strengthens for firms with high growth 
opportunities (where the agency cost of debt is exacerbated). Overall, our study 
provides initial and consistent evidence for a positive overconfidence-debt maturity 
relationship via overconfidence mitigating the agency cost of long-term debt.  
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In summary, the major contributions of this thesis are threefold. First, we develop time-
varying managerial overconfidence measures, which allow us to examine the impact of 
the changes in managerial overconfidence on the changes of debt level and debt 
maturity structure. Second, although previous empirical studies also suggest that 
managerial overconfidence is an important determinant of corporate financing decisions, 
we provide initial empirical evidences which are different from those documented in the 
literature but are consistent with behavioural corporate financing theories. In particular, 
we are the first to document that managerial overconfidence is negatively related to 
leverage and that managerial overconfidence (especially the “risk perception bias”) is 
associated with reverse pecking order preference. Third, we propose an agency cost of 
debt hypothesis based on Hackbarth (2009) that rationalizes the positive relation 
between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework with a 
particular focus on the theoretical effects of managerial overconfidence on firm 
financing decisions. Chapter 3 shows and evaluates various ways managerial 
overconfidence can be operationalized and chapter 4 discusses how specific estimation 
methods are selected based on both certain capital structure theories and the 
characteristics of our data. Chapter 5, 6 and 7 are three empirical studies examining the 
impacts of managerial overconfidence on capital structure, pecking order behaviour and 
debt maturity respectively. These three empirical chapters are by and large self-
contained. Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by summarizing the key contributions, 
potential limitations and providing suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Behavioural Capital Structure Theories: The Effects of 
Managerial Overconfidence 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of behavioural capital structure theories and importantly 
we propose a more comprehensive market timing theory, namely Market Timing Matrix 
(MTM).
7
 In particular, we compare and discuss behavioural models that incorporate 
managerial overconfidence/optimism in market timing, trade-off and pecking order 
frameworks. The purpose of this review is to show that the irrational manager approach 
of behavioural capital structure matters - it can complement standard capital structure 
theories and therefore has important implications for firm financing decisions.
8
  
 
Furthermore, this review articulates the interactions among standard theories of capital 
structure. This leads to interesting testable hypotheses. For example, managerial 
overconfidence influences market timing behaviour which in turn affects the dynamic 
adjustment speed of capital structure and pecking order preference. This review also 
provides a solid foundation for our development of testable hypotheses related to more 
specific financing decisions (level of leverage, choice between debt and equity, choice 
between short-term and long-term debt, etc.) in the subsequent empirical chapters 
(Chapter 4, 5 and 6).  
 
 
2.2 Standard Capital Structure Theories and Their Interactions 
Standard capital structure theories provide useful frameworks to analyse the effects of 
behavioural bias on financing decisions. Therefore, we first provide an overview of 
standard capital structure theories and their building blocks (e.g. tax, bankruptcy costs, 
                                                          
7
 Gider and Hackbarth (2010) provide an excellent review of two important behavioural 
financing models (Hackbarth, 2008; Hackbarth; 2009). However, we attempts to offer a 
more comprehensive review on behavioural capital structure theories by including 
important discussions on market timing theory (here, we propose a more comprehensive 
market timing theory, namely Market Timing Matrix (MTM), which incorporates 
managerial overconfidence) and other behavioural models by Heaton (2002), 
Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) and Baker and Wurgler (2012).  
8
 For example, Hackbarth (2008) incorporates managerial overconfidence into the trade-
off framework and Heaton’s (2002) model shows that managerial overconfidence 
provide a re-interpretation of information asymmetry-based pecking order theory.  
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agency costs and information asymmetry). Many previous studies tend to consider 
different theories of capital structure as competing theories and attempts to empirically 
identify the theory that can explain the data best. However, empirical literature shows 
that major capital structure theories can explain some but not all empirical patterns. In 
this section, we first briefly introduce three major capital structure theories: trade-off 
theory, pecking order theory and market timing theory.  
 
2.2.1 Standard capital structure theories  
Modigliani and Miller’s (MM) (1958) seminal work forms the basis of modern capital 
structure theories. (See e.g., Harris and Raviv (1991), Myers (2003) and Frank and 
Goyal (2011) for reviews on standard capital structure theories.) This section discusses 
major capital structure theories which have been developed by relaxing some key 
assumptions of MM theorem (e.g. there are no tax, bankruptcy costs, information cost, 
agency costs, etc.).  
 
2.2.1.1 Modigliani-Miller theorem (without and with taxes) 
We first describe MM propositions without corporate taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 
1958) and then incorporate the role of corporate taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). 
MM Proposition I (without taxes) suggests that the market value of a firm is not 
influenced by its financing decisions. According to Proposition I, the market value of 
the firm (𝑉) can be represented as the sum of the market value of equity (𝑉𝐸) and debt 
(𝑉𝐷), i.e., 𝑉 = 𝑉𝐸 + 𝑉𝐷, and the value of unlevered (𝑉𝑈) and levered (𝑉𝐿) firms are the 
same, i.e., 𝑉𝑈 = 𝑉𝐿. This means that capital structure is irrelevant to firm’s market 
value. The intuition is that the size of a pie is not determined by how the pie is sliced. In 
other words, firm value is determined by investment rather than financing decisions, 
assuming that those two decisions are completely separated.  
 
MM Proposition II (without taxes) shows that the cost of equity of levered firms (𝐾𝐸) is 
equal to the cost of unlevered equity (𝐾𝑈) plus a financial risk premium that is the 
spread between 𝐾𝑈 and risk-free rate (𝑟) multiplied by the debt-to-equity ratio (𝐷 𝐸⁄ ). In 
MM Proposition II, cost of levered equity can be shown as follows: 𝐾𝐸 = 𝐾𝑈 + (𝐾𝑈 −
𝑟)(𝐷 𝐸⁄ ). This equation suggests that cost of equity is positively related to the debt-to-
equity ratio. This is because debt financing will increase shareholders’ risk.  
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However, the above arguments ignore corporate taxes
9
. Taking effective corporate taxes 
(𝑇𝐶) into consideration, MM Proposition I (with taxes) becomes 𝑉𝐿 = 𝑉𝑈 + 𝑇𝐶𝐷, where 
𝑇𝐶𝐷 is the present value of tax shields
10
 which makes the value of levered firms higher 
than that of unlevered firms. This is because interest payment reduces tax payment and 
therefore increases shareholders’ wealth.  
 
MM Proposition II (with taxes) can be written as 𝐾𝐸 = 𝐾𝑈 + (𝐾𝑈 − 𝑟)(1 − 𝑇𝐶)(𝐷 𝐸⁄ ). 
This equation also shows that cost of equity will increase with debt level. However, in 
the presence of corporate taxes, MM propositions suggest that firm value is positively 
related to debt level and thus is optimal to adopt an all-debt capital structure. However, 
this proposition ignores bankruptcy and agency costs associated with debt and therefore 
might not be realistic.  
 
Although MM theorem provides a probably oversimplified view of financing, 
recognizing its underlying assumptions
11
 may help to identify the factors (i.e. 
frictions/market imperfections) that can make financing value relevant. In the 
subsequent sections, we further relax assumptions of MM theorem by incorporating 
various frictions including bankruptcy costs, agency problems, information asymmetry 
and investor and managerial irrationalities. We particularly focus on one friction: 
managerial overconfidence.  
 
2.2.1.2 Trade-off theory 
Trade-off theory is developed based on Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) seminal 
work. The central idea of trade-off theory is that two alternative sources of financing 
(i.e. debt and equity) are associated with various costs and benefits and therefore 
optimal leverage can be identified when the marginal costs equal marginal benefits. 
                                                          
9
 Here, we do not consider personal taxes. However, personal taxes will reduce net tax 
saving because at the personal level interest income is taxed while capital gain is not 
taxed.  
10
 The present value of tax shield (𝑇𝐶𝐷) is calculated as follows: 𝑇𝑐(𝑟𝐷) 𝑟⁄ = 𝑇𝐶𝐷 , 
where tax savings are discounted at the cost of debt (𝑟).  
11  
Modigliani-Miller’s (1958) irrelevance theorem is based on several strong 
assumptions (e.g. there are no taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, information 
asymmetries, etc.).  
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This section first introduces tax benefit and bankruptcy cost of debt and then describes 
agency costs of debt and equity.  
 
a. Tax benefit of debt vs. bankruptcy cost of debt 
Trade-off theory suggests that financing decisions are based on the trade-off between 
tax benefits and bankruptcy costs associated with debt financing (Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973). Debt financing can be beneficial because interest payment is tax 
deductible, meaning that interest payments will reduce taxable income (especially for 
profitable firms). In terms of the bankruptcy costs of debt, there are direct and indirect 
costs and the latter is usually more considerable. Firms with higher debt levels will have 
a higher probability that they may not be able to pay their debt holders and consequently 
go bankrupt. The direct cost is associated with the bankruptcy process (e.g., legal and 
administrative fees). More importantly, highly leveraged firms may also suffer from 
various indirect costs of financial distress that are difficult to quantify. For example, 
customers may stop buying products from financially distressed firms and employees 
are less willing to work for those firms. This is because, as Titman’s (1984) model 
suggests, bankruptcy can impose costs on its customers, workers and suppliers.  
 
b. Agency costs of debt and equity 
In addition to tax benefit and bankruptcy costs of debt, agency costs of debt and equity 
may also influence firms’ optimal leverage. In particular, from an agency perspective, 
managers should compare the agency costs of debt (overinvestment and 
underinvestment problem) and the agency cost of equity (free cash flow problem).  
 
Asset substitution and debt overhang: Both debt and equity are associated with agency 
problems. On one hand, the conflict of interest between debt holders and shareholders 
may lead to overinvestment and underinvestment problems. Overinvestment refers to 
shareholders’ incentive to invest in risky projects at the expense of debt holders, which 
is also known as “asset substitution” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This can be regarded 
as a risk-shifting strategy where shareholders gain most if the risky project generates 
high returns while debt holders bear the costs if the project fails. In anticipating this 
suboptimal investment behaviour, bond holders demand a higher risk premium, which 
increases cost of debt. Another form of conflict between debt holders and shareholders 
is underinvestment or “debt overhang” problem (Myers, 1977). Shareholders may want 
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to forgo some value-enhancing investment if debt holders capture most of the gains 
from the investment. In brief, debt financing is subject to two types of agency costs, 
which makes firms less willing to use debt.  
 
Free cash flow problem: On the other hand, the conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders may cause free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). Self-interested 
managers have the incentive to invest the free cash flow in “empire building” that can 
increase their power but decrease shareholders’ value. In this case, debt plays a 
disciplinary role because debt payment reduces the amount of free cash flow available 
for those self-interested managers. Therefore, debt financing has the benefit of reducing 
agency costs of free cash flow. To sum up, debt financing may increase agency costs 
associated with both overinvestment and underinvestment problems but decrease 
agency cost of free cash flow. Therefore, firm’s optimal capital structure can also be 
determined by balancing between the agency costs of debt and equity.  
 
In sum, trade-off theory implies that there is some optimal target leverage where the 
marginal benefits of debt (tax shields and disciplinary role of debt) equal its marginal 
costs (bankruptcy costs and agency costs of overinvestment and underinvestment 
problems). To maximize firm value, firms need to adjust their current leverage toward 
their target leverage. However, trade-off theory only provides an incomplete picture of 
potential costs and benefits associated with debt and equity. Therefore, other capital 
structure theories including pecking order theory and market timing theory may interact 
with trade-off theory, which jointly influence leverage adjustment.  
 
2.2.1.3 Pecking order theory  
Pecking order theory is first proposed by Donaldson (1961), which suggests that there is 
a preference for internal financing over external financing (including both debt and 
equity) and if internal financing is not sufficient debt is preferred to equity. It is 
important to recognize that the pecking order preference is conditional. The most widely 
cited condition is information asymmetry, as developed by Myers and Majluf (1984). 
The idea is that the pecking order preference is driven by information costs associated 
with different sources of financing. In particular, internal financing is subject to zero 
information cost. However, in terms of external financing, equity is more likely to be 
undervalued by outside investors and therefore has higher information cost than debt. 
36 
 
Therefore, equity is only used as a last resort. Put differently, the information 
asymmetry problem can be considered as the conflict between existing shareholders, 
who have an information advantage, and future investors. In contrast to the prediction of 
trade-off theory, there is not target leverage according to pecking order theory.  
 
The pecking order preference might also be conditional on other factors (e.g. transaction 
costs, agency costs, tax and managerial overconfidence). This thesis focuses on 
managerial overconfidence as a potential condition of pecking order preference. 
Heaton’s (2002) model suggests that overconfident managers who believe that external 
financing (especially equity) are undervalued by outside investors and therefore tend to 
have a standard pecking order preference. (Chapter 6 provides a review of empirical 
studies on various factors (e.g. market timing, information asymmetry) influencing the 
degree of pecking order preference using modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
method.) 
 
2.2.1.4 Market timing theory  
More recently, Baker and Wurgler (2002) articulate and empirically test a market timing 
theory of capital structure. The idea is simply “buy low and sell high”. More 
specifically, a firm will issue more equity when its managers believe that the firm stocks 
are overvalued. This proposition is consistent with Graham and Harvey’s (2001) survey 
evidence that two-thirds of CFOs in their sample take equity mispricing into 
consideration when making equity issuance decisions. The underlying assumption is 
that managers are rational and are able to take the benefit of market mispricing which is 
mainly a product of investor irrationalities. In brief, capital structure can be seen as the 
accumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002).  
 
Another type of market timing is based on time-varying information asymmetry. 
Korajczyk, Lucas and McDonald’s (1992) model predicts that firms tend to issue equity 
following information releases which mitigate Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse 
selection problem. In contrast to the key prediction of trade-off theory, market timing 
theory does not imply the existence of an optimal leverage target.  
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However, this thesis articulates that Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory 
might be incomplete in the sense that it does not incorporate managerial irrationalities 
(especially managerial overconfidence). We will propose a more comprehensive market 
timing theory, namely “Market Timing Matrix” (see section 2.4.4 for a detailed 
description of this theoretical framework).  
 
2.2.2 Interactions among main capital structure theories  
More importantly, we articulate and discuss the interactions among standard capital 
structure theories. We believe that all capital structure theories are useful in the sense 
that they shed light on various costs and benefits associated with different choices of 
financing. In other words, capital structure theories can be complementary rather than 
competing. For example, trade-off theory suggests there is a long-run optimal target 
debt level, while market timing theory might help explain the speed of adjustment to the 
target.  
More specifically, corporate financing decisions are often made where various costs and 
benefits, as suggested by multiple theories, are taken into consideration. That is why 
there are potential interactions among capital structure theories (see Figure 2.1 below), 
which will be explained in the following sections.  
 
Figure 2.1 Interactions between capital structure theories 
This figure shows the interactions among three major capital structure theories. More 
specifically, the interaction between trade-off and pecking order is explained in section 
2.2.2.1 (see Table 2.1); the interaction between trade-off and market timing is explained 
in section 2.2.2.2 (see Table 2.2) and the interaction between pecking order and market 
timing is explained in section 2.2.2.3 (see Table 2.3). 
 
Market timing 
Pecking order Trade-off 
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2.2.2.1 Interaction between trade-off and pecking order: financing deficit and 
dynamic adjustment (see Table 2.1)
12
  
Financing deficit affects the leverage adjustment speed. More specifically, 
underleveraged firms with a financing deficit and overleverage firms with a financing 
surplus are more likely to use debt. This pattern is consistent with Byoun’s (2008) 
empirical evidence that “most of the adjustments occur when firms are above target 
with a surplus or below target debt with a financial deficit”. This is because debt 
issuance is driven by both the incentive to reduce the deviation from target leverage and 
a pecking order preference for debt over equity to meet financing needs.  
 
Table 2.1 Interaction between financing deficit and leverage adjustment 
Interaction between 
trade-off and pecking order 
Pecking order 
Financing deficit Financing surplus 
Trade-off 
Underleveraged 
↑ 𝑫 𝒐𝒓 ↓ 𝑬 + ↑ 𝑫 
Higher SOA 
↑ 𝐷 𝑜𝑟 ↓ 𝐸 + ↓ 𝐷 
Lower SOA 
Overleveraged 
↓ 𝐷 𝑜𝑟 ↑ 𝐸 + ↑ 𝐷 
Lower SOA 
↓ 𝑫 𝒐𝒓 ↑ 𝑬 + ↓ 𝑫 
Higher SOA 
Note: “↑ 𝐷” and “↑ 𝐸” represent debt and equity issuance respectively, while “↓ 𝐷” and “↓ 𝐸” 
represent debt and equity buyback respectively. “+” means joint effect. The left side of “+” 
shows the prediction of trade-off theory while the right side of “+” shows the prediction of 
pecking order theory. SOA refers to the speed of adjustment.  
 
2.2.2.2 Interaction between trade-off and market timing: market timing and 
dynamic adjustment (see Table 2.2) 
Market timing opportunity (i.e. firm stock mispricing) affects the leverage adjustment 
speed. In particular, the adjustment speed is higher for underleveraged firms whose 
stocks are undervalued and overleveraged firms whose stocks are overvalued. The 
reason is that both market timing opportunity and trade-off between tax benefits and 
bankruptcy may jointly influence the speed of leverage adjustment. This proposition is 
consistent with the argument that “capital structure adjustment speeds should respond 
to some of the market timing variables previously identified in the literature as affecting 
leverage levels” Faulkender et al. (2012, p 641). Empirically, Warr et al. (2012) test the 
interaction between market timing and the trade-off theory. They suggest that the rate of 
adjustment towards target leverage depends on whether the firm is undervalued or 
                                                          
12
 Also see Table 1 in Byoun (2008).  
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overvalued. In particular, the target adjustment is more rapid when the firm’s leverage is 
above (below) the target and the firm is overvalued (undervalued). 
 
Table 2.2 Interaction between market timing and leverage adjustment 
Interaction between 
trade-off and market timing 
Market timing 
Overvalued Undervalued 
Trade-off 
Underleveraged 
↑ 𝐷 𝑜𝑟 ↓ 𝐸 + ↑ 𝐸 
Lower SOA 
↑ 𝑫 𝒐𝒓 ↓ 𝑬 + ↓ 𝑬 
Higher SOA 
Overleveraged 
↓ 𝑫 𝒐𝒓 ↑ 𝑬 + ↑ 𝑬 
Higher SOA 
↓ 𝐷 𝑜𝑟 ↑ 𝐸 + ↓ 𝐸 
Lower SOA 
Note: “↑ 𝐷” and “↑ 𝐸” represent debt and equity issuance respectively, while “↓ 𝐷” and “↓ 𝐸” 
represent debt and equity buyback respectively. “+” means joint effect. The left side of “+” 
shows the prediction of trade-off theory while the right side of “+” shows the prediction of 
market timing theory. SOA refers to the speed of adjustment. 
 
2.2.2.3 Interaction between pecking order and market timing: market timing and 
pecking order preference (see Table 2.3) 
Both market timing and information asymmetry may influence the degree of pecking 
order preference. In particular, firms with financing deficit are more likely to follow 
pecking order (i.e. the preference for debt over equity) when their stocks are 
undervalued. Elliott et al. (2007) empirically test the effect of equity mispricing on the 
pecking order behaviour. They report that the degree of overvaluation (undervaluation) 
is positively related to the proportion of the firm’s financing deficit that is funded with 
equity (debt). Their evidence suggests that market timing affects pecking order 
preference, especially the preference for debt over equity.  
 
Table 2.3 Interaction between market timing and pecking order 
Interaction between 
pecking order and market timing 
Market timing 
Overvalued Undervalued 
Pecking order 
Financing deficit 
↑ 𝐷 + ↑ 𝐸 
Weakened PO 
↑ 𝑫 + ↓ 𝑬 
Enhanced PO 
Financing surplus 
↓ 𝑫 + ↑ 𝑬 
Enhanced PO 
↓ 𝐷+ ↓ 𝐸 
Weakened PO 
Note: “↑ 𝐷” and “↑ 𝐸” represent debt and equity issuance respectively, while “↓ 𝐷” and “↓ 𝐸” 
represent debt and equity buyback respectively. “+” means joint effect. The left side of “+” 
shows the prediction of pecking order theory while the right side of “+” shows the prediction of 
market timing theory. PO refers to pecking order. 
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However, those costs and benefits are difficult to value, the perceptions of which are 
therefore subject to managerial biases. That is why behavioural capital structure theories 
become an important and necessary complement to the standard theories. 
 
 
2.3 Main Facets of Overconfidence 
Ackert and Deaves (2010) define overconfidence as “the tendency for people to 
overestimate their knowledge, abilities, and the precision of their information, or to be 
overly sanguine of the future and their ability to control it” (see Ackert and Deaves 
(2010) for a more detailed description of various strains of overconfidence). From the 
above definition, we can see that overconfidence has many facets including, for 
example, miscalibration, better-than-average effect and illusion of control. Therefore, 
the word “overconfidence” has often been used in a broad sense that it subsumes several 
aspects of overconfidence. In addition, overconfidence and another related concept, i.e. 
optimism, are often used interchangeably in the behavioural finance literature. This 
section first briefly introduces various forms of overconfidence as a psychological bias 
and then shows how overconfidence/optimism is formally modelled in the context of 
corporate financing.  
 
2.3.1 Miscalibration  
Miscalibration is one of the most well-established forms of overconfidence and it can be 
defined as the tendency to overestimate the precision of people’s own knowledge. This 
form of overconfidence has been documented in Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1977) that participants tend to be overconfident about their knowledge when answering 
questions of moderate to extreme difficulty. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) attribute 
miscalibration to anchoring. In particular, narrow confidence interval
13
 constructed 
around an answer is due to insufficient adjustment from an anchor (i.e. an initial 
estimate). In a financial context, Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2013) measure 
miscalibration of senior financial executives by asking their views on future stock 
market. They find evidence that financial executives are subject to miscalibration. More 
specifically, they document that less than 40 percent of the time the actual market 
                                                          
13
 Miscalibration test is often conducted by asking the participants to construct 
confidence intervals for their answers. Overconfidence is detected if their intervals are 
too narrow.  
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returns are within the executives’ 80 percent confidence interval14 meaning that their 
subjective confidence intervals are too narrow.  
 
2.3.2 Better-than-average effect 
Another common form of overconfidence is called better-than-average effect. This 
effect means that people tend to believe that they are better than average in terms of 
their abilities or positive personal attributes. In other words, people tend to have 
unrealistically positive views of the self (see Taylor and Brown (1988) for a more 
detailed description). For example, Svenson (1981) reports that 82 percent of a sample 
students believe that they are top 30 percent in terms of driving safety. Taylor and 
Brown (1988) conclude that most individuals see themselves as not only better than the 
average person but also better than others see them.  
 
2.3.3 Illusion of control  
Illusion of control is also considered as one form of overconfidence. This means that 
overconfident people tend to overestimate the control they have over events and 
outcomes. Langer (1975) defines the phenomenon of “illusion of control” as “an 
expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective 
probability would warrant”. Langer’s (1975) experimental evidence suggest that the 
participants become more confident and more willing to take risks when factors from 
skill situations (e.g. competition, choice, stimulus or response familiarity, or passive or 
active involvement) are introduced into chance situations which are not controllable. In 
other words, when a chance situation mimics a skill situation, people tend to behave as 
if they are able to influence the outcome of uncontrollable events. For example, in one 
experiment of the effect of choice on illusion of control, participants strongly prefer the 
case when they are allowed to choose their own lottery tickets. However, in fact, this 
choice will not change the likelihood of winning the lottery but lead to illusion of 
control.  
 
                                                          
14
 An 80 percent confidence interval means that the executive is 80 percent sure that the 
stock returns will be within a particular range provided by him/her.  
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2.3.4 Excessive optimism  
Another closely related but distinct psychological bias is excessive optimism. Different 
from overconfidence which leads to overestimation of the precision of one’s 
knowledge/information and ability, excessive optimism makes people overestimate the 
probability of good outcomes and underestimate the probability of bad outcomes. 
Weinstein (1980) provides experimental evidence of the existence of excessive 
optimism. In his experiment, students are asked to estimate their chance of experiencing 
positive and negative future events respectively relative to their classmates. He finds 
that students tend to believe they are more likely to experience positive events and less 
likely to experience negative events than their classmates. Weinstein (1980) attributes 
this unrealistic optimism to the tendency that the students focus on what they can do to 
improve their chances of achieving positive outcomes without realizing that their 
classmates may also be able to take the same actions. This underlying mechanism of 
excessive optimism seems closely related to illusion of control.  
 
2.3.5 Self-attribution bias: “endogenous overconfidence”  
Overconfidence bias is durable partly because people fail to learn from past failures or 
mistakes. Instead, people may learn to be overconfident (Gervais and Odean, 2001). 
This is because people often interpret their performance in a biased manner, namely 
self-attribution bias. In particular, People with self-attribution bias tend to attribute good 
outcomes to personal factors (e.g. ability), while attributing bad outcomes to external 
factors that are not controllable (Miller and Ross, 1975). In brief, self-attribution bias 
may contribute to the durability and level of overconfidence.  
 
To sum up, given various manifestations of overconfidence, it is challenging to 
empirically distinguish between different forms of overconfidence considering that 
there might be some overlaps among various facets of overconfidence. As argued by 
Ackert and Deaves (2010) that “it is not always easy to tease out the different strains of 
overconfidence”. However, this is an important empirical issue because different facets 
of overconfidence may have different implications for financing decisions. In what 
follows, we will describe how overconfidence is modelled and incorporated into capital 
structure theories and its predicted influences on financing decisions.  
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2.3.6 Definitions of overconfidence in empirical studies  
Given multiple facets of overconfidence, empirical studies on overconfidence may 
focus on different aspects of overconfidence. As expected, Moore and Healy (2008) 
raise the concern that “overconfidence has been studies in inconsistent ways”, meaning 
that existing empirical studies are based on three distinct definitions of overconfidence 
(see Figure 2.2). In particular, they report that around 64 percent of empirical studies 
examine “overestimation of one’s actual ability, performance, level of control, or 
chance of success”. Roughly 31 percent of empirical overconfidence studies are related 
to “excessive certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s belief”. The remaining 5 percent 
of studies focus on better-than-average effect. Consequently, different types of 
overconfidence may have distinct empirical implications. However, Moore and Healy 
(2008) further point out that many researchers treat all three types of overconfidence as 
if they are the same and are related to the same underlying psychological problems. 
Similarly, Gervais (2010) also argue that overconfidence and optimism
15
 are typically 
used and discussed interchangeably in the finance literature, although those two biases 
are “technically distinct”. Fortunately, in many cases the effects of overconfidence and 
optimism are similar. Gervais (2010) show the similar effects of these two biases on 
capital budgeting and therefore also discuss both biases interchangeably.  
 
Figure 2.2 Three definitions of overconfidence 
This figure shows the percentages of previous studies on overconfidence that focus on 
one of three facets of overconfidence, namely overestimation (64%), overprecision 
(31%) and overplacement (5%), respectively.  
 
Source: based on the information from Moore and Healy (2008) 
                                                          
15
 Gervais (2010) considers overconfidence as miscalibration and optimism as 
overestimation of the likelihood of favourable future events.  
Overestimation 
of one’s actual 
performance, 
64% 
Excessive 
precision in 
one’s beliefs, 
31% 
Overplacement 
of one’s 
performance 
relative to 
others, 5% 
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2.4 Behavioural Capital Structure Theories 
Next, we provide an overview of major behavioural capital structure theories. We first 
briefly compare how overconfidence and optimism are modelled in the finance context 
and then discuss various behavioural financing models and their main implications.  
 
2.4.1 Definitions (modelling approaches) of overconfidence and 
optimism  
In a review paper on behavioural finance, Shefrin (2010) defines optimism as 
overestimation of the first moment of cash flows or returns and overconfidence as 
underestimation of the second moment (i.e. risk). More specifically, Table 2.4 compares 
how optimism and overconfidence are modelled in the behavioural corporate finance 
literature. Although same terms (optimism/overconfidence) have been used in those 
models, their definitions (i.e. modelling approaches) are not identical. In particular, 
optimism is modelled as overestimation of probability of good firm performance 
(Heaton, 2002), growth rate of earnings (Hackbarth, 2008), growth rate of assets in 
place (Hackbarth, 2009), value of firm’s assets and investment opportunities (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2012) and probability of good project (Landier and Thesmar, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, the definitions of overconfidence are even less consistent. 
Overconfidence is modelled as either underestimation of riskiness of earnings 
(Hackbarth, 2008) and riskiness of assets in place (Hackbarth, 2009) or overestimation 
of mean returns to investment (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011) and precision of own 
information (Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011). Different modelling approaches will 
lead to differing predictions. For example, Hackbarth’s (2008) model distinguishes 
between optimism (i.e. “growth perception bias”) and overconfidence (“risk perception 
bias”) which have different effects on firm’s financing decisions. However, as 
summarised by Gervais (2010, p417), “despite the fact that overconfidence and 
optimism are technically distinct, the two biases are often taken to mean the same thing 
in the finance literature”. In the following sections, we will discuss the roles of 
overconfidence and/or optimism in various behavioural finance models. (In this thesis, 
we use overconfidence and optimism interchangeably except in the pecking order 
context where the effects of these two biases are different (see section 2.4.5).)  
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Table 2.4 Definitions of overconfidence in behavioural corporate finance models 
This table summarizes how overconfidence and/or optimism are modelled in 
behavioural corporate finance (mainly financing-related) models.  
Terms used 
Definitions (modelling 
approaches)  
Contexts References 
Optimism 
“Managers are “optimistic” 
when they systematically 
overestimate the probability of 
good firm performance and 
underestimate the probability of 
bad firm performance.” 
Financing; 
pecking order; 
free cash flow 
Heaton (2002) 
FM 
Optimism 
“growth perception bias” i.e. 
“optimistic managers 
overestimate the growth rate of 
earnings” Financing; trade-
off; pecking order 
Hackbarth 
(2008) JFQA 
Overconfidence 
“risk perception bias” i.e. 
“overconfident managers 
underestimate the riskiness of 
earnings” 
Optimism 
“Optimistic managers 
overestimate the growth rate of 
assets in place.” Financing; 
agency problem 
Hackbarth 
(2009) JCF 
Overconfidence 
“Overconfident managers 
underestimate the riskiness of 
assets in place.” 
Overconfidence 
“overestimation of mean 
returns to investment” 
Financing; 
pecking order; 
debt conservatism 
Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan 
(2011) JF 
Optimism 
“We assume the manager is 
optimistic about the value of 
the firm’s assets and investment 
opportunities.” 
Financing and 
investment 
(market timing 
and catering) 
Baker and 
Wurgler 
(2012)  
Optimism 
“Optimists do not have realistic 
a priori beliefs on the project’s 
type. Ex ante, they believe the 
project is good with probability 
1.”  
Debt maturity 
Landier and 
Thesmar 
(2009) RFS 
Overconfidence 
“individuals overestimate the 
precision of their information 
or their ability to interpret that 
information when they make 
economic decisions” 
Investment and 
compensation  
Gervais, 
Heaton and 
Odean (2011) 
JF 
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Next, we compare existing behavioural capital structure theories. First, we present a 
simple model of non-fundamental effects, i.e. the effect of non-fundamental factors 
including managerial overconfidence, limited intermediation and corporate opportunism 
on the supply and demand of equity capital. Second, we review more specific 
behavioural capital structure models. We propose a more comprehensive market timing 
theory (namely “Market Timing Matrix”), where managerial overconfidence is 
incorporated into Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing framework. We further 
show how existing behavioural models incorporate managerial overconfidence into 
pecking order and trade-off frameworks. We will particularly focus on empirical 
predictions generated by various behavioural capital structure theories.  
 
2.4.2 A simple model of non-fundamental effect
16
 
This section presents a simple model including all the building blocks of non-
fundamental effects. Our model incorporates managerial overconfidence into Baker’s 
(2009) work on capital market driven corporate finance. The model shows how a 
combination of investor sentiment, managerial overconfidence, limited intermediation 
and corporate opportunism may affect the supply and demand of equity capital 
respectively, and thus have an impact on firms’ capital structure in equilibrium. 
 
First, from the supply side of equity market, investors’ supply of capital (Qs) is 
determined by (see Baker, 2009):  
 
Qs = (∅ − P)K + [(∅ + δ) − P]k (2.1) 
 
where, ∅ is firm fundamentals; P is the price of equity; δ is investor sentiment; K is the 
capital of rational intermediaries; k is the capital of irrational investors.  
 
                                                          
16
 Many previous studies on capital structure assume that investors and managers are 
rational and try to examine the relationship between firm fundamental characteristics, 
such as profit, size, tangible assets, growth, tax, etc., and firm leverage, which can be 
called fundamental effect. However, the non-fundamental effect (i.e. the impact of 
investor and managerial irrationalities on capital structure, especially equity issuance) is 
under-researched and may add incremental explanatory power.  
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In standard corporate finance, we assume that the capital of rational intermediaries 
(K→∞) dominates the capital of irrational investors (k). As a result, any price 
deviations from the fundamentals will be eliminated by those competitive 
intermediaries through capital market arbitrage. However, in a more realistic case of 
limited intermediation (K<∞), which is a broader notion of limits to arbitrage, investor 
sentiment can generate mispricing, which also affect the supply of equity capital.    
 
Second, from the demand side of equity market, firms’ demand of capital (QD) is:  
 
QD = a + b[P − (∅ + μ)] + c∅ (2.2) 
 
where, μ is managerial overconfidence, the coefficient b represents corporate 
opportunism. 
 
From the perspective of standard corporate finance, there is no managerial 
overconfidence (μ = 0) and prices reflect fundamentals (P=∅), therefore, the demand of 
capital is only determined by firm fundamentals (QD = a + c∅). However, from 
behavioral perspective, prices deviate from fundamentals because of the combination of 
investor sentiment and limited intermediation, and the managers are also subject to 
overconfidence bias. The coefficient b, called corporate opportunism, suggests that 
managers are trying to take advantage of their perceived mispricing. Equation (2.2) also 
shows that managerial overconfidence (μ) is negatively related to the demand of equity 
financing (QD).  
 
From Equation (2.1), we obtain the inelastic price of equity:  
 
P = ∅ +
k
K + k
δ −
1
K + k
QS (2.3) 
 
By substituting P in Equation (2.3) into Equation (2.2) we get the amount of equity 
issues in equilibrium:   
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QE = QS = QD = a′ + b′(
k
K + k
δ − μ) + c′∅,where x′ = x
K + k
K + k + b
 (2.4) 
 
From Equation (2.4), we may conclude that the firms’ level of equity issued in 
equilibrium is determined by a combination of investor sentiment, managerial 
overconfidence, limited intermediation, and corporate opportunism. In particular, 
investor sentiment, the degree of limited intermediation (i.e. the proportion of the 
capital of irrational investors) and corporate opportunism are negatively related to firm 
leverage, while managerial overconfidence has a positive effect on leverage.     
 
2.4.3 Irrational investor approach vs. irrational manager approach 
Next, we show the effects of investor and managerial irrationalities in a market timing 
and catering framework. In Baker and Wurgler’s (2012) survey on behavioural 
corporate finance, they present market timing and catering models incorporating 
investor and managerial irrationalities respectively.
17
 Their models, however, do not 
consider standard frictions including tax, bankruptcy cost, agency costs and information 
asymmetry.  
 
2.4.3.1 Irrational investor-rational manager approach 
We first introduce their model with irrational investors who make firms’ stocks 
mispriced and therefore create market timing opportunities for rational managers. 
According to Baker and Wurgler (2012), rational managers have three conflicting goals: 
(1) maximization of firm fundamental value, (2) catering (i.e. maximization of current 
firm share price) and (3) market timing (i.e. exploit current market mispricing). 
Balancing the above three goals, the objective function of a rational manager is
18
: 
 
                                                          
17
 Following Baker and Wurgler’s (2012) modelling approach, Shefrin (2010) provide a 
simple model that incorporates both investor and managerial irrationalities that sheds 
light on the optimal decision of overconfident managers in an inefficient market with 
irrational investors.  
18
 It is assumed that investment and financing decisions are independent.  
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max
𝐾,𝑒
𝜆[𝑓(𝐾; ∙) − 𝐾 + 𝑒𝛿(∙)] + (1 − 𝜆)𝛿(∙) 
max
𝐾,𝑒
𝜆 [ 𝑓(𝐾; ∙) − 𝐾⏟     
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
+ 𝑒𝛿(∙)⏟  
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
] + (1 − 𝜆) 𝛿(∙)⏟
𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
(2.5) 
 
where 𝐾 is new investment, 𝑓(𝐾; ∙) is a function of investment and financing, which 
specifies the present value of future cash flow, (𝑓(𝐾; ∙) − 𝐾) represents fundamental 
value, 𝛿(∙) is temporary mispricing of equity, 𝑒 is the fraction of the firm sold to exploit 
market mispricing, 𝑒𝛿(∙) is the gains of existing and long-run shareholders from market 
timing, 𝜆 is a measure of manager’s horizon (𝜆 ∈ [0,1] ).  
 
Optimal financing decision for the rational manager in an inefficient market with 
irrational investors can be obtained by differentiating the objective function with respect 
to 𝑒:  
 
−𝑓𝑒(𝐾; ∙) = 𝛿(∙) + (𝑒 +
(1 − 𝜆)
𝜆
)𝛿𝑒(∙) (2.6) 
 
Equation 2.6 suggests that rational managers will be unwilling to issue stocks when they 
are under-priced by irrational investors.  
 
2.4.3.2 Irrational manager-rational investor approach 
In contrast, Baker and Wurgler (2012) show another similar model based on the 
assumption that managers are irrational but investors are rational. More specifically, 
those irrational managers tend to overestimate the value of firm assets and future 
investment. In addition, irrational managers balance two conflicting goals: (1) 
maximization of “perceived” firm fundamental value and (2) minimization of 
“perceived” financing cost. Therefore, the objective function of an irrational manager is: 
 
max
𝐾,𝑒
(1 + 𝛾)𝑓(𝐾; ∙) − 𝐾 − 𝑒𝛾𝑓(𝐾; ∙) 
max
𝐾,𝑒
(1 + 𝛾)𝑓(𝐾; ∙) − 𝐾⏟            
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
− 𝑒𝛾𝑓(𝐾; ∙)⏟   
𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
 
(2.7) 
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where 𝛾 represents managerial overconfidence and/or optimism, 𝛾𝑓(𝐾; ∙) is the amount 
of manager’s perceived undervaluation, 𝑒𝛾𝑓(𝐾; ∙) is manager’s perceived losses of 
existing and long-run shareholders from market timing, other parameters have the same 
definitions as in Equation 2.5.  
 
Optimal financing decision for the irrational/overconfident manager in an efficient 
market can be obtained by differentiating the objective function with respect to 𝑒:  
 
(1 +  𝛾)𝑓𝑒(𝐾; ∙) = 𝛾(𝑓(𝐾; ) + 𝑒𝑓𝑒(𝐾; )) (2.8) 
 
Equation 2.8 suggests that overconfident managers will be reluctant to issue equity 
which they believe to be under-priced.
19
  
 
2.4.4 A more comprehensive market timing theory: Market Timing 
Matrix 
This section develops a more comprehensive market timing theory based on Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory which assumes that investors are irrational and 
managers are rational (i.e. irrational investor-rational manager approach). However, the 
main focus of this thesis is the effect of irrational managers. In particular, we 
complement Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory by incorporating 
managerial overconfidence in firm’s market timing decisions.  
 
2.4.4.1 Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory is incomplete 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) articulate and test the market timing theory of capital 
structure. They claim that “capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of past 
attempts to time the equity market”. The purpose of market timing is to exploit 
temporary fluctuations of the cost of equity by issuing shares at high prices and 
repurchasing at low prices. The critical assumption of market timing is that ‘managers 
believe that they can time the market’. As argued by Baker and Wurgler (2002), market 
                                                          
19
 This prediction is consistent with Heaton’s (2002) model described in section 4.6.  
51 
 
timing will benefit the ongoing shareholders in the company at the expense of entering 
and existing ones.
20
  
 
However, Baker and Wurgler’s argument may overlook an important underlying 
concept of market timing. Consequently, their definition and the results of market 
timing suggested by them may be incomplete. Shefrin (2007), in his book Behavioral 
Corporate Finance, emphasises the role of “biased and unbiased perception of 
mispricing” in market timing.  
 
“The main behavioral consideration is market timing, meaning buying low 
and selling high to take advantage of perceived inefficient prices. 
Executives sell high when they issue equity that they perceive to be 
overvalued and buy low when they repurchase that they perceive to be 
undervalued. In this connection, perceptions are key, being unbiased in 
some circumstances and biased in others.”  
 
Shefrin (2007) further claims that behavioural approach of capital structure is concerned 
with both when managers’ perceptions are correct/unbiased and incorrect/biased. 
Therefore, from the behavioural perspective, Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) version of 
market timing theory can be further developed by relaxing their assumption that 
managers are rational.  
 
2.4.4.2 Further development of behavioural timing theory: Market Timing Matrix  
To extend the existing market timing theory, it is important to be explicit about the 
underlying behavioural assumptions of different versions of market timing that are 
related to the irrationalities of two major participants of market timing: investors and 
managers. Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory assumes that managers are 
rational and investors are irrational, in which case rational managers with an 
                                                          
20
 However, the results of empirical tests of market timing hypothesis are controversial. 
Some studies question the persistence of the impact of market timing on capital 
structure. Leary and Roberts (2005) find that US firms rebalance their capital structure 
towards a target in three to five years. Studies by Alti (2006), Hovakimian (2006), 
Flannery and Rangan (2006) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) also suggest that the 
impact of market timing is short-lived. By contrast, Welch (2004) and Huang and Ritter 
(2006) argue that the rebalance is very slow and thus the influence of past market timing 
is long-lived. 
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information advantage buy or sell their own firm’s stocks when they believe that their 
stocks are mispriced by irrational investors. However, their assumption that managers 
are rational is not realistic given that managers are even more likely to be subject to 
cognitive biases (especially managerial overconfidence) (see, e.g., Heaton, 2002). 
Managerial overconfidence will cause biased perception of mispricing which in turn 
drives irrational managers’ market timing behaviour. In brief, managers’ perception of 
mispricing can be either unbiased or biased. Taken together, perceived mispricing, as a 
key reason for market timing, can not only be driven by investor irrationality but also 
managerial irrationality (or some combination thereof).  
 
Taking various behavioural assumptions on the rationality of investors and managers 
into consideration, we propose a more comprehensive market timing framework, 
namely the Market Timing Matrix (MTM), which shows four distinct situations where 
the participants of market timing can be either rational or irrational (see Table 2.5). In 
particular, there are rational investor-rational manager approach (Approach I), irrational 
investor-rational manager approach (Approach II), rational investor-irrational manager 
approach (Approach III) and irrational investor-irrational manager approach (Approach 
IV).  
 
Figure 2.3 displays the key mechanisms of two distinct approaches in behavioural 
finance: (1) Baker and Wurgler’s market timing theory (Approach II) and (2) our 
managerial overconfidence-based market timing theory (Approach III). Part A of Figure 
2.3 shows that investor irrationality leads to real stock mispricing that creates market 
timing opportunity for rational managers who have an unbiased perception about their 
fundamental values. Rational managers can successfully buy low and sell high and 
therefore benefit ongoing shareholders of their firm at the expense of existing and 
entering investors. In contrast, Part B of Figure 2.3 shows that, for irrational managers 
who are subject to biased perceptions of stock price, managerial irrationality will make 
the firm lose from attempts at market timing, which can be regarded as market 
mistiming. This is because managerial timing activities are simply motivated by their 
biased perceived mispricing, even though the market prices correctly reflect firm 
fundamentals. In this case, irrational managers may mistime the market (e.g. repurchase 
when the stocks are overvalued). In brief, investor and managerial irrationalities may 
lead to equity timing and mistiming respectively. To our knowledge, the latter approach 
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(i.e. Approach III) has not been articulated in the market timing literature. Our empirical 
analysis in this thesis is also more related to Approach III.  
 
 
Table 2.5 Market Timing Matrix (MTM) with irrational managers and investors 
This table presents a more comprehensive market timing framework. Approach II 
represents Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory, which suggests that 
rational managers with information advantage are able to take the benefit of real 
mispricing of their firms’ stock associated with investor irrationalities. We propose 
Approach III, in which we relax Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) assumption that managers 
are rational. Instead, we articulate that managerial overconfidence is associated with 
managers’ biased perception of mispricing which in turn leads to market (mis)timing.  
Participants of 
Market Timing 
(MT) 
Manager 
 
Rational 
 
Irrational (Overconfidence) 
In
v
es
to
rs
 
R
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Approach I 
(Both are rational) 
 
Efficient price 
MT doesn’t work 
Time-varying information 
asymmetry 
 
Approach III 
(Irrational manager but 
rational market) 
 
Perceived mispricing 
MT takes place 
(benefit the investors
21
) 
 
Ir
ra
ti
o
n
a
l 
(O
v
er
co
n
fi
d
en
ce
) 
 
Approach II 
(Rational manager but 
irrational market) 
 
Real mispricing 
MT takes place 
(benefit the company) 
 
Approach IV 
(Both are irrational) 
 
Ambiguity 
                                                          
21
 Managerial overconfidence leads to market mistiming, which benefits investors on 
the other side of the transaction but not shareholders who hold the firm’s stock.  
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Figure 2.3 The impacts of investor and managerial irrationalities on market timing and capital structure 
Part A: Rational Manager-Irrational Investor Approach (Approach II in MTM)   Part B: Irrational Manager-Rational Investor Approach (Approach III in MTM) 
                                  
      Rational Manager               Irrational Manager       
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2.4.5 Optimism vs. overconfidence as a driver of pecking order  
Gider and Hackbarth (2010) provide two simple models on the effects of managerial 
optimism and overconfidence respectively on pecking order preference. Interestingly, 
their models illustrate that optimism and overconfidence have distinct implications for 
the choice between debt and equity issuance. In the subsequent sections, we will show 
why optimism and overconfidence are associated with standard and reverse pecking 
order preference respectively.  
 
2.4.5.1 Managerial optimism and standard pecking order  
Gider and Hackbarth’s (2010) optimism model shows that managerial optimism is a 
driver of standard pecking order preference. In their model, optimistic managers tend to 
overestimate the likelihood of the good state and underestimate the likelihood of bad 
state, meaning that the expected future cash flows are overestimated. Optimistic 
managers think that their firms’ securities are undervalued by the market. More 
specifically, they believe that equity is more undervalued than risky debt. This is 
because the value of equity is more sensitive to biased beliefs. Therefore, optimistic 
managers prefer debt to equity. In addition, optimistic managers prefer internal 
financing that is insensitive to biased beliefs to risky debt. In other words, optimistic 
managers are reluctant to use external financing. Instead, they will increase retained 
earnings in anticipation of future investment to avoid issuing debt and equity. Taken 
together, managerial optimism is associated with a preference for internal over external 
financing and a preference for debt over equity. This model is similar to Heaton’s 
(2002) model and also provides a reinterpretation of Myers and Majluf’s (1984) 
information asymmetry-based pecking order theory.  
 
2.4.5.2 Managerial overconfidence and reverse pecking order  
Different from optimism, Gider and Hackbarth’s (2010) overconfidence model predicts 
a reverse rather than standard pecking order preference. In this model, overconfident 
managers tend to underestimate the value of project in the good state and overestimate 
the value of project in the bad state, meaning that the project is perceived to be less 
risky. Overconfident managers believe risky debt is undervalued because they think that 
debt investors underestimate the payoff in a bad state (e.g. default).  
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In contrast, overconfident managers believe equity is overvalued. This is because 
overconfident managers think that equity investors also underestimate the payoff to debt 
holders and therefore overestimate the residual payoff to equity holders. Put differently, 
equity can be viewed as a call option
22
 on the firm’s assets and the value of this call 
option is partly determined by the risks of firm’s project (Gider and Hackbarth, 2010). 
In particular, the value of call option is positively related to project risk
23
. Therefore, 
overconfident managers who underestimate the project risk believe that equity is 
overvalued. Taken together, perceived undervaluation of debt and perceived 
overvaluation of equity by overconfidence managers leads to a reverse pecking order 
preference for equity over risky debt. In brief, managerial overconfidence is associated 
with reverse pecking order preference. However, in reality, managers can be both 
optimistic and overconfident. Recall that optimism and overconfidence may lead to 
standard and reverse pecking order respectively (as summarized in Table 2.6), firms’ 
actual pecking order preference therefore depends on “the actual mix of the two 
managerial biases” (Gider and Hackbarth, 2010).24  
 
 
Table 2.6 Distinct impacts of overconfidence and optimism on debt-equity choice 
 Debt Equity 
Pecking order 
preference 
Optimism 
(i.e. higher perceived 
probability of good 
outcome) 
Perceived 
undervaluation 
Higher perceived 
undervaluation 
Standard pecking 
order: preference for 
debt over equity 
                                                          
22 
Shareholders have a call option on the firm with an exercise price of X. In a call-
option graph where the horizontal axis is cash flow to firm and vertical axis is cash flow 
to shareholders, if firm’s cash flow is beyond X, shareholders will exercise the option by 
buying the firm from the debt holders (i.e. owner of the firm) for the price X. If firm’s 
cash flow is below X, shareholders will not exercise the call option and debt holders 
receive entire firm’s cash flow. (see e.g., Hillier et al. (2010) for more descriptions on 
equity and call option)
 
23
 As shown in Black-Scholes model, the value of call option is positively related to the 
variance of the continuous stock returns.  
24
 Hackbarth (2008) first explicitly distinguish between optimism (i.e. growth 
overestimation) and overconfidence (i.e. risk underestimation) and also predict that 
optimism and overconfidence are associated with standard and reverse pecking order 
preference, although Hackbarth’s (2008) modelling approaches are much more 
complicated than Gider and Hackbarth (2010).  
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Overconfidence 
(i.e. biased perceived 
future project value) 
Perceived 
undervaluation 
Perceived 
overvaluation 
Reverse pecking 
order: preference for 
equity over debt 
Note: this table is based on models presented in Gider and Hackbarth (2010) that 
distinguish the roles of managerial overconfidence and optimism.  
 
2.4.6 Heaton’s (2002) model (perceived information asymmetry) 
Heaton’s (2002) model shows the impact of managerial overconfidence on corporate 
financing decisions, which seems to be compatible with pecking order theory. He points 
out that overconfident managers tend to overestimate the expected return of their firm 
projects. They believe that the equities and debts issued by the firm are systematically 
undervalued by outside investors. Therefore, the managers prefer internal rather than 
external finance. Furthermore, equities are more subject to perceived undervaluation 
than debt. Therefore, equity financing is only used as a last resort, as suggested by the 
standard pecking order theory. The model also predicts that the pecking order type of 
financing decision is more pronounced the more overconfident the managers are, ceteris 
paribus. Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2004) also denote that optimistic managers will 
have a pecking order preference and would never wish to issue new equity.  
 
Heaton (2002) defines managerial optimism as overestimation (underestimation) of the 
probability of good (bad) firm performance. The good (bad) firm performance refers to 
good (bad) future cash flow and high (low) payoffs to new projects. More risky 
securities are more sensitive to probabilistic beliefs and hence are believed by 
overconfident managers to be more overvalued by the outside investors. Therefore, 
equity issues are more likely to be affected by managerial overconfidence than debt 
issues.  
 
In Heaton’s (2002) model, the cost of all-equity financing is greater than the cost of all 
risk-free debt financing because of the biased estimation of future cash flow. The risky 
debt can be regarded as a combination of risk-free debt and equity. Therefore, the cost 
of financing, as a weighted average of cost of risk-free debt and equity, is as follows.   
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w
K
+ (
K − w
K
) (
K − w
ET(y2) − w
)(
EM(y2) − w
K − w
)
=
w
K
+ (
K − w
K
)(
EM(y2) − w
ET(y2) − w
) > 1 
(2.9) 
 
where, w is amount of risk-free debt, K is initial investment, subscripts “T” and “M” 
denote true probability and managerial perception respectively, ET(y2) is the expected 
firm value and EM(y2) is manager’s perceived firm value at date t=2.  
 
When w = K, meaning the initial investment is fully financed by risk-free debt, the cost 
of financing is the lowest, which equals one. Therefore, the model suggests that 
overconfident managers will always prefer to issue the security with the largest 
component of risk-free debt. In other words, the standard pecking order behaviour is 
followed by overconfident managers.  
 
2.4.7 Hackbarth’s (2008) model (trade-off theory) 
Hackbarth (2008) incorporates managerial traits (i.e. overconfidence and optimism) into 
trade-off theory of capital structure. According to Hackbarth’s managerial traits theory, 
managers’ irrationalities are reflected on their biased perception of their firm’s growth 
and risk. That is irrational managers are subject to two types of biases: one is growth 
perception bias (i.e. optimistic managers overestimate the earnings growth); the other is 
risk perception bias (i.e. overconfident managers underestimate the risk associated with 
future earnings). His model predicts that overconfident managers tend to issue more 
debt and their financing decisions need not follow a pecking order. 
 
Managerial traits have implications on both debt-equity mix and debt issuance. With 
regard to debt-equity choice, managers with growth perception bias may perceive 
external finance, especially equity, as very costly and therefore have a standard pecking 
order preference, which is consistent with the prediction of Heaton’s (2002) model. In 
contrast, managers with risk perception bias have reverse pecking order preference. The 
reason is that those managers perceive their firms’ equity to be overvalued while believe 
that debt is undervalued by the market.  
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Besides, in terms of the impact of managerial traits on debt issuance, it is suggested that 
both types of biases may lead irrational managers to issue more debt. Those managers 
believe their firm is more profitable and less risky, which makes them underestimate the 
likelihood of financial distress. In the light of trade-off theory, managerial irrationalities 
(i.e. optimism and overconfidence) are positively related to the level of debt issued.  
 
It can be concluded that both the magnitude and the combinations of managerial biases 
including optimism (i.e. growth perception bias) and overconfidence (i.e. risk 
perception bias) may affect both pecking order and trade-off behaviours. Therefore, as 
suggested by Hackbarth (2008), it is necessary to rethink the way capital structure tests 
are conducted and interpreted. 
 
To sum up, Heaton’s (2002) model provides a re-interpretation of information 
asymmetry-based pecking order theory, suggesting a preference for debt over equity 
driven by managerial overconfidence. Hackbarth’s (2008) model shows that 
overconfidence and optimism have differing effects on pecking order preference. In 
addition, Hackbarth’s (2008) model predicts that overconfident managers who 
underestimate bankruptcy cost of debt tend to use more debt for tax benefit.  
 
2.4.8 Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) model (debt conservatism) 
More recently, Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) model also shows that managerial 
overconfidence, which is defined as “overestimation of mean returns to investment”, is 
associated with a standard pecking order preference, which is similar to Heaton’s (2002) 
model prediction. In particular, managerial overconfidence will lead to an unconditional 
preference for internal over external financing and a conditional (on accessing external 
financing) preference for debt over equity. However, they articulate that overconfidence 
may lead to “debt conservatism”, meaning that “the absolute amount of debt used by 
overconfident CEOs can be smaller even if leverage is higher (due to less frequent 
equity issuance)” (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011). Regarding the overconfidence-
leverage relationship, in contrast to the models of Heaton (2002) and Hackbarth (2008), 
Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) unique prediction is that managerial 
overconfidence may be either positively or negatively related to leverage. This is 
because, as argued by Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011), debt conservatism “can, but 
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need not” imply lower leverage, considering that overconfidence managers are even 
more reluctant to use equity relative to debt. Table 2.7 summarizes Malmendier, Tate 
and Yan’s (2011) model predictions on the impacts of managerial overconfidence on 
various aspects of financing decisions.  
 
Table 2.7 Empirical predictions on the effects of overconfidence on financing 
decisions 
This table presents the implications of Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) related to two 
aspects of financing including (i) debt vs. equity issuance (column a and b) and (ii) 
firm’s aggregate indebtedness (column c and d). Column a and b suggest that 
managerial overconfidence is associated with the preference for debt over equity 
conditional on using external financing. This prediction is consistent with existing 
behavioural models (e.g. Heaton, 2002). Column c and d include more unique 
prediction that managerial overconfidence may explain debt conservatism. In particular, 
column c predicts that overconfident managers often do not use enough debt to take 
available tax benefits. Similarly, column d suggests that overconfident managers are 
reluctant to use debt, which leads to lower leverage.  
 
(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Raising new external financing Aggregate indebtedness 
 
Preference 
for debt vs. 
equity 
Choice between 
debt and equity 
given “financing 
deficit” 
Debt level relative 
to maximum tax 
benefit available 
(“Kink”) 
Leverage 
Overconfidence Debt Debt Low High Low 
Source: adapted from Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011)  
 
2.4.9 Managerial overconfidence and agency problem (Hackbarth, 
2008, 2009) 
Our above discussions suggest that managerial overconfidence is often associated with 
biased perception and consequently leads to suboptimal financing decisions. However, 
if overconfidence is always detrimental to firm value, one may ask why firms hire 
overconfident managers. This is so-called “overconfident manager puzzle” (Hirshleifer 
et al., 2012). This section shows how managerial overconfidence can reduce agency 
problem in a real-options framework. In particular, in Shefrin’s (2010) review paper on 
behavioural finance, he summarizes that  
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“… unrealistic optimism and overconfidence can produce benefits in the 
presence of agency-related managerial traits that lead to underinvestment, such 
as risk aversion or debt overhang. (Gervais et al., 2003; Goel and Thakor, 2008; 
Hackbarth, 2009).” 
 
Gider and Hackbarth (2010) also argue that “managerial biases can play a positive role 
for levered firms because they ameliorate manager-shareholder conflicts and 
bondholder-manager conflicts”. Standard corporate financing theories suggest that 
agency problems have implications for optimal capital structure. From a behavioural 
perspective, agency problems serve as channels through which managerial 
overconfidence has impacts on financing policies. In particular, managerial 
overconfidence has important influences on agency problems related to (1) the conflicts 
between manager and shareholders and (2) the conflicts between bondholders and 
shareholders. This section explains how managerial overconfidence changes agency 
costs of equity and debt, which in turn affects firm’s financing decisions.  
 
2.4.9.1 Manager-shareholder conflicts: agency cost of equity 
Managerial overconfidence mitigates a particular form of conflict between manager and 
shareholders, namely the free cash flow problem, by reducing the amount of free cash 
flow. This mechanism is called leverage effect. The idea is that overconfident managers 
underestimate the bankruptcy cost of debt and tend to use more debt than their rational 
counterparts for tax benefits. The resulting higher debt levels play a disciplinary role 
and thus reduce agency cost of equity (Hackbarth, 2008).  
 
2.4.9.2 Bondholder-shareholder conflicts: agency cost of debt 
Managerial overconfidence can also reduce agency costs of debt. Hackbarth’s (2009) 
model shows that managerial overconfidence can also mitigate two types of agency 
costs of debt, namely (1) debt overhang and (2) risk shifting and asset stripping, in real 
options frameworks. Gider and Hackbarth (2010) conclude that  
 
“… biased beliefs lead to more favourable corporate policies from the 
bondholders’ point of view: more investment and earlier bankruptcy” 
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Next, we explain the how overconfidence/optimism can serve as a solution to debt 
agency problems.  
 
a. Debt overhang 
Managerial overconfidence can reduce agency problems associated with the conflict 
between bondholders and shareholders. Hackbarth (2009) develops agency models of 
corporate borrowing from a behavioural perspective. His model shows that managerial 
overconfidence may alleviate debt overhang/underinvestment problem. This can be 
explained by the timing effect of managerial overconfidence, meaning that 
overconfident managers invest earlier and more than rational managers. The idea is that 
overconfident managers underestimate the value of waiting for more information about 
new investment, which leads to earlier exercise of the option to invest. Therefore, 
managerial overconfidence reduces the conflict between bondholders and shareholders 
over the exercise of growth options, that is underinvestment problem.  
 
b. Risk shifting and asset stripping 
Also in a real option framework, managerial overconfidence can mitigate another type 
of agency cost of debt, namely risking shifting or asset stripping. This benefit of 
managerial overconfidence can also be attributed to the timing effect. In particular, 
overconfident/optimistic managers underestimate the likelihood of bankruptcy and 
therefore their perceived option value of waiting to risk shift or asset strip is higher than 
their rational counterparts. In other words, overconfident/optimistic managers tend to 
exercise option at relatively lower thresholds, meaning later risky new investment 
decisions and asset sales. Therefore, managerial overconfidence is beneficial, especially 
from bondholders’ perspective, in terms of later risk shifting and asset stripping.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, this section summarizes major empirical implications of behavioural 
capital structure theories discussed in the previous sections. We will present the 
hypotheses tested in the thesis, which are developed based on tailored behavioural 
capital structure theories, in the subsequent empirical chapters.  
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Major implications of behavioural capital structure models can be outlined as follows: 
(1) Heaton’s (2002) model provides a reinterpretation of information asymmetry-based 
pecking order theory. His model suggests that managerial overconfidence can be an 
alternative explanation of the preference for internal over external financing and the 
preference for debt over equity; (2) Hackbarth’s (2008) model distinguishes between the 
roles of optimism and overconfidence. In particular, optimism (i.e. growth 
overestimation) is associated with enhanced pecking order preference, while 
overconfidence (i.e. risk underestimation) leads to reverse pecking order preference. In 
addition, he shows that, in a trade-off framework, overconfidence causes 
underestimation of bankruptcy cost, which in turn increases leverage and therefore 
mitigate agency cost of equity (i.e. free cash flow problem); (3) Consistent with 
Heaton’s (2002) model, Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) model also predicts a 
relationship between managerial overconfidence and the standard pecking order. A 
unique prediction of Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) is that overconfidence is 
associated with debt conservatism, meaning that overconfident managers may be 
reluctant to use debt or retain more earnings and therefore avoid using debt; and (4) 
Hackbarth’s (2009) model shows that, in a real-options framework, 
optimism/overconfidence can mitigate agency costs of debt including both the 
underinvestment problem (i.e. debt overhang) and asset substitution and risk shifting.  
 
Existing behavioural capital structure theories incorporate managerial overconfidence 
into either the pecking order or trade-off framework. However, we argue that 
managerial overconfidence can be easily incorporated into Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) 
market timing theory which assumes that managers are rational. We propose a more 
comprehensive version of market timing theory, namely Market Timing Matrix (MTM). 
The key prediction of MTM is that managerial overconfidence may lead to perceived 
mispricing which induces overconfident managers to repurchase their firms’ shares 
which they believe is undervalued by the market.  
 
In brief, the empirical predictions regarding the effect of managerial overconfidence are 
sensitive to the modelling approach adopted (e.g. whether overconfidence is modelled 
as growth perception bias or risk perception bias in Hackbarth (2008)). In addition, 
there may be potential non-linear effects of managerial overconfidence, meaning that 
mild overconfidence and extreme overconfidence have different effects on corporate 
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policies (see e.g. Hackbarth, 2009). Finally, Table 2.8 shows major behavioural theories 
reviewed above which are empirically tested in this thesis. Detailed hypotheses 
development will be presented in the subsequent empirical chapters.  
 
 
Table 2.8 Behavioural theories tested in our empirical chapters 
Empirical 
chapters 
Relevant behavioural financing theories 
Leverage 
Debt conservatism (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011); trade-off theory 
(Hackbarth, 2008); Market Timing Matrix (MTM) proposed in this thesis 
Pecking 
order 
Perceived information asymmetry (Heaton, 2002); pecking order 
preference (Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011); Market 
Timing Matrix (MTM) which is advanced in this thesis 
Debt 
maturity 
Agency cost of debt (Hackbarth, 2009) 
Note: not all the implications of behavioural/standard financing theories reviewed in 
this chapter are empirically tested in this thesis.  
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Chapter 3. Methodology: Empirical Measures (operationalization of 
managerial overconfidence) 
 
This chapter outlines and evaluates various ways in which the key construct of the 
thesis, i.e. managerial overconfidence, can be operationalized.  
 
3.1 Measures of Managerial Overconfidence 
This section shows the rationale for the use of various proxies for managerial 
overconfidence and discusses the advantages and limitations associated with each of the 
following proxies:  
 
1. Stock options  
2. Media portrayal 
3. First-person pronouns  
4. Optimistic disclosure tone 
(composite index) 
5. Insider trading (net purchase 
ratio)  
6. Managerial earnings forecast 
7. Relative pay and fraction of 
variable compensation  
8. Industry-adjusted investment 
rate 
9. Dividend payment  
10. Recent performance  
11. Multiple acquisitions  
12. R&D expenditure (innovation) 
 
Table 3.1 presents the rationales, advantages and limitations of various types of 
overconfidence proxies.  
 
3.1.1 Stock option-based measures 
The two most commonly used overconfidence measures in the existing behavioural 
corporate finance literature are based on executive stock options and media portrayal 
proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008). In what follows, we first describe the 
option-based measures and then discuss its potential limitations and consider its 
applicability in the UK context.  
 
Based on the personal portfolio decisions of the CEO, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 
2008) construct two option-based measures of CEO overconfidence. CEOs who hold 
options beyond rational thresholds are considered as overconfident. It is often the case 
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that CEOs held their executive stock options until they are close to expiration. In this 
case their portfolios are under-diversified. This is mainly because stock and option 
grants are often a large part of CEO compensation contracts, and more importantly 
CEOs are prohibited to short sell those stocks. In addition, CEO’s reputational (human) 
capital is also exposed to the firm risk. Therefore, the underdiversification of CEOs’ 
portfolio may indicate that they are overconfident about the company’s future stock 
performance. In particular, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) measure the 
overconfidence of the U.S. CEOs by looking at whether a CEO exercises options too 
late. The rationale is that an overconfident executive delays the exercise of in-the-
money options in the belief that the firm’s stock price will be higher in the future.  
 
3.1.1.1 Option-based measure: Holder67 
As proposed by Malmendier and Tate (2005), there are two ways to construct the 
rational thresholds. One approach is called Holder 67, which is based on the Hall and 
Murphy (2002) model. The model will be used to calibrate a range of rational 
benchmarks for exercise given various risk aversion and diversification. Then, those 
CEOs with options beyond these benchmarks are categorized as overconfident. The 
Holder 67 measure can be constructed through the following four steps: 
 
 Step 1: Take 67% in-the-money during the fifth year as the threshold (i.e. a 
rational CEO should have exercised part of its portfolio during or before the fifth 
year, if the option is over 67% in-the-money in year five).  
 Step 2: Then pick a subsample of CEOs whose value of options are above the 
threshold more than twice during the sample period.  
 Step 3: From the subsample above, identify the first time (if any) when the CEO 
fails to exercise the option during or before the fifth year. 
 Step 4: The CEO is classified as overconfident if from that point in time onward 
he/she continues failing to exercise at least one more time during his/her term as 
CEO.  
 
3.1.1.2 Option-based measure: Longholder 
The other approach is called Longholder. Longholders are the overconfident CEOs who 
hold the option into final year of its duration. Similar to the Holder 67 measure, it 
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captures the habitual failure to diversify, which means the overconfidence is not time-
varying, as pointed out by Malmendier and Tate (2005). Figure 3.1 illustrates how the 
option-based measure of overconfidence can be constructed. Items needed to construct 
the proxy: (1) a list of the names of managers, (2) the date that the stock option was 
granted to the manager (𝑇0), (3) the date that exercise of the option could begin (𝑇1), (4) 
the exercise date of the option (𝑇𝑒), (5) the expiration date of the option (𝑇3), (6) the 
strike price and (7) company stock price throughout the entire life of the option. (Note: 
UK executive option has a life span of 10 years and a vesting period of three years). In 
particular, a manager is classified as overconfident if: (1) he/she holds the option until 
the expiration date or until the last year before the expiration date and (2) the options 
are in-the-money (i.e. the company stock price is higher than the strike price) 
throughout the entire life of the option.  
 
Figure 3.1 Construction of option-based measure of overconfidence 
 
 
However, Malmendier and Tate’s (2005, 2008) option-based proxies are subject to 
criticisms. Cao (2009) re-examines the impact of CEO option exercise on firm 
investment. However, according to Cao (2009), CEO option exercise is more related to 
stock mispricing and firm growth opportunities and therefore is not a clean proxy for 
managerial overconfidence. Similarly, Jin and Kothari (2008) argue that CEO’s 
persistent holding of options are affected by “a myriad of economic factors” and 
therefore may not only reflect CEO overconfidence.  
 
3.1.1.3 Continuous option-delay measures  
More recently, several U.S. studies (Li et al., 2009; Schrand and Zechman, 2011) 
propose the option-delay proxy of managerial overconfidence which attempts to 
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quantify the degree of delay in exercising options based on the value of unexercised 
exercisable options. Li et al. (2009) measure the delay as the intrinsic value of the 
unexercised exercisable options divided by the total value of unexercised exercisable 
and unexercisable options and stock holdings. Similarly, Schrand and Zechman (2011) 
define the option-delay as the natural logarithm of the value of the CEO’s in-the-money 
unexercised exercisable options. The option-delay measures are superior to Longholder 
and Holder 67 in the sense that they reflect different degrees of overconfidence. 
However, the option-delay measures are based on Black-Scholes option pricing model 
and thus subject to various limitations of the model and its assumptions.
25
  
 
3.1.1.4 Why option-based measure might not be valid for UK executives 
Kyriacou, Luintel and Mase (2010) point out that “UK executives’ need to diversify is 
less pressing” because of the significant differences in the structure of executive 
remuneration and regulation. On the one hand, option grants of UK CEOs contribute to 
a much smaller proportion of their total remuneration, which means that UK CEO’s 
personal portfolio is relatively less undiversified. Conyon and Murphy (2000) estimate 
that the effective value of US CEOs’ total holdings (i.e. the sum of unexercised options 
and inventive plans) is almost 10 times higher than that of UK CEOs. More recently, 
Conyon, Core and Guay (2011) compare incentives (including stock holdings and stock 
options) of US and UK CEOs. They report that US CEOs have much higher incentives 
than UK CEOs. More specifically, US CEO incentives are 5.6 times higher than UK 
CEO incentives in the year 2003. Taken together, the remunerations of UK CEOs are 
less exposed to their firms’ stock market performance and hence they have less 
incentive to diversify by exercising options early. 
 
On the other hand, vesting period of UK executive options is much longer (Kole, 1997), 
which is associated with less grant value (Hall and Murphy, 2002) and hence less need 
to diversify. By contrast, it is claimed by Kyriacou, Luintel and Mase (2010) that a 
unique regulatory regime of the UK, namely “four times emoluments rule”, may 
encourage the UK executives to exercise early. The Rule specifies that the maximum 
                                                          
25
 Black-Scholes model is based on several strong assumptions, which may influence 
the fairness of the computed option price. For example, continuously compounded stock 
returns are assumed to be normally distributed and independent over time and there are 
no transactions costs (see e.g., Hull, 2010).  
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amount of options a UK executive can hold is four times emoluments including base 
salaries and bonuses. As a result, we may argue that the rule may provide some 
incentive for UK executives, especially those whose option value almost hit the “four 
times emoluments” limit, to exercise part of their existing options in order to receive 
new stock options.  
       
Taken together, we argue that the distinct remuneration structure and regulation may 
challenge the applicability of the option-based proxy for managerial overconfidence in 
the UK. In particular, given the smaller proportion of remuneration from options and 
longer vesting period, delaying the exercise of options by UK executives may simply 
because of their reduced desire to diversify rather than overconfidence. Moreover, the 
“four times emoluments rule” may force some overconfident UK executives to exercise 
early. (One possible reason that a UK CEO may want to replace the existing options 
with new options is that the CEO is especially optimistic about the farther future 
covered by the life of the new options.) In this case, early exercise becomes an indicator 
of long-term overconfidence. In brief, we conclude that the option-based measure of 
managerial overconfidence can be contaminated by UK’s unique feature of 
remuneration structure and regulatory regime.   
 
3.1.2 Media coverage approach  
This proxy for CEO overconfidence is based on the trait theory, particularly the Five 
Factor Model (FFM) which is composed of five personality traits: openness, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness and neuroticism. Those factors are 
measured on a continuous and normally distributed scale (Brown and Sarma, 2007). 
Overconfidence of each CEO can be calculated by the following formula: 
 
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =
(𝑎) + (𝑏)
(𝑐)
 
(3.1) 
 
where the parameters 𝑎 , 𝑏  and 𝑐  are the numbers of articles (e.g. newspapers and 
business publications) that portray each individual CEO as: (a) “confident”; (b) 
“optimistic” and (c) “reliable”, “cautious”, “conservative”, “practical”, “frugal”, 
“disciplined”, “conscientious”, “not confident” or “not optimistic” 
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In practice, the degree of overconfidence can be measured by the following four steps. 
 
 Step 1: Collect information on how business press portrayed our target CEOs 
during the sample period. 
 Step 2: Five separate searches are conducted for each CEO based on the FFM. 
 Step 3: Record the number of articles that describe the CEO as (a), (b) and (c) 
respectively 
 Step 4: Using the formula above, we get a continuous variable (OC) indicating 
the degree of overconfidence for each CEO. 
 
However, this press-based proxy of managerial overconfidence has also been criticised 
because of the highly subjective nature of the judgements made by journalists. As 
pointed out by Doukas and Petmezas (2007), “any judgment made by a newspaper or 
journal has a high probability of subjective judgment leading to unreliable conclusions”. 
Furthermore, this problem is more severe for small firms considering limited media 
coverage (i.e. fewer articles available) of smaller firms. Consequently, the reliability of 
the press-based measure of CEO overconfidence is also questionable.    
 
3.1.3 Self-attribution bias  
We will now introduce self-attribution bias (SAB), a closely related concept to 
managerial overconfidence. SAB is regarded as an important source of managerial 
overconfidence. People with self-attribution bias are prone to attribute success (failure) 
to their own abilities (external factors) (Miller and Ross, 1975). Regarding the 
relationship between the SAB and overconfidence, Hirshleifer (2001) argues that 
overconfidence and self-attribution bias can be described as “static and dynamic 
counterparts”. This means that self-attribution bias is related to people’s learning 
process and can make them “learn to be overconfident”. In other words, the 
overconfidence stemming from self-attribution bias can develop over time and therefore 
the level of this particular type of overconfidence is time-varying. 
 
Theoretically, Gervais and Odean’s (2001) model shows that biased self-attribution may 
contribute to overconfidence. In their model, even those managers born without bias 
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may become overconfident if they are subject to SAB. Similarly, Daniel et al. (1998) 
model confidence as outcome dependent. In brief, self-attribution bias may feed 
overconfidence. However, previous behavioural corporate finance literature primarily 
focuses on the static and exogenous overconfidence.  
 
We measure SAB using computational linguistic analysis. Linguistic analysis of 
financial narratives is becoming increasingly widely used.
26
 Recent accounting and 
finance studies use several content analysis softwares (e.g., DICTION, LIWC and 
General Inquirer) to analyse various language dimensions of different narratives,
27
 for 
instance, (1) optimistic vs. pessimistic, (2) positive vs. negative, (3) forward-looking, 
and (4) the usage of personal pronouns.  
 
3.1.4 Time-varying words-based proxy: optimistic tone  
In the presence of self-attribution bias, managers may learn to be overconfident, 
meaning that the level of overconfidence is time-varying. Therefore, it is important to 
construct a time-varying measure of managerial overconfidence. A recent study 
(Garrard, et al., 2014) on the linguistic hubris syndrome argue that  
 
“meaning, emotion and attitude are communicated intentionally through 
language, but psychological and cognitive changes can be reflected in more 
subtle ways, of which a speaker remains unaware”.  
 
Considering the above relationship between language and psychological/cognitive bias, 
we use the optimistic tone of Chairman’s Statement as a proxy for overconfidence. The 
rationale is that the use of optimistic words in financial narratives is driven by managers’ 
overconfidence bias. In practice, this tone measure is constructed using computational 
content analysis. We postpone a more detailed description of how the tone measures are 
constructed using content analysis software to section 3.2.2.  
 
                                                          
26
 This is partly because of the development of content analysis software and the 
availability of digital financial narratives.  
27
 Various texts analysed in the finance and accounting literature include MD&A 
(Kothari et al., 2009; Li, 2010a), CEO interviews (Kim, 2011) and earnings 
announcement (Rogers et al., 2009). For a more comprehensive summary of textual 
analysis studies, see Appendix A2 in Li (2010b).  
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However, the optimistic tone is also subject to alternative interpretations. In particular, 
rational managers may want to use optimistic words to inform investors and therefore 
reduce information asymmetry. In addition, rational managers are also likely to 
intentionally disinform investors by using optimistic words to manipulate investors’ 
perception of firm performance (i.e. impression management). (see Chapter 5 for an 
more detailed review of alternative interpretations of optimistic tone from information 
asymmetry, impression management and hubris perspectives respectively).  
 
3.1.5 Insider trading-based measure: net purchase ratio  
The insider trading patterns of the managers may reflect their perceptions of firms’ 
prospects (Jenter, 2005). Overconfident managers tend to overestimate the firm value 
and hence are more willing to purchase their own stocks. This trading behaviour can be 
considered as managers’ market timing in their personal portfolios. In the spirit of 
Malmendier and Tate (2005b)
28
, Jenter (2005) and Jin and Kothari (2008), we use 
insider trading-based measures of managerial overconfidence. More specifically, we 
construct the net purchase ratio (NPR) as follows: 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑅 =
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
(3.2) 
 
The NPR ranges from -1 to 1. If NPR is 1, insiders buy shares without selling; if NPR is 
-1, insiders sell shares without buying in a particular fiscal year.  
 
However, both insider trading-based measure and stock option-based measure are 
related to managerial personal portfolio choice and are likely to be motivated by inside 
information. In particular, rational managers may buy more shares and hold options 
longer to take the advantage of their superior information about firm value. Therefore, it 
                                                          
28
 Malmendier and Tate (2005) construct a “net buyer” measure of overconfidence 
based on insider trading. A manager is defined as “net buyer” if his/her net purchase 
ratio (NPR) is positive for more than two years out of the first five sample years. 
However, the “net buyer” proxy captures habitual/persistent rather than time-varying 
managerial overconfidence.  
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is important to empirically rule out information asymmetry as an alternative explanation 
of a higher net purchase ratio.
29
  
 
3.1.6 Managerial earnings forecast 
Lin, Hu and Chen (2005) propose a measure of overconfidence based on managerial 
earnings forecast. The idea is that overconfident managers who are optimistic about 
firm’s future profitability tend to make upward-biased earnings forecasts. A manager is 
considered as overconfident if the number of upwardly-biased forecasts is greater than 
that of downwardly-biased forecasts during the manager’s tenure (Lin, Hu and Chen, 
2005). A particular forecast is regarded as upwardly-biased if the forecast error is 
positive, where forecast error is defined as follows: 
 
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (3.3) 
 
However, factors other than overconfidence, including information asymmetry, market 
timing, managerial skills and luck, are also likely to influence the sign and magnitude of 
the forecast errors. More specifically, as mentioned in Lin, Hu and Chen (2005), 
rational managers tend to release biased forecasts in the following three situations: (1) 
upwardly-biased forecast will be released prior to equity offerings to increase share 
prices and therefore reduce the cost of equity, (2) upwardly-biased forecasts will be 
released prior to insider selling to take the benefit from price increase and (3) managers 
of financially distressed firm also have more incentive to publish upwardly-biased 
forecasts. Consequently, considering that it is empirically challenging to rule out all 
rational managerial incentives, earnings forecast might not be a clean proxy for 
managerial overconfidence.  
 
3.1.7 Executive compensation-based proxy 
Managerial overconfidence could also be related to two aspects of CEO compensation: 
one is the pay of the CEO relative to other executives and the other is the convexity of 
CEO compensation contract (i.e. the proportion of variable pay).  
                                                          
29
 One way to examine whether the NPR is contaminated by information asymmetry is 
to conduct subsample analysis and see how sensitive the relationship between NPR and 
the dependent variable (e.g. leverage) is to various proxies for information asymmetry.  
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3.1.7.1 Relative pay  
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) use CEO relative compensation as a proxy for CEO’s 
self-importance, which is regarded as a driver of CEO hubris. Chatterjee and Hambrick 
(2007) use the relative pay as a measure of CEO narcissism. In addition, Paredes (2004) 
theorize that CEO overconfidence is a product of corporate governance, in particular, 
their own executive compensation package. He emphasizes the psychological effect of 
CEO pay, that is, high compensation provides positive feedback to the CEO and also 
signals recent success, both of which contribute to CEO overconfidence. The CEO pay-
based proxy can be calculated as follows:  
 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐸 𝑃𝐴𝑌 =
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑝𝑎𝑦
2𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑦
 
(3.4) 
 
There are two versions of relative pay based on cash and non-cash compensation 
respectively. Specifically, relative cash pay is defined as CEO’s cash compensation 
including salary and bonus divided by that of the second highest-paid executive. 
Alternatively, relative non-cash pay is defined as CEO’s non-cash compensation such as 
deferred income, stock grants and stock options (using Black-Scholes valuation) divided 
by that of the second highest-paid executive (alternatively, the denominator can be the 
pay of the top four executives except the CEO). However, relative pay is also subject to 
an alternative interpretation. Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011) use CEO pay slice (i.e. 
CEO’s relative pay among top-five executives) as a proxy for CEO power/dominance, 
which captures the relative importance of CEO’s abilities and power in the top 
management team.
30
  
 
3.1.7.2 Variable pay 
Moreover, the composition of CEO compensation, especially the fraction of variable 
(i.e. performance-based) compensation, is determined by managerial overconfidence 
(Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011). The idea is that overconfident managers tend to 
                                                          
30 Jiraporn, Chintrakarn and Liu (2012) find that CEOs’ power, as measured by their 
relative pay, has a significant and negative impact on firm leverage. However, if their 
CEO power measure captures CEO overconfidence, the negative relationship between 
CEO power and leverage is likely to be partly driven by managerial overconfidence.  
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underestimate the risks associated with highly variable pay and therefore prefer highly 
convex
31
 compensation contracts. The fraction of variable compensation can be 
constructed as follows:  
 
𝑉𝐴𝑅𝐼𝐴𝐵𝐿𝐸 𝑃𝐴𝑌 =
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠 + 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦
 
(3.5) 
 
However, there is a non-linear relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
compensation contracts. In particular, mild overconfidence will reduce the fraction of 
variable pay (Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011). In contrast, extreme overconfidence 
will increase the fraction of variable pay.  
 
3.1.7.3 Alternative explanations of equity-based compensation (EBC) 
However, the above compensation-based measure of overconfidence is also subject to 
alternative explanations. For example, previous studies (e.g., Datta, Iskandar‐Datta and 
Raman, 2001; Datta, Iskandar‐Datta and Raman, 2005) on the effect of equity-based 
compensation (EBC) show that high EBC may enhance manager-shareholder alignment. 
In particular, Datta, Iskandar‐Datta and Raman (2001) document that a high EBC firms 
pay lower acquisition premium and have better postacquisition stock price performance. 
This evidence suggests that EBC is not a valid proxy for managerial overconfidence 
which will lead to value-destroying acquisitions. In addition, Datta, Iskandar‐Datta and 
Raman (2005) further show that high EBC leads to a more negative market reaction to 
seasoned equity offerings. This is because future shareholders believe that managers 
with high EBC have more incentive to issue overvalued stocks for the benefit of 
existing shareholders. In brief, compensation structure can be more related to agency 
problems rather than managerial overconfidence.  
 
3.1.8 Industry-adjusted investment rate 
Campbell, Gallmeyer, Johnson, Rutherford and Stanley (2011) classify CEOs as 
overconfident if their firm is in the top quintile of firms based on industry-adjusted 
investment rates for two consecutive years. The idea is that overconfident managers 
                                                          
31
 “Highly convex compensation contracts” means that the fraction of variable 
compensation is high.  
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tend to overinvest and therefore higher IAIR may indicate that the manager of a 
particular firm is overconfident. Given that the industry median is a proxy for the 
optimal level of investment for a particular sector, the investment rate is adjusted by the 
Datastream’s Level 4 (INDM4) industry median. In particular, industry-adjusted 
investment rate is defined as the difference between a firm’s investment rate and the 
median investment rate of the firms in the same INDM4 industry as follows:  
 
𝐼𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑅𝑠,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (3.6) 
 
where, IRit  is the investment rate of firm i . IRs,it̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the average investment rate of 
industry s . The investment rate is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to 
beginning of year property, plant and equipment. Alternatively, we define the 
investment rate as the ratio of capital expenditures to beginning of year sales.  
 
However, the problem with the investment-based measure of overconfidence is that it 
may fail to capture managerial overconfidence because overconfidence may be 
associated with underinvestment. Managerial overconfidence may lead to 
underinvestment especially when internal financing is not sufficient and perceived 
benefits from the investment are less than perceived cost of external financing by 
overconfident managers (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011).  
 
3.1.9 Dividend payment  
Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2007) argue that the relationship between dividend policy 
and managerial overconfidence depends on whether the overconfident managers are 
more optimistic about future cash flow or investment opportunities. In particular, if the 
managers overestimate future cash flow, dividend payment will more likely to be 
maintained. However, if the managers believe that there will be more investment 
opportunities and therefore increasing financing needs, they may want to retain more 
earnings and hence not initiate dividends.  
 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) articulate and test the catering theory of dividends. The 
catering theory of dividends predicts that firms will initiate dividends when the stocks 
of existing dividend payers are relatively overvalued by the investors (i.e. there is a 
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positive dividend premium being paid). It might be the case that non-payers with 
overconfident managers may attribute their perceived underpricing to non-payment of 
dividend. Therefore, the catering theory seems to imply that overconfident non-payers 
are more likely to initiate dividends.  
 
Furthermore, Deshmukh, Goel and Howe (2013) develop a more direct model of the 
relationship between managerial overconfidence and dividend policy. They hypothesize 
that dividends provide information about managerial overconfidence. More specifically, 
their model predicts that dividend payment is negatively related to managerial 
overconfidence, which is supported by their empirical evidences. They find that the 
negative relationship is more pronounced in the firms with less growth opportunities, 
lower cash flow and greater information asymmetry. In brief, the relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and dividend payment is not conclusive. That is why 
dividend payment is probably not a suitable proxy for managerial overconfidence.  
 
3.1.10 Multiple acquisitions 
Several studies (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) find that managerial overconfidence is 
associated with more value-destroying merger and acquisitions. Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) also document that managerial overconfidence leads to higher frequency of 
merger and acquisitions. A manager is regarded as overconfident if he/she makes over 
five acquisitions during the sample period. However, the use of this acquisition-based 
measure will lead to a much smaller sample size. Consequently, one may not be able to 
control for firm fixed effects which might be correlated with managerial overconfidence. 
Another problem is that managers, who do not engage in multiple acquisitions, are also 
likely to be highly overconfident. This is partly because some overconfident managers 
of small and young firms may not yet have the ability to acquire another company.
32
  
 
3.1.11 Recent stock performance  
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) use recent stock performance as one proxy for 
managerial overconfidence. The idea is that managers may attribute good stock 
                                                          
32
 Overconfident managers, who underestimate bankruptcy risks, may be more willing 
to work in small and young firms with more volatile financial performance. In addition, 
some managers in these types of firms are founders/entrepreneurs who tend to be 
overconfident.  
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performance to their superior abilities and therefore become increasingly overconfident. 
However, stock performance is highly endogeneous, meaning that it may be 
contaminated by several firm fundamental characteristics (e.g., firm size, growth 
opportunities and profitability), and therefore is probably not a clean proxy for 
managerial overconfidence.  
 
3.1.12 R&D expenditure (innovation) 
Galasso and Simcoe (2011) examine the relationship between CEO overconfidence and 
firm innovation. They report that overconfident CEOs perform around 18% more 
research and development (R&D) than their rational counterparts. Dong, Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2012) also document that CEO overconfidence is positively related to the level of 
R&D expenditure. However, the R&D expenditure is also subject to alternative 
explanations. For example, large R&D investment might be associated with higher 
information asymmetry. Barker and Mueller (2002) examine the impact of CEO 
characteristics on firm R&D spending. They find that R&D spending is negatively 
related to CEO age and positively related to CEO stockholdings and career experience 
in marketing and/or engineering/R&D.  
 
Table 3.1 summarizes and compares various overconfidence measures discussed above. 
The table shows major advantages and limitations of each proxy, which provides a good 
justification of our choice of overconfidence measures, namely optimistic tone and 
insider trading-based measure. In brief, the major advantage of our measures relative to 
other measures is that our measures capture time-varying overconfidence.  
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Table 3.1 A summary of measures of managerial overconfidence 
No. Measure Type Data Rationale Advantage Limitation References 
1 Option exercise Managerial 
personal portfolio 
decision  
Executive 
compensation 
Late exercise of options of 
managers with under-diversified 
portfolio reveals overconfidence 
Widely used and 
comparability 
Alternative explanations: 
mispricing, growth opportunity 
and inside information 
Malmendier and Tate 
(2005, 2008) 
2 Media portrayal Outside perception  Newspapers and 
journal articles 
The judgement of journalists and 
analysts  
Widely used and 
comparability 
Highly subjective and biased 
media coverage 
Malmendier and Tate 
(2008); Brown and 
Sarma (2007) 
3 First person 
pronouns 
Managerial words Accounting 
narrative 
Self-serving attribution 
contributes to the level of 
overconfidence / narcissism 
Time-varying 
overconfidence 
Alternative explanations: 
impression management 
Li (2010); Chatterjee 
and Hambrick (2007) 
4 Optimistic tone 
index 
Managerial words Accounting 
narrative 
Overconfident managers tend to 
use optimistic words 
Time-varying 
overconfidence 
Alternative explanations: 
information asymmetry and 
impression management 
Developed in this study 
5 Insider trading Managerial 
personal portfolio 
decision 
Insider trading data High net insider purchase reveals 
overconfidence 
Easy to construct Alternative explanations: 
information asymmetry 
Glaser et al. (2008); 
Marciukaityte and 
Szewczyk (2011) 
6 Managerial 
earnings forecast 
error 
Managerial 
behaviour 
Earnings forecast 
and actual earnings 
Upward-biased earnings forecast 
indicates overconfidence  
Easy to construct Alternative explanations: 
information asymmetry, skills and 
luck 
Lin, Hu and Chen 
(2005) 
7 Relative pay Corporate 
governance 
Executive 
compensation 
High compensation contributes 
to the level of overconfidence 
Easy to construct Alternative explanations: power 
and abilities 
Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997) 
8 Recent 
performance 
Firm performance Stock price data Good recent stock performance 
contributes to overconfidence   
Data availability Multiple explanations of stock 
performance 
Hayward and Hambrick 
(1997) 
9 Industry-adjusted 
investment 
Firm decision Accounting data Investment behaviour is driven 
by managerial overconfidence 
Data availability Inconsistent overconfidence-
investment relationship; alternative 
explanation: growth opportunity 
Campbell et al. (2011) 
10 Dividend 
payment 
Firm decision Accounting data Dividend policy is driven by 
managerial overconfidence  
Data availability Inconsistent overconfidence-
dividend relationship 
Deshmukh, Goel and 
Howe (2013) 
11 Multiple 
acquisitions 
Firm decision M&A data The propensity of M&A is driven 
by managerial overconfidence 
Easy to construct Smaller sample size Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) 
12 R&D expenditure  Firm decision Accounting data Firm innovation activities are 
driven by  managerial 
overconfidence  
Data availability Industry effect Galasso and Simcoe 
(2011) 
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3.2 Managerial Overconfidence Measures Used In This Thesis 
Next, our discussion moves to two managerial overconfidence measures used in our 
empirical tests. One is based on managerial words, i.e., tone of UK Chairman’s 
Statement and first person pronouns. The other is based on managerial actions, i.e., how 
managers trade their own firm’s shares. In what follows, we introduce how these words-
based and action-based measures are constructed.  
 
3.2.1 The importance of using time-varying measure of overconfidence  
Static/categorical measures of managerial overconfidence are widely used in the 
previous literature. However, we articulate that for empirical studies examining the 
effect of overconfidence, it is important to construct a time-varying/continuous measure 
of overconfidence for the following two reasons. First, the level of overconfidence may 
change over time as people, who are subject to self-attribution bias, may learn to be 
increasingly overconfident. Second, the theoretical effect of overconfidence might not 
be monotonic, in which case continuous measures of overconfidence are necessary to 
empirically test the non-linear effect of overconfidence. Moreover, time-varying 
overconfidence measures allow us to examine the impact of changes in overconfidence 
on the change of firm financial policies. Furthermore, time-varying overconfidence 
measures make it easier to control for unobserved heterogeneity using fixed effects 
(within) or first difference estimator. This is particularly important considering that 
overconfidence measures are likely to be contaminated by managerial/firm fixed effects 
that may also potentially drive corporate financial policies, which consequently could 
lead to a spurious relationship.  
 
3.2.2 Tone of Chairman’s Statement 
In this section, we will first introduce the key steps of computational content analysis 
and then show how a composite tone index can be constructed.  
 
3.2.2.1 Why we use Chairman’s Statement 
We use the Chairman’s Statement from the UK annual reports as the source of narrative 
to construct managerial words-based measures of overconfidence for several reasons. 
First, Chairman’s Statement is widely read by investors and analysts (Bartlett and 
Chandler, 1997). According to Clatworthy and Jones (2003), the Chairman’s Statement 
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is “the most read of the UK’s accounting narratives” and “the longest established”. 33 
Second, Chairman’s Statement is largely unaudited and not heavily regulated. The 
language used in the Chairman’s Statement is much less standard than Directors’ Report 
which is subject to regulatory requirements. Third, disclosure-related litigation is rare in 
the UK relative to the US. Therefore, the UK accounting narratives (e.g., Chairman’s 
Statement) are relatively less constrained compared with the MD&A in the US 10-K 
report. Finally, while Chairman’s Statement is signed by the chairman, who is often a 
non-executive director in the UK, existing literature
34
 seems to agree that Chairman’s 
Statement is an organizational rather than individual communication (Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2003, 2006; Schleicher and Walker, 2010). This means that firm’s key financial 
decision makers (e.g., CEO/CFO) also have an influence on the choice of language in 
the Chairman’s Statement.  
 
3.2.2.2 Computational content analysis  
To facilitate large sample analysis, instead of conducting manual content analysis which 
is not feasible, we apply some well-established computational linguistic analysis tools. 
In particular, we use two content analysis software, namely Diction 6 and Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2007, to analyse UK Chairman’s Statement. First, we 
will briefly introduce and compare those two pieces of software and then describe in 
detail the major steps of our content analysis.  
                                                          
33
 Many previous studies on UK accounting narratives focus on Chairman’s Statement 
(see e.g., Smith and Taffler, 2000; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Clatworthy and Jones, 
2006). Smith and Taffler (2000) use Chairman’s Statement to predict firm bankruptcy. 
A more recent study (Schleicher and Walker, 2010) conduct manual content analysis of 
the tone of forward-looking statements (i.e. outlook sections) in the UK annual reports 
(most of which are located at the end of Chairman’s Statement).  
34
 For example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) argue that accounting narratives such as 
UK Chairman’s Statement allow “management” to describe corporate financial 
performance. In addition, in a study on impression management, Clatworthy and Jones 
(2006) point out that the analysis of the signs of impression management in Chairman’s 
Statement may reflect managers’ belief about whether impression management is 
worthwhile. This also implies that not only chairman but managers have an impact on 
the writing of Chairman’s Statement. More specifically, Clatworthy and Jones (2006) 
argue that managers tend to “elaborate on positive financial performance in the 
Chairman’s Statement”. More recently, Schleicher and Walker (2010) attribute the bias 
in the tone of outlook statements to “managers”. In particular, they argue that 
“managers with a willingness to engage in impression management are likely to target 
forward-looking statements”, while 73.5 percent of the forward-looking narratives are 
located in Chairman’s Statement (Schleicher and Walker, 2010). 
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a. Content analysis software  
We use two types of content analysis software, namely Diction 6 and LIWC 2007. The 
default dictionaries of these two software (e.g. optimism, certainty, net emotion, etc.) 
are used to measure managerial overconfidence. Diction 6 quantifies five main semantic 
features (including Activity, Optimism, Certainty, Realism and Commonality) and 35 
sub-features. LIWC 2007 mainly captures 22 linguistic dimensions (e.g. pronouns) and 
32 psychological constructs (e.g. affect, cognition). In addition, both Diction 6 and 
LIWC 2007 support the use of a user-defined dictionary. This allows us to use 
dictionaries/wordlists developed by finance and accounting researchers (Henry, 2008; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2011) to construct optimistic tone measures.  
 
Appendix 3.A briefly compares those two pieces of software. (Lowe (2002) provides a 
review of various content analysis software.) In brief, this study uses dictionaries from 
various sources (i.e. default dictionaries and custom dictionaries) to ensure the validity 
of our words-based overconfident measure. We will describe each dictionary/wordlist 
used to gauge overconfident beliefs in subsequent sections.  
 
b. Steps of computational content analysis  
Figure 3.2 shows the major steps of computational content analysis of the Chairman’s 
Statement, which is a labour intensive and time-consuming process.  
 
First, UK annual reports are downloaded from company websites. Second, Chairman's 
Statements
35
 are manually copied
36
 from the annual reports (in PDF format) to text files. 
In particular, each Statement is stored in one specific text file which is named with a 
unique number corresponding to a particular firm-year. Third, content analysis of those 
Chairman's Statements are performed using LIWC 2007 by inputting all the text files 
                                                          
35
 Firm-years in which there is no Chairman's Statement are excluded from our sample. 
However, for some firm years, as an equivalent to the Chairman's Statement, we also 
use statements made by Chairman but under different titles such as Chairman's Review, 
Chairman's Overview, Chairman's Introduction, Chairman's Letter/Message and Letters 
to Shareholders.  
36
 The text in the annual report must be copyable in the sense that the PDF report is not 
made of the scanned version of the original report. This is a problem especially for 
some annual report in the 1990s. In addition, some annual reports in the Secured PDF 
format are also unable to be copied and therefore are excluded from the sample  
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into the software. Both standard Diction 6 and LIWC 2007 dictionaries and wordlists 
developed by finance and accounting researchers (e.g. positive/negative wordlists (i.e. 
tone) developed by Henry (2008) and Loughran and McDonald (2011)) are used to 
analysis various language dimensions of our texts (e.g. optimism, certainty). Finally, the 
software will report all the results (i.e. various dimensions of language) as a table in one 
text file. 
 
Figure 3.2 Steps of computational content analysis of Chairman’s Statement 
 
 
c. Transformation errors 
When copying text from the PDF document to the text file, various transformation 
errors may appear. For example, some separate words will be mistakenly combined into 
one after transforming to the text file. In other words, the gap between neighbouring 
words disappears, which will make the subsequent content analysis biased. To correct 
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various transformation errors, we first combine all the text files into a single file (using 
the text files merging tool i.e. TXT Collector Software) and then copy all the content in 
that single file into MS Word Document to detect and correct the errors. Table 3.2 
presents various examples of transformation errors and how we correct them.  
 
Table 3.2 Types of transformation errors and examples 
This table presents examples of various transformation errors in TEXT files and 
illustrates how we manually correct for those errors before the texts are used for content 
analysis.  
Original text in PDF 
format 
Examples of transformation errors in 
TEXT file 
Corrections 
to perform well 
during flight tests. We 
signed 
to perform well during flight tests.We 
signed 
Add space before 
"We" 
Confident; financial  Confi dent; fi nancial  
Remove space 
after the letter "I" 
Flexibility of our 
business model and 
our consistently 
flexibilityofourbusinessmodelandourcons
istently 
Add spaces among 
neighbouring 
words 
Senior made 
significant progress in 
getting 
Senior made signiÞcant progress in 
getting 
Replace the 
symbol "Þ" with 
letter "fi"  
Our response 
O 
ur response 
Remove the space 
between "O" and 
"ur" 
Employees E m p l o y e e s  
Remove the spaces 
between the letters 
Trading profits in 
most of the Group's 
aerospace 
Trading profits in most of the GroupÕs 
aerospace 
Replace the letter 
"Õ" with the 
inverted comma   
 
3.2.2.3 Measurement of tone 
This section describes how tone measures are constructed. Tone is defined as the 
difference between positive and negative words divided by the sum of positive and 
negative words as follows:  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
 
(3.7) 
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We use two wordlists developed by Loughran and McDonald (2011) and Henry (2008) 
respectively to identify “positive” and “negative” words in the Chairman’s Statement. 
In particular, there are 354 positive words and 2,349 negative words in Loughran and 
McDonald’s (2011) wordlist and 105 positive words and 85 negative words in Henry’s 
(2008) wordlist. Therefore, we expect the mean of Loughran and McDonald’s tone will 
be less positive relative to Henry’s tone because Loughran and McDonald’s wordlist 
includes a much more comprehensive list of negative words.  
 
We construct optimistic tone measures by counting both optimism-increasing and 
optimism-decreasing words. We use six individual wordlists. Our first three wordlists 
are the same as those in Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) and Davis, Ge, 
Matsumoto and Zhang (2012), namely TONE_OPTIMISM, TONE_H and TONE_LM. 
TONE_OPTIMISM is a measure of net optimism
37
 counted using a dictionary in Diction 
6.
38
 Liu, Taffler and John (2009) conduct content analysis of CEO speech in the context 
of merger and acquisitions and also use the optimism variable in Diction as a proxy for 
CEO overconfidence. More recently, Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) use 
TONE_OPTIMISM as a measure of fund manager overconfidence. TONE_H and 
TONE_LM are two wordlists developed by Henry (2008) and Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) respectively to measure positive and negative words especially in a financial 
context. In particular, TONE_H and TONE_LM are calculated as the ratio of the 
difference between positive and negative words to the sum of positive and negative 
words.
39
  
         
Besides, we also use another three tone measures, all of which are positively related to 
optimism, including TONE_CERTAIN1, TONE_CERTAIN2 and TONE_EMOTION. 
                                                          
37
 In Diction, optimism is defined as “language endorsing some person, group, concept 
or event, or highlighting their positive entailments”. 
38
 As a unique feature of Diction software, there is standardization procedure when 
calculating a particular item. In particular, we compare our collected Chairman’s 
Statements to three alternative norms in Diction including (1) all cases, (2) corporate 
financial reports and (3) corporate public relations. Our empirical results are 
qualitatively similar using alternative norms.  
39
 The terms “positive/negative” and “optimistic/pessimistic” are often used 
interchangeably in the literature (e.g., Davis, Piger and Sedor, 2012). Li (2010b) 
standardize the terms to “positive/negative” instead of “optimistic/pessimistic”.  
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TONE_CERTAIN1 and TONE_EMOTION
40
 are measured using dictionaries in 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2007. TONE_CERTAIN2 is another 
measure of certainty
41
 based on a dictionary in Diction 6. TONE_CERTAIN2 has also 
been used to measure overconfidence of fund managers (Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012). 
Similarly, Li (2010b) includes “uncertain tone”, which is highly associated with 
negative tone, in his tone measure.  
 
3.2.2.4 Composite tone index: principal component analysis (PCA) 
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a statistical technique that converts a set of 
correlated variables into a set of linearly independent variables (i.e. principal 
components). The first principal component captures the largest variance in the data (i.e. 
most information). The second principal component has the second highest variance and 
is orthogonal to the first component. In other words, the N component contains more 
information than N+1 component. The last principal has the lowest variance (i.e. least 
information). The total number of principal components is less than the number of 
original variables. All the principal components contain the same information as the 
original variables. (see Jolliffe (2005) for a detailed description of the PCA) 
 
a. Standardization 
PCA is sensitive to the scaling of original variables (Jolliffe, 2005). In principle, if the 
differences in standard deviations of the original variables are large, those variables 
have to be standardized before conducting PCA. The original variables can be 
normalized as follows:  
 
𝑋𝑠 =
𝑋 − ?̅?
𝜎𝑋
 
(3.8) 
 
                                                          
40
 An earlier version of LIWC has a category named “optimism”, however in the 2007 
version words are classified more broadly into “positive emotion” and “negative 
emotion”.  
41
 In Diction, certainty is defined as “language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and 
completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra”. 
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where 𝑋 is the original variable, 𝑋𝑠  is the standardized variable 𝑋 , ?̅?  and 𝜎𝑋  are the 
mean and standard deviation of the variable 𝑋 . 𝑋𝑠  follows a standard normal 
distribution (𝑋𝑠~𝒩(0, 1)). All the original variables, 𝑋, have to be interval data.  
 
b. Correlation-based PCA 
In practice, the statistical software, Stata, calculates the correlation matrix, which is the 
default, instead of covariance matrix for the principal components. The relationship 
between correlation and covariance can be represented as follows:  
 
𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑗 =
𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑗
√𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑖√𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑗𝑗
 
(3.9) 
 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑖𝑗  is the correlation between variables 𝑖  and 𝑗 ; 𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑗  is the covariance 
between variables 𝑖  and 𝑗 ; √𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑖  and √𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑗𝑗  are the standard deviations of the 
variables 𝑖 and 𝑗 respectively. As can be seen from the above equitation, the use of the 
correlation matrix accounts for the problem that original variables are on different 
scales by standardizing those variables.  
 
c. Orthogonalization 
The original variables may be contaminated by firm-specific characteristics. To address 
this concern, we regress the original variables on a set of firm-specific variables (𝑥𝑘,𝑖𝑡) 
as follows: 
 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +∑𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘,𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(3.10) 
 
The error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡) is orthogonal to all firm-specific variables. In other words, the 
orthogonalized individual tone measure ( 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡
⊥ ) is the error term from the above 
regression, which can be used to form an orthogonalized tone index.
42
  
 
                                                          
42
 Baker and Wurgler (2006) construct an orthogonalized investor sentiment index 
following the same procedure, which is orthogonal to several macroeconomic factors.  
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𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡
⊥ = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3.11) 
In what follows, we briefly introduce how tone index is constructed using PCA.  
 
d. Composite tone index 
The main purpose we use PCA to construct composite tone index is to check the 
validity of our individual tone measures by examining whether they are driven by a 
common mechanism (i.e. managerial overconfidence). If this is the case, the first 
principal component is expected to explain a major proportion of the variance in the 
data (as indicated by eigenvalue). Using PCA, tone index can be represented as a linear 
combination of individual tone measures as follows:  
 
𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 =∑𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑘,𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑘=1
 
(3.12) 
 
where 𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡  is the composite tone index that consists of n individual tone 
measures (i.e. 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑘,𝑖𝑡). 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘 is the loadings for each tone measure and the sum of 
squared loadings equals 1 (i.e. 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔1
2 + 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔2
2 +⋯+ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛
2 = 1).  
 
3.2.3 Insider trading-based measure  
Following prior studies (e.g., John and Lang, 1991; Marciukaityte and Szewczyk, 2011) 
we construct the valued-based and volume-based net purchase ratio (NPR) using the 
value and volume of open market purchases and sales respectively as follows: 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑅1𝑖𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡
 
(3.13) 
 
where, 𝑁𝑃𝑅1𝑖𝑡 is the value-based NPR of all firm directors, executive or non-executive 
directors of firm 𝑖 in fiscal year 𝑡. 𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 is the aggregate value of insider purchases 
and 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 is the aggregate value of insider sales. Alternatively, the NPR based on 
the number of trades can be calculated as follows:  
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𝑁𝑃𝑅2𝑖𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
 
(3.14) 
 
where, 𝑁𝑃𝑅2𝑖𝑡  is the volume-based NPR of all firm directors, executive or non-
executive directors of firm 𝑖  in fiscal year 𝑡 . 𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  is the aggregate volume of 
insider purchases. 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  is the aggregate volume of insider sales. Besides, the 
value-based and volume-based NPRs for individual directors including Chairman 
(𝑉𝐴_𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 and 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡), CEO (𝑉𝐴_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 and 𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡) and CFO (𝑉𝐴_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑉𝑂𝐿_𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡 ) are also constructed. The NPR ranges from -1 to 1 and higher NPR 
indicates higher managerial overconfidence. 
         
Next, we briefly compare volume-based and value-based NPR. Volume-based NPR is 
superior in the sense that it may capture the potential relation between the frequency of 
purchases and the level of overconfidence. Previous studies (Billett and Qian, 2008; 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007) indicate that multiple acquisitions are associated with 
increasing overconfidence due to self-attribution. Similarly, multiple insider purchases 
may also contribute to overconfidence if the insiders attribute the success of previous 
purchases to their own (timing) ability.
43
  
         
However, the volume-based NPR fails to reflect managers’ perceived mispricing of 
their stocks. The value-based NPR takes the price of insider transactions into 
consideration. As noted earlier, overconfident managers tend to believe that their firm 
stocks are undervalued. Consequently, they are more likely to purchase at a higher price 
relative to their rational counterparts. The value-based NPR captures the perceived 
undervaluation which is an indicator of overconfidence.
44
 In brief, the volume-based 
                                                          
43
 For example, overconfident directors buy one share at a time for three times for 10 
p/share, while rational directors also buy one share at a time but for twice for 15 p/share. 
Both of them sell one share for 10 p/share. The volume-based NPRs for overconfident 
and rational directors are 1/2 and 1/3 respectively, while the value-based NPRs for them 
are both 1/2 (i.e. (30-10)/(30+10)). In this case, the volume-based NPR is able to 
capture the “endogenous” overconfidence of those directors with more frequent 
purchases. 
44
 For example, if both overconfident and rational insiders buy and sell one share for 
10p/share, their volume-based NPRs are both 0. Due to the perceived undervaluation, 
overconfident directors are more likely to buy at a relatively higher price (15 p/share). 
Therefore, the value-based NPR tends to be higher (i.e. (15-10)/(15+10)=0.2) for the 
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NPR plays a better role in gauging “endogenous overconfidence” developed from self-
attribution, while the value-based NPR is a better measure of the degree of perceived 
undervaluation caused by overconfidence.  
 
Interaction between managerial words and actions 
To sum up, this thesis uses both managerial words (i.e. what managers say) and actions 
(i.e. what managers do) to gauge their overconfident beliefs. However, it is likely that 
managerial words may contradict their actions. For instance, managers may use many 
positive words (i.e. positive tone) in the Chairman’s Statement, however, they may sell 
their firms’ stocks. In this case, managers’ trading may indicate their true belief that 
they are not optimistic about firm’s future prospects, meaning that managers use 
positive words to intentionally disinform investors. Table 3.3 shows the interactions 
between managerial words and trading of their own firm’s shares. An interesting 
empirical question is whether the effect of managerial words depends on their actions.  
 
Table 3.3 Interaction between managerial optimistic words and actions 
Words*Actions 
Actions 
Purchase Selling 
Words 
Positive Consistent Inconsistent 
Negative Inconsistent Consistent 
 
3.2.4 Caveats and conclusion  
A common limitation of most of the overconfidence measures reviewed in this chapter 
is that they may not be able to distinguish between two distinct but closely related 
constructs: overconfidence and optimism. Gider and Hackbarth (2010) argue that a 
well-suited proxy should be able to “capture optimism and overconfidence separately”. 
In addition, it is also important to examine the extent to which our overconfidence 
measures (especially the insider trading-based measure) is contaminated by information 
asymmetry. This is important because information asymmetry is often an alternative 
explanation for many empirical patterns related to firm financing. In conclusion, this 
chapter provides an overview of various major proxies of managerial overconfidence. 
We justify why we use tone and insider trading-based measures of overconfidence in 
this thesis and we further explain how those two measures are constructed.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
overconfident directors. From this perspective, the value-based NPR is a more valid 
measure of overconfidence. 
92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
Methodology: Estimation Methods of Unbalanced 
Panel Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93 
 
Chapter 4. Methodology: Estimation Methods of Unbalanced Panel 
Data 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses how and why certain econometric methods are selected to 
analyse the data and make inference. Importantly, relevant theories will be briefly 
mentioned in this chapter to justify our selection of econometric techniques. More 
detailed explanations of the theories related to specific empirical studies will be 
provided in the empirical chapters. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we also postpone 
the descriptions of empirical models and various alternative specifications to subsequent 
empirical chapters.  
 
The empirical analysis of this thesis is based on panel data. Hsiao (2003) notes that  
 
“… although panel data offer many advantages, they are not panacea. The power 
of panel data analysis depends critically on the compatibility of the assumptions 
of statistical tools with the data generating process. Otherwise, misleading 
inference will follow”.  
 
The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to justify our selection of estimation 
methods based on both major characteristics of our panel data and of capital structure 
theories. Table 4.1 summarizes the major econometric methods used in our subsequent 
empirical analysis and corresponding theories and characteristics of data. Our 
discussion mainly focuses on five major aspects of methodological issues in this thesis:  
 
(1) estimation methods for models with a fractional dependent variable,  
(2) estimation methods for models with a binary dependent variable,  
(3) estimation methods for models with a lagged dependent variable (i.e. 
dynamic panel),  
(4) unobserved firm fixed effects and  
(5) interaction effects and multicollinearity.  
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Table 4.1 Choices of methods based on the characteristics of data and theories 
This table summarizes how we choose certain econometric techniques based on 
characteristics of our panel data and relevant theories. The first column summarizes the 
major characteristics of our panel data. The second column outlines relevant finance 
theories. The third column includes main econometric methods/techniques.  
Characteristics of data 
 
 
Economic theory 
(mainly capital structure 
theories) 
Choice of econometric 
techniques  
1. Fractional dependent 
variable [e.g. left-censored 
leverage ratio and right-
censored debt maturity ratio] 
Zero-leverage puzzle (some 
behavioural capital structure 
theory is only applicable to 
levered firms) 
Tobit;  
Random-effect Tobit 
2. Dynamic panel: lagged 
dependent variable  
[e.g. lagged leverage in 
partial adjustment model] 
Dynamic trade-off theory; to 
avoid “dynamic 
misspecification”  
Two-step system GMM 
3. Discrete dependent 
variable  
[e.g. an indicator of zero/low 
leverage] 
Debt conservatism; reverse 
pecking order preference 
Pooled logit model 
4. Unobserved firm fixed 
effects 
 
Firm-specific time-invariant 
drivers of managerial 
overconfidence 
Fixed effects estimator; 
GMM estimator  
5. First differenced data 
 
The effect of time-varying 
overconfidence  
First difference 
estimator  
6. Interaction terms  
[e.g. a) the interaction 
between tone and insider 
trading;  
b) the interaction between 
financing deficit and 
overconfidence measure] 
a) Inconsistency between 
managerial words and 
actions, 
b) Heterogeneous pecking 
order coefficient 
Demean the interaction 
term if there is a 
multicollinearity 
problem 
 
 
4.2 Estimators for Models with Fractional Dependent Variable 
This section introduces Tobit estimators that account for the fractional nature of 
dependent variables. Some dependent variables of this thesis are fractional in the sense 
that they are bounded between zero and one. For example, the leverage ratio (i.e. total 
debt divided by total assets) is especially left-censored, meaning that there are a large 
number of zero-leverage firm-year observations (around 15 percent in our sample). In 
this case, the linear probability model (LPM) (i.e. OLS) is problematic that there will be 
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negative predicted values for the dependent variable. Instead, we use Tobit model to 
overcome this problem.  
 
4.2.1 Pooled Tobit model 
Tobit estimator is developed by Tobin (1958) and has been used in the corporate 
finance literature to estimate models with a fractional dependent variable (e.g. leverage 
ratio and debt maturity ratio). The Tobit model can be expressed as follows:  
 
𝑦∗ = 𝑿′𝛽 + 𝑒 (4.1) 
 
𝑦 = {
𝑦∗ 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑦∗ < 1
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ ≤ 0
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑦∗ ≥ 1
 (4.2) 
 
where 𝑦∗ is a latent variable and normally distributed. The observed dependent variable 
(𝑦) is left-censored at zero and right-censored at one. However, if there is no censored 
observation, Tobit model is equivalent to OLS.  
 
More specifically, the Tobit model is comprised of two separate models including a 
Probit regression and a truncated regression. First, the Probit model is used to estimate 
the discrete decision (e.g. whether a firm uses debt or not):  
𝑃(𝑦∗ > 0) = Φ(𝑿′𝛽) . Second, the truncated regression is used to estimate the 
continuous decision (e.g. leverage decision of levered firms):  
𝐸(𝑦|𝑦∗ > 0) = 𝑿′𝛽 + 𝜎𝜆 (
𝑿′𝛽
𝜎
). The Tobit model assumes that the coefficient estimates 
from the above two models are the same (i.e. 𝛽). In other words, it is assumed that a 
common set of explanatory variables have the same impacts on both discrete and 
continuous decisions. 
 
4.2.2 Random-effect Tobit model  
For panel data, one may use random-effects Tobit (RE-Tobit) model instead of the 
pooled Tobit. The RE-Tobit model can be represented as:  
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (4.3) 
 
where, 𝑣𝑖 is random effects and is not correlated with the error term, 𝑒𝑖𝑡. The RE-Tobit 
estimation is based on quadrature approximation, the accuracy of which may be 
influenced by the number of integration points. Therefore, it is important to check 
whether the estimated coefficients are sensitive to different numbers of integration 
points.  
 
4.2.3 Likelihood ratio test: pooled Tobit vs. RE-Tobit 
We use likelihood ratio (LR) test to see whether pooled Tobit or RE-Tobit is more 
suitable for our data. The LR test compares the log-likelihood functions for the 
unrestricted and restricted models. More specifically, the LR statistic can be calculated 
as follows (see e.g. Wooldridge, 2009):  
 
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 2(𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 − 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) (4.4) 
 
where, 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  and 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  are the log-likelihood of unrestricted and 
restricted models respectively. The 𝐿𝐿𝑢𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  is often greater than 𝐿𝐿𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 , 
meaning that the LR statistic is usually positive. 
 
 
4.3 Estimators for Models with Binary Dependent Variable 
Another type of limited dependent variable used in this thesis is binary. This section 
compares linear probability model (LPM) and two non-linear estimators including Logit 
and Probit models.  
 
4.3.1 Linear probability model (LPM) 
Linear probability model (i.e. OLS regression with a binary dependent variable) is often 
used in economics (Wooldridge, 2009). This is partly because the LPM is relatively 
easy to estimate and interpret. However, the LPM is subject to several important 
limitations. First, using OLS, predicted probabilities (i.e. fitted values) can be either 
below zero or above one. Second, the relationship between the probability and the 
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independent variables may not be linear. To avoid the above problems, we use more 
advanced non-linear binary response models (i.e. Logit and Probit) estimated using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), as described below. 
 
4.3.2 Logit and Probit models  
A binary response model can be represented as follows:  
 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑿) = 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝑿𝛽) (4.5) 
 
where 𝑓 is a function bounded between zero and one. 𝑿𝛽 refers to ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=1 . Equation 
4.5 has two special cases including Logit and Probit models. In Logit model, 𝑓  is 
logistic cumulative density function (CDF). The logistic function can be written as  
 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑿) =
exp (𝛽0 + 𝑿𝛽)
1 + exp (𝛽0 + 𝑿𝛽)
 (4.6) 
 
In Probit model, 𝑓 is standard normal cumulative density function (CDF). The Probit 
function  is  
 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑿) = ∫ ∅(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝛽0+𝑿𝛽
−∞
 (4.7) 
 
Both Logit and Probit models ensure that the predicted probability is between zero and 
one (i.e. lim𝑋→−∞ 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝑿𝛽) = 0  and lim𝑋→∞ 𝑓(𝛽0 + 𝑿𝛽) = 1 ). Some researchers 
prefer Probit because of the properties of normal distribution (Wooldridge, 2009). 
However, in practice Logit and Probit often produce similar results.  
 
The interpretation of coefficient estimates from Logit and Probit regressions are less 
straightforward relative to linear probability model (LPM). In the LPM, the probabilities 
are linear in 𝑿, which is not the case for Logit and Probit. In the case of Logit model, 
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we can rewrite Equation 4.6 as follows: ln (
𝑃
1−𝑃
) = 𝛽0 + 𝑿𝛽, where the log-odds ratio
45
 
( ln (
𝑃
1−𝑃
)) is linear in 𝑿  while the probabilities (𝑃 ) are not linear in 𝑿 . The slope 
coefficient (𝛽) can be interpreted as the change of the log of odds ratio that is driven by 
one unit change of 𝑿. Moreover, both Logit and Probit take all the explanatory variables 
into consideration when calculating the change in probability, while in the LPM only a 
particular explanatory variable is involved (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
 
 
4.4 Estimators for Dynamic Panel 
In a recent paper on the estimation of dynamic panel models in corporate finance, by 
Flannery and Hankins (2013) compare the performance of various estimators including 
OLS, fixed effects, GMM and LSDVC (i.e. dynamic FE model with correction for bias).  
Their results suggest that estimators’ performance largely depend on the characteristics 
of data. In other words, the appropriate estimator can be chosen based on data’s 
properties. Table 4.2 summarizes whether various estimation methods are suitable for 
data with certain features (e.g. unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic panel, 
autocorrelation and endogeneity). For example, system GMM can be used to estimate 
models with unobserved heterogeneity, lagged dependent variable (i.e. dynamic panel) 
and endogeneity but will not provide appropriate estimates in the presence of second 
order serial correlation.  
 
This section first explains why it is theoretically and empirically more appropriate to 
examine the dynamic model of capital structure and then briefly reviews various 
estimation methods of dynamic panel data models. We first discuss problems with using 
pooled OLS, first-differencing, fixed effect (within) and Anderson and Hsiao IV 
technique to estimate dynamic panel and then introduce GMM as a more appropriate 
estimator. We will also compare different versions of GMM (e.g., difference vs. system 
GMM and one-step vs. two-step GMM).  
 
 
 
                                                          
45
 The log-odds ratio indicates the probability that an event happens relative to the 
probability that an event does not happen.  
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Table 4.2 Choice of estimators of dynamic panel based on data features 
This table shows whether each estimation method is able to cope with certain data 
features including unobserved heterogeneity (column a), dynamic panel data (column 
b), second order serial correlation (column c) and endogenous variables (column d).  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 
Unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Dynamic 
panel data 
Second order 
serial correlation 
Endogenous 
variables 
OLS No No Yes No 
Fixed effects Yes No Yes No 
Difference GMM Yes Yes No Yes 
System GMM Yes Yes No Yes 
LSDVC Yes Yes Yes No 
Source: adapted from Table 2 in Flannery and Hankins (2013) 
 
4.4.1 Dynamic capital structure model (partial adjustment model) 
We first briefly describe the partial adjustment model widely used in the dynamic 
capital structure literature. The target capital structure can be estimated as: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ =∑𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘=1
+ 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (4.8) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗  is the target leverage, 𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡  represents a group of determinants of capital 
structure.  
 
The degree of adjustment can be represented as (partial adjustment model):  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝜌(𝑌𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) (4.9) 
 
If 𝜌 = 1, then the actual change will be equal to the desired change, which means full 
adjustment. If 𝜌 = 0, no adjustments are made. If 0 < 𝜌 < 1, partial adjustment takes 
place. This is called two-step dynamic adjustment model, where the target leverage is 
estimated in the first stage.  
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Alternatively, we may use one-step dynamic capital structure model obtained by 
combining equation (4.8) and (4.9):  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜌)𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 +∑𝜌𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.10) 
 
The speed of adjustment is 𝜌, which is measured by one minus the coefficient of the 
lagged debt maturity (1 − 𝜌). If the cost of deviation is higher (lower) than the cost of 
adjustment then 𝜌 tend to be unity (zero).  
 
4.4.2 Dynamic misspecification  
Before discussing various dynamic panel estimators, we show, from an econometrics 
perspective, the importance of controlling for a lagged dependent variable. Static capital 
structure models (without controlling for the lagged leverage ratio) may suffer from 
“dynamic misspecification” problem, which is a particular type of omitted variable bias. 
More specifically, if the lagged dependent variable is omitted, the model is likely to be 
misspecified especially in terms of autocorrelation. One potential cause of the 
autocorrelation is that the error term includes the omitted lagged dependent variable that 
are serially correlated. More generally, it is methodologically sound to adopt the 
“general to specific” approach (Hendry and Richard, 1983) by starting with a general 
model and then (if necessary) proceeding to a more parsimonious specification. In our 
case, we include the lagged leverage variable to reduce the chance of “dynamic 
misspecification”.  
 
4.4.3 Estimation methods of dynamic panel 
The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as one of the regressors complicates the 
estimation. In particular, it is recognised that standard panel estimators including OLS, 
first differences OLS, and fixed effects within group estimators become inconsistent 
(see e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Asteriou and Hall, 2007). In what follows, the 
bias related to each of those estimators will be briefly discussed.  
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4.4.3.1 Pooled OLS 
First, the problem with OLS estimates based on equation (4.10) is that the lagged 
dependent variable 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 may be correlated with the unobservable fixed effects 𝜇𝑖, and 
consequently the regressor 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 and the error term 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are correlated. In addition, 
the fixed effects 𝜇𝑖 may also be correlated with other independent variables.  
 
4.4.3.2 Fixed effect (within) 
One may try to eliminate the bias associated with OLS estimator using the within 
transformed fixed effects model 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = 𝛽0(𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑖,𝑡−1𝑡) +∑𝛽𝑘(𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘=1
) 
+(𝜂𝑡 − ?̅?𝑡) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?) 
(4.11) 
 
Although firm specific effects can be removed, the estimation is still subject to another 
bias caused by the correlation between (𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1) and (𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1). In this 
case, the OLS estimation of the within model can be consistent only if 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 is very 
small relative to 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 , which is only possible if 𝑇  goes to infinity in long panels 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p764).  
 
4.4.3.3 First difference 
Another way of removing the fixed effects is the first differencing transformation 
 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 +∑𝛽𝑘∆𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘
𝑘=1
+ ∆𝜂𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.12) 
 
However, this first differenced OLS estimator is still inconsistent since Δ𝜀𝑖𝑡  is 
correlated with Δ𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 through the terms 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1 and 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 (Ozkan, 2000, Antoniou et al., 
2008). Furthermore, the random effect estimator is also inconsistent due to the 
correlation between the quasi-demeaned dependent variable and residuals (Asteriou and 
Hall, 2007).  
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4.4.3.4 Instrumental variable estimator 
The standard method used to estimate the dynamic unobservable effects panel data 
model is the instrumental variable estimator first introduced by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) (hereafter, AH estimator). The AH estimator is based on first-differenced model 
(equation 4.12) and then 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 is used as an instrument for ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 is considered 
as a valid instrument because it is correlated with ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 but uncorrelated with ∆𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
Alternatively, ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 can be used as an instrument for ∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1, which is found to be 
more efficient if the autoregressive parameter 𝛽0 > 0 (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981). The 
AH estimator can be consistent as long as the errors 𝑢𝑖𝑡  are not serially correlated. 
However, the AH estimator may not be efficient partly because of the fact that not all 
available moment conditions are used (Ozkan, 2000, Antoniou et al., 2008).  
 
4.4.3.5 Generalised method of moment (GMM) 
Having discussed the inconsistency of standard panel estimators and the inefficiency of 
AH estimator, more specialized methods for dynamic panel data, including Arellano 
and Bond’s (1991) difference GMM (GMM-DIF) and Blundell and Bond’s (1998) 
system GMM (GMM-SYS), will be considered
46
. Wooldridge (2001) suggests that 
GMM is indispensable for dynamic panel models with unobservable fixed effects. The 
GMM-DIF uses lagged levels dated 𝑡 − 2  and beyond as instruments for the first-
differenced equation (equation 4.12), which can be regarded as an unbalanced 
instrument sets. This estimator provides consistent estimates of the autoregressive 
parameter as the number of observations, 𝑛, goes to infinity with fixed number of years 
𝑡.  
 
However, the GMM-DIF is subject to weak instrument problems due to the weak 
correlation between the lagged levels (i.e. the instruments) and subsequent first-
differences (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This problem of weak instrument becomes 
                                                          
46
 GMM estimators have been widely used to estimate dynamic capital structure models 
(see e.g. Antoniou et al., 2008). More recently, GMM estimator has also been used in 
corporate governance research to incorporate dynamic nature of corporate governance 
choices. For example, Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) apply GMM estimator to 
examine the effect of board structure on firm performance. They argue that other 
commonly used estimation methods that are unable to cope with dynamic relationship 
between current governance and past firm performance may be biased.  
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apparent either when the autoregressive parameter 𝛽0 approaches unity or the variance 
of firm fixed-effects 𝜇𝑖  increases relative to the variance of the error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . 
Consequently, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is biased downwards.  
 
a. Downward bias of difference GMM 
Bond et al. (2001) suggest a way of detecting downward finite sample bias, associated 
with use of the first-differenced GMM estimator, by comparing the autoregressive 
parameters estimated using alternative methods. In particular, the OLS levels will 
provide an upwards-biased estimate of α, given the firm-specific effects (Hsiao, 1986). 
In contrast, the estimate of α from the Within Group (WG) estimator is downwards-
biased in short panels (Nickell, 1981). In other words, the estimates of the OLS levels 
and WG may indicate the upper and lower bounds of a consistent estimate respectively. 
Therefore, the first-differenced GMM estimate is very likely to be biased downwards if 
it appears to be close to or even below the Within Group estimate (i.e. the lower bound). 
 
b. System GMM 
Blundell and Bond (1998) propose GMM-SYS under which instruments in levels and 
first differences are used in a system of first-differenced and levels equations 
respectively. By exploiting additional moment conditions from the level equations, the 
GMM-SYS has superior finite sample properties. Theoretically, Hayakawa (2007) 
derives the finite sample bias and show that GMM-SYS is more efficient than GMM-
DIF and GMM level estimators. In particular, the analysis shows that the bias of GMM-
SYS is “a weighted sum of the biases in opposite directions of the first differencing and 
the level GMM estimates”. In addition, another advantage of using GMM is related to 
the normality condition. It should be noticed that our dependent variables, the leverage 
and debt maturity ratios, are bounded between zero and one and are therefore not 
normal. Fortunately, the GMM estimator is robust to non-normality.  
 
c. Two step vs. one step GMM 
On the other hand, it is recognized that two-step GMM is more efficient than one-step 
GMM. The two-step GMM uses the optimal weighting matrix obtained from the first-
step estimation. Considering that the model is overidentified, the two-step GMM, also 
called the optimal GMM, is more efficient (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). Nevertheless, 
considering that the asymptotic standard errors of the efficient two-step GMM can be 
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biased downwards especially for small samples, the one-step GMM is routinely used to 
make inferences before the Windmeijer (2005) correction was developed (Roodman, 
2009). Therefore, our two-step GMM standard errors will be based on Windmeijer bias-
corrected estimator. Hence, it seems that the two-step GMM-SYS is the optimal method 
for our dynamic panel data. 
 
d. Robustness checks (sensitivity to lag structures) and specification tests 
In practice GMM estimators suffer from the instrument proliferation problems 
(Roodman, 2009). More specifically, high instrument count can overfit endogenous 
variables and even weaken the Hansen test of instrument validity. To minimize those 
problems, we have to limit the number of instruments by using certain lags only rather 
than all available lags as instruments. Furthermore, Roodman (2009) emphasize that it 
is important to check the sensitivity of the GMM results to reductions in the number of 
instruments, in which case the number of instruments should be reported. In brief, given 
the combination of lagged dependent variable, fixed effects and short panel, a GMM 
estimator is more appropriate than other standard estimation methods. However, the 
validity of GMM models will be checked based on several specification tests including 
1) Sargan test 2) Wald test and 3) Autocorrelation test.  
 
4.4.3.6 Doubly-censored Tobit model 
A recent paper by Elsas and Florysiak (2011) proposes the doubly-censored Tobit 
model, which is suitable for unbalanced dynamic panel with a fractional dependent 
variable. This estimator might be superior to the GMM estimator since it allows for the 
specification of a censored leverage ratio. Elsas and Florysiak (2011) find that the 
doubly-censored Tobit estimator is subject to the least bias in the context of dynamic 
adjustment of capital structure. A recent study (John, Kim and Palia, 2012) uses this 
estimator to examine capital structure adjustment.  
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4.5 Firm Fixed Effects 
As argued by Wooldridge (2002), “a primary motivation for using panel data is to solve 
the omitted variables problem”.47 In this thesis, managerial overconfidence is likely to 
be correlated with unobserved firm fixed effects which are firm characteristics that vary 
across entities but remain constant over time. For example, overconfident managers 
might be attracted to growing firms partly because they overestimate future growth but 
underestimate risks. Therefore, it is important to control for fixed effects using a within 
or first difference estimator.  
 
4.5.1 Potential fixed effects (omitted variables) as a source of 
endogeneity 
Roberts and Whited (2012) provide a review of three major sources of endogeneity (i.e. 
omitted variable
48
, reverse causality and measurement error). They discuss various 
techniques that can be applied in empirical corporate finance to mitigate the 
endogeneity concern including instrumental variable, difference-in-difference, 
regression discontinuity design, matching, panel data methods and higher order 
moments estimators. This section focuses on how to mitigate a particular type of 
endogeneity that is associated with fixed effects (omitted variable) using panel data 
methods. In general, fixed effects may exist if unobserved time-invariant 
firm/individual characteristics are not included in the empirical model. For example, 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics (e.g. education level, past experience, ability) 
of firm managers might be correlated with measures of managerial overconfidence. 
Consequently, the unobserved heterogeneity may drive both managerial overconfidence 
and the firm’s financing decision, which leads to a spurious relationship. Therefore, it is 
important to address the above endogeneity problem by controlling for firm fixed 
effects.  
 
                                                          
47
 Another two solutions to omitted variable bias when the omitted variable is 
unobservable are instrumental variable approach and randomized controlled 
experiments (Stock and Watson, 2003). These two approaches however are less 
applicable for this thesis. Instead, we use panel data approach (i.e. fixed effects 
estimators) to control for unobserved omitted variables.  
48
 This is regarded as one of the most common sources of endogeneity in corporate 
finance (Roberts and Whited, 2012). This is an important concern for our empirical 
analysis because capital structure regression often “contains a significant firm effect” 
(Peterson, 2009).  
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4.5.2 How and when to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
A recent study (Gormley and Matsa, 2014) compares the estimates of models with 
unobserved heterogeneity across entities (e.g. firms, managers, industries) using four 
estimators including OLS, adjusted-Y estimation (AdjY)
49
, average effects estimation 
(AvgE)
50
 and FE. They find that OLS, AdjY and AvgE estimators can yield inconsistent 
estimates and be severely biased. To illustrate, they estimate a standard capital structure 
regression where book leverage is regressed on several standard capital structure 
determinants. As expected, the coefficient estimates from OLS, AdjY and AvgE appear 
to be highly different from the FE estimates
51
 in terms of magnitude and sometimes 
signs.
52
 Gormley and Matsa (2014) conclude that FE estimator is the best way to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity (see Table 4.3).  
 
More specifically, Gormley and Matsa (2014) suggest that FE should be used given the 
following conditions: 
Condition 1: The existence of unobserved group heterogeneity; there is potential 
correlation between the heterogeneity and a variable of interest  
Condition 2: Within group variation in the variable of interest  
Condition 3: Valid measurement of the variable of interest 
 
Condition 1 refers to the motivation of using a FE estimator. In practice, the presence of 
fixed effects can be detected by comparing standard errors from different estimation 
methods. More specifically, if the standard errors clustered by firm are much (e.g. over 
                                                          
49
 The AdjY estimation adjusts the dependent variable by demeaning the dependent 
variable with respect to the group. For example, industry mean can be removed from the 
dependent variable, which is often called “industry-adjusted”. In this way, the effect of 
industry is removed from the dependent variable.  
50
 The AvgE estimation adds the group’s sample mean as an independent variable to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, in which case the sample mean is used as a proxy 
for the unobserved variation.  
51
 This is also the case in the examples of executive compensation, firm value and stock 
returns (Gormley and Matsa, 2014).  
52
 Roberts and Whited (2012) also point out the reason why fixed effects estimation 
make significant differences in the estimated coefficients on the determinants of 
leverage is that leverage is a level not a change. They argue that if the dependent 
variable is a first differenced variable (e.g. investment that can be considered as the 
change of capital stock) and if the fixed effect is only correlated with the level of the 
dependent variable, estimated coefficients from fixed effects regressions will be 
qualitatively similar to pooled OLS.  
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three times) greater than White standard errors, fixed effects are highly likely to exist 
(Peterson, 2009). Condition 2 and 3 are related to two major limitations of the FE 
estimator, namely (1) time-invariant independent variable of interest and (2) 
measurement error of the variable of interest, which will be discussed in the subsequent 
section.  
 
Table 4.3 Comparison of the performance of estimators in presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity 
This table is based on Gormley and Matsa’s (2014) study that compares the 
performance of four estimation methods in presence of unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. 
“common errors”). They point out that OLS, adjusted-Y estimation (AdjY) and average 
effects estimation (AvgE) are all inconsistent and therefore only FE is recommended to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity.  
 OLS AdjY AvgE FE 
Description Ordinary least 
squares 
Demean the dependent 
variable within each 
group (e.g. industry 
adjusted) 
 
Include the sample 
mean of the group’s 
independent 
variable as a control 
variable 
 
Either add dummy 
variables for each 
entity as control 
variables or 
demean all 
variables within 
entities 
Property Inconsistent Inconsistent Inconsistent Consistent 
Reasons why 
the estimator 
is inconsistent 
Fail to control 
for unobserved 
heterogeneity 
Omitted variable 
problem: the mean of 
independent variables 
may influence the 
demeaned dependent 
variable, which is not 
controlled for 
Measurement error 
bias: sample mean 
may be a biased 
measure of the 
unobserved factor 
NA 
 
4.5.3 Limitations of fixed effects and how to address them 
Although fixed effects can mitigate the endogeneity problem due to omitted variables, it 
has several limitations (see e.g. Gormley and Matsa, 2014; Roberts and Whited, 2012). 
First, fixed effects estimators are not able to estimate the effect of any time-invariant 
variables (e.g. gender, education, past experience). Fortunately, our main variable of 
interest is time-varying. One possible solution, as mentioned in Gormley and Matsa 
(2014), is the Hausman and Taylor’s (1981) two-step instrumental variable (IV) 
approach in the FE estimation framework (i.e. the XTHTAYLOR in Stata).  
 
Second, measurement error of the variable of interest may lead to attenuation bias. This 
might be a particular concern of this thesis considering the difficulty of measuring our 
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key independent variable (i.e. managerial overconfidence). To mitigate this attenuation 
bias, Gormley and Matsa (2014) outline the following three approaches: (i) use a GMM 
estimator (Erikson and Whited, 2000), (ii) use an instrumental variable approach (Biorn, 
2000) and (iii) recover the true parameter by using different transformation of the data 
e.g. within transformation and first differences (e.g. McKinnish, 2008). Our empirical 
analysis uses both approaches (i) and (iii) mentioned above as robustness checks
53
. Next, 
we compare two alternative fixed effects estimators: within vs. first difference estimator. 
 
4.5.3.1 Fixed effects (within) estimator vs. first difference estimator 
Fixed effects (within) estimator and first difference estimator are two alternative ways 
to remove unobserved effects by time-demeaning and differencing the data respectively. 
The choice between the above two estimators for short panel data depends on the serial 
correlation of the residual: if the errors are serially uncorrelated, a within estimator is 
more efficient than first differencing; if the errors exhibit substantial positive serial 
correlation, first differencing is more efficient because the differenced error is serially 
uncorrelated (Wooldridge, 2009). In practice, it is difficult to choose between within 
and first difference. It is therefore advisable to check whether the results are sensitive to 
that choice. However, both within transformation and first-differencing transformation 
remove any long run components from the variables (Asteriou and Hall, 2011; Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009). Consequently, fixed effects regressions only examine the effects of 
short-run components of the explanatory variables.  
 
4.5.4 Potential problem with unbalanced panel 
The panel data used in this thesis is unbalanced (like many other empirical studies in 
finance). This is because our final sample is selected based on the availability of three 
main data sources: accounting data, insider trading data and digital annual reports of 
UK firms. However, when using fixed effects models to estimate unbalanced panel, it is 
important to understand the reasons why the panel is unbalanced (i.e. why some firm-
year observations are missing). In particular, fixed effects estimation will be biased if 
the reason for missing data is correlated with the error term (Wooldridge, 2009). 
Common reasons for missing data include mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy and 
leveraged buyouts. More specifically, firm-years without insider trading are excluded 
                                                          
53
 Approach (iii) is not adopted since it is difficult to find an instrument for managerial 
overconfidence. 
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from our sample. These reasons are likely to be correlated with the error term (i.e. 
unmeasured determinants of financing decisions). Consequently, our fixed effects 
estimations might be subject to sample selection bias. However, there will be no 
problem if these reasons are correlated with unobserved fixed effects.  
 
4.5.5 Fixed effects vs. random effects 
The coefficient estimates from FE and RE estimators can be considerably different 
especially in short panels (large cross-section dimension and small time dimension) 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009). When choosing between FE and RE estimators, we need to 
consider the following aspects (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). First, if the error term and 
the independent variables are correlated, FE is unbiased while RE is biased. Second, in 
short panels, if RE is the true model, RE is more efficient than FE. Third, although FE 
controls for all unobservable time-invariant variables, FE is not able to estimate such 
time-invariant variables. This becomes a limitation of FE estimators especially when the 
main variable of interest (e.g. managerial traits) is highly persistent over time.  
 
In practice, the Hausman test can be used to choose between FE and RE. In particular, a 
large Hausman statistic rejects the null hypothesis that RE is consistent (while FE is 
always consistent). In other words, Hausman test examines whether RE can be as good 
as FE. In contrast, a small Hausman statistic indicates that RE might be more 
appropriate. In addition, Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test can be used to test 
whether there are random effects. (also see chapter 21 in Cameron and Trivedi (2005) 
and chapter 10 in Wooldridge (2002) for comparisons of FE and RE)  
 
 
4.6 Interaction Effects and Multicollinearity 
Interaction effect appears when the relationship between one independent variable and 
the dependent variable varies with the magnitude of another independent variable. Take 
our empirical test of the heterogeneous/conditional pecking order preference as an 
example, the pecking order coefficient, i.e. the sensitivity between financing deficit 
(independent variable) and net debt issues (dependent variable), depends on another 
independent variable (i.e. managerial overconfidence). In this case, we empirically 
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examine the interaction effects by adding an interaction term between financing deficit 
and managerial overconfidence.  
 
To illustrate the interaction effects, the following is a regression model with interaction 
term:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.13) 
 
The partial effect of 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 on 𝑌𝑖𝑡 can be represented as:  
 
∆𝑌𝑖𝑡
∆𝑋1,𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 (4.14) 
 
If 𝛽3  is statistically significant, we may conclude that there is an interaction effect 
between 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 and 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡.  
 
In addition, testing the interaction effects can also help to verify the underlying 
mechanism/channel through which 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 influences 𝑌𝑖𝑡. 
 
4.6.1 Reparameterization of the model with interaction terms  
However, as mentioned in Wooldridge (2009), the interpretation of 𝛽1 is tricky: 𝛽1 is 
the partial effect of 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 on 𝑌𝑖𝑡 when 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 is zero. To have a meaningful partial effect, 
we can reparameterize as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)(𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛,𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
= (𝛼0 + 𝛽3𝑋1,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅𝑋2,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) + (𝛽1 − 𝛽3𝑋2,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )𝑋1,𝑖𝑡
+ (𝛽2 − 𝛽3𝑋1,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑋𝑛,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
(4.15) 
 
where 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are the sample means of 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 and 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 respectively.  
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After demeaning the interaction term, the interpretation of the coefficient on 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 
becomes useful: (𝛽1 − 𝛽3𝑋2,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is the partial effect of 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 on 𝑌𝑖𝑡 when 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . In 
addition, we can replace 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  with any other values of interest (e.g. the median 
of the explanatory variables) (Wooldridge, 2009).  
 
Another problem with the model including interaction term is that the interaction term, 
𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 , will be, by construction, highly correlated with 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡  and/or 𝑋2,𝑖𝑡 . One 
common way to avoid unreliable estimates due to multicollinearity is to demean 
interaction terms (see e.g. Balli and Sørensen, 2012).  
 
4.6.2 Consequences of imperfect multicollinearity  
As summarized in Asteriou and Hall (2011), imperfect multicollinearity has several 
consequences. First, multicollinearity is associated with high standard errors and low t-
statistics. This will lead to the conclusion that a potentially important explanatory 
variable is statistically insignificant. Second, the signs of the coefficient estimates are 
also likely to be changed due to multicollinearity. Third, the estimated coefficients can 
be very sensitive to small changes in sample size.  
 
4.6.3 An indicator of multicollinearity: variance inflation factor (VIF) 
Empirical models with interaction terms are often subject to multicollinearity problem 
that will inflate standard errors. As a way to diagnose multicollinearity, variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of independent variable 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 can be calculated as follows: 
 
𝑉𝐼𝐹 =
1
(1 − 𝑅2)
 (4.16) 
 
where 𝑅2  is obtained from the regression where the independent variable 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡  is 
regressed on all other independent variables. VIF measures the extent to which the 
variance (i.e. the square of standard error) of the coefficient on 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 is inflated because 
of multicollinearity. If VIF is 1, it means that 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 is orthogonal to all other independent 
variables. However, if VIF is 10, it means that all other explanatory variables explains 
90% (i.e. 𝑅2) of the variations of 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡. Consequently, the variance of the coefficient on 
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𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 is 900% higher. In other words, the standard error of the coefficient on 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 is 30% 
higher. As a rule of thumb, a VIF beyond 10 is often considered as an indication of high 
multicollinearity. As mentioned before, to alleviate potential multicollinearity problem, 
we can demean the independent variable 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡.  
 
4.6.4 Another way to test interaction effects: subsample analysis 
Alternatively, to examine the extent to which the effect of 𝑋 (independent variable) on 
𝑌 (dependent variable) is influenced by 𝑍 (independent variable), one can regress 𝑌 on 
𝑋 using several subsamples partitioned based on 𝑍. For example, we can first divide the 
sample into two subsamples based on large 𝑍 (above the median) and small 𝑍 (below 
the median) and then compare the coefficient estimates on 𝑋 from those two subsamples. 
If there is no significant difference between the above two coefficients, one may 
conclude that the relationship between 𝑋 and 𝑌 is not sensitive to 𝑍.  
 
Compare coefficients across groups:  
Subsample 1: small 𝑍  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑍 + 𝛽1
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑍𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.17) 
Subsample 2: large 𝑍 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑍 + 𝛽1
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑍𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.18) 
No interaction effects if:  𝛽1
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑍 = 𝛽1
𝐿𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑍
  
 
The advantage of using subsample analysis to examine interaction effects is that we do 
not need to use interaction term and therefore can avoid resulting multicollinearity 
problem. However, this approach is subject to several limitations. First, coefficients 
from different regressions based on subsamples might not be easily comparable 
(especially when the R-squared of those regressions are highly different). Second, 
dividing into subsamples may reduce consecutive firm-years, which makes it difficult to 
capture the effect of within firm variations and more importantly control for firm fixed 
effects.  
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4.7 Internal Validity: Components, Threats and Solutions 
4.7.1 Finite sample and asymptotic properties of estimators  
To compare finite/small sample properties of different estimators, we can use the mean 
squared error (MSE) of the model defined as follows (e.g. Wooldridge, 2009):  
 
𝑀𝑆𝐸(𝑊) = 𝐸[(𝑊 − 𝜃)2] = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊)⏟    
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
+ [𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑊)⏟    
𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠
]2 
(4.19) 
 
where, 𝑊  is an estimator of a parameter 𝜃 , which can be represented as a 
function (𝑓) of random variables (𝑉): 𝑊 = 𝑓(𝑉).  
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊) is the variance of the estimator.  
𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑊) is the bias of the estimator (i.e. 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠(𝑊) = 𝐸(𝑊) − 𝜃, where 𝐸(𝑊) 
is the expected value of the probability distribution of 𝑊).  
 
Unbiasedness and efficiency are two finite/small sample properties of the estimator. 
One can reduce the bias of an estimator by choosing an appropriate function (𝑓). As an 
asymptotic property, consistency is considered as “the minimal requirement of an 
estimator” (Wooldridge, 2009). This is because an inconsistent estimator can be far 
from the parameter (𝜃) and may not be useful. Suppose 𝑊𝑛 is an estimator of 𝜃 with a 
sample of 𝑛 obervations. 𝑊𝑛  is regarded as a consistent estimator if for every 𝜀 > 0, 
𝑃(|𝑊𝑛 − 𝜃| > 𝜀) shrinks to zero as the sample size (𝑛) goes to infinity. Table 4.4 
compares the consistency of linear panel models. In particular, if the assumed/true 
model is fixed effects estimator, the pooled OLS, between and random effects 
estimators are inconsistent.  
 
Table 4.4 Linear panel model: common estimators and models 
This table shows whether the estimates from pooled OLS, between, within, first 
differences and random effects estimators are consistent given the true model is pooled 
OLS (column a), random effects (column b) or fixed effects (column c) respectively.  
 Assumed/True Model 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Estimator of 𝛽 Pooled Random Effects Fixed Effects 
Pooled OLS Consistent Consistent Inconsistent 
Between Consistent Consistent Inconsistent 
114 
 
Within (or Fixed Effects) Consistent Consistent Consistent 
First Differences Consistent Consistent Consistent 
Random Effects Consistent Consistent Inconsistent 
Source: Cameron and Trivedi (2005) p699.  
 
4.7.2 Threats to internal validity and solutions
54
  
To enhance the internal validity of our empirical analysis, we review major threats to 
internal validity and possible solutions (see Table 4.5). A statistical analysis is 
considered as internally valid “if the statistical inferences about casual effects are valid 
for the population being studied” (Stock and Watson, 2003). More specifically, 
according to Stock and Watson (2003), internal validity has the following three 
components: (1) unbiasedness, (2) consistency and (3) standard errors yield confidence 
intervals that have the desired confidence level.  
 
Table 4.5 presents five sources of bias that make the coefficient estimates from OLS 
regression biased and inconsistent, namely omitted variable bias, functional form 
misspecification, measurement error, sample selection and simultaneous causality, all of 
which can be attributed to the correlation between the independent variable and the 
error term in the population regression (Stock and Watson, 2003). In addition, we also 
briefly discuss the estimation of standard errors in panel models.  
 
Table 4.5 Threats to internal validity: definitions and solutions 
This table presents six factors that may influence the internal validity. Possible solutions 
to each threat to internal validity are also outlined. * indicates the solutions that have 
been implemented in our thesis to enhance internal validity.  
Threats to 
internal validity  
Definitions Solutions 
Unobservable 
omitted 
variables 
“a variable that both determines Y and 
is correlated with one or more of the 
included regression is omitted” (Stock 
and Watson, 2003) 
a. Fixed effects estimator* 
b. Instrumental variable 
c. Randomized controlled 
experiment 
Functional form 
misspecification 
The true population regression 
function is nonlinear, however the 
terms reflecting nonlinear 
relationships are omitted in the 
estimated linear regression 
a. Polynomial regression* 
b. Natural logarithm*  
c. Interaction terms* 
                                                          
54
 See chapter 7 in Stock and Watson (2003) for a more detailed discussion on this topic.  
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Errors in 
variable 
Measurement error (measures of 
independent variables are not clean) 
 
a. Find a more valid 
measure
55
* 
b. Instrumental variable
56
  
c. Mathematical model of 
measurement error 
Sample 
selection 
“availability of the data is influenced 
by a selection process that is related to 
the value of the dependent variable” 
(Stock and Watson, 2003) 
a. Heckman sample 
selection model 
Simultaneous 
causality 
Reverse causality (causality runs from 
dependent variable to independent 
variables, which makes the 
independent variables correlated with 
the error term) 
a. Instrumental variable 
b. Randomized controlled 
experiment 
Inconsistent 
standard errors  
Heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation 
a. Use robust standard 
errors* 
Source: summarized based on chapter 7 in Stock and Watson (2003) 
 
4.7.2.1 Omitted variable bias 
Omission of a relevant explanatory variable will make the coefficient estimates of 
existing explanatory variables in the model biased and inconsistent. This omitted 
variable bias occurs when the omitted variable is correlated with other explanatory 
variables and determines the dependent variable. Consequently, omitted variable bias 
violates one of the least square assumptions that the correlation between independent 
variables and the error term should be zero. In Stock and Watson (2003), the omitted 
variable bias can be represented as follows: 
 
𝛽1̂
𝑝
→𝛽1 +
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖, 𝑋𝑖)
𝜎𝑋
2 = 𝛽1 + 𝜌𝑋𝑢
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑋
 (4.20) 
 
The above equation shows that 𝛽1̂ is close to 𝛽1 + 𝜌𝑋𝑢
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑋
 as the sample size increases. 
𝛽1̂ is therefore not a consistent estimator of 𝛽1. 𝜌𝑋𝑢
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑋
 is the bias that will not decrease 
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 It is important to measure the data accurately as there are no satisfactory solutions to 
the “errors in variable” problem (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
56
 As argued by Gujarati and Porter (2009), the instrumental variable approach is 
theoretically appealing but not always practical. This is also true in our empirical 
analysis considering that it is difficult (if not impossible) to find an instrument for 
managerial overconfidence.  
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as the sample size increases. The magnitude and the direction of the bias depend on the 
absolute value and sign of 𝜌𝑋𝑢 respectively. 
 
a. Exclusion of a relevant variable vs. inclusion of an irrelevant variable  
Having shown the consequence of excluding a relevant variable (i.e. underfitting 
problem), one may ask what if an irrelevant variable is included (i.e. overfitting 
problem). Fortunately, the inclusion of an irrelevant variable still provides unbiased and 
consistent estimates. However, the only problem is that the estimated variances of the 
coefficients are inflated. After comparing the bias associated with underfitting and 
overfitting, Gujarati and Porter (2009) provide an “unwanted”57 suggestion that “it is 
better to include irrelevant variables than to omit the relevant ones”.  
 
4.7.2.2 Functional form misspecification  
There are various functional forms including linear, linear-log, reciprocal, quadratic, 
interaction, log-linear, log-reciprocal, log-quadratic, double-log and logistic functional 
forms (see e.g., Table 8.1 in Asteriou and Hall (2007)). This section focuses on two 
functional forms that can be used to model two types of non-linear relationships (i.e. 
inverted U-shaped and J-shaped relationships respectively): polynomial regression and 
logistic transformation. (Another commonly used functional form that includes 
interaction terms has been introduced in section 4.6.)  
 
a. Polynomial regression  
It is likely that the effect of 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 on 𝑌𝑖𝑡 depends on the magnitude of 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡. In this case, 
the relationship between independent variable and dependent variable is not linear. For 
example, in our empirical analysis, moderate managerial overconfidence and extremely 
high levels of overconfidence may have different effects on managerial decisions (e.g. 
inverted U-shaped relationship). One way to model this non-linearity is to use a 
polynomial regression as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋1,𝑖𝑡
2 +⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑋1,𝑖𝑡
𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.21) 
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 This suggestion is regarded as “unwanted” because in an ideal world if the true model 
is known any irrelevant explanatory variables should be excluded.  
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However, the polynomial regression is still considered as a multiple linear regression 
where 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡
𝑛  is considered as additional independent variables. One potential problem 
with this approach is that 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡  and 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡
𝑛  can be highly correlated which leads to 
multicollinearity problem. In finance, a quadratic function, i.e. 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽2𝑋1,𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, is often used. If 𝛽1 is positive and 𝛽2 is negative, one can conclude that 
𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 has a diminishing effect on 𝑌𝑖𝑡. 
 
b. Natural logarithm  
Another case where the relationship between independent variable and dependent 
variable is non-linear is that the effect of 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 on 𝑌𝑖𝑡 may increase as the magnitude of 
𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 increases (i.e. J-shaped relationship). If this is the case, taking logs will convert an 
exponential relationship to linear relationship, which therefore enables us to use linear 
estimation methods to model non-linear relationship. A linear-log model is shown as 
follows
58
:  
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ln (𝑋1,𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4.22) 
 
In addition, logarithmic form has several other important benefits/purposes. First, taking 
logs can normalize the data, meaning that its distribution becomes less skewed. This 
makes the estimates less sensitive to extreme values of independent variables (i.e. 
outliers). Second, the coefficients on the logarithmic form of the independent variables 
are easier to interpret because those slope coefficients are invariant to the units of 
measurement. In addition, Wooldridge (2009) summarizes several rules of thumb for 
taking logs. Logarithmic form is often used when a variable is (a) a positive dollar 
amount (e.g. wages, firm size); (b) large integer value (e.g. number of employees); (c) 
measured in years (e.g. CEO tenure, firm age) and (d) a proportion or a percent 
(although there is a tendency to use them in level forms).  
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 If 𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 takes on positive and zero values, one can use ln (𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + 1).  
118 
 
4.7.2.3 Measurement error in independent variable (errors-in-variables)
59
 
Measurement error (i.e. errors-in-variables bias) can make the explanatory variable 
correlated with the error term, which in turn makes the OLS estimates biased and 
inconsistent. The measurement error problem can be illustrated as follows:  
 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋?̃? + [𝛽1(𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋?̃?) + 𝜇𝑖] 
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋?̃? + 𝑣𝑖 
(4.23) 
 
As shown in the above equation, the error term contains (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖)̃ , which will be 
correlated with 𝑋?̃? . If the regressor, 𝑋?̃? , is correlated with the error term, 𝛽1̂  will be 
biased and inconsistent. More specifically, the magnitude and direction of the bias in 𝛽1̂ 
depends on the correlation between 𝑋?̃? .and (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝑖)̃ . Put differently, the measured 
value 𝑋?̃?  can be represented as the sum of the actual value 𝑋𝑖  and a purely random 
component 𝑤  with mean zero and variance 𝜎𝑤
2 : 𝑋?̃? = 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑤 . 𝛽1̂  has the probability 
limit: 𝛽1̂
𝑝
→
𝜎𝑋
2
𝜎𝑋
2+𝜎𝑤
2 𝛽1 . 𝛽1̂ is inconsistent and biased towards zero because the ratio of 
𝜎𝑋
2
𝜎𝑋
2+𝜎𝑤
2  is less than one.  
 
4.7.2.4 Estimation of standard errors in panel models 
To make appropriate statistical inference, it is important to use panel-robust standard 
errors (see section 21.2.3. in Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for more detailed discussion 
on panel-robust statistical inference). The estimation of default standard errors in 
statistical software (e.g. Stata) often assumes the error term is independent and 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). However, this assumption is often violated in practice. In 
particular, the errors may be correlated over time. This serial correlation can cause 
underestimation of standard errors. Moreover, the errors are likely to be heteroskedastic. 
                                                          
59
 This is especially a major concern of the empirical work on managerial 
overconfidence considering that it is challenging to measure cognitive bias which is not 
directly observable. As we discussed in Chapter 3, many overconfidence measures used 
in the literature are likely to be contaminated by other frictions (e.g. information 
asymmetry). It is therefore important to use relatively clean proxies for overconfidence 
and attempt to rule out alternative explanations.  
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Therefore, we need to use cluster-robust standard errors that are adjusted for both serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity
60
.  
 
Peterson (2009) compares various approaches that can be used to estimate standard 
errors in finance panel data sets. Different methods may generate highly different 
standard errors. The choice of appropriate method of estimating standard errors depends 
on whether there is firm effect (i.e. time-series dependence, meaning that the residuals 
are correlated across years within a firm) and/or time effect (i.e. cross-sectional 
dependence, meaning that the residuals are correlated across firms within a year) in the 
data. Peterson (2009) suggests that in the presence of firm fixed effect, which is 
common in corporate finance data, robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
unbiased. Peterson (2009) reports that in capital structure regression White and Fama-
MacBeth standard errors are significantly biased downwards. Furthermore, in terms of 
potential time effect in capital structure regression, Peterson (2009) finds that clustering 
by time has little effect on the standard errors, indicating that the time effect is small in 
the capital structure data. Therefore, standard errors clustered by firm seem to be the 
appropriate method to deal with firm effects in many corporate finance datasets.  
 
In addition, Imbens and Kolesar (2012) argue that the commonly used (conventional) 
robust standard errors (i.e. Eicker-Huber-White (EHW) and Liang-Zeger (LZ)) are 
biased downward especially in relatively small samples. In other words, the validity of 
the EHW and LZ standard errors rely on large sample sizes. They suggest that empirical 
studies should implement Bell and McCaffrey’s (BM) (2002) modification.  
 
 
4.8 Conclusion and the Choice of the Methods of Our Empirical 
Analysis 
This chapter describes and compares econometric methods that are suitable for our 
empirical analysis. The major implications can be summarized as follows. For models 
with a binary dependent variable, Logit/Probit model is superior to linear dependent 
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 As pointed out in Cameron and Trivedi (2005), in the presence of serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity, it is not enough to only use either (a) heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors or (b) cluster-robust standard errors with the assumption of 
homoscedasticity.  
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model (i.e. OLS). For models with a fractional dependent variable, Tobit model is more 
valid. For models with a lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable (i.e. 
dynamic model), GMM is more suitable than standard panel data estimators (e.g. fixed 
effects). For models with unobserved firm fixed effects, fixed effects (within) or first 
difference estimator should be used to control for unobserved heterogeneity. For models 
with interaction terms, multicollinearity might be a potential concern, which can 
however be mitigated by demeaning the interaction terms.  
 
More specifically, the methods which are used in our empirical analysis are described as 
follows. In the first empirical study (i.e. Chapter 5), we choose the following methods. 
First, to examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on leverage, we use the fixed 
effects estimator with the purpose of removing potential time-invariant firm specific 
effects that are correlated with managerial overconfidence. Considering that the 
dependent variable (i.e. leverage ratio) is left censored, meaning that there are quite a 
few observations with zero leverage, we use a random-effects Tobit estimator which is 
suitable for models with censored dependent variable. In addition, to examine the 
effects of the changes of managerial overconfidence on the changes of leverage, we use 
a first difference estimator. Furthermore, to test the joint effects of managerial 
optimistic words and actions, we add an interaction term to our empirical model. We 
also conduct subsample analysis to examine whether the relation between our measures 
of overconfidence and leverage is driven by information asymmetry. As robustness 
checks, we use system GMM to estimate partial dynamic adjustment model in which 
the lagged leverage ratio is included as a control variable. We also use logistic 
regression to examine the impact of managerial overconfidence on the probability of 
low and zero leverage respectively, in which case we have binary dependent variables.  
 
In the second empirical study (i.e. Chapter 6), the following methods are used. First, to 
examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on the degree of pecking order 
preference, we interact managerial overconfidence with the financing deficit variable in 
the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) (SSM) regression. This modified SSM regression 
is then estimated using a fixed effects estimator, considering that there might be some 
time-invariant firm specific effects that are correlated with managerial overconfidence. 
Furthermore, we conduct subsample analysis to see whether the relation between 
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managerial overconfidence and the pecking order preference is influenced by firm size 
and earnings volatility.  
 
In the third empirical study (i.e. Chapter 7), we adopt the following methods. First, we 
use a fixed effects estimator to test the relation between managerial overconfidence and 
debt maturity structure. However, the dependent variable (i.e. the debt maturity ratio) is 
right censored, meaning that some firms only use long-term debt in a particular year. In 
other words, the upper limit of the debt maturity ratio is one. Given the fractional nature 
of the dependent variable, we use a random-effects Tobit estimator. In addition, we 
examine the impact of the changes of managerial overconfidence on the changes of debt 
maturity using a first difference estimator. Moreover, we conduct subsample analysis to 
see whether the relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity depends 
on firms’ future investment opportunities and the level of leverage. The subsample 
analysis can help to understand the underlying channel through which managerial 
overconfidence affects debt maturity structure.  
 
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that “model building is an art as well as 
a science” (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). In other words, econometric analysis is not 
purely technical, although this chapter is largely devoted to the technical aspects of 
panel data econometrics. The importance of the relatively less technical aspects of 
empirical analysis can never be overstated. We therefore conclude this chapter by 
outlining Kennedy’s (2002) ten commandments of applied econometrics to guide our 
empirical work: (1) use common sense and theory; (2) ask the right question; (3) know 
the context; (4) inspect the data; (5) not worship complexity; (6) look long and hard at 
thy results; (7) beware the costs of data mining; (8) be willing to compromise; (9) not 
confuse significance with substance; and (10) confess in the presence of sensitivity. To 
sum up, this thesis aims to conduct analysis that is technically appropriate and apply 
appropriately Kennedy’s commandments of applied econometrics. 
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Chapter 5. Empirical Study 1: Optimistic Disclosure Tone, Insider 
Trading and Capital Structure 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A growing literature demonstrates the importance of the effect of managers on 
corporate policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Cadenillas et al., 2004). In 
particular Frank and Goyal (2007) document a first order effect that the differences 
among CEOs and especially CFOs matter for firm’s capital structure. More specifically, 
recent theoretical (Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier et al., 2011) and 
empirical studies (Graham et al., 2013; Ben-David et al., 2013; Malmendier et al., 2011; 
Malmendier and Zheng, 2012) examine how a particular trait of managers (i.e. 
managerial overconfidence) impacts financing decisions. One limitation of the above 
empirical tests of the role of managerial overconfidence is that their empirical measures 
of overconfidence are time-invariant. The reason why overconfidence can be time-
varying is that people are subject to self-attribution bias,
 61
 described as “endogenous 
overconfidence” (Hillary and Hsu, 2011), and therefore will learn to be overconfident 
(Hirshleifer, 2001). With this in mind, this chapter empirically examines the impact of 
time-varying managerial overconfidence as a determinant of leverage whereas related 
prior literature examines static measures of overconfidence.  
         
A unique feature of this study is that we use both words and actions of managers to 
gauge their time-varying overconfident beliefs. The words-based measure of 
overconfidence is constructed using computational content analysis of the tone of UK 
Chairman’s Statement. To ensure the validity of our tone measures, we construct 
composite tone index using principal component analysis, which consists of six 
individual measures of optimistic tone.
 62
 The action-based measure is related to how 
firm managers trade their own firm’s shares. The idea is that overconfident managers 
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 Self-attribution bias can be defined as a tendency to attribute good (bad) outcomes to 
own abilities (external factors) (Miller and Ross, 1975). 
62
 These six tone measures are calculated using (1) the wordlists developed by finance 
and accounting researchers (Henry, 2008; Loughran and McDonald, 2011) for the 
analysis of financial narratives and (2) relevant dictionaries (i.e. wordlists used to define 
various dimensions of language) in two linguistic analysis software (Diction and LIWC) 
(e.g. optimism and certainty). More explanations on the tone measures are available in 
the methodology section.  
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are more likely to buy and less likely to sell. Interestingly, we can explore potential 
contradictions between managerial words and actions
63
. Recent work (Brockman, Li 
and Price, 2012) reports a reverse tone-insider trading pattern (i.e. positive (negative) 
conference call tone predicts net insider selling (purchase)). A key contribution of this 
study is to empirically examine the implications of this type of contradiction for 
leverage.  
         
The theoretical relationship between managerial overconfidence and leverage can be 
either positive or negative (Malmendier et al., 2011). Heaton’s (2002) model suggests 
that overconfident managers believe that equity is undervalued by outside investors and 
they are therefore reluctant to use equity financing. In other words, managerial 
overconfidence is associated with higher information costs, which in turn leads to 
higher leverage. Hackbarth (2008) incorporates managerial overconfidence in a trade-
off framework and also predict that managerial overconfidence is positively related to 
leverage. This is because overconfident managers underestimate the bankruptcy cost of 
debt and consequently use more debt to take tax benefits. However, Malmendier et al. 
(2011) show that managerial overconfidence may lead to either a preference for debt 
over equity financing, as predicted by Heaton’s (2002) model, or debt conservatism. 
They argue that the net effect of managerial overconfidence on leverage depends on 
manager’s perceived financing costs and investment returns as well as the availability of 
internal financing (more discussions on this model will be presented in section 5.2). The 
main purpose of this study is to empirically test different channels through which 
managerial overconfidence affects leverage. 
         
This study has two major findings. First, optimistic tone is negatively related to leverage. 
This finding is consistent with the proposition that managerial overconfidence may lead 
to conservative debt policy, especially when firms have sufficient retained earnings or 
perceived financing costs are higher than corresponding investment returns. Our 
subsample analysis further confirms that the negative tone-leverage relationship is not 
driven by either information asymmetry or impression management.  
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 For example, insider selling may contradict optimistic tone, suggesting the possibility 
that managers attempts to intentionally disinform investors. More discussions on the 
combined effects of tone and insider trading will be provided later. 
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Second, we find interesting joint effect of optimistic tone and insider trading. The 
coefficient on the interaction between tone and insider selling is negative, suggesting 
that high insider (especially CEOs) sales weaken the negative tone-leverage relationship. 
This observation can be attributed to the fact that insider selling contradicts optimistic 
tone which indicates that managers are not as confident as their words suggest. In 
contrast, insider purchase, which confirms that optimistic tone is a strong proxy for 
managerial overconfidence, enhances the negative tone-leverage relationship.  
         
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, we develop a time-varying measure of 
managerial overconfidence using computational tone analysis and we are one of the first 
studies that examine the effects of optimistic tone in the corporate finance context. 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we provide initial empirical evidence that 
managerial overconfidence may lead to lower leverage. This important evidence 
supports Malmendier et al.’s (2011) proposition that debt conservatism may be caused 
by managerial overconfidence. Third, we explore the empirical implications of the 
inconsistency between managerial words and actions, both of which provide useful 
windows into managerial beliefs.  
         
We proceed as follows. Section 5.2 first reviews alternative explanations of optimistic 
tone and then develops hypotheses regarding the effects of managerial overconfidence 
on leverage. Section 5.3 describes our two measures of managerial overconfidence, 
namely tone of Chairman’s Statement and insider trading of CEO and CFO, and our 
sample. Section 5.4 discusses main findings and alternative interpretations of our results 
and conducts robustness checks. Section 5.5 concludes.  
 
 
5.2 Hypothesis Development 
This section first discusses various alternative interpretations of corporate disclosure 
tone and then develops the link between tone and leverage. Finally, we show the joint 
effects of tone and insider trading on leverage.  
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5.2.1 Corporate disclosure tone - an overview  
A growing body of accounting literature examines the tone (i.e. the use of 
optimistic/pessimistic or positive/negative language) of various corporate disclosures 
including Managerial Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) (Davies and Tama-Sweet, 
2012), earnings press releases (Davis, Piger and Sedor, 2012; Demers and Vega, 2011) 
and conference calls (Price et al., 2012). However, the effects of disclosure tone on 
corporate financial decisions remain a neglected area of research. Interestingly, previous 
studies suggest that disclosure tone has multiple interpretations, namely “inform”, 
“intentionally disinform” and “unintentionally disinform” investors. In particular, 
disclosure tone is subject to three major alternative interpretations from information 
asymmetry, impression management and overconfidence (hubris) perspectives 
respectively.
 64
  
 
5.2.1.1 Information asymmetry perspective: “inform investors” 
First, positive disclosure tone can be interpreted as “incremental information” (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan, 2011), which “inform” investors and therefore reduces 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. This information asymmetry 
interpretation of tone is based on the assumption that investors are rational and are able 
to undo reporting bias. Considering that reporting bias will reduce stock price 
performance and managerial reputation (Baginski et al., 2000), managers therefore have 
no incentive to engage in biased reporting. Lang and Lundholm (2000) investigate 
voluntary disclosure activities around equity offerings and their impacts on stock prices. 
They find that firms with a consistent level of disclosure experience relatively smaller 
price declines at the announcement date. This is because disclosure reduces the 
information costs associated with equity offering. Furthermore, Kothari, Li and Short 
(2009) find that positive management disclosure is negatively related to the equity cost 
of capital and return volatility, which supports the view that disclosures can mitigate 
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 See Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2011) for a comprehensive review on various 
explanations of narrative disclosures and a conceptual framework of impression 
management. They provide four explanations for corporate disclosure, namely 
incremental information, impression management, hubris and retrospective sense-
making.  
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information asymmetry
65
 (see e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 
2004).  
 
5.2.1.2 Impression management perspective: “intentionally disinform investors” 
Second, disclosure tone can be regarded as a way of impression management. In other 
words, managers attempt to “intentionally disinform” investors or manipulate investors’ 
perception of firm performance. More specifically, impression management can be 
caused by agency problems between managers and investors where biased reporting is a 
strategic choice of self-interested managers to maximize their personal wealth (e.g., 
Adelberg, 1979; Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Moreover, impression management 
may be used as another mechanism (in addition to “reducing information asymmetry”) 
to reduce cost of equity, namely “hyping” (Lang and Lundhold, 2000). Empirically, 
Lang and Lundhold (2000) document that firms with a considerable increase of 
disclosure in the six months before their offering experience price increase prior to the 
equity offering. However, those firms have much larger negative returns at and 
subsequent to the announcement. This observation is consistent with the proposition 
that disclosure is used to “hype the stock”.  
 
5.2.1.3 Managerial overconfidence perspective: “unintentionally disinform 
investors” 
Third, from behavioural/psychological perspective, optimistic disclosure tone can be a 
product of managerial overconfidence/hubris (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2011). In this 
case, irrational managers “unintentionally disinform” investors. However, this 
behavioural interpretation of tone is largely neglected by existing literature of corporate 
disclosure (Brennan and Conroy, 2013). Amernic and Craig (2007) emphasize the 
importance of monitoring excessive narcissist-like language used by narcissist CEOs, 
who are prone to be overconfident, in their letters to shareholders.  Recent studies report 
evidences of cognitive bias (e.g. overconfidence) detected using manual and 
computational linguistic analysis of corporate disclosures. For example, Craig and 
Amernic (2011) detect destructive narcissism of CEOs of Enron, Starbucks and General 
Motors based on CEO’s letter to shareholders. In a similar vein, Brennan and Conroy 
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 In particular, positive/favourable disclosures are associated with market makers’ 
favourable evaluation of firm future value and risk, which in turn reduce the transaction 
cost of equity (i.e. adverse-selection component of the bid-ask spread).  
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(2013) also conduct manual content analysis of narratives in bank CEO letters to 
shareholders to reveal CEO personality traits (e.g. narcissism, hubris, overconfidence 
and CEO-attribution). Furthermore, computational content analysis of managerial 
statements are employed to measure overconfidence of CEO and fund managers (e.g., 
Liu, Taffler and John, 2009; Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012). Davis, Matsumoto and Zhang 
(2012) examine the effect of managerial style on the tone of earnings conference calls. 
This body of recent evidence supports the notion that “tone used in corporate 
disclosures is potentially influenced by unintentional, manager-specific tendencies
66
 to 
be overly optimistic or pessimistic”. From this perspective, optimistic tone can be 
regarded as a proxy for managerial overconfidence. This study makes an important 
contribution to this under-researched behavioural perspective of disclosure tone and 
tests the relationship between optimistic tone and leverage.  
 
5.2.2 Testable hypotheses  
This section first develops the link between “contemporaneous” optimistic tone, as a 
proxy for managerial overconfidence, and firm’s leverage and then shows the combined 
effects of insider trading patterns and tone on leverage.  
 
5.2.2.1 Optimistic tone and leverage 
Before developing our hypotheses on the tone-leverage relationship, it is important to 
draw a difference between contemporaneous tone and lagged tone. In particular, given 
that Chairman’s Statement is only available for investors to read (several weeks) after 
the fiscal year end, the only channel through which contemporaneous tone influences 
leverage is managerial overconfidence. In other words, the contemporaneous tone can 
be considered as an ex-post measure of managers’ overconfident beliefs. Empirically, to 
directly examine the roles of the other two alternative channels, namely “reducing 
information asymmetry” and “hyping the stock”, we have to use lagged tone measures. 
67
 In this case, the market reacts to the lagged tone of Chairman’s Statement, which in 
turn influences firms’ leverage. However, the problem is that the lagged tone can also 
be considered as a proxy for previous year’s managerial overconfidence. Therefore, 
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 It is considered as managerial bias that is closely related to their personalities, 
experience and values (Davis, Matsumoto and Zhang, 2012).  
67
 In an “inform” or “intentionally disinform” context, contemporaneous tone is not 
expected to influence firms’ contemporaneous leverage.  
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because of the difficulties in disentangling lagged tone, our empirical tests focus on the 
behavioural perspective of disclosure tone, where we use contemporaneous tone to 
measure managerial overconfidence.
68
  
         
Next, we discuss the effects of managerial overconfidence on leverage. Based on a 
recent model by Malmendier et al. (2011), the theoretical relationship between 
managerial overconfidence and firm leverage depends on the relation between 
“overestimated investment returns, cash holdings and perceived financing costs”.  
         
In particular, managerial overconfidence may lead to lower level of debt (i.e. debt 
conservatism) if the firm has sufficient internal finance (i.e. retained earnings), which is 
particularly true because overconfident managers may retain cash for future investment.
 
69
 Huang-Meier, Lambertides and Steeley (2013) empirically examine the effect of CEO 
optimism on corporate cash holding policy. They find that optimistic managers hold 
more cash than their non-optimistic counterparts, which is consistent with the 
proposition that optimistic managers are reluctant to use external financing and 
therefore hold more cash. In brief, managerial overconfidence could make the firm 
forgo the tax benefits and therefore be underleveraged relative to the optimal target debt 
ratio. To empirically examine Malmendier et al.’s (2011) proposition that managerial 
overconfidence may lead to conservative debt policy, we test the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): contemporaneous tone, as a measure of managerial 
overconfidence, is negatively related to leverage, if managerial overconfidence is 
associated with debt conservatism.  
 
                                                          
68
 One may argue that using lagged tone can reduce simultaneity bias and is therefore 
preferred. However, a recent study (Reed, 2013) shows that lagging a suspected 
endogenous independent variable does not help to avoid simultaneity problem 
especially when this variable is serially correlated.  
69
 Another explanation for the negative overconfidence-leverage relationship is related 
to “perceived financing costs”. More specifically, overconfident managers tend to 
overestimate the information costs associated with external financing including both 
debt and equity. In this case, it is possible that overconfident manager’s perceived 
financing costs outweigh investment returns (Malmendier et al., 2011). Consequently, if 
internal financing is not sufficient, overconfident managers are likely to forgo 
investment opportunities. In brief, managerial overconfidence may lead to 
underinvestment and lower financing needs.  
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On the other hand, however, as pointed out by Malmendier et al. (2011), debt 
conservatism caused by overconfidence “can, but need not” lead to low leverage. This is 
because managerial overconfidence may enhance the preference for debt over equity 
financing. Put differently, overconfident managers tend to issue equity more 
conservatively than debt. Similarly, an earlier model by Heaton (2002) also suggests 
that optimistic managers believe that equity is undervalued by outside investors and 
therefore prefer debt to equity. Using Shyam-Sunder and Myers’s (1999) financing 
deficit framework, Malmendier et al. (2011) and Malmendier and Zheng (2012) find 
supporting evidences that overconfident managers are more willing to use debt to meet 
external financing needs. Furthermore, from trade-off perspective, Hackbarth’s (2008) 
model predicts that overconfident managers will underestimate financial distress costs 
associated with debt and hence tend to use more debt than their rational counterparts. 
Taken together, from these perspectives managerial overconfidence could be positively 
related to leverage.  
 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): contemporaneous tone, as a measure of managerial 
overconfidence, is positively related to leverage, if managerial overconfidence is 
associated with enhanced preference for debt over equity.  
 
 
5.2.2.2 Joint effect of tone and insider trading on leverage 
One may argue that “contemporaneous tone” may also indirectly influence leverage 
through the other two channels considering the possibility that managers maintain 
similar level of optimistic tone throughout the fiscal year. For example, firm managers 
may have already delivered similar financial narratives to investors via other ways of 
business communication especially the mandatory quarterly reporting
70
 (including 
interim management statements and quarterly results announcements). More 
specifically, the tone of Chairman’s Statement might be similar to that of other 
narratives published earlier in the same fiscal year. 
                                                          
70
 UK government strongly supports European Commission’s recent proposal that the 
requirement to publish quarterly financial reports under the EU Transparency Directive 
should become voluntary. The purpose is to reduce excessive focus on short-term 
earnings and encourage long-term decision-making, as a response to John Kay’s 
Review of UK Equity Markets published in July, 2012.  
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One way to empirically distinguish alternative effects of tone is to compare managers’ 
personal beliefs about firms’ prospects gauged from their actions and words. More 
specifically, we double check managers’ overconfidence beliefs as indicated by their 
optimistic tone using their insider trading patterns which serves as another window into 
their beliefs. The idea is that insider selling may indicate that optimistic tone is used to 
“hype the stock”, while insider purchase may indicate that optimistic tone is driven by 
managerial overconfidence. 
         
In particular, to further distinguish between “intentionally disinform” and 
“unintentionally disinform”, we investigate the interaction between insider trading and 
tone. In the context of shareholder litigation, Rogers et al. (2011) find that litigation risk 
is greater when managers use optimistic language and engage in insider selling. This is 
because insider selling signals managers’ intent to mislead investors using optimistic 
language. Following the same logic, we expect that insider selling and purchase may 
indicate “intentionally disinform” and “unintentionally disinform” respectively. 
Therefore, we expect the following combined effects of insider trading and tone on 
tone-leverage relationship.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): the interaction between tone and insider selling will weaken 
the tone-leverage relationship, when insider selling contradicts optimistic tone 
and indicates that optimistic tone is used to “intentionally disinform” investors. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): the interaction between tone and insider purchase will 
enhance the tone-leverage relationship, when insider purchase confirms 
optimistic tone and indicates that optimistic tone is used to “unintentionally 
disinform” investors.  
 
 
5.3 Methodology and Data 
This section first introduces our two measures of managerial overconfidence and then 
describes our sampling procedures and presents summary statistics and correlation 
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analysis. We postpone the description of various empirical model specifications until 
the next section.  
 
5.3.1 Dependent variable: book leverage vs. market leverage 
Like many previous empirical studies on capital structure, we uses both book and 
market leverage, partly because there is no consensus on which measure is more 
suitable. Book leverage is more related to asset in place (which supports debt financing) 
than to growth opportunities (Myers, 1977) and it also better resemble the relationship 
between investment and source of financing. However, book leverage is backward 
looking and moreover book equity is a “plug-number” that can be negative (Welch, 
2004). In contrast, market leverage is forward looking. The limitation of market 
leverage is that it is driven by stock price changes and therefore is relatively more 
volatile than book leverage. Given the above differences between book and market 
leverage, it is expected that empirical results based on these two alternative measures of 
leverage will not be identical. (see e.g., Frank and Goyal (2009) and Bessler, Drobetz 
and Kazemieh (2011) for more discussions on the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with book and market leverage.) 
 
5.3.2 Measurement of managerial overconfidence  
We use both words-based and action-based measures of managerial overconfidence. In 
contrast to the static measures of overconfidence commonly employed in the literature, 
our overconfidence measures are time-varying.
 71
  
 
5.3.2.1 Words-based measure of overconfidence: optimistic tone  
We construct two composite tone indices. One is based on the raw tone measures. The 
other is orthogonalized so that each component is not correlated with certain firm-
specific variables (especially standard capital structure determinants).  
 
                                                          
71
 Existing behavioural finance studies (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan, 2011) tend to model managerial overconfidence as a habitual behaviour 
which is static. This static approach can be problematic because other behavioural 
biases, especially self-attribution bias, may affect the confidence level. In other words, 
although the level of overconfidence can be quite persistent over time, we should not 
examine overconfidence in isolation.  
133 
 
a. Raw Tone Index 
Our first measure of managerial overconfidence is based on tone analysis
72
 of the 
Chairman’s Statement. We construct optimistic tone measures by counting both 
optimism-increasing and optimism-decreasing words. We use six individual wordlists. 
Our first three wordlists are the same as those in Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) 
and Davis, Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang (2012), namely TONE_OPTIMISM, TONE_H 
and TONE_LM. TONE_OPTIMISM is a measure of net optimism
73
 counted using a 
dictionary in Diction 6.
 74
 Liu, Taffler and John (2009) conduct content analysis of CEO 
speech in the context of mergers and acquisitions and also use the optimism variable in 
Diction as a proxy for CEO overconfidence. More recently, Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) 
use TONE_OPTIMISM as a measure of fund manager overconfidence. TONE_H and 
TONE_LM are two wordlists developed by Henry (2008) and Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) respectively to measure positive and negative words especially in a financial 
context. In particular, TONE_H and TONE_LM are calculated as the ratio of the 
difference between positive and negative words to the sum of positive and negative 
words
75
 (i.e. 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡−𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡
).  
         
Besides, we also use another three tone measures, all of which are positively related to 
optimism, including TONE_CERTAIN1, TONE_CERTAIN2 and TONE_EMOTION. 
TONE_CERTAIN1 and TONE_EMOTION
76
 are measured using dictionaries in 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) 2007. TONE_CERTAIN2 is another 
                                                          
72
 Tone analysis (and more generally textual analysis) is becoming increasingly popular 
in recent accounting and finance studies. For example, Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman 
(2011) examine the relation between disclosure tone and shareholder litigation. For a 
review on studies of corporate disclosures, please see Li (2010a).  
73
 In Diction, optimism is defined as “language endorsing some person, group, concept 
or event, or highlighting their positive entailments”. 
74
 As a unique feature of Diction software, there is standardization procedure when 
calculating a particular item. In particular, we compare our collected Chairman’s 
Statements to three alternative norms in Diction including (1) all cases, (2) corporate 
financial reports and (3) corporate public relations. Our empirical results are 
qualitatively similar using alternative norms.  
75
 The terms “positive/negative” and “optimistic/pessimistic” are often used 
interchangeably in the literature (e.g., Davis, Piger and Sedor, 2012). Li (2010b) 
standardize the terms to “positive/negative” instead of “optimistic/pessimistic”.  
76
 An earlier version of LIWC has a category named “optimism”, however in the 2007 
version words are classified more broadly into “positive emotion” and “negative 
emotion”.  
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measure of certainty
77
 based on a dictionary in Diction 6. TONE_CERTAIN2 has also 
been used to measure overconfidence of fund managers (Eshraghi and Taffler, 2012). 
Similarly, Li (2010b) includes “uncertain tone”, which is highly associated with 
negative tone, in his tone measure.  
         
To address potential endogeneity issues associated with the above six individual tone 
measures, we form a composite tone index using a principal component analysis (PCA). 
In particular, we define 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  as the first principal components of the 
correlation matrix of six raw tone measures. The first component, with an eigenvalue of 
2.609,
 78
 explains 43.5 percent of our sample variance.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 =∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
6
𝑗=1
= 0.496𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 0.192𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛1𝑖𝑡 + 0.446𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡
+ 0.027𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛2𝑖𝑡 + 0.480𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 0.536𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡 (5.1) 
 
where, 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  represents individual tone measure j of firm i in fiscal year t. 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗  is the loading for individual tone measure j of firm i. The loading for 
Certain1 and Certain2 is much lower compared with other tone measures. However, 
our empirical results are qualitatively similar when we exclude those two measures of 
certainty tone.  
 
b. Orthogonalized Tone Index 
To address the concern that the raw tone might be contaminated by firm-specific 
variables
79
, a composite index of the orthogonalized tone measures is constructed as 
                                                          
77
 In Diction, certainty is defined as “language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and 
completeness and a tendency to speak ex cathedra”. 
78
 The eigenvalue of second component is close to one (i.e. 1.135).  
79
 In terms of the determinants of tone (e.g., current performance, growth opportunities, 
operating risks and complexity), Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2011) find that tone, as 
measured using Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist, is positively related to 
market-to-book and volatility of stock returns and negatively related to firm size, age 
and number of business segments. Our first orthogonalized tone measure (TONE_RES1) 
controls for four standard determinants of capital structure (i.e. market-to-book, size, 
tangibility and profitability). Our second orthogonalized tone measure (TONE_RES2) 
further controls for stock price performance and firm age. 
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follows. First, we regress each individual tone measure on standard determinants of 
capital structure as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 (5.2) 
 
where, 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  represents six individual tone measures. 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the corresponding 
orthogonalized individual tone measures.  
         
Next, a composite index ( 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
⊥ ) is formed based on the first principal 
component of six residuals (i.e. 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
⊥ = 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡) from the above regressions. The first 
component explains 41.8 percent of the sample variance
80
.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
⊥ =∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
⊥
6
𝑗=1
=∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡
6
𝑗=1
= 0.495𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
⊥ + 0.154𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛1𝑖𝑡
⊥ + 0.440𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡
⊥
+ 0.036𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛2𝑖𝑡
⊥ + 0.490𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝐻𝑖𝑡
⊥ + 0.545𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡
⊥ (5.3) 
 
         
The use of orthogonalized tone is also inspired by a paper on tone management by 
Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2011). They argue that disclosure tone can be used to either 
“inform” or “disinform” investors. On the one hand, positive tone may reflect firm’s 
fundamental and thus can “inform”. For example, more profitable firms may use more 
positive tone. On the other hand, tone can be regarded as a form of impression 
management or strategic choice (i.e. “abnormal tone” 81 ) to manipulate investors’ 
perception of firm performance and thus can “disinform”. Such impression management 
can be complementary to earnings management.  
 
c. Suitability of Chairman’s Statement for tone analysis 
We use the Chairman’s Statement in the UK annual report as the source of narrative for 
tone analysis for several reasons. First, the Chairman’s Statement is widely read by 
                                                          
80
 The eigenvalues of first and second components are 2.509 and 1.139 respectively.  
81
 It is abnormal in the sense that the positive tone cannot be justified by firm’s 
fundamentals.  
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investors and analysts (Bartlett and Chandler, 1997). According to Clatworthy and 
Jones (2003), the Chairman’s Statement is “the most read of the UK’s accounting 
narratives” and “the longest established”. 82 Second, Chairman’s Statement is largely 
unaudited and not heavily regulated. The language used in the Chairman’s Statement is 
much less standard than Directors’ Report which is subject to regulatory requirements. 
Third, disclosure-related litigation is rare in the UK relative to the US. Therefore, the 
UK accounting narratives (e.g. Chairman’s Statement) are relatively less constrained 
compared with the MD&A in the US 10-K report. Finally, while Chairman’s Statement 
is signed by chairman, who is often a non-executive director in the UK, existing 
literature
83
 seems to agree that Chairman’s Statement is an organizational rather than 
individual communication. This means that firm’s key financial decision makers (e.g. 
CEO and CFO) also have significant influences on the choice of language in the 
Chairman’s Statement.  
 
5.3.2.2 Action-based measure of overconfidence: net purchase ratio  
The insider trading patterns of the managers may reflect their perceptions of firms’ 
prospects (Jenter, 2005). Overconfident managers tend to overestimate the firm value 
and hence are more willing to purchase their own stocks. This trading behaviour can be 
considered as managers’ market timing in their personal portfolios. In the spirit of 
Jenter (2005) and Jin and Kothari (2008), we use insider trading-based measure of 
managerial overconfidence. In particular, following prior studies (e.g., John and Lang, 
1991; Marciukaityte and Szewczyk, 2011) we construct the valued-based and volume-
based net purchase ratio (NPR) using the value and volume of open market purchases 
and sales respectively as follows: 
                                                          
82
 Many previous studies on UK accounting narratives focus on Chairman’s Statement 
(see e.g., Smith and Taffler, 2000, Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Clatworthy and Jones, 
2006). Smith and Taffler (2000) use Chairman’s Statement to predict firm bankruptcy. 
A more recent study (Schleicher and Walker, 2010) conduct manual content analysis of 
the tone of forward-looking statements (i.e. outlook sections) in the UK annual report 
(most of which are located at the end of Chairman’s Statement).  
83
 For example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) argue that accounting narratives such as 
UK Chairman’s Statement allow “management” to describe corporate financial 
performance. In addition, Schleicher and Walker (2010) attribute the bias in the tone of 
outlook statements to “managers”. In particular, they argue that “managers with a 
willingness to engage in impression management are likely to target forward-looking 
statements”, while 73.5 percent of the forward-looking narratives are located in 
Chairman’s Statement (Schleicher and Walker, 2010). 
137 
 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡
 
(5.4) 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
 
(5.5) 
 
where, 𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡  and 𝑁𝑃𝑅_𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡  are the value-based and volume-based NPRs 
respectively of CEO and CFO of firm 𝑖 in fiscal year 𝑡. 𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 and 𝐵𝑢𝑦_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 are the 
aggregate value and volume of insider purchases respectively and 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡  and 
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙_𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 are the aggregate value and volume of insider sales respectively. The NPR 
ranges from -1 to 1 and higher NPR indicates higher managerial overconfidence.  
         
a. Value-based NPR vs. volume-based NPR 
Next, we briefly compare volume-based and value-based NPR. Volume-based NPR is 
superior in the sense that it may capture the potential relation between the frequency of 
purchases and the level of overconfidence. Previous studies (Billett and Qian, 2008; 
Doukas and Petmezas, 2007) indicate that multiple acquisitions are associated with 
increasing overconfidence due to self-attribution. Similarly, multiple insider purchases 
may also contribute to overconfidence if the insiders attribute the success of previous 
purchases to their own (timing) ability.
84
 However, the volume-based NPR may fail to 
fully reflect managers’ perceived mispricing of their stocks. The value-based NPR takes 
the price of insider transactions into consideration. As noted earlier, overconfident 
managers tend to believe that their firm stocks are undervalued. Consequently, they are 
more likely to purchase at a higher price relative to their rational counterparts. The 
value-based NPR captures the perceived undervaluation which is an indicator of 
                                                          
84
 For example, overconfident directors buy one share at a time for three times for 10 
p/share, while rational directors also buy one share at a time but for twice for 15 p/share. 
Both of them sell one share for 10 p/share. The volume-based NPRs for overconfident 
and rational directors are 1/2 and 1/3 respectively, while the value-based NPRs for them 
are both 1/2 (i.e. (30-10)/(30+10)). In this case, the volume-based NPR is able to 
capture the “endogenous” overconfidence of those directors with more frequent 
purchases. 
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overconfidence.
85
 In brief, the volume-based NPR plays a better role in gauging 
“endogenous overconfidence” developed from self-attribution, while the value-based 
NPR is a better measure of the degree of perceived undervaluation caused by 
overconfidence.  
 
However, alternatively, managers may trade based on their private information. In this 
case, higher NPR is an indicator of a higher degree of information asymmetry. Our 
subsequent subsample analysis shows that the relationship between NPRs of CEO and 
leverage is stronger for smaller, intangible and younger firms
86
. This observation 
suggests that NPR might also capture information asymmetry.  
 
5.3.3 The sample 
Data used in this study are from the following sources. The UK firms’ financial data is 
obtained from Thomson Worldscope database. Insider trading data is from Hemmington 
Scott database. Chairman’s Statements are manually collected from the company annual 
reports which are downloaded either through Northcote website or directly from 
company websites. 
         
Our sample of unbalanced panel data is constructed as follows. The selection of sample 
period is guided by data availability. All financial and utility firms are excluded. Firm 
observations with missing financial data are excluded. Observations with the length of 
fiscal period less than 11 months or over 13 months are excluded. To conduct tone 
analysis, we need the digital version of the UK company annual reports, so that the 
Chairman Statement can be readable by the content analysis software (i.e. LIWC 2007 
and Diction 6)
87
. In addition, to construct insider trading-based measure of 
                                                          
85
 For example, if both overconfident and rational insiders buy and sell one share for 
10p/share, their volume-based NPRs are both 0. Due to the perceived undervaluation, 
overconfident directors are more likely to buy at a relatively higher price (15 p/share). 
Therefore, the value-based NPR tends to be higher (i.e. (15-10)/(15+10)=0.2) for the 
overconfident directors. From this perspective, the value-based NPR is a more valid 
measure of overconfidence. 
86
 Firm size, tangibility and firm age are all negatively associated with information 
asymmetry. 
87
 In terms of the procedure of content analysis, we first extract Chairman’s Statements 
from annual report. Next, we detect transformation errors in the combined text file using 
the Spelling & Grammar function in Microsoft Word 2010. Finally, various types of 
errors are corrected before the texts are inputted in the LIWC and Diction.  
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overconfidence, only those firms with insider transactions in any year during our sample 
period are selected. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile to 
eliminate the effect of outliers. The final sample comprises 459 firms and 2283 
observations during the period 1994-2011
88
.  
 
5.3.3.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 5.1 presents summary statistics of our main variables. The means of book and 
market leverage are 0.180 and 0.140 respectively. The mean of firm size (i.e. logarithm 
of sales) is 12.320 with a standard deviation of 2.240. Our sample seems to be 
representative in terms of firm size. The mean of CEOs’ NPRs are lower than those of 
CFOs, while CEOs’ NPRs are relatively more volatile. We also report the distribution 
of the net purchase ratio (NPR) of CEO and CFO in Panel D. Over 60 percent of their 
NPRs are 1, indicating that insider purchases occur far more often than insider sales.   
         
Table 5.2 shows the pairwise Pearson correlations matrix. Surprisingly, the correlation 
between tone-based measures of overconfidence (TONE and TONE_RES) and insider 
trading-based measures of CEO and CFO overconfidence (VA_CEO, VOL_CEO, 
VA_CFO and VOL_CFO) are negative and statistically significant. Therefore, this 
suggests that these two measures might capture different aspects of overconfidence. 
This is because either words-based or action-based measure is subject to alternative 
interpretations other than managerial overconfidence, which will be discussed later. 
         
Regarding the correlations between overconfidence measures and leverage, both TONE 
and TONE_RES are negatively and significantly related to book and market leverage. In 
contrast, NPRs of CEO and CFO are positively and significantly related to book and 
especially market leverage. Market-to-book ratio is negatively related to leverage, while 
firm size, tangibility and profitability are positively related to leverage. Finally, 
multicollinearity is not a major concern given that the magnitudes of the correlations 
between independent variables are not large
89
.  
 
                                                          
88
 Most of the observations are after 2000 because machine readable annual reports are 
almost not available in the 1990s.   
89
 We also check potential multicollinearity by looking at variance inflation factor (VIF) 
of all explanatory variables and interaction terms. Their VIF values are all less than 10, 
indicating low degree of collinearity.  
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent variables.  
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Median Max. 
Panel A: standard dependent and independent variables 
Book leverage 2283 0.180 0.150 0.000 0.170 0.610 
Market leverage 2283 0.140 0.130 0.000 0.110 0.520 
PDEF_CF/NA 2283 0.110 0.310 0.000 0.000 2.030 
NDEF_CF/NA 2283 -0.030 0.070 -0.430 0.000 0.000 
MB 2283 1.760 1.260 0.560 1.400 8.790 
Log(sales) 2283 12.320 2.240 6.140 12.510 16.870 
Tangibility 2283 0.260 0.230 0.000 0.200 0.890 
Profitability 2283 0.090 0.180 -0.880 0.120 0.390 
Effective tax rate 2283 0.230 0.350 -1.620 0.280 1.640 
Price performance 2283 0.000 0.530 -1.880 0.080 1.170 
Firm age 2283 5.668 1.029 2.079 5.587 7.419 
Panel B: words-based measures of managerial overconfidence (i.e. tone of Chairman’s Statement) 
TONE 2283 -0.000 1.615 -5.693 0.150 3.676 
TONE_RES 2283 -0.000 1.584 -5.034 0.165 4.988 
NET_EMOTION 2283 0.740 0.170 0.220 0.760 1.000 
CERTAIN1 2283 1.030 0.430 0.210 0.970 2.330 
OPTIMISM 2283 53.520 2.070 49.430 53.330 60.160 
CERTAIN2 2283 45.630 3.130 32.610 46.040 51.880 
TONE_H 2283 0.720 0.230 -0.060 0.770 1.000 
TONE_LM 2283 0.560 0.290 -0.290 0.600 1.000 
Panel C: action-based measures of managerial overconfidence (i.e. net purchase ratio) 
VA_CEO 1327 0.330 0.890 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
VA_CFO 1071 0.460 0.830 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
VOL_CEO 1327 0.480 0.790 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
VOL_CFO 1071 0.570 0.740 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
Panel D: distribution of NPRs of CEO and CFO 
 
VA_CEO VA_CFO VOL_CEO VOL_CFO 
Intervals Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage 
-1 249 18.76% 166 15.50% 249 18.76% 166 15.50% 
(-1, -0.8] 104 7.84% 61 5.70% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
(-0.8, -0.6] 34 2.56% 16 1.49% 5 0.38% 1 0.09% 
(-0.6, -0.4] 24 1.81% 19 1.77% 6 0.45% 3 0.28% 
(-0.4, -0.2] 22 1.66% 18 1.68% 26 1.96% 19 1.77% 
(-0.2, 0] 20 1.51% 19 1.77% 84 6.33% 66 6.16% 
(0, 0.2) 21 1.58% 12 1.12% 2 0.15% 3 0.28% 
[0.2, 0.4) 13 0.98% 11 1.03% 48 3.62% 18 1.68% 
[0.4, 0.6) 14 1.06% 14 1.31% 19 1.43% 17 1.59% 
[0.6, 0.8) 9 0.68% 5 0.47% 31 2.34% 12 1.12% 
[0.8, 1) 9 0.68% 7 0.65% 49 3.69% 43 4.01% 
1 808 60.89% 723 67.51% 808 60.89% 723 67.51% 
Total 1327 100% 1071 100% 1327 100% 1071 100% 
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Table 5.2 Correlation matrix 
This table shows Pearson correlation coefficients between all pairs of our main variables, as defined in Appendix 5.A. ***, ** and * indicate that the correlation coefficient is 
significant at 1% 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  1. PDEF_CF/NA 1 
           2. NDEF_CF/NA 0.176*** 1 
          3. MB 0.187*** -0.040* 1 
         4. Log(sales) -0.260*** -0.118*** -0.179*** 1 
        5. Tangibility -0.126*** -0.018 -0.118*** 0.238*** 1 
       6. Profitability -0.345*** -0.169*** -0.053** 0.460*** 0.203*** 1 
      7. Effective tax rate -0.029 0.002 -0.002 0.183*** 0.063*** 0.171*** 1 
     8. Price performance 0.038* -0.092*** 0.253*** 0.104*** 0.071*** 0.275*** 0.062*** 1 
    9. Book leverage -0.006 -0.025 -0.194*** 0.409*** 0.394*** 0.135*** 0.065*** -0.045** 1 
   10. Market leverage -0.037* 0.007 -0.380*** 0.295*** 0.357*** 0.026 0.014 -0.209*** 0.883*** 1 
  11. TONE 0.064*** -0.048** 0.197*** 0.196*** -0.004 0.228*** 0.058*** 0.309*** -0.043** -0.192*** 
  12. TONE_RES 0.128*** 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.204*** -0.076*** -0.150*** 
  13. NET_EMOTION 0.025 -0.071*** 0.110*** 0.228*** 0.013 0.261*** 0.087*** 0.242*** -0.021 -0.122*** 
  14. CERTAIN1 -0.092*** -0.059*** 0.021 0.261*** 0.042** 0.117*** 0.032 0.035* 0.090*** 0.043** 
  15. OPTIMISM 0.023 -0.032 0.104*** 0.229*** 0.054*** 0.155*** 0.015 0.162*** 0.051** -0.044** 
  16. CERTAIN2 0.023 -0.011 -0.005 0.006 -0.013 -0.05** -0.039* 0.010 0.000 -0.004 
  17. TONE_H 0.110*** 0.012 0.227*** 0.010 -0.052** 0.142*** 0.035* 0.311*** -0.103*** -0.253*** 
  18. TONE_LM 0.083*** -0.041** 0.194*** 0.086*** -0.039* 0.151*** 0.039* 0.282*** -0.093*** -0.216*** 
  19. VA_CEO 0.058** 0.055** -0.224*** -0.171*** -0.044 -0.182*** -0.038 -0.168*** 0.017 0.120*** 
  20. VA_CFO 0.060** -0.029 -0.203*** -0.178*** -0.028 -0.171*** -0.033 -0.163*** 0.056* 0.139*** 
  21. VOL_CEO 0.040 0.065** -0.217*** -0.058** -0.032 -0.149*** -0.012 -0.149*** 0.072*** 0.140*** 
  22. VOL_CFO 0.051* -0.018 -0.204*** -0.087*** -0.017 -0.14*** -0.011 -0.148*** 0.083*** 0.136*** 
   11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
11. TONE 1 
           12. TONE_RES 0.938*** 1 
          13. NET_EMOTION 0.801*** 0.740*** 1 
         14. CERTAIN1 0.310*** 0.235*** 0.175*** 1 
        15. OPTIMISM 0.721*** 0.670*** 0.451*** 0.275*** 1 
       16. CERTAIN2  0.043** 0.056*** 0.000 0.128*** 0.042** 1 
      
17. TONE_H 0.774*** 0.744*** 0.503*** 0.064*** 0.353*** 0.010 1 
     18. TONE_LM 0.865*** 0.831*** 0.600*** 0.121*** 0.505*** -0.009 0.657*** 1 
    19. VA_CEO -0.155*** -0.056** -0.127*** -0.084*** -0.119*** 0.008 -0.110*** -0.122*** 1 
   20. VA_CFO -0.141*** -0.047 -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.076** -0.052* -0.087*** -0.126*** 0.670*** 1 
  21. VOL_CEO -0.145*** -0.071*** -0.110*** -0.073*** -0.108*** 0.011 -0.098*** -0.130*** 0.876*** 0.644*** 1 
 22. VOL_CFO -0.142*** -0.068** -0.108*** -0.099*** -0.078*** -0.029 -0.092*** -0.137*** 0.595*** 0.898*** 0.723*** 1 
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5.4 Results and Discussion 
5.4.1 Univariate leverage regression 
Table 5.3 summarizes univariate leverage regressions. We find that both TONE and 
TONE_RES explain a relatively large proportion of within firm variations in leverage 
(especially market leverage). The coefficients on both tone measures are negative and 
statistically significant at 1% level. In addition, the net purchases ratios (NPRs) of both 
CEO and CFO have positive and significant impacts on leverage. Firm size and 
tangibility are positively associated with leverage and account for a significant 
proportion of between firm variations in leverage (especially book leverage). Market-to-
book ratio has negative coefficients and helps to explain the relatively high proportion 
of both within and between firm variations in market leverage. The signs and statistical 
significance of all explanatory variables will be further tested using subsequent 
multivariate regressions.  
 
5.4.2 Multivariate leverage regression  
This section examines the influence of managerial overconfidence on leverage, 
controlling for standard capital structure determinants. In particular, we use the 
following model to test the impact of the level of overconfidence on both market and 
book leverage:  
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                (5.6) 
 
where, 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is book or market leverage ratio. 𝑿𝑖𝑡  is a vector of firm-level control 
variables including PDEF, NDEF, market-to-book ratio, firm size, tangibility and 
profitability. 𝑣𝑖 is time-invariant firm-specific effects. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We use both 
fixed effects (FE) and random-effects Tobit (RE-Tobit) as the estimators. RE-Tobit 
estimator is superior in the sense that it accounts for the fractional nature of dependent 
variable (i.e. leverage ratio is bounded between zero and one).  
         
Table 5.4 reports the results for leverage regressions (Equation 5.6). The coefficients on 
both TONE and TONE_RES are negative and statistically significant at 1% level in all 
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specifications.
 90, 91
 This observation is consistent with the proposition that managerial 
overconfidence may cause debt conservatism (Hypothesis 1a). From investors’ 
perspective, this result is also in line with the argument that moderate managerial 
overconfidence makes equity investors more willing to buy firms’ share (because of 
potential positive effects of overconfidence). Furthermore, our subsequent subsample 
analysis (see section 4.5.1) demonstrates that the observed negative tone-leverage 
relationship is unlikely to be due to either information asymmetry or impression 
management.  
         
On the other hand, both insider trading-based measures of CEO (VOL_CEO) and 
especially CFO overconfidence (VA_CFO and VOL_CFO) are positively and 
significantly related to leverage. This finding appears, at face value, to be consistent 
with the prediction that managerial overconfidence may lead to the preference for debt 
over equity (because overconfident managers tend to use equity more conservatively 
than debt) (Hypothesis 1b). However, given a reverse tone-insider trading pattern that 
NPRs are negatively related to words-based proxy for managerial overconfidence (i.e. 
optimistic tone), NPR may not be a clean proxy for managerial overconfidence (our 
subsequent analysis in section 5.4.5.2 shows that NPR is likely to be contaminated by 
information asymmetry). There might be other channels through which NPRs lead to 
higher leverage. In fact, the positive relationship between NPRs and leverage can be 
explained by two well-documented patterns in standard finance including (1) insider 
selling prior to equity offerings (e.g., Karpoff and Lee, 1991) and (2) insider purchase 
                                                          
90
 The raw tone measure, TONE, is subject to endogeneity problem that positive tone 
might be driven by high profitability and good stock price performance. In this case, the 
negative coefficient on TONE can also be attributed to the negative effects of 
profitability and price performance on leverage. However, our finding that the 
coefficient on TONE_RES is also significantly negative can reduce the above 
endogeneity concern.  
91
 One may ask whether the negative relationship between tone and leverage can be 
explained by reverse causality. In particular, high leverage (or overleveraged) firms, 
according to trade-off theory, will probably need to adjust down their leverage by 
issuing equity in the next fiscal year. In this case, overleveraged firms will use 
optimistic tone to reduce the information cost of equity. Another form of reverse 
causality is that overlevered firms, in order to counteract potential unfavourable analyst 
reports and credit rating downgrade associated with high leverage, will use optimistic 
tone. Both two forms of reverse causality imply that high leverage may cause more 
optimistic tone. However, this implication of reverse causality is not consistent with our 
empirical finding. 
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prior to equity repurchases (e.g., Lee et al., 1992). In addition, the positive NPR-
leverage relationship might also be explained by overconfident managers’ greater 
willingness to both buy their own shares and initiate share repurchase program relative 
to their rational counterparts.  
         
Among the firm-level controls, the coefficients on tangibility and firm size are positive, 
while the coefficients on market-to-book ratio and profitability are negative. Tangibility 
is positively related to leverage, which can be explained by the fact that collateral makes 
debt financing easier. Firm size is also positively related to leverage, which is consistent 
with the notion that large firms have better reputation and lower bankruptcy risk and are 
therefore use more debt. However, this finding is inconsistent with pecking order 
prediction that firm size, as a proxy for information costs, should be positively related to 
equity issuance. The negative effect of the market-to-book ratio on leverage is 
consistent with market timing argument that firms prefer equity financing when firm 
stock is overvalued. The negative effect of profitability on leverage can be attributed to 
profitable firms’ pecking order preference for internal financing over debt financing. 
The above results are robust to alternative measures of leverage (i.e. book leverage (see 
panel A) vs. market leverage (see panel B)). 
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Table 5.3 Univariate leverage regressions 
This table reports estimated coefficients and within, between and overall R-squared of univariate fixed effects (FE) regressions where the dependent variables are book (Panel A) and 
market (Panel B) leverage respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Panel A. Dependent variable: book leverage Panel B. Dependent variable: market leverage 
Variables 
Estimated 
coefficients 
t-stat R
2
 (within) R
2
 (between) R
2
 (overall) 
Estimated 
coefficients 
t-stat R
2
 (within) R
2
 (between) R
2
 (overall) 
TONE -0.007*** -5.79 0.020 0.001 0.002 -0.015*** -11.26 0.101 0.029 0.037 
TONE_RES -0.006*** -4.99 0.015 0.004 0.006 -0.012*** -9.47 0.068 0.015 0.023 
CEO_VA 0.001 0.13 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.008** 2.50 0.007 0.020 0.015 
CEO_VOL 0.003 0.97 0.001 0.006 0.005 0.011*** 3.29 0.012 0.024 0.020 
CFO_VA 0.007** 2.11 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.009** 2.49 0.008 0.018 0.018 
CFO_VOL 0.005 1.34 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.011** 2.50 0.009 0.021 0.018 
PDEF/NA 0.035*** 4.26 0.020 0.008 0.000 0.010 1.37 0.002 0.015 0.001 
NDEF/NA 0.176*** 5.00 0.029 0.009 0.001 0.137*** 5.12 0.017 0.003 0.000 
MB -0.004 -1.12 0.003 0.048 0.038 -0.023*** -6.02 0.078 0.152 0.144 
Firm size 0.013* 1.70 0.007 0.171 0.168 0.025*** 3.93 0.022 0.091 0.087 
Tangibility 0.083 1.53 0.006 0.210 0.156 0.028 0.59 0.001 0.179 0.128 
Profitability -0.089*** -3.44 0.018 0.016 0.018 -0.152*** -5.62 0.051 0.004 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
146 
 
Table 5.4 Leverage 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) and random-effect Tobit (RE-Tobit) regressions with book and market leverage as dependent variables in Panel A and B respectively. All the 
variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Dependent variable: book leverage 
Variables  (1) FE (2) RE-Tobit (3) FE (4) RE-Tobit (5) FE (6) RE-Tobit (7) FE (8) RE-Tobit (9) FE (10) RE-Tobit (11) FE (12) RE-Tobit 
TONE -0.006*** -0.006***           
 (0.000) (0.000)           
TONE_RES   -0.005*** -0.006***         
   (0.000) (0.000)         
VA_CEO     0.000 0.001        
     (0.883) (0.798)       
VOL_CEO       0.002 0.004      
       (0.502) (0.229)     
VA_CFO         0.006** 0.010***   
         (0.050) (0.005)   
VOL_CFO           0.005 0.009** 
           (0.211) (0.020) 
PDEF 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
NDEF 0.276*** 0.246*** 0.276*** 0.246*** 0.168*** 0.149*** 0.167*** 0.148*** 0.170*** 0.155*** 0.169*** 0.155*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
MB -0.002 -0.004* -0.003  -0.006*** -0.001 -0.004  0.000 -0.004  0.000 -0.002  -0.001 -0.002  
 (0.653) (0.064) (0.334) (0.008) (0.908) (0.167) (0.974) (0.219) (0.956) (0.539) (0.947) (0.556) 
Firm size 0.019*** 0.032*** 0.019** 0.031*** 0.017 0.034*** 0.018* 0.034*** 0.009 0.031*** 0.008 0.030*** 
 (0.009) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.111) (0.000) (0.093) (0.000) (0.481) (0.000) (0.529) (0.000) 
Tangibility 0.110* 0.196*** 0.112** 0.198*** 0.039 0.186*** 0.038 0.184*** 0.102 0.241*** 0.106 0.243*** 
 (0.051) (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.628) (0.000) (0.633) (0.000) (0.208) (0.000) (0.190) (0.000) 
Profitability -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.077*** -0.082*** -0.106** -0.099*** -0.105** -0.098*** -0.165*** -0.149*** -0.165*** -0.148*** 
 (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant -0.077 -0.262*** -0.066  -0.250*** -0.027 -0.285*** -0.039 -0.289*** 0.079 -0.265*** 0.091 -0.260*** 
 (0.405) (0.000) (0.481) (0.000) (0.844) (0.000) (0.775) (0.000) (0.617) (0.000) (0.561) (0.000) 
R2 (within) 0.100  0.097  0.088  0.089  0.123  0.120  
R2 (between) 0.303  0.303  0.173  0.177  0.095  0.090  
Log-likelihood  1800.010  1799.985  1027.310  1027.999  826.417  825.255 
Obs. 2283 2283 2283 2283 1327 1327 1327 1327 1071 1071 1071 1071 
Firms 459 459 459 459 377 377 377 377 340 340 340 340 
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Table 5.4 Leverage (Continued) 
Panel B. Dependent variable: market leverage 
Variables  (1) FE (2) RE-Tobit (3) FE (4) RE-Tobit (5) FE (6) RE-Tobit (7) FE (8) RE-Tobit (9) FE (10) RE-Tobit (11) FE (12) RE-Tobit 
TONE -0.012*** -0.012***           
 (0.000) (0.000)           
TONE_RES   -0.011*** -0.011***         
   (0.000) (0.000)         
VA_CEO     0.003 0.003        
     (0.235) (0.244)       
VOL_CEO       0.005* 0.006*     
       (0.081) (0.081)     
VA_CFO         0.009*** 0.010***   
         (0.009) (0.001)   
VOL_CFO           0.008* 0.011*** 
           (0.052) (0.005) 
PDEF 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.021*** 0.030*** 0.018** 0.025** 0.018** 0.025** 0.027** 0.031*** 0.027** 0.031*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.012) (0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) 
NDEF 0.109*** 0.092*** 0.109*** 0.092*** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.123*** 0.100*** 0.130*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.108*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
MB -0.016*** -0.028*** -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.021*** -0.033*** -0.020*** -0.033*** -0.026*** -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.038*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Tangibility 0.073* 0.145*** 0.077* 0.149*** 0.062 0.154*** 0.060 0.152*** 0.095 0.191*** 0.100 0.193*** 
 (0.093) (0.000) (0.075) (0.000) (0.294) (0.000) (0.302) (0.000) (0.176) (0.000) (0.151) (0.000) 
Profitability -0.096*** -0.092*** -0.113*** -0.110*** -0.171*** -0.148*** -0.171*** -0.148*** -0.247*** -0.194*** -0.247*** -0.193*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.139* -0.170*** -0.115  -0.145*** -0.313*** -0.187*** -0.317*** -0.189*** -0.160 -0.154*** -0.147 -0.150*** 
 (0.100) (0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.210) (0.000) (0.250) (0.000) 
R2 (within) 0.203  0.204  0.210  0.212  0.263  0.260  
R2 (between) 0.274  0.275  0.218  0.218  0.226  0.230  
Log-likelihood  1983.342  1983.904  1106.644  1107.490  919.337  918.252 
Obs. 2283 2283 2283 2283 1327 1327 1327 1327 1071 1071 1071 1071 
Firms 459 459 459 459 377 377 377 377 340 340 340 340 
148 
 
5.4.3 Multivariate leverage regression in first differences 
Next, to examine the impacts of changes in managerial overconfidence (especially the 
time-varying component of optimistic tone) on the changes of leverage, we run 
Equation 5.6 in first differences
92
 as follows:  
 
∆𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1∆𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2∆𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                         (5.7) 
 
where, all variables are fiscal year-on-year changes of the level variables in Equation 
5.6.  
         
Table 5.5 reports the results from leverage regression in first differences (Equation 5.7). 
The coefficients on both ∆TONE and ∆TONE_RES are negative and significant at 1% 
level. This finding confirms the negative relationship between the level of tone and 
leverage ratio. However, the coefficients on changes of net purchase ratio (NPR) of 
CEO and CFO are all statistically insignificant and their signs vary across model 
specifications. This could be attributed to small within-firm variations of NPRs and a 
majority (i.e. more than 60 percent) of value and volume-based NPRs of CEO and CFO 
are one. We find consistent results with our previous findings (in Section 5.4.2) for most 
of the control variables including ∆PDEF/NA (+), ∆NDEF/NA (+), ∆MB (-), ∆firm size 
(+) and ∆profitability (+), except ∆tangibility which becomes less stable in terms of 
statistical significance and signs.  
 
5.4.4 Interaction between optimistic tone and insider trading 
Section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 show that optimistic tone and insider trading (i.e. net purchase 
ratio) have different direct impacts on leverage. This section further explores the 
empirical implication of the interaction between optimistic tone and insider trading for 
leverage.  
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 Similarly, Frank and Goyal (2003) also run leverage regressions in first differences. 
However, they point out that this specification may bias the coefficient estimates 
towards zero and has a lower R
2
.  
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Table 5.5 Leverage regressions in first differences 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) leverage regressions in first differences with book and market leverage as dependent variables. All the variables are defined in Appendix 
5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Panel A. Dependent variable: book leverage change (model 1-6) Panel B. Dependent variable: market leverage change (model 7-12) 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE (9) FE (10) FE (11) FE (12) FE 
∆TONE -0.002***      -0.007***      
 (0.008)      (0.000)      
∆TONE_RES  -0.002***      -0.007***     
  (0.008)      (0.000)     
∆VA_CEO   -0.005      -0.001    
   (0.114)      (0.712)    
∆VOL_CEO    -0.005      0.000   
 
   (0.309)      (0.965)   
∆VA_CFO   
  
0.002 
 
  
  
0.003 
    
  
(0.513) 
 
  
  
(0.437) 
 ∆VOL_CFO  
   
0.002   
   
0.004 
 
 
   
(0.708)   
   
(0.463) 
∆PDEF/NA 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.042** 0.042*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022** 0.022** 0.020* 0.020* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.029) (0.069) (0.070) 
∆NDEF/NA 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.143** 0.143** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.005) 
∆MB -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.011* -0.010* -0.006 -0.006 -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 
(0.006) (0.002) (0.059) (0.069) (0.172) (0.176) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆Firm size 0.021* 0.021* 0.043** 0.044** 0.043 0.044 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.099*** 0.100*** 0.104*** 0.105*** 
 
(0.058) (0.061) (0.026) (0.022) (0.157) (0.155) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆Tangibility 0.158** 0.159** -0.018 -0.016 0.106 0.104 0.100** 0.103** 0.077 0.079 0.078 0.077 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.840) (0.858) (0.434) (0.440) (0.039) (0.035) (0.263) (0.252) (0.437) (0.442) 
∆Profitability -0.079*** -0.083*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.208*** -0.209*** -0.089*** -0.100*** -0.140*** -0.139*** -0.289*** -0.288*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.003** -0.003** -0.004** -0.004** -0.003 -0.003 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.204) (0.198) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
R2 (within) 0.173 0.173 0.196 0.193 0.196 0.195 0.233 0.233 0.243 0.242 0.284 0.284 
R2 (between) 0.132 0.132 0.115 0.113 0.142 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.141 0.142 0.088 0.087 
Firms 421 421 256 256 206 206 421 421 256 256 206 206 
Obs. 1645 1645 754 754 569 569 1645 1645 754 754 569 569 
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The main purpose of examining the interaction between optimistic tone and insider 
trading is to empirically distinguish between “intentionally disinform” and 
“overconfidence (unintentionally disinform)” perspectives of tone. We follow the 
empirical strategies of Staw et al. (1983) and Abrahamson and Park (1994), in which 
the association between impression management and insider sales is examined. 
Specifically, if positive tone is associated with subsequent stock sales by firm directors, 
it is highly likely that positive tone is used consciously to manipulate investors’ 
perception. On the other hand, the interaction between positive tone and high net 
purchase is an indication of managerial overconfidence, meaning that managerial 
overconfidence contributes to both positive tone and insider purchases. Put differently, a 
combination of highly optimistic tone and high net purchase indicates overconfidence. 
In this case, managerial overconfidence makes managers disinform investors 
unconsciously by using optimistic tone.  
         
In particular, to test the joint effect of optimistic tone of Chairman’s Statement and 
insider trading, similar to Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011)
93
 we interact tone 
measures with an indicator of abnormal insider trading as follows:  
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑏2𝑁𝑃𝑅(−1)_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑏3𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑅(−1)_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝐵4𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                             (5.8) 
 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝑏2𝑁𝑃𝑅(1)_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑏3𝑇𝑂𝑁𝐸𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑃𝑅(1)_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 
𝐵4𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                                                              (5.9) 
 
where, 𝑁𝑃𝑅(−1)_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of pure insider selling that takes the value 
one if the net purchase ratio is -1 and zero otherwise. 𝑁𝑃𝑅(1)_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an indicator 
of pure insider purchase that takes the value one if the net purchase ratio is 1 and zero 
otherwise. We check variance inflation factors (VIFs) for the above regression models 
with interaction terms, multicollinearity is not a problem.  
         
                                                          
93
 Rogers, Buskirk and Zechman (2011) examine the combined effects of optimistic 
tone of earnings announcements and insider trading in the context of shareholder 
litigation. They report that the interaction between optimism and abnormal insider 
selling will increase litigation risk. The reason for the increased likelihood of being sued 
is that insider selling contradicts optimistic disclosure tone. 
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Table 5.6 reports the results for leverage regressions with interaction effects of tone and 
an indicator of pure insider selling (Equation 5.8). CEO_NPR(-1) and CFO_NPR(-1) 
are two dummy variables take on the value one if NPRs of CEO and CFO respectively 
are -1 and zero otherwise. Both CEO_NPR(-1) and CFO_NPR(-1) are negatively 
correlated with leverage, while only the coefficients on CFO_NPR(-1) are statistically 
significant in all specifications. In terms of the combined effects, the interaction 
between CEO_NPR(-1) and tone measures are positive and statistically significant in 
most of the specifications. In brief, the above findings suggest that CEO selling could 
weaken the negative effects of optimistic tone on leverage, while CFO selling has a 
direct and significantly negative impact on leverage.  
         
Table 5.7 reports the results for the leverage regressions with interaction effects of tone 
and an indicator of pure insider purchase (Equation 5.9). CEO_NPR(1) and 
CFO_NPR(1) are two dummy variables take on the value one if NPRs of CEO and CFO 
respectively are 1 and zero otherwise. Both CEO_NPR(1) and CFO_NPR(1) are 
positively correlated with leverage, while the coefficients on CFO_NPR(1) are 
statistically more significant. Regarding interaction effects, the interaction between 
CEO_NPR(1) and tone measures are negative and statistically significant in all 
specifications. This finding suggests that optimistic tone has more negative impacts on 
leverage especially when CEOs engage in pure purchase of their firm’s stocks. The 
interaction between CFO_NPR(1) and tone measures are also negative but statistically 
insignificant.  
         
Overall, the negative coefficients on the interaction between insider purchase dummy 
and tone also support the managerial overconfidence channel: high insider purchase 
activities suggest that optimistic tone is a strong indicator of managerial overconfidence, 
that is, high insider purchase is associated with enhanced debt conservatism caused by 
managerial overconfidence (Hypothesis 3). On the other hand, the positive coefficients 
on the interaction between insider selling dummy and tone are consistent with the 
managerial overconfidence story: high insider selling activities suggest that optimistic 
tone is a weak indicator of managerial overconfidence. Consequently, the presence of 
high insider selling is associated with weaker debt conservatism caused by managerial 
overconfidence (i.e. the negative relationship between optimistic tone and leverage) 
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(Hypothesis 2). In brief, insider trading patterns indicates how strong optimistic tone is 
as a measure of overconfidence.  
         
Nevertheless, one may contend that the above interaction effects may also be explained 
by information asymmetry and impression management channels. In particular, insider 
(especially CEO) selling, which contradicts optimistic tone, will make equity investors 
less willing to buy the firm’s shares. In contrast, when high CEO purchase, as another 
indicator of managerial belief, confirms optimistic tone, investors are more willing to 
buy firm’s stocks. The above two mechanisms only work when investors react to the 
tone. However, this is less likely given that we measure tone using the contemporaneous 
Chairman’s Statement which is only available for the readers (e.g. investors) after fiscal 
year end. To further rule out the above two alternative channels, we conduct more 
formal analysis in the next section.  
 
5.4.5 Subsample analysis: alternative interpretations of optimistic tone 
and insider trading 
This section investigates whether our two measures of managerial belief are subject to 
alternative interpretations, especially information asymmetry, by conducting subsample 
analysis.  
 
5.4.5.1 Sensitivity of tone-leverage relationship to information asymmetry 
To distinguish between rational (i.e. information asymmetry and impression 
management) and irrational (i.e. managerial overconfidence (hubris)) interpretations of 
optimistic tone, we examine the extent to which the significance of tone-leverage 
relationship varies with proxies for information asymmetries. Firm size is an important 
indicator of information asymmetries. Small firms have higher information asymmetry 
problem and are followed by fewer analysts. Lang and Lundholm (2000) examine 
whether voluntary disclosure prior to equity offerings are used to reduce information 
asymmetry or hype the stock. For this research purpose, their sample is limited to small 
firms. The reason is that small firms are followed by fewer analysts and are more likely 
to use disclosure to “influence market  
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Table 5.6 Leverage regression with interaction effects of tone and insider selling 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with book and market leverage as dependent variables. Interactions between indicators of pure insider selling (i.e. 
CEO_NPR(-1) and CFO_NPR(-1)) and tone are included in all regressions. All the variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level 
clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Dependent variable: market leverage Panel B. Dependent variable: book leverage 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
TONE -0.011*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.006*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.006) 
 TONE_RES 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.005*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.007) 
CEO_NPR(-1) -0.011** -0.008* 
  
-0.002 -0.001 
  
 
(0.040) (0.100) 
  
(0.716) (0.908) 
  CEO_NPR(-1)*TONE 0.011*** 
   
0.010*** 
   
 
(0.001) 
   
(0.008) 
   CEO_NPR(-1)*TONE_RES 
 
0.007** 
   
0.008** 
  
  
(0.046) 
   
(0.038) 
  CFO_NPR(-1) 
  
-0.017** -0.015* 
  
-0.009 -0.008 
   
(0.033) (0.051) 
  
(0.247) (0.331) 
CFO_NPR(-1)*TONE 
  
0.007 
   
0.006 
 
   
(0.148) 
   
(0.230) 
 CFO_NPR(-1)*TONE_RES 
   
0.003 
   
0.006 
    
(0.464) 
   
(0.236) 
PDEF/NA 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NDEF/NA 0.138*** 0.136*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
MB -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.024*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.841) (0.947) (0.894) (0.994) 
Firm size 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.023** 0.022** 0.015 0.014 0.005 0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.018) (0.180) (0.201) (0.653) (0.675) 
Tangibility 0.035 0.034 0.078 0.083 0.026 0.024 0.096 0.097 
 
(0.543) (0.551) (0.250) (0.227) (0.740) (0.761) (0.217) (0.213) 
Profitability -0.135*** -0.151*** -0.208*** -0.224*** -0.086* -0.095** -0.147*** -0.155*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.081) (0.048) (0.007) (0.004) 
Constant -0.241** -0.220** -0.103 -0.087 0.004 0.014 0.120 0.127 
 
(0.015) (0.027) (0.414) (0.495) (0.974) (0.917) (0.439) (0.414) 
R2 (within) 0.258 0.254 0.298 0.298 0.109 0.107 0.130 0.130 
R2 (between) 0.230 0.226 0.225 0.226 0.138 0.128 0.056 0.058 
Firms 377 377 340 340 377 377 340 340 
Obs. 1327 1327 1071 1071 1327 1327 1071 1071 
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Table 5.7 Leverage regression with interaction effects of tone and insider purchase 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with book and market leverage as dependent variables. Interactions between indicators of pure insider purchase (i.e. 
CEO_NPR(1) and CFO_NPR(1)) and tone are included in all regressions. All the variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: market leverage Dependent variable: book leverage 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
TONE -0.006*** 
 
-0.008*** 
 
-0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.422) 
 
(0.239) 
 TONE_RES 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.004 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.186) 
CEO_NPR(1) 0.004 0.003 
  
0.000 0.000 
  
 
(0.437) (0.538) 
  
(0.948) (0.927) 
  CEO_NPR(1)*TONE -0.007*** 
   
-0.006*** 
   
 
(0.004) 
   
(0.007) 
   CEO_NPR(1)*TONE_RES 
 
-0.004* 
   
-0.004* 
  
  
(0.077) 
   
(0.081) 
  CFO_NPR(1) 
  
0.010 0.010 
  
0.011* 0.011* 
   
(0.120) (0.129) 
  
(0.069) (0.070) 
CFO_NPR(1)*TONE 
  
-0.003 
   
-0.001 
 
   
(0.380) 
   
(0.705) 
 CFO_NPR(1)*TONE_RES 
   
-0.002 
   
-0.001 
    
(0.566) 
   
(0.754) 
PDEF/NA 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
NDEF/NA 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.177*** 0.176*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
MB -0.017*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.025*** 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.852) (0.996) (0.848) (0.982) 
Firm size 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.024** 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.011) (0.177) (0.209) (0.496) (0.530) 
Tangibility 0.033 0.035 0.082 0.084 0.023 0.023 0.095 0.096 
 
(0.553) (0.535) (0.233) (0.219) (0.767) (0.764) (0.222) (0.219) 
Profitability -0.134*** -0.151*** -0.210*** -0.226*** -0.084* -0.094* -0.148*** -0.156*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.089) (0.051) (0.006) (0.003) 
Constant -0.252*** -0.227** -0.141 -0.119 0.002 0.016 0.075 0.086 
 
(0.010) (0.021) (0.267) (0.351) (0.990) (0.908) (0.629) (0.584) 
R2 (within) 0.255 0.252 0.296 0.297 0.107 0.105 0.132 0.132 
R2 (between) 0.227 0.225 0.226 0.226 0.137 0.131 0.081 0.081 
Firms 377 377 340 340 377 377 340 340 
Obs. 1327 1327 1071 1071 1327 1327 1071 1071 
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perceptions”94 (Lang and Lundholm, 2000). In contrast, large firms followed by many 
analysts are expected to provide more transparent and high-quality disclosures (Osma 
and Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). This proposition is supported by Osma and Guillamón-
Saorín’s (2011) empirical evidences that firm size and number of analysts following the 
firm, as proxies for information environment, are negatively associated with impression 
management (e.g. manually coded disclosure tone).  
         
In sum, small firms have more incentive to not only reduce information asymmetry but 
also to manipulate investors’ impression, using unbiased and biased reporting 
respectively. Therefore, if our optimistic tone influences leverage through the above two 
rational channels, we would expect that the negative relationship between tone and 
leverage will be stronger for small firms. However, our results in Table 5.8 do not 
support this conjecture. In particular, we find that both economic and statistical 
significance of the negative relationship between tone and leverage are extremely 
similar for small (i.e. bottom quartile) and large (i.e. top quartile) firms (see Panel A in 
Table 5.11). As a robustness check, we compare small firms in the bottom decile and 
large firms in the top decile. The results are qualitatively similar. The results are also 
robust to alternative measures of information asymmetry, namely tangibility, firm age 
and market-to-book (see Panel B, C and D in Table 5.8 respectively)
95
. Therefore, we 
may conclude that the observed tone-leverage relationship is less likely to be driven by 
                                                          
94
 Another reason why small firms are more likely to engage in impression management 
is related to Baker and Wurgler’s (2006) proposition that smaller firms are relatively 
more “hard-to-value” and are therefore more influenced by investor sentiment. The 
implication is that investment decisions of irrational investors with high sentiment are 
more easily influenced by impression management. This is because irrational investors 
are less able to undo biased reporting, which offers small firms more scope for 
impression management. 
95
 First, the economic and statistical significance of the coefficients on tone measures 
are extremely similar for intangible and tangible firms. Second, the tone-leverage 
relationships are also similar for young and old firms. When we compare young and old 
firms in bottom decile and large firms in top decile, the tone measures are only 
statistically significant for old firms. Third, we divide our sample into high and low 
growth firms. The economic and statistical significance of tone-leverage relationships 
are weaker for firms with high market-to-book ratio. This finding is also inconsistent 
with information asymmetry channel. Taken together, the above observations that the 
tone-leverage relationships are similar across subsamples split based on proxies for 
information asymmetry and information environment suggest that the significant tone-
leverage relationship is less likely due to either information asymmetry or impression 
management.  
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either information asymmetry or impression management. In other words, our empirical 
results favour the managerial overconfidence channel.
96
  
 
5.4.5.2 Sensitivity of NPR-leverage relationship to information asymmetry 
Next, to see whether NPR also captures information asymmetry as well as managerial 
overconfidence, we examine the sensitivity of the NPR-leverage relationship to firm 
characteristics (including firm size, tangibility, firm age and market-to-book) related to 
information asymmetry. As shown in Table 5.9
97
, the coefficients on value-based NPRs 
of CEO are both statistically and economically more significant for smaller, intangible 
and younger firms which have higher information costs. This finding suggests that NPR 
could be more related to information asymmetry rather than managerial overconfidence. 
Therefore, we may conclude that the positive NPR-leverage relationship might reflect 
information asymmetry.  
         
To sum up, the above subsample analysis shows that (1) the negative tone-leverage 
relationship is less likely to be driven by either information asymmetry or impression 
management, while (2) the positive NPR-leverage relationship could be due to 
information asymmetry. Put differently, optimistic tone seems to be a more reliable and 
cleaner proxy for managerial overconfidence, while NPR is contaminated by 
information asymmetry. This important observation can explain why the words-based 
and action-based measures of managerial beliefs have differing effects on leverage.  
 
 
                                                          
96 Bodnaruk, Loughran and McDonald’s (2013) study suggests that the frequency of 
negative words can be used as a proxy for financial constraints. However, our 
subsample analysis shows that our key results (i.e. the negative relation between tone 
and leverage) are not sensitive to various firm characteristics that are related to financial 
constraints (e.g. firm size, firm age, etc.). Therefore, we may conclude that our findings 
regarding the tone-leverage relation are not entirely consistent with tone proxying for 
financial constraints.  
97
 We use OLS instead of fixed effect (within) estimator because the subsample analysis 
of NPR-leverage relationship is based on smaller samples (and shorter panels) and more 
importantly our key variable (i.e. NPRs) has small within variations.  
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Table 5.8 Subsample analysis: sensitivity of tone-leverage relationship to information asymmetry 
This table presents fixed effect (FE) regressions with book and market leverage as dependent variables. Subsamples split based on firm size, tangibility, firm age and market-to-book 
are estimated to examine the impacts of information asymmetry and information environment on the tone-leverage relationship. “Small Quartile” and “Large Quartile” consist of the 
smallest and largest (in terms of total assets) observations from the bottom and top quartile respectively. “Intang. Quartile” and “Tang. Quartile” consist of the most intangible and 
tangible observations from the bottom and top quartile respectively. “Young Quartile” and “Old Quartile” consist of the youngest and oldest observations from the bottom and top 
quartile respectively. “LowMB Quartile” and “HighMB Quartile” consist of observations with lowest and highest MB ratio from the bottom and top quartile respectively. Six control 
variables are also included but not reported to save space. All the variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: market leverage (column 1-4) Dependent variable: book leverage (column 5-8) 
 
(1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
Panel A: firm size Small Quartile Small Quartile Large Quartile Large Quartile Small Quartile Small Quartile Large Quartile Large Quartile 
TONE -0.010*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.006** 
 
-0.007** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.011) 
 TONE_RES 
 
-0.009*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
-0.006** 
 
-0.006** 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.011) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within), R2 (between) 0.106, 0.179 0.106, 0.180 0.367, 0.383 0.367, 0.384 0.045, 0.027 0.044, 0.028 0.154, 0.283 0.154, 0.283 
Firms 163 163 112 112 163 163 112 112 
Obs. 571 571 570 570 571 571 570 570 
Panel B: tangibility Intang. Quartile Intang. Quartile Tang. Quartile Tang. Quartile Intang. Quartile Intang. Quartile Tang. Quartile Tang. Quartile 
TONE -0.014*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.000) 
 TONE_RES 
 
-0.013*** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.000) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within), R2 (between) 0.155, 0.176 0.156, 0.177 0.281, 0.295 0.282, 0.295 0.065, 0.003 0.065, 0.003 0.091, 0.204 0.091, 0.204 
Firms 171 171 135 135 171 171 135 135 
Obs. 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 
Panel C: firm age Young Quartile Young Quartile Old Quartile Old Quartile Young Quartile Young Quartile Old Quartile Old Quartile 
TONE -0.008*** 
 
-0.008*** 
 
-0.006* 
 
-0.003 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.056) 
 
(0.133) 
 TONE_RES 
 
-0.008*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.005* 
 
-0.003 
 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.137) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within), R2 (between) 0.156, 0.264 0.156, 0.264 0.394, 0.285 0.394, 0.285 0.105, 0.230 0.104, 0.231 0.157, 0.186 0.157, 0.187 
Firms 171 171 91 91 171 171 91 91 
Obs. 567 567 570 570 567 567 570 570 
Panel D: market-to-book HighMB Quartile HighMB Quartile LowMB Quartile LowMB Quartile HighMB Quartile HighMB Quartile LowMB Quartile LowMB Quartile 
TONE -0.003**  -0.013*** 
 
-0.005** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
 
(0.037)  (0.000) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.000) 
 TONE_RES  -0.003** 
 
-0.013*** 
 
-0.005** 
 
-0.011*** 
 
 (0.037) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.000) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 (within), R2 (between) 0.130, 0.321 0.130, 0.321 0.214, 0.095 0.215, 0.096 0.079, 0.274 0.079, 0.275 0.141, 0.146 0.141, 0.146 
Firms 189 189 243 243 189 189 243 243 
Obs. 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 570 
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Table 5.9 Subsample analysis: sensitivity of value-based NPR-leverage relationship to information asymmetry 
This table presents OLS regressions with book and market leverage as dependent variables. Subsamples split based on firm size, tangibility, firm age and market-to-book are 
estimated to examine the impacts of information asymmetry and information environment on the NPR-leverage relationship. “Small Quartile” and “Large Quartile” consist of the 
smallest and largest (in terms of total assets) observations from the bottom and top quartile respectively. “Intang. Quartile” and “Tang. Quartile” consist of the most intangible and 
tangible observations from the bottom and top quartile respectively. “Young Quartile” and “Old Quartile” consist of the youngest and oldest observations from the bottom and top 
quartile respectively. “LowMB Quartile” and “HighMB Quartile” consist of observations with lowest and highest MB ratio from the bottom and top quartile respectively. Six control 
variables are also included but not reported to save space. All the variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Robust standard errors are used. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: market leverage (column 1-4) Dependent variable: book leverage (column 5-8) 
 
(1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS (5) OLS (6) OLS (7) OLS (8) OLS 
Panel A: firm size Small Quartile Small Quartile Large Quartile Large Quartile Small Quartile Small Quartile Large Quartile Large Quartile 
VA_CEO 0.021*** 
 
0.012** 
 
0.023*** 
 
0.005 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.030) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.475) 
 VA_CFO 0.012 
 
0.021*** 
 
0.019** 
 
0.018** 
  
(0.125) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.020) 
 
(0.046) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.205 0.212 0.436 0.429 0.178 0.143 0.239 0.221 
Obs. 271 167 429 339 271 167 429 339 
Panel B: tangibility Intang. Quartile Intang. Quartile Tang. Quartile Tang. Quartile Intang. Quartile Intang. Quartile Tang. Quartile Tang. Quartile 
VA_CEO 0.010* 
 
0.010 
 
0.006 
 
0.005 
 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.362) 
 
(0.529) 
 VA_CFO 0.012* 
 
0.018** 
 
0.011 
 
0.023** 
  
(0.075) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.179) 
 
(0.025) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.191 0.191 0.343 0.365 0.140 0.133 0.230 0.218 
Obs. 316 234 364 282 316 234 364 282 
Panel C: firm age Young Quartile Young Quartile Old Quartile Old Quartile Young Quartile Young Quartile Old Quartile Old Quartile 
VA_CEO 0.008 
 
0.000 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
 
(0.218) 
 
(0.976) 
 
(0.950) 
 
(0.795) 
 VA_CFO 0.023*** 
 
0.007 
 
0.022* 
 
0.008 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.296) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.398) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.337 0.340 0.344 0.365 0.387 0.350 0.223 0.189 
Obs. 317 228 357 295 317 228 357 295 
Panel D: market-to-book HighMB Quartile HighMB Quartile LowMB Quartile LowMB Quartile HighMB Quartile HighMB Quartile LowMB Quartile LowMB Quartile 
VA_CEO 0.001 
 
0.018* 
 
0.003 
 
0.015 
 
 
(0.752) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.646) 
 
(0.127) 
 VA_CFO 0.001 
 
0.017 
 
0.010 
 
0.015 
  
(0.882) 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.218) 
 
(0.160) 
Control variables  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.401 0.387 0.267 0.273 0.406 0.372 0.310 0.311 
Obs. 327 279 334 257 327 279 334 257 
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5.4.6 Robustness checks  
We conduct several robustness checks using alternative model specifications, estimators 
and subsamples.  
         
5.4.6.1 System-GMM 
Our tone measures might be endogenous. We attempt to alleviate this concern using the 
system Generalized Method of Moments (sys-GMM) to estimate the following dynamic 
partial adjustment model: 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝐵3𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 . We 
include a lagged dependent variable (i.e. 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1 ) to avoid potential “dynamic 
misspecification”. We report the results from GMM regressions in Table 5.10. All the 
explanatory variables as treated as endogenous. Our main empirical results are robust to 
this alternative estimator
98
.  
         
5.4.6.2 Logistic analysis of low/zero-leverage 
Furthermore, we further examine the relationship between managerial overconfidence 
and debt conservatism. More specifically, we use logit models to test the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on the likelihood of firm-years with low leverage (i.e. below 
5%) or zero leverage. This specification is closely related to recent studies on “zero-
leverage puzzle” (e.g., Strebulaev and Yang, 2012; Devos et al., 2012). In our sample, 
around 34.3 and 14.3 percent of the firm-years have low and zero leverage respectively. 
We use the following logit models: 
 
Pr(𝐿𝑂𝑊𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)                      (5.10) 
 
Pr(𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝑓(𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵2𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)                    (5.11) 
 
where,  𝐿𝑂𝑊_𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable that equals one if the market leverage of a 
particular firm-year is less than 5% and zero otherwise. 𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂_𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡  is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the leverage of a particular firm-year is zero and zero 
otherwise.  𝑿𝑖𝑡 is a vector of firm-level control variables including market-to-book ratio, 
                                                          
98
 We check our model specifications using autocorrelation tests and Hansen test. In 
particular, the null of no second order autocorrelation fails to be rejected. Hansen test 
fails to reject the null of instrument validity.  
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firm size, tangibility and profitability. 𝑣𝑖 is time-invariant firm-specific effects. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term.  
         
Table 5.11 reports logistic analysis of the determinants of the probability of low 
leverage (Equation 5.10). We find that insider trading-based measures of CEO and 
especially CFO overconfidence have negative and significant impacts on the probability 
of low leverage. In contrast, both TONE and TONE_RES are positively and significantly 
related to the probability of low leverage.  
         
Table 5.12 reports logistic analysis of the determinants of the probability of zero 
leverage (Equation 5.11). Only CFO overconfidence has a negative and significant 
impact on the probability of zero leverage. The signs of the coefficients on TONE and 
TONE_RES are sensitive to estimation methods and statistically insignificant. To 
conclude, the results from logistic analysis further confirm our previous findings from 
leverage regressions (Equation 5.6) that tone-based measures of overconfidence is 
negatively associated with leverage, while insider trading-based measures of CEO and 
CFO overconfidence are positively associated with leverage.  
 
5.4.6.3 Non-linear effect 
We examine the non-linear effect of optimistic tone by including a quadratic term of 
tone in Equation 5.6. The relationship between optimistic tone and leverage could be 
non-linear if the effects of moderate overconfidence differ from extremely high 
overconfidence
99
. We find some evidence that support this proposition. Both 
TONE*TONE and TONE_RES*TONE_RES have positive and statistically significant 
(at 5% level) effects on market leverage using OLS estimator. However, this non-linear 
relationship becomes insignificant when using book leverage and fixed effects estimator. 
Consistent with our previous findings, both tone measures have negative and significant 
impacts on leverage in all specifications.  
        
                                                          
99
 Campbell et al. (2011) is the first study that examines different effects of low, 
moderate, and high levels of CEO optimism in the context of forced turnover. They find 
a non-linear (i.e. inversed-U) relationship between optimism and the probability of 
forced turnover.  
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Table 5.10 Dynamic leverage adjustment: system GMM 
This table presents leverage regressions with book and market leverage as dependent variables. All the variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. The models are estimated using 
two-step system GMM. All explanatory variables are treated as endogenous, which are instrumented using lags 2 or 3. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity 
are used. P-values are given in parentheses. AR(1) and AR(2) are first and second order autocorrelation of residuals, asymptotically distributed as standard normal under the 
null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is a test of instrument validity. F test is a test of overall model fit. P-values of the above diagnostic tests are reported. Number of 
instruments is also reported. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Panel A. Dependent variable: book leverage (model 1-2) Panel B. Dependent variable: market leverage (model 3-4) 
 
(1) SYS-GMM (2) SYS-GMM (3) SYS-GMM (4) SYS-GMM 
Lagged leverage 0.842*** 0.843*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE -0.005** 
 
-0.016***  
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.000)  
TONE_RES 
 
-0.004**  -0.013*** 
  
(0.027)  (0.000) 
PDEF/NA 0.006 0.007 0.021 0.034** 
 
(0.565) (0.562) (0.121) (0.014) 
NDEF/NA 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.225*** 0.318*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
MB 0.001 0.000 -0.017*** -0.014*** 
 
(0.663) (0.846) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000) 
Tangibility 0.060** 0.062** 0.018 0.016 
 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.524) (0.571) 
Profitability  -0.015 -0.022 -0.082*** -0.061** 
 
(0.537) (0.350) (0.002) (0.016) 
Constant -0.092*** -0.082*** -0.036 -0.101*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.274) (0.001) 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.835 0.837 0.292 0.722 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.628 0.637 0.389 0.464 
F test (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Number of instruments 284 284 284 284 
Firms 421 421 421 421 
Obs. 1645 1645 1645 1645 
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Table 5.11 Logistic analysis of low leverage 
This table presents fixed effect logit (FE-logit) and pooled logit (P-logit) regressions where coefficients reported as log odds ratios. The dependent variable is low leverage 
dummy that equals one if market leverage is less than 5% and zero otherwise. All the variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level 
clustering. Log-likelihood and log pseudolikelihood are reported for FE-logit and P-logit respectively. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that 
coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: low leverage dummy=1 if market leverage is below 5%. 
 
(1) FE-logit (2) P-logit (3) FE-logit (4) P-logit (5) FE-logit (6) P-logit (7) FE-logit (8) P-logit (9) FE-logit (10) P-logit (11) FE-logit (12) P-logit 
VA_CEO -0.043  -0.277*** 
          
 
(0.853) (0.001) 
          VOL_CEO 
 
-0.266 -0.350*** 
        
 
  
(0.334) (0.000) 
        VA_CFO 
   
-0.607* -0.399*** 
      
 
    
(0.056) (0.000) 
      VOL_CFO 
     
-0.753* -0.409*** 
    
 
      
(0.087) (0.000) 
    TONE 
        
0.231*** 0.086** 
  
 
        
(0.008) (0.016) 
  TONE_RES 
          
0.223*** 0.083** 
           
(0.007) (0.015) 
MB 2.669*** 1.033*** 2.571*** 1.032*** 2.709*** 0.858*** 2.772*** 0.873*** 1.688*** 0.882*** 1.754*** 0.908*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm size -0.946  -0.525*** -1.042* -0.518*** 0.570  -0.504*** 0.590  -0.491*** -0.755** -0.501*** -0.725** -0.491*** 
 
(0.103) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000) (0.302) (0.000) (0.282) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
Tangibility -7.426  -2.837*** -7.637* -2.863*** 1.553  -2.639*** 1.365  -2.665*** -3.765** -2.239*** -3.853** -2.270*** 
 
(0.101) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.689) (0.000) (0.728) (0.000) (0.044) (0.000) (0.039) (0.000) 
Profitability 3.234  0.642  3.623  0.619  0.303  0.811  0.174  0.815  1.283  0.883** 1.630  1.016*** 
 
(0.277) (0.254) (0.228) (0.270) (0.912) (0.207) (0.949) (0.207) (0.343) (0.025) (0.222) (0.009) 
Constant 
 
4.701***  4.687***  4.586*** 
 
4.453*** 
 
4.340*** 
 
4.161*** 
  
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Log-likelihood -74.486 -571.006 -74.030 -569.151 -49.612 -473.518 -49.866 -474.371 -196.607 -1067.232 -196.538 -1067.158 
Obs.  300 1327 300 1327 201 1071 201 1071 656 2283 656 2283 
Firms 64 377 64 377 43 340 43 340 111 459 111 459 
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Table 5.12 Logistic analysis of zero leverage 
This table presents fixed effect logit (FE-logit) and pooled logit (P-logit) regressions where coefficients reported as log odds ratios. The dependent variable is zero leverage 
dummy that equals one if market leverage is 0% and zero otherwise. All the variables are defined in Appendix 5.A. Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. Log-
likelihood and log pseudolikelihood are reported for FE-logit and P-logit respectively. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: zero leverage dummy=1 if market leverage is 0%. 
 
(1) FE-logit (2) P-logit (3) FE-logit (4) P-logit (5) FE-logit (6) P-logit (7) FE-logit (8) P-logit (9) FE-logit (10) P-logit (11) FE-logit (12) P-logit 
VA_CEO 0.036 -0.134 
          
 
(0.916) (0.248) 
          VOL_CEO 
 
-0.121 -0.110 
        
 
  
(0.710) (0.381) 
        VA_CFO 
   
-1.089* -0.379*** 
      
 
    
(0.089) (0.003) 
      VOL_CFO 
     
-1.418* -0.327** 
    
 
      
(0.080) (0.015) 
    TONE 
        
0.100 -0.008 
  
 
        
(0.317) (0.865) 
  TONE_RES 
          
0.097 -0.008 
           
(-0.311) (0.855) 
MB -0.076 0.191*** -0.093 0.198*** -0.626 0.248*** -0.760 0.256*** -0.142 0.224*** -0.112 0.221*** 
 
(0.759) (0.003) (0.704) (0.003) (0.161) (0.003) (0.127) (0.002) (0.302) (0.000) (-0.402) (0.000) 
Firm size -1.641** -0.522*** -1.652** -0.518*** -0.323 -0.511*** -0.188 -0.495*** -0.699** -0.561*** -0.686** -0.561*** 
 
(0.035) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.762) (0.000) (0.863) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (-0.019) (0.000) 
Tangibility 2.726 -1.270*** 3.066 -1.274*** 14.804** -1.028 15.318** -1.047* -2.326 -1.189*** -2.367 -1.187*** 
 
(0.565) (0.007) (0.518) (0.007) (0.038) (0.104) (0.04) (0.097) (0.315) (0.003) (-0.307) (0.003) 
Profitability 2.161 1.236** 1.978 1.251** 6.355* 0.852 6.210* 0.888 1.085 1.558*** 1.237 1.546*** 
 
(0.328) (0.024) (0.354) (0.023) (0.094) (0.236) (0.086) (0.216) (0.304) (0.000) (-0.232) (0.000) 
Constant 
 
4.194*** 
 
4.131*** 
 
3.969*** 
 
3.779*** 
 
4.354*** 
 
4.37*** 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Log-likelihood -37.993 -420.333 -37.930 -420.637 -22.836 -311.907 -22.605 -313.335 -118.848 -740.171 -118.835 -740.169 
Obs. 115 1327 115 1327 80 1071 80 1071 317 2283 317 2283 
Firms 26 377 26 377 18 340 18 340 54 459 54 459 
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5.4.6.4 Year and industry effects 
We control for year and industry effects on leverage by including year and industry 
dummies. The results are qualitatively similar.  
 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
This study contributes to the finance and accounting literature by examining the impact 
of disclosure tone on capital structure. In particular, we provide new evidence that 
managerial optimistic words, as a proxy for managerial overconfidence, may lead to 
conservative debt policy. This important finding provides initial empirical evidence 
supporting Malmendier et al.’s (2011) proposition that managerial overconfidence is 
associated with debt conservatism.  
         
We also document that when managerial actions (i.e. insider trading) contradict their 
words (i.e. tone), the tone-leverage relationship is weakened. This new insight is in line 
with previous evidences in the accounting literature that the combined effect of 
optimistic tone and abnormal insider selling is associated with higher litigation risk 
(Rogers et al., 2011). In contrast, we find that insider purchase, which confirms 
optimistic tone, enhances negative tone-leverage relationship.  
 
Moreover, our further analysis finds that optimistic tone is a more reliable and valid 
proxy for managerial overconfidence than insider trading measures. Insider trading 
seem to also capture information asymmetry. Overall, the major implication of this 
study is that time-varying managerial overconfident belief, gauged from their words, is 
an important determinant of leverage.  
         
There are two major implications for future studies. First, our composite tone-based 
measure of overconfidence can be adopted in studies on time-varying managerial 
overconfidence. Second, it will be interesting to examine the joint effect of managerial 
“words” and “actions” on other corporate financial policies and events, especially when 
there is a discrepancy between their words and actions.  
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Chapter 6. Empirical Study 2: Managerial Overconfidence and 
Reverse Pecking Order Preference 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The pecking order theory of capital structure suggests that firms “prefer”100 internal to 
external financing and if the internal funds are not sufficient debt is preferred to equity 
(Donaldson, 1961; Myers, 1984; Myers and Maljuf, 1984). Although numerous 
empirical studies (e.g., Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003; 
Lemmon and Zender, 2010) have been devoted to test the pecking order theory, the 
underlying driving forces of pecking order behaviour receives much less attention
101
. 
There is a strand of literature that uses Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) (1999) 
financing deficit framework to examine various drivers of pecking order preference, 
including information asymmetry (Bharath et al., 2009), mispricing (Elliott et al., 2007), 
market conditions (Huang and Ritter, 2009) and managerial overconfidence 
(Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011; Malmendier and Zheng, 2012). An important 
empirical modification made to the SSM framework is that firm-years with financing 
deficit and financing surplus (i.e. negative financing deficit) are tested separately, which 
is based on a more realistic assumption of an asymmetric pecking order coefficient 
(Kayhan and Titman, 2007; De Jong et al., 2010).  
         
Empirical evidence on the pecking order predictions are mixed. Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) propose a test of pecking order theory and find it outperforms the static 
trade-off theory. In contrast, using a larger sample, Frank and Goyal (2003) do not find 
strong evidence for the pecking order theory. They report a “pecking order puzzle (size 
                                                          
100
 Frank and Goyal (2008) argue that there are two alternative interpretations of the 
preference: strict vs. “other things equal” version. They point out that the strict 
interpretation of pecking order preference is more refutable and is in fact refuted. The 
“other things equal” interpretation therefore becomes more popular and recent empirical 
studies examine different versions of “other things equal”. This important distinction 
between two alternative interpretations of pecking order preference suggests that 
pecking order theory is a conditional theory. Accordingly, it is more important to 
empirically examine various conditions driving pecking order preference rather than the 
pecking order itself.  
101
 According to Frank and Goyal (2008), “no one [to date] has tried to distinguish 
among the alternative possible sources of pecking order behavior”. 
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anomaly)” 102  that larger firms, which are relatively less subject to the information 
asymmetry, exhibit more pecking order behaviour. This finding is inconsistent with the 
pecking order model based on information asymmetry. The main purpose of this study 
is to examine whether managerial overconfidence is a potential driver of pecking order 
preference, which in turn may shed light on the pecking order puzzle.  
 
To reconcile the above contrasting findings, it is important to recognize that pecking 
order theory is a conditional theory
103
 (Myers, 2001). In the capital structure literature, 
perhaps the most commonly cited condition for pecking order is Myers and Majluf’s 
(1984) adverse selection
104
. However, pecking order theory can be regarded as a 
“funding preference theory” rather than a pure adverse selection problem (Welch, 2006). 
In particular, the pecking order may arise if issuing more junior securities is relatively 
more costly. In other words, the adverse selection costs associated with information 
sensitive securities is only one of the potential driving forces.
105
 In brief, information 
asymmetry is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition of pecking order behaviour.  
 
From behavioural finance perspective, managerial overconfidence can also serve as a 
driver of pecking order preference (Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011). 
However, the theoretical relationship between managerial overconfidence and pecking 
order is somewhat controversial due in large part to different modelling approaches of 
                                                          
102
 De Jong et al. (2010) refer to Frank and Goyal’s (2003) finding that firm size is 
positively related to the degree of pecking order as pecking order puzzle or size 
anomaly. 
103
 A good description of conditional theory is as follows: “… the theory finds support 
when its basic assumptions hold in the data, as should reasonably be expected of any 
theory” (Bharath et al., 2009).  
104
 The Myers-Majluf (1984) type model shows that the pecking order is conditional on 
the asymmetric information between managers and outside investors. Managers with 
more inside information are reluctant to use external financing, especially the equity, 
which is undervalued by the outsiders. 
105
 Similarly, Fama and French’s (2005) study suggests that asymmetric information 
problems are neither the only nor perhaps even an important determinant of capital 
structure. They further argue that “any forces that cause firms to systematically deviate 
from pecking order financing imply that the pecking order, as the complete model of 
capital structure proposed by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984), is dead”. 
Other potential conditions of pecking order include agency costs (Myers, 2003; Leary 
and Roberts, 2010), corporate taxes (Stiglitz, 1973; Hennessy and Whited, 2005) and 
transaction costs (Welch, 2006). 
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overconfidence. Heaton’s (2002) model shows that firms with overconfident managers 
tend to believe that firm stock is undervalued by the outsiders and thus are reluctant to 
issue equity, which leads to an enhanced pecking order. Put differently, overconfident 
managers believe that they have positive inside information (i.e. perceived asymmetric 
information). Therefore, Heaton’s (2002) model provides a re-interpretation of the 
traditional Myers-Maljuf (1984) model from actual information asymmetry to simply 
perceived information asymmetry being a driver of pecking order (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005).
106
 However, Hackbarth’s (2008) model predicts an either standard or reverse 
pecking order for firms subject to two types of managerial overconfidence, namely 
growth perception bias and risk perception bias respectively. The reason why 
overconfident managers in Hackbarth’s (2008) model may not follow a standard 
pecking order is that those managers especially with risk perception bias (i.e. 
underestimate the riskiness of earnings) believe that the equity (debt) is overvalued 
(undervalued). In short, whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens 
pecking order preference is an empirical question.
107
  
         
In terms of empirical strategy, we use the modified versions of Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (SSM) (1999) regression. In particular, our modified model is asymmetric so that 
we can differentiate the impacts of managerial overconfidence on issuance and 
repurchase decisions.
108
 Regarding managerial overconfidence measures, we employ 
computational linguistic analysis of Chairman’s Statement to construct composite tone 
indices. Industry-adjusted investment rate is also used as a proxy for managerial 
overconfidence. In addition, we gauge CEO and CFO overconfidence based on how 
they trade their own firms’ shares. 
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 Similarly, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) develop a model of capital structure 
with overconfident managers who overestimate firms’ mean future cash flow and 
therefore believe that their firms are undervalued by the market. Their model also 
predicts a pecking order preference arised from managerial overconfidence, conditional 
on raising risky external capital. 
107  
Importantly, Hackbarth (2008) argue that the ambiguous effects of managerial 
overconfidence on the pecking order
 
may shed light on the inconclusive cross-sectional 
findings on the standard pecking order prediction.  
108
 Our empirical strategies are slightly different from recent studies by Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan (2011) and Malmendier and Zheng (2012). In particular, we distinguish 
between firms with financing deficit and financing surplus (i.e. negative financing 
deficit), which are related to issuance and repurchase decisions respectively. More 
discussions on the asymmetric pecking order behaviour and corresponding empirical 
models are available in the hypothesis development and methodology sections.  
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We find that both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and 
negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) regression framework, especially when there is financing deficit. These findings 
suggest that overconfident managers prefer equity to debt to meet external financing 
needs, meaning that managerial overconfidence leads to a reverse pecking order 
preference. This new evidence supports Hackbarth’s (2008) proposition that 
overconfident managers, who underestimate the riskiness of earnings (“risk perception 
bias”), tend to believe that debt is undervalued but equity is overvalued (because of the 
convexity of equity) and therefore prefer equity to debt financing.
109
 This observed 
overconfidence-induced reverse pecking order preference also corroborates our earlier 
finding that optimistic tone is negatively associated with leverage. Further support for 
our main hypothesis is provided by showing that the relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and reverse pecking order preference is more pronounced for firms with 
higher earnings volatility. This observation confirms that “risk perception bias” is the 
underlying channel through which overconfidence leads to reverse pecking order 
preference, as predicted by Hackbarth (2008).  
 
Furthermore, we find that the effect of overconfidence on reverse pecking order 
preference is especially strong for small firms. In other words, overconfident managers 
in those small firms are reluctant to follow standard pecking order behaviour, in which 
case managerial overconfidence contributes to the pecking order puzzle/size anomaly 
(i.e. small firms with higher information asymmetry surprisingly exhibit weaker 
pecking order preference relative to large firms). In addition, the effects of insider 
trading-based measures of managerial overconfidence are, however, relatively weak and 
less consistent, which is probably because insider (especially CEO) trading is driven by 
information asymmetry and thus is not a perfect proxy for managerial overconfidence. 
Overall, this study supports the proposition that managerial overconfidence is an 
underlying driver of the reverse pecking order preference especially for small firms, 
which partly explain the pecking order puzzle. 
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 This finding is in contrast to studies by Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) and 
Malmendier and Zheng (2012) which document that managerial overconfidence of US 
firms, measured by executive stock options and media portrayal, lead to enhanced 
pecking order behaviour.  
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We proceed as follows. Section 6.2 describes pecking order tests and provides a review 
of tests of various pecking order conditions using modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers 
(1999) regression. Section 6.3 develops the hypotheses. Section 6.4 presents 
methodology and data. Section 6.5 discusses the empirical findings and section 6.6 
concludes.  
 
 
6.2 Related Literature  
This section reviews empirical tests of pecking order theory, with particular focus on 
various modified versions of Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) (1999) financing deficit 
regression. The common purpose of those modified SSM regressions is to test various 
conditions of pecking order behaviour, including information asymmetry, mispricing 
and market conditions. We postpone a discussion of theoretical and empirical studies on 
manager overconfidence, as a behavioural condition of a pecking order, until the 
hypothesis development section. 
 
6.2.1 Pecking order tests  
In the capital structure literature, there are two types of pecking order tests (Fama and 
French, 2005): (1) profitability-leverage relationship and (2) SSM regression. First, as a 
general test of pecking order behaviour, many empirical studies of capital structure (e.g., 
Fama and French, 2002) examine the relationship between profitability and leverage. In 
particular, pecking order theory predicts a negative relationship between profitability 
and leverage. However, Frank and Goyal (2009) point out that in dynamic trade-off 
theory profitability can also be inversely related to leverage. This means that even if 
trade-off theory works more profitable firms may have lower leverage in the presence of 
leverage adjustment costs. In addition, from agency perspective, profitability may be a 
signal of investment opportunity (Frank and Goyal, 2003) which lowers the firm’s debt 
level because of agency conflict between shareholders and debt holders. Thus, the 
profitability-leverage relationship is not a perfect test of the pecking order theory 
because pecking order is not the only explanation of this relationship.  
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6.2.1.1 Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) test of pecking order theory  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) (1999) propose a more specific method to test the 
pecking order theory. In particular, they examine to what extent net debt issues are 
driven by firm financing deficit (DEF). According to the static pecking order theory, 
firms with external financing needs use only debt to fund their deficit. The SSM 
regression can be written as follows:  
 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃𝑂𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (6.1) 
 
where, ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the amount of debt issued or retired, 𝑏𝑃𝑂 is the pecking order coefficient, 
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡  is the financing deficit
110
. 𝑏𝑃𝑂  is expected to be close to one under the strict 
pecking order theory.  
         
A positive DEF suggests that there is a need for external financing, while a negative 
DEF means that internal funds are sufficient. It should be noted that the model is 
estimated over both positive and negative financing deficits, assuming a homogeneous 
and symmetric pecking order coefficient. Put differently, the simple pecking order 
suggests that the firm only issues or repurchases equity as a last resort. For firms with 
negative 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡, it is also expected that 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑏𝑃𝑂 = 1. However, the validity of the 
assumption of a homogeneous and symmetric pecking order coefficient in the SSM 
empirical model is questionable, which will be discussed in section 6.4.1.  
 
6.2.1.2 Pecking order puzzle  
However, Shyam-Sunder and Myers’s (1999) empirical findings are not supported by a 
subsequent study by Frank and Goyal (2003) based on a much larger sample. Frank and 
Goyal (2003) report a puzzling result that large firms are more likely to follow pecking 
order behaviour. This result is inconsistent with the standard pecking order theory based 
on information asymmetry, since firm size is perceived to be negatively related to 
information asymmetry problem. This puzzling result is referred to pecking order 
puzzle or size anomaly (De Jong et al., 2010). However, as pointed out by Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan (2011), this puzzle may be explained by managerial overconfidence. 
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 The DEF is calculated, using accounting cash flow identity, as the sum of dividend 
payments, capital expenditures, net increases in working capital and the current portion 
of long-term debt at start of period minus operating cash flows after interest and taxes. 
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Specifically, managers of those large firms become overconfident due to good past 
performance and thus have a more pronounced pecking order preference. An alternative 
explanation might be that overconfident managers in small firms have reverse pecking 
order preference (more discussions on effects of overconfidence on pecking order 
preference will be presented in section 6.3). One major motivation of this study is 
therefore to see whether managerial overconfidence can partly explain the pecking order 
puzzle.  
 
6.2.2 Tests of pecking order conditions: modified SSM (1999) 
framework  
It has been recognized that pecking order theory is a conditional theory, meaning that its 
performance largely depends on various underlying assumptions. Using modified SSM 
regressions where the pecking order coefficient is treated as heterogeneous, a growing 
body of literature examines various conditions including (1) information asymmetry, (2) 
mispricing and (3) market conditions.  
 
6.2.2.1 Information asymmetry  
Bharath et al. (2009) examine the impact of information asymmetry, using market 
microstructure proxies, on the degree of pecking order preference. Following the SSM 
framework, the interaction between information asymmetry and financing deficit is 
tested. Bharath et al. (2009) find that firms with higher information asymmetry are more 
likely to exhibit the pecking order behaviour. This finding supports Myers and Majluf’s 
(1984) pecking order model based on information asymmetry. From a behavioural 
perspective, Malmendier and Tate (2005) note that managerial overconfidence may 
provide a re-interpretation of the Myers-Maljuf (1984) pecking order model based on 
information asymmetry. Similarly, in a recent review paper Baker and Wurgler (2013) 
argue that existing evidence on pecking order theory is in accordance with the 
managerial overconfidence argument. In other words, perceived information asymmetry, 
raised from managerial overconfidence, may serve as a substitute of the real information 
asymmetry. Thus, it becomes vital to test the effect of managerial overconfidence as a 
potential condition of the pecking order.  
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6.2.2.2 Market timing (firm level): equity mispricing  
Besides, the pecking order coefficient may also be influenced by market timing 
behaviour. In particular, Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory predicts that 
overvalued (undervalued) firms are more likely to use equity (debt) to fund the 
financing deficit. Elliott et al. (2007) test the market timing theory of capital structure 
using the SSM framework. Their main purpose is to examine the impact of mispricing 
on the pecking order behaviour. Empirically, they interact an equity valuation-based 
measure of firm mispricing with the financing deficit in the SSM framework. Their 
empirical results suggest that the degree of overvaluation (undervaluation) is positively 
related to the proportion of the firm’s financing deficit that is funded with equity (debt). 
This finding supports the proposition that market timing affects the type of security used 
to fund the financing deficit.
111
  
 
6.2.2.3 Market timing (market level): time-varying cost of capital 
As discussed above, Elliott et al. (2007) document the impact of market timing, as 
motivated by equity misvaluation of each individual firms, on the pecking order 
coefficient. Their evidence of the interaction between market timing and pecking order 
is in line with Huang and Ritter (2009). Huang and Ritter (2009) empirically capture the 
market timing opportunity at the market level (i.e. time-varying cost of capital), as 
opposed to the firm-level measures of misvaluation in Elliott et al. (2007). More 
specifically, Huang and Ritter (2009) interact the implied market-level equity risk 
premium (ERP) with the pecking order coefficient. The market timing theory predicts a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term between the ERP and the positive financing 
deficit. Notably, their empirical test only focuses on the positive financing deficit, since 
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 However, Baker and Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory might be incomplete. 
Their theory follows the rational manager-irrational investor approach, assuming that 
only investors are irrational but managers are rational. This approach fails to recognise 
that managers tend to be overconfident which has been the key assumption of growing 
behavioural corporate finance literature (see e.g., Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008; 
Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011). We articulate that managerial overconfidence may 
play an important role in market timing. More specifically, considering that mispricing 
can be regarded as a perception (since the intrinsic value is not observable), this 
perception might be biased due to managerial overconfidence. Consequently, 
overconfident managers may engage in market mistiming, which is motivated by 
“perceived mispricing” of their firm stocks. It is therefore reasonable to argue that not 
only market timing but market mistiming may influence the pecking order behaviour. In 
brief, from market mistiming perspective, managerial overconfidence may also drive 
the pecking order preference.  
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the effect of market conditions on a negative financing deficit is unclear. Consistent 
with the market timing theory, they find that firms with a positive financing deficit tend 
to use more external equity when the cost of equity capital is low. Taken together, 
previous literature suggests that pecking order preference is likely to be driven by 
various conditions including information asymmetry, firm-level and market-level 
market timing. In the next section, we focus on managerial overconfidence as a driver 
of pecking order preference.  
 
 
6.3 Hypothesis Development 
This section develops two competing hypotheses based on behavioural financing 
theories which suggest that managerial overconfidence can either enhance or weaken 
pecking order preference.  
 
6.3.1 Managerial overconfidence enhances pecking order preference 
It has been recognized that the existing empirical evidence on pecking order preference 
can be almost, at face value, explained by managerial optimism (Baker and Wurgler, 
2011). However, the theoretical relationship between managerial overconfidence and 
pecking order behaviour is sensitive to modelling framework. Heaton’s (2002) model 
shows that optimistic managers prefer debt to equity since the latter is perceived to be 
undervalued. Malmendier and Tate (2005) argue that Heaton’s (2002) model provides a 
re-interpretation of the information asymmetry-based pecking order model by Myers-
Maljuf (1984). The idea is that managerial optimism is associated with perceived 
positive information. In a similar vein, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) develop a 
model
112
 of overconfidence and financing decisions and also empirically test its main 
predictions. Their major prediction is that overconfident managers only use external 
finance if overestimated returns to investment are greater than the perceived costs of 
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 Their model allows for two frictions including tax benefit of debt and financial 
distress cost. Overconfidence is defined as “the overestimation of mean returns to 
investment”. Managerial overconfidence can lead to either overinvestment or 
underinvestment, depending on the availability of internal funds or riskless debt 
financing. In particular, overconfident managers with sufficient internal or riskless 
financing are prone to overinvest. Another implication of overconfidence is that 
overconfident manager may have a biased perception of the cost of external financing. 
For this reason, if there is financing deficit, overconfident managers may underinvest. 
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external financing. However, when they do use external financing, overconfident 
managers, who believe that debt is less subject to mispricing relative to equity, tend to 
use more debt than their rational counterparts. In brief, their main prediction regarding 
the pecking order behaviour is also consistent with Heaton (2002).  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Managerial overconfidence enhances the preference for debt 
over equity.  
         
Empirically, Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) find that managerial overconfidence, as 
measured by executive stock options and media portrayal, is positively related to the 
pecking order coefficient. In other words, overconfidence leads to more pronounced 
pecking order behaviour. Furthermore, Malmendier and Zheng (2012) empirically 
compare the roles of CEO and CFO overconfidence and find that only CFO 
overconfidence has a positive and significant impact on pecking order coefficient.  
         
6.3.2 Managerial overconfidence weakens pecking order preference  
In contrast to the predictions of Heaton (2002) and Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011), 
Hackbarth’s (2008) model shows that managerial overconfidence may lead to a reverse 
pecking order. This proposition is inconsistent with Heaton’s (2002) model, which can 
be attributed to the different modelling approaches of managerial overconfidence. In 
particular, in Hackbarth’s (2008) model, overconfidence is modelled as risk perception 
bias (i.e. underestimation of the riskiness of earnings) which makes overconfident 
managers believe that debt is undervalued by the market because their perceived default 
risk is lower. In contrast, overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of 
earnings believe that their firms’ equity is overvalued because of the convexity of equity.  
Put differently, equity can be viewed as a call option
113
 on firm’s assets and the value of 
this call option is partly determined by the risks of the firm’s project. In particular, the 
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Shareholders have a call option on the firm with an exercise price of X. In a call-
option graph where the horizontal axis is cash flow to firm and vertical axis is cash flow 
to shareholders, if firm’s cash flow is beyond X, shareholders will exercise the option by 
buying the firm from the debt holders (i.e. owner of the firm) for the price X. If firm’s 
cash flow is below X, shareholders will not exercise the call option and debt holders 
receive entire firm’s cash flow. (see e.g., Hillier et al. (2010) for more descriptions on 
equity and call option)
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value of call option is positively related to project risk
114
. Therefore, overconfident 
managers who underestimate the project risk believe that equity is overvalued. Taken 
together, Hackbarth’s (2008) model suggests that overconfident managers with risk 
perception bias believe that debt is undervalued but equity is overvalued and hence 
surprisingly have a reverse pecking order preference.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Managerial overconfidence (especially Hackbarth’s (2008) risk 
perception bias) weakens the preference for debt over equity.  
 
To sum up, as argued by Malmendier and Tate (2005), managerial overconfidence can 
be a potential explanation for the pecking order type behaviour and its variation across 
firms and within firms. Nevertheless, the theoretical relation between overconfidence 
and the pecking order can be either positive (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 
2011) or negative (Hackbarth, 2008), depending on the way overconfidence is 
modelled
115
. Put differently, Hackbarth (2008) concludes that both “the magnitude and 
the combination” of two managerial biases, namely growth perception bias and risk 
perception bias, determine the pecking order preference (especially preference for debt 
vs. equity financing). Therefore, it becomes an empirical question whether 
overconfidence enhances or weakens the pecking order preference.  
 
 
6.4 Methodology and Data 
6.4.1 The model  
To test the effect of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference for debt 
over equity financing, we adopt the modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (SSM) (1999) 
regression framework where the pecking order coefficient (i.e. the coefficient on the 
financing deficit (DEF)) is not only heterogeneous but also asymmetric. In what follows, 
we briefly describe two important dimensions of our empirical model, namely 
heterogeneity and asymmetry of the pecking order coefficient.  
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 As shown in Black-Scholes model, the value of call option is positively related to the 
variance of the continuous stock returns.  
115
 Moreover, it is a daunting task to measure overconfidence in a way that can reflect 
different modelling approaches. 
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6.4.1.1 Heterogeneity of the pecking order coefficient 
On one hand, the original SSM (1999) test assumes that the pecking order coefficient is 
homogeneous. However, there might be cross-sectional differences in terms of the 
degree of the pecking order preference. As discussed earlier, the empirical performance 
of the pecking order theory depends on the underlying conditions (e.g., information 
asymmetry, mispricing, market conditions and managerial overconfidence). Therefore, 
it is more appropriate to assume that the pecking order coefficient is heterogeneous, 
meaning the pecking order theory is conditional. Empirically, one may interact the DEF 
with potential conditions of the pecking order preference. For example, a closely related 
study by Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) adds an interaction term between 
managerial overconfidence the DEF to the SSM (1999) regression to examine the 
influence of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference. However, their 
empirical model does not distinguish between firms with financing deficit and surplus, 
which is based on the questionable assumption that the pecking order coefficient is 
symmetric. In what follows, we discuss why the pecking order coefficient in the SSM 
(1999) regression is likely to be asymmetric.  
 
6.4.1.2 Asymmetry of the pecking order coefficient 
On the other hand, the original SSM (1999) test and many subsequent studies (e.g., 
Frank and Goyal, 2003; Bharath et al., 2009) do not distinguish between negative and 
positive financing deficit (DEF). According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
pecking order behaviour is assumed to be symmetric, meaning that “the simple pecking 
order’s predictions do not depend on the sign of DEF”. In other words, they believe that 
“the Myers-Majluf reasoning works in reverse when the company has a surplus and 
wants to return cash to investors”.  
 
However, Kayhan and Titman (2007) point out that Shyam-Sunder and Myers’s (1999) 
approach fails to account for asymmetry between positive and negative DEF. They 
argue that this asymmetry exists because equity issuance and repurchase are associated 
with different information issues. To empirically capture this asymmetric effect, 
Kayhan and Titman (2007) interact the DEF with a dummy variable indicating the sign 
of the DEF (e.g. the dummy variable equals one if the DEF is positive and zero 
otherwise). De Jong et al. (2010) empirically examine the asymmetry between the 
effects of financing deficits and surpluses. In terms of the role of managerial 
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overconfidence, they argue that “the level of optimism of a firm’s manager is not 
required to explain issuance decisions, while it is an essential part of the pecking order 
theory for repurchase decisions”. De Jong et al. (2010) suggest that a correct pecking 
order specification should differentiate between financing deficits and financing 
surpluses
116
.  
 
6.4.2 Measurement of financing deficit (DEF) 
In principle, financing deficit can be defined using either balance sheet data (e.g., Fama 
and French, 2005; Chang and Dasgupta; 2009) or cash flow data (e.g., Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2003). Although the cash flow approach is 
commonly adopted, balance sheet approach is probably superior for the following two 
reasons. First, cash flow data suffers from relatively large amounts of missing 
observations
117
. Second, and more importantly, the cash flow approach understates 
equity issued “because the statement of cash flow does not show stock issued in 
mergers or outright grants of stock to employees because such issues produce no cash 
flows” (Fama and French, 2005).  
 
6.4.2.1 Balance sheet approach 
Following the balance sheet approach adopted by Chang and Dasgupta (2009) and 
Huang and Ritter (2009), net debt issues is calculated as the difference between the 
change in total assets and the change in book equity; net equity issues is calculated as 
the difference between the change in book equity and the change in retained earnings. 
Financing deficit is defined as the sum of net equity issues and net debt issues, which is 
therefore equivalent to the change in total assets minus the change in retained earnings. 
The balance sheet approach can be shown as follows:  
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 They propose the following model to capture the asymmetric pecking order 
behaviour: 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑜𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡
where, 𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one if 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 < 0, and zero otherwise. The 
pecking order coefficient is 𝛽𝑝𝑜  and (𝛽𝑝𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑢𝑟 ) respectively for the firms with 
financing deficits and financing surpluses. They find that the estimated pecking order 
coefficient is 0.90, 0.74 and 0.09 respectively for financing surpluses, normal deficits 
and large deficits. 
117
 Baker and Wurgler (2002) prefer balance sheet approach because of poor availability 
of cash flow data in Compustat. 
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𝐷𝐸𝐹_𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 = (∆𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡)⏟          
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ (∆𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡)⏟          
∆𝐸𝑖𝑡
= ∆𝐴𝑖𝑡 − ∆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 (6.2) 
 
where, ∆𝐴𝑖𝑡 is the change in total assets. ∆𝐵𝐸𝑖𝑡 is the change in book value of equity. 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the change in retained earnings. ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡  and ∆𝐸𝑖𝑡  are the net debt and equity 
issues respectively. 
 
6.4.2.2 Cash flow approach  
Alternatively, Frank and Goyal (2003) use detailed positions of cash flow items to 
construct the DEF and recode missing values to be zero. In particular, they construct the 
DEF as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐸𝐹_𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 (6.3) 
 
where, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 is dividend payments. 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is capital expenditures. ∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 is net increases 
in working capital and the current proportion of long-term debt at start of period. 
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 is the operating cash flows after interest and taxes.  
 
To avoid recoding, similar to Bessler, Drobetz and Grüninger (2011), we use aggregated 
cash flow items.
 118
 In particular, following previous studies using Worldscope data (e.g., 
Seifert and Gonenc, 2010; Bessler, Drobetz and Grüninger, 2011), net debt is measured 
as long term borrowings minus reduction in long term debt. Net equity is measured as 
net proceeds from sale/issue of common and preferred stock
119
 minus 
common/preferred redeemed, retired and converted. The above variables are scaled by 
net assets (i.e. total assets minus current liabilities).  
 
6.4.3 Measurement of managerial overconfidence  
We use one words-based measure and two action-based measures of managerial 
overconfidence. Words-based overconfidence measure is based on tone analysis of 
Chairman’s Statement. Two action-based measures are overconfidence beliefs revealed 
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 See Appendix A in Bessler et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion on the calculation 
of the DEF. Bessler et al. (2011) also use Worldscope data for their international study.  
119
 This can also be calculated as the sum of proceeds from stock options and other 
proceeds from sale/issue of common/preferred stock.  
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from firm’s investment activity and insider trading behaviour respectively. Different 
from the static measures of overconfidence commonly employed in the literature, our 
overconfidence measures are time-varying
120
.  
 
6.4.3.1 Words-based measure of overconfidence: optimistic tone  
We construct two composite tone indices. One is based on the raw tone measures. The 
other is orthogonalized so that each component is not correlated with certain firm-
specific variables (especially standard capital structure determinants). (see section 
5.3.2.1 for detailed descriptions of how raw tone index (TONE) and orthogonalized tone 
index (TONE_RES) are constructed)  
 
6.4.3.2 Action-based measure of overconfidence: overinvestment 
Our first action-based measure of overconfidence is industry-adjusted investment rate 
(IAIR). The idea is that overconfidence managers tend to overestimate the present value 
of future investment, which in turn leads to overinvestment. Therefore, higher IAIR 
may indicate that the manager of a particular firm is overconfident. More specifically, 
we construct the IAIR as the difference between a firm’s investment rate and the 
median investment rate of the firms in the same Datastream’s Level 4 (INDM4) 
industry as follows:  
 
𝐼𝐴𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑅𝑠,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (6.4) 
 
where, IRit  is the investment rate of firm i . 𝐼𝑅𝑠,𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  is the average investment rate of 
industry s . The investment rate is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to 
beginning of year property, plant and equipment (IAIR1).
121
 Alternatively, we define 
investment rate as the ratio of capital expenditures to beginning of year sales (IAIR2).  
                                                          
120
 Existing behavioural finance studies (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier, 
Tate and Yan, 2011) tend to model managerial overconfidence as a habitual behaviour 
which is static. This static approach can be problematic because other behavioural 
biases, especially self-attribution bias, may affect the confidence level. In other words, 
although the level of overconfidence can be quite persistent over time, we should not 
examine overconfidence in isolation.  
121
 Campbell, et al. (2011) classify CEOs as overconfident if their firm is in the top 
quintile of firms based on industry-adjusted investment rates for two consecutive years. 
However, we believe that managerial overconfidence is time-varying and therefore we 
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6.4.3.3 Action-based measure of overconfidence: net purchase ratio  
We also gauge overconfidence based on how managers trade their own firms’ 
shares. In particular, net purchase of the CEO and CFO are used as indicators of 
their overconfidence. (see section 5.3.2.2 of Chapter 5 for detailed descriptions of 
how volume-based and value-based net purchase ratio (NPR) of CEO and CFO are 
constructed)  
 
6.4.4 The sample 
Data used in this study are from the following sources. The UK firms’ financial data is 
obtained from Thomson Worldscope database. Insider trading data is from Hemmington 
Scott database. Chairman’s Statements are manually collected from the company annual 
reports which are downloaded either through Northcote website or directly from 
company websites. Our sample of unbalanced panel data is constructed as follows. The 
selection of sample period is guided by data availability. All financial and utility firms 
are excluded. Firm observations with missing financial data are excluded. Observations 
with the length of fiscal period less than 11 months or over 13 months are excluded. To 
conduct tone analysis, we need the digital version of the UK company annual reports, so 
that the Chairman Statement can be readable by the content analysis software (i.e. LIWC 
2007 and Diction 6)
122
. In addition, to construct an insider trading-based measure of 
overconfidence, only those firms with insider transactions in any year during our sample 
period are selected. All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile to 
eliminate the effect of outliers. The final sample comprises 459 firms and 2283 
observations during the period 1994-2011
123
.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
create a dummy variable (IAIRD) that takes the value of one if the IAIR1 is in the top 
quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise.  
122
 In terms of the procedure of content analysis, we first extract Chairman’s Statements 
from annual report. Next, we detect transformation errors in the combined text file using 
the Spelling & Grammar function in Microsoft Word 2010. Finally, various types of 
errors are corrected before the texts are inputted in the content analysis software (LIWC 
and Diction).  
123
 Most of the observations are after 2000 because machine readable annual reports are 
almost not available in the 1990s.   
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6.4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics for the UK firms in our sample. The mean of 
DEF_CF is 0.080, which is the sum of ∆𝐷_𝐶𝐹 (0.020) and ∆𝐸_𝐶𝐹 (0.060), while the 
means of PDEF_CF and NDEF_CF are 0.110 and -0.030 respectively
124
. The net equity 
issues contribute to around 75 percent
125
 of the DEF_CF, which is not in line with 
SSM’s pecking order hypothesis. However, using balance sheet data, the means of 
DEF_BS, PDEF_BS and NDEF_BS are 0.190, 0.250 and -0.060 respectively, and the 
means of ∆𝐷_𝐵𝑆 and ∆𝐸_𝐵𝑆 are 0.120 and 0.070 respectively. We can see that less than 
37 percent of the DEF_BS is covered by net equity issues. Therefore, we expect that 
empirical evidences based on balance sheet approach will be relatively more close to the 
pecking order prediction. Importantly, we find that the percentage of firm-years with 
negative DEF should not be neglected. In particular, using aggregate cash flow data, the 
percentage of observations with negative DEF is 37.3
126
, while 8.9 and 53.8 percent of 
the observations have zero and positive DEF respectively. Similarly, using balance 
sheet data, around 39 percent of the observations have negative DEF. Given the large 
amount of observations with financing surplus, it becomes important to empirically 
investigate whether the magnitude of the pecking order coefficient in SSM framework 
will depend on the sign of DEF. The mean of firm size (i.e. logarithm of sales) is 12.320 
with a standard deviation of 2.240. The means of book and market leverage are 0.180 
and 0.140 respectively. The majority of our sample firms seem not have extremely high 
leverage (the maximum book and market leverages are 0.610 and 0.520 respectively), 
and thus their financing decisions are more likely to be motivated by pecking order 
preference
127
. 
 
 
 
                                                          
124
 Huang and Ritter (2009) exclude firm year observations where the absolute values of 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 or ∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 are greater than 400%. In our sample, the maximum absolute values of our 
winsorized measures of ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 and ∆𝐸𝑖𝑡 are around 200%.  
125
 Similarly, Seifert and Gonenc (2010) document that 62.5% and 83.6% of financing 
deficit is financed by equity in 23 emerging market countries and the US respectively.  
126
 This is consistent with 36.2 percent in Lin et al.’s (2008) Taiwan firm sample. 
127
 Take debt capacity into consideration, the financing decisions of firms with “low to 
moderate” leverage are more likely to follow pecking order behaviour, while dynamic 
trade-off theory becomes the primary explanation for the financing behaviour of firms 
with “high” leverage (and consequently high financial distress costs) (Lemmon and 
Zender, 2010).  
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent variables.  
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Median Max. 
Panel A: dependent variables and financing deficit measures 
DEF_BS/NA 2283 0.190 0.560 -1.110 0.060 3.040 
∆ D_BS/NA 2283 0.120 0.370 -0.630 0.040 2.030 
∆ E_BS/NA 2283 0.070 0.310 -0.790 0.010 1.950 
DEF_CF/NA 2283 0.080 0.330 -0.430 0.000 2.030 
∆ D_CF/NA 2283 0.020 0.140 -0.310 0.000 0.790 
∆ E_CF/NA 2283 0.060 0.260 -0.310 0.000 1.800 
Panel B: firm-level control variables  
MB 2283 1.760 1.260 0.560 1.400 8.790 
Log(sales) 2283 12.320 2.240 6.140 12.510 16.870 
Tangibility 2283 0.260 0.230 0.000 0.200 0.890 
Profitability 2283 0.090 0.180 -0.880 0.120 0.390 
Effective tax rate 2283 0.230 0.350 -1.620 0.280 1.640 
Price performance 2283 0.000 0.530 -1.880 0.080 1.170 
Book leverage 2283 0.180 0.150 0.000 0.170 0.610 
Market leverage 2283 0.140 0.130 0.000 0.110 0.520 
Panel C: words-based measures of managerial overconfidence (i.e. tone of Chairman’s Statement) 
TONE 2283 -0.000 1.615 -5.693 0.150 3.676 
TONE_RES 2283 -0.000 1.584 -5.034 0.165 4.988 
NET_EMOTION 2283 0.740 0.170 0.220 0.760 1.000 
CERTAIN 2283 1.030 0.430 0.210 0.970 2.330 
OPTIMISM 2283 53.520 2.070 49.430 53.330 60.160 
CERTAINTY 2283 45.630 3.130 32.610 46.040 51.880 
TONE_H 2283 0.720 0.230 -0.060 0.770 1.000 
TONE_LM 2283 0.560 0.290 -0.290 0.600 1.000 
Panel D: action-based measures of managerial overconfidence  
VA_CEO 1327 0.330 0.890 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
VA_CFO 1071 0.460 0.830 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
VOL_CEO 1327 0.480 0.790 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
VOL_CFO 1071 0.570 0.740 -1.000 1.000 1.000 
IAIR1_L4 2283 0.060 0.310 -0.350 0.000 1.860 
IAIRD 2283 0.100 0.300 0.000 0.000 1.000 
IAIR2_L4 2283 0.030 0.160 -0.240 0.000 1.190 
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6.4.4.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 6.2 shows the pairwise Pearson correlation matrix. We first compare balance 
sheet approach and cash flow approach by looking at the correlations between net debt 
issues, net equity issues and financing deficit (i.e. the sum of net debt and equity issues). 
The correlation between ∆D_BS/NA (∆E_BS/NA) and ∆D_CF/NA (∆E_CF/NA) is 0.605 
(0.773). In addition, the correlation between DEF_BS/NA and DEF_CF/NA is 0.746. 
PDEF_BS/NA is highly correlated with PDEF_CF/NA (0.801), however, the correlation 
between NDEF_BS/NA and NDEF_CF/NA is much lower (0.313). The correlation 
between tone-based measures of overconfidence (TONE and TONE_RES) and the 
insider trading-based measures of CEO and CFO overconfidence (VA_CEO, VOL_CEO, 
VA_CFO and VOL_CFO) are negative. This is probably because the insider trading-
based measure is likely to be contaminated by information asymmetry and might not be 
a perfect proxy for managerial overconfidence.  
         
Regarding the correlations between net debt and equity issues and independent variables, 
both TONE and TONE_RES are positively related to net debt issues and net equity 
issues. NPRs of CEO and CFO (including VA_CEO, VOL_CEO, VA_CFO and 
VOL_CFO) are positively and significantly related to net equity issues (∆E_CF/NA). 
Market-to-book ratio is positively and significantly related to both ∆E_BS/NA and 
∆E_CF/NA, consistent with market timing proposition that firms prefer equity financing 
when its stock is overvalued. Firm size is positively (negatively) and significantly 
related to ∆D_BS/NA and ∆D_CF/NA (∆E_BS/NA and ∆E_CF/NA). Tangibility and 
profitability are especially negatively and significantly correlated with ∆E_BS/NA and 
∆E_CF/NA. Both book and market leverage are positively (negatively) and significantly 
related to ∆D_BS/NA and ∆D_CF/NA (∆E_BS/NA and ∆E_CF/NA). The correlations 
among independent variables are not high enough to raise concerns about 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 6.2 Correlation matrix 
This table shows Pearson correlation coefficients between all pairs of our main variables, as defined in Appendix 6.A. ***, ** and * indicate that the correlation coefficient is 
significant at 1% 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. DEF_BS/NA 1 
           2. ∆ D_BS/NA 0.776*** 1 
          3. ∆ E_BS/NA 0.742*** 0.2*** 1 
         4. DEF_CF/NA 0.746*** 0.475*** 0.696*** 1 
        5. ∆ D_CF/NA 0.468*** 0.605*** 0.085*** 0.539*** 1 
       6. ∆ E_CF/NA 0.617*** 0.224*** 0.773*** 0.872*** 0.081*** 1 
      7. MB 0.165*** 0.033 0.239*** 0.168*** 0.018 0.194*** 1 
     8. Log(sales) -0.121*** 0.063*** -0.278*** -0.270*** 0.043** -0.347*** -0.179*** 1 
    9. Tangibility -0.103*** -0.044** -0.130*** -0.123*** 0.029 -0.166*** -0.118*** 0.238*** 1 
   10. Profitability -0.187*** 0.031 -0.350*** -0.361*** 0.002 -0.432*** -0.053** 0.460*** 0.203*** 1 
  11. TONE 0.127*** 0.149*** 0.032 0.050** 0.094*** 0.005 0.197*** 0.196*** -0.004 0.228*** 1 
 12. TONE_RES 0.148*** 0.132*** 0.084*** 0.122*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.938*** 1 
13. NET_EMOTION 0.089*** 0.113*** 0.005 0.008 0.085*** -0.037* 0.110*** 0.228*** 0.013 0.261*** 0.801*** 0.740*** 
14. CERTAIN -0.051** 0.001 -0.086*** -0.100*** -0.023 -0.107*** 0.021 0.261*** 0.042** 0.117*** 0.310*** 0.235*** 
15. OPTIMISM 0.066*** 0.085*** 0.012 0.014 0.053** -0.013 0.104*** 0.229*** 0.054*** 0.155*** 0.721*** 0.670*** 
16. CERTAINTY 0.022 -0.003 0.046** 0.019 -0.024 0.037* -0.005 0.006 -0.013 -0.050** 0.043** 0.056*** 
17. TONE_H 0.147*** 0.153*** 0.063*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.068*** 0.227*** 0.010 -0.052** 0.142*** 0.774*** 0.744*** 
18. TONE_LM 0.131*** 0.136*** 0.054*** 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.038* 0.194*** 0.086*** -0.039* 0.151*** 0.865*** 0.831*** 
19. VA_CEO -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 0.067** 0.002 0.079*** -0.224*** -0.171*** -0.044 -0.182*** -0.155*** -0.056** 
20. VA_CFO -0.005 -0.034 0.036 0.048 -0.033 0.086*** -0.203*** -0.178*** -0.028 -0.171*** -0.141*** -0.047 
21. VOL_CEO -0.007 0.000 -0.020 0.052* 0.007 0.056** -0.217*** -0.058** -0.032 -0.149*** -0.145*** -0.071*** 
22. VOL_CFO -0.006 -0.019 0.013 0.043 -0.010 0.062** -0.204*** -0.087*** -0.017 -0.14*** -0.142*** -0.068** 
23. IAIR1_L4 0.256*** 0.207*** 0.206*** 0.262*** 0.138*** 0.240*** 0.174*** -0.180*** -0.169*** -0.110*** 0.026 0.029 
24. IAIR2_L4 0.142*** 0.077*** 0.159*** 0.200*** 0.139*** 0.163*** 0.106*** -0.250*** 0.183*** -0.179*** -0.043** 0.017 
 
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
13. NET_EMOTION 1                       
14. CERTAIN 0.175*** 1 
          15. OPTIMISM 0.451*** 0.275*** 1 
         16. CERTAINTY 0.000 0.128*** 0.042** 1 
        17. TONE_H 0.503*** 0.064*** 0.353*** 0.010 1 
       18. TONE_LM 0.600*** 0.121*** 0.505*** -0.009 0.657*** 1 
      19. VA_CEO -0.127*** -0.084*** -0.119*** 0.008 -0.110*** -0.122*** 1 
     20. VA_CFO -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.076** -0.052* -0.087*** -0.126*** 0.670*** 1 
    21. VOL_CEO -0.110*** -0.073*** -0.108*** 0.011 -0.098*** -0.130*** 0.876*** 0.644*** 1 
   22. VOL_CFO -0.108*** -0.099*** -0.078*** -0.029 -0.092*** -0.137*** 0.595*** 0.898*** 0.723*** 1 
  23. IAIR1_L4 0.006 -0.041** -0.027 0.040* 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.006 0.020 -0.015 0.004 1 
 24. IAIR2_L4 -0.044** -0.073*** -0.071*** 0.018 -0.010 0.005 0.042 0.016 0.008 -0.014 0.376*** 1 
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6.5 Results and Discussion 
To examine the effect of managerial overconfidence on the pecking order preference, 
we use a modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression 
framework as follows:  
 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵4∆𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (6.5) 
 
where, ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 is net debt issues as a percentage of beginning-of-year net assets. 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 is a 
measure of financing deficit scaled by beginning-of-year net assets (i.e. total assets 
minus current liabilities). 𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 is managerial overconfidence. We use both words-based 
(i.e. tone) and action-based (i.e. insider trading and firm investment) measures of 
managerial overconfidence. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term. ∆𝑿𝑖𝑡 is a vector of firm-level controls 
including changes in market-to-book ratio, firm size, tangibility and profitability (see 
Frank and Goyal, 2003). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm level. 𝑣𝑖 
is time-invariant firm-specific effects. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the error term.
128
 
 
6.5.1 Optimistic tone and pecking order preference 
Table 6.3 reports the effects of optimistic tone on the pecking order coefficient (i.e. the 
coefficient on the DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit 
regression. An increase in the pecking order coefficient indicates an enhanced pecking 
order preference, while a decrease in pecking order coefficient indicates a 
reverse/weakened pecking order preference. The coefficients on DEF are around 0.55 in 
most models in Panel A and B and are even much lower in Panel C (below 0.25). This 
observation that pecking order coefficient is far below one is in contrast to the static 
pecking order prediction, meaning that firms in our sample do not have a strong 
preference for debt over equity financing. Moreover, both tone index (TONE) and 
orthogonalized tone index (TONE_RES) have negative impacts on the pecking order 
coefficient. More specifically, the interaction between TONE_RES and DEF is negative 
and statistically significant. This negative coefficient on TONE_RES*DEF suggests that 
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 Another way to test the impact of managerial overconfidence on the preference for 
debt over equity financing is logistic analysis which examines the probability of debt 
issues relative to equity issues. However, this approach fails to control for firm fixed 
effects.  
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managerial overconfidence, as measured by optimistic tone, leads to a reverse pecking 
order preference.  
 
As a robustness test, Table 6.4 reports the effects of optimistic tone dummies on the 
pecking order coefficient. TONE_DUM and TONE_RES_DUM are binary variables that 
take the value of 1 if TONE and TONE_RES are above their sample median and 0 
otherwise. We find that both TONE_DUM and TONE_RES_DUM have negative and 
statistically significant effects on the pecking order coefficient especially in Panel B 
(model 3-4) which is the subsample including firm-year observations with financing 
deficit (i.e. DEF>0). In contrast, in Panel C (model 5-6) which is the subsample 
including firm-year observations with financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0), the tone dummies 
have positive and statistically insignificant impacts on the pecking order coefficient.  
 
To sum up, the above results suggest that tone leads to a reverse pecking order 
preference. One major concern related to this words-based managerial overconfidence 
measure is that tone might be contaminated by information asymmetry. In other words, 
rational managers use optimistic tone intentionally to reduce information asymmetry. 
However, if this is the case, tone that is contaminated by information asymmetry will 
enhance pecking order preference, which is not consistent with our empirical findings. 
Therefore, we may conclude that the negative relationship between tone and pecking 
order coefficient is not likely to be driven by information asymmetry.  
 
6.5.2 Industry-adjusted investment rate and pecking order preference 
Table 6.5 reports the effects of the action-based managerial overconfidence measure (i.e. 
industry-adjusted investment rate) on pecking order preference. We find that both 
IAIRD and IAIR2_L4 have negative and statistically significant effects on the pecking 
order coefficient in model 2-3 and model 5-6. This finding suggests that managerial 
overconfidence, as measured by firms’ overinvestment, leads to reverse pecking order 
preference especially for firms with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0). To sum up, the 
results based on industry-adjusted investment further confirms our earlier findings that 
optimistic tone (see section 6.5.1) is related to a weakened preference for debt over 
equity financing (i.e. a reverse pecking order preference).  
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Table 6.3 Tone and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of optimistic tone index (TONE) and orthogonalized tone index (TONE_RES) on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction 
between tone and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by 
net assets. Panel A is based on the full sample, while Panel B and C focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0) and financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0) 
respectively. All models are estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Full sample (model 1-3) Panel B. DEF_BS>0 (model 4-6) Panel C. DEF_BS<0 (model 7-9) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DEF 0.548*** 0.549*** 0.558*** 0.554*** 0.559*** 0.568*** 0.242*** 0.228*** 0.230*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE  0.009***   0.003    0.004   
  (0.010)   (0.505)   (0.483)  
TONE_RES   0.011***   0.009*   0.001  
   (0.001)   (0.088)   (0.773) 
TONE*DEF  -0.007    -0.011    -0.045   
  (0.550)   (0.427)   (0.144)  
TONE_RES*DEF   -0.023**   -0.023*   -0.052* 
   (0.027)   (0.077)   (0.096) 
∆ MB -0.005  -0.006  -0.007  0.002  0.002  0.001  0.000  -0.004  -0.002  
 (0.641) (0.522) (0.479) (0.862) (0.862) (0.923) (0.999) (0.751) (0.873) 
∆ Firm size 0.147*** 0.142*** 0.138*** 0.124** 0.122** 0.116** 0.164*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
∆ Tangibility -0.009  0.005  0.000  0.297  0.291* 0.281* -0.206  -0.148  -0.138  
 (0.944) (0.967) (1.000) (0.104) (0.096) (0.095) (0.217) (0.341) (0.368) 
∆ Profitability -0.271*** -0.283*** -0.268*** -0.339*** -0.34*** -0.331*** -0.199*** -0.214*** -0.210*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.001  0.000  0.001  0.012  0.011  0.011  -0.071*** -0.069*** -0.070*** 
  (0.847) (0.974) (0.837) (0.329) (0.355) (0.375) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Within R2 0.683 0.684 0.687 0.655 0.655 0.658 0.205 0.228 0.230 
Between R2 0.437 0.442 0.445 0.456 0.452 0.460 0.190 0.170 0.198 
Obs. 2283 2283 2283 1451 1451 1451 832 832 832 
Firms 459 459 459 433 433 433 363 363 363 
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Table 6.4 Tone dummies and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of optimistic tone dummies (i.e. TONE_DUM and TONE_RES_DUM that are one if tone index and orthogonalized tone index are above their 
median respectively and zero otherwise) on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction between tone dummies and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is based on the full sample, while 
Panel B and C focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0) and financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0) respectively. All models are estimated using fixed 
effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Full sample (model 1-2) Panel B. DEF_BS>0 (model 3-4) Panel C. DEF_BS<0 (model 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.603*** 0.591*** 0.643*** 0.612*** 0.24*** 0.228*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
TONE_DUM 0.012   0.018   0.014   
 (0.307)  (0.247)  (0.354)  
TONE_RES_DUM  0.022*  0.028   0.022  
  (0.062)  (0.126)  (0.115) 
TONE_DUM*DEF -0.085**  -0.122***  0.000   
 (0.024)  (0.006)  (0.999)  
TONE_RES_DUM*DEF  -0.070*  -0.087*  0.025  
  (0.099)  (0.098)  (0.782) 
∆ MB -0.006  -0.006  0.003  0.001  -0.002  -0.002  
 (0.555) (0.542) (0.821) (0.899) (0.866) (0.846) 
∆ Firm size 0.140*** 0.143*** 0.116** 0.120** 0.161*** 0.163*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.018) (0.004) (0.003) 
∆ Tangibility -0.026  -0.010  0.271  0.277* -0.195  -0.189  
 (0.826) (0.930) (0.103) (0.099) (0.243) (0.254) 
∆ Profitability -0.259*** -0.262*** -0.318*** -0.326*** -0.204*** -0.205*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.006  -0.011  -0.003  -0.004  -0.077*** -0.081*** 
  (0.412) (0.118) (0.863) (0.761) (0.000) (0.000) 
Within R2 0.687 0.686 0.664 0.659 0.206 0.208 
Between R2 0.416 0.439 0.433 0.456 0.189 0.192 
Obs. 2283 2283 1451 1451 832 832 
Firms 459 459 433 433 363 363 
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Table 6.5 Industry-adjusted investment rate and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of industry-adjusted investment rate (including IAIR1_L4, IAIRD and IAIR2_L4) on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction 
between industry-adjusted investment rate and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent 
variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is based on the full sample, while Panel B and C focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0) 
and financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0) respectively. All models are estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Full sample (model 1-3) Panel B. DEF_BS>0 (model 4-6) Panel C. DEF_BS<0 (model 7-9) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DEF 0.559*** 0.587*** 0.57*** 0.573*** 0.620*** 0.580*** 0.234*** 0.255*** 0.245*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR1_L4 0.090***   0.084*   -0.100    
 (0.008)   (0.055)   (0.103)   
IAIRD  0.075***   0.134***   -0.127**  
  (0.002)   (0.000)   (0.029)  
IAIR2_L4   0.229***   0.334***   -0.083  
   (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.579) 
IAIR1_L4*DEF -0.071    -0.086    -0.293*   
 (0.192)   (0.188)   (0.083)   
IAIRD*DEF  -0.152**   -0.219***   -0.242   
  (0.020)   (0.005)   (0.210)  
IAIR2_L4*DEF   -0.282**   -0.307*   0.194  
   (0.041)   (0.052)   (0.618) 
∆ MB -0.005  -0.005  -0.004  0.000  0.000  0.001  -0.002  -0.003  -0.002  
 (0.599) (0.621) (0.673) (0.991) (0.989) (0.93) (0.862) (0.813) (0.888) 
∆ Firm size 0.140*** 0.148*** 0.134*** 0.129** 0.131** 0.119** 0.159*** 0.166*** 0.178*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.011) (0.027) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
∆ Tangibility -0.082  0.028  0.000  0.279  0.393* 0.235  -0.200  -0.203  -0.226  
 (0.513) (0.828) (1.000) (0.165) (0.056) (0.282) (0.225) (0.226) (0.210) 
∆ Profitability -0.259*** -0.241*** -0.243*** -0.323*** -0.295** -0.305*** -0.191*** -0.188*** -0.203*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) 
Constant -0.004  -0.008  -0.006  0.002  -0.011  -0.004  -0.074*** -0.066*** -0.069*** 
  (0.434) (0.160) (0.229) (0.848) (0.325) (0.709) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Within R2 0.687 0.692 0.693 0.66 0.678 0.669 0.221 0.218 0.208 
Between R2 0.444 0.456 0.434 0.457 0.474 0.445 0.165 0.144 0.189 
Obs. 2283 2283 2283 1451 1451 1451 832 832 832 
Firms 459 459 459 433 433 433 363 363 363 
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6.5.3 Further analysis 
Having provided the evidence that managerial overconfidence, as measured by tone and 
firm investment, leads to a reverse pecking order preference, we conduct further 
analysis to see whether managerial overconfidence may contribute to the pecking order 
puzzle (i.e. size anomaly) by comparing the effects of managerial overconfidence on 
pecking order preference for small and large firms. In addition, we examine whether 
“risk perception bias (i.e. underestimation of the riskiness of earnings)” is the 
underlying channel through which managerial overconfidence weakens pecking order 
preference (as described in hypothesis 1b). In particular, we compare the effects of 
managerial overconfidence on pecking order preference for firms with high and low 
earning volatility. Furthermore, considering that CEO and CFO may have different 
duties, we compare CEO and CFO overconfidence, as indicated by their net purchase of 
their own firms’ shares, on pecking order preference.  
 
6.5.3.1 Can managerial overconfidence explain the pecking order puzzle/size 
anomaly? 
We examine whether the effects of managerial overconfidence on pecking order 
preference are different for small and large firms. This further analysis is motivated by 
the pecking order puzzle documented by Frank and Goyal (2003) that firm size is 
positively associated with the degree of pecking order preference, which contradicts the 
standard (information asymmetry-based) pecking order theory. A potential explanation 
for this puzzle is that overconfident managers in smaller firms are reluctant to follow 
standard pecking order although smaller firms are subject to higher information costs. 
To test this conjecture, we split the whole sample into two subsamples: Panel A in 
Table 6.6 and 6.7 includes firm-year observations with firm size below median, while 
Panel B in Table 6.6 and 6.7 includes firm-year observations with firm size above 
median.  
 
Table 6.6 and 6.7 compares the effects of tone and industry-adjusted investment rate 
respectively on pecking order preference for small and large firms. Consistent with 
Frank and Goyal’s (2003) observation that small firms exhibit weaker pecking order 
preference, we also find that the pecking order coefficient (i.e. the coefficient on DEF) 
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is smaller for small firms.
129
 More importantly, we find that both optimistic tone (see 
model 1, 2 and 4 in Panel A of Table 6.6) and industry-adjusted investment rate (see 
model 4, 5 and 6 in Panel A of Table 6.7) have negative and statistically significant 
impacts on the pecking order coefficient especially for small firms whose firm size is 
below sample median. This finding sheds important light on the pecking order puzzle. 
In particular, our results suggest that managerial overconfidence in small firms makes 
those small firms less willing to follow standard pecking order preference and therefore 
contribute to the pecking order puzzle or size anomaly.  
 
6.5.3.2 What is the underlying channel through which managerial overconfidence 
leads to reverse pecking order preference?  
Recall hypothesis 1b that overconfident managers with risk perception bias who 
underestimate the riskiness of firm earnings tend to have a reverse pecking order 
preference, if risk perception bias is the channel through which managerial 
overconfidence weakens pecking order preference, we expect the overconfidence-
induced revere pecking order preference is more significant especially for firms with 
higher earnings volatility. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that, for firms with 
relatively high earnings volatility, both tone and industry-adjusted investment rate have 
negative impacts on the pecking order preference, which are statistically significant (see 
model 2 of Table 6.8 and model 2, 4, 5 and 6 of Table 6.9). In contrast, for firms with 
low earnings volatility, the impacts of tone and industry-adjusted investment rate on the 
pecking order preference are either positive or negative and statistically insignificant in 
all the models (see Panel B of Table 6.8 and 6.9). Taken together, we may conclude that 
managerial overconfidence has negative and statistically significant impacts on the 
pecking order preference only for those firms with relatively higher earnings volatility. 
This is consistent with overconfident managers in those highly volatile (in terms of the 
earnings) firms having a biased perception of the riskiness of earnings which in turn 
leads to a reverse pecking order preference as we described in hypothesis 1b. In brief, 
                                                          
129
 The observed relatively weaker pecking order preference of small firms may not be 
due to managerial choice/preference. In particular, small firms may find it difficult to 
raise debt financing and therefore have to use equity. In this case, small firms are not 
able to follow the standard pecking order, which can potentially explain why small 
firms have lower pecking order coefficient. However, the purpose of our analysis is to 
see whether managerial overconfidence contributes to the weakened pecking order of 
small firms.  
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the above subsample analysis based on firm earnings volatility further confirms 
hypothesis 1b by suggesting that the overconfidence-induced reverse pecking order 
preference can be attributed to the underestimation of earnings volatility.  
 
6.5.3.3 Do net purchases (as a proxy for overconfidence) of CEO and CFO have the 
same impact on pecking order preference?  
Table 6.10 presents the effects of overconfidence of both CEO and CFO, as measured 
by their net purchase ratio (NPR), on the pecking order preference. VA_CEO and 
VA_CFO are value-based NPR of CEO and CFO respectively, while VOL_CEO and 
VOL_CFO are volume-based NPR of CEO and CFO respectively. Interestingly, the 
effects of CEO and CFO net purchase have different impacts on pecking order 
coefficient. In particular, the coefficients on VA_CEO*DEF and VOL_CEO*DEF are 
positive and statistically significant in model 5 and 7 respectively, which suggests that 
the CEO net purchase leads to an enhanced pecking order preference.  
 
In contrast, the coefficients on VA_CFO*DEF and VOL_CFO*DEF are negative and 
statistically significant in model 6 and 4 respectively, meaning that the CFO net 
purchase leads to reverse pecking order preference. The results related to the CFO net 
purchase is consistent with our findings related to tone that managerial overconfidence 
weaken firms’ pecking order preference. However, the opposite effect of CEO net 
purchase could potentially be attributed to the fact that CEO has more private 
information about the firm relative to CFO and therefore CEO’s trading is more likely 
to be driven by information asymmetry rather than CEO overconfidence. In other words, 
CEO insider trading more reflects private information rather than overconfidence. 
Therefore, we find that CEO net purchase, which is likely to be contaminated by 
information asymmetry, is associated with an enhanced pecking order preference.  
 
As a robustness test, Table 6.11 presents the effects of CEO and CFO net purchase 
dummies on the pecking order preference. CEO_DUM and CFO_DUM are binary 
variables that take the value of 1 if the NPR of CEO and CFO take the value of one and 
0 otherwise. We find that only the effects of CFO_DUM on pecking order coefficient 
are statistically significant and negative (model 2 and 4). To conclude, CFO 
overconfidence as measured by their net purchase of their own firms’ share leads to a 
reverse pecking order preference.  
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Table 6.6 Comparison of the effects of tone on pecking order preference for small and large firms 
This table examines whether the effect of optimistic tone index (TONE) and orthogonalized tone index (TONE_RES) on the pecking order preference depends on firm size. 
We therefore compare the results from two subsamples divided by firm size. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is the subsample including 
small firms with firm size below its median and Panel B is the subsample including large firms with firm size above its median. All models are estimated using fixed effects 
within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Small firms (below median) (model 1-4) Panel B. Large firms (above median) (model 5-8) 
  DEF_BS (model 1-2) DEF_CF (model 3-4) DEF_BS (model 5-6) DEF_CF (model 7-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEF 0.420*** 0.431*** 0.450*** 0.471*** 0.727*** 0.728*** 0.928*** 0.933*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE 0.011*  0.024***  0.010***  0.015***  
 (0.053)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.010)  
TONE_RES  0.014**  0.025***  0.010***  0.012** 
  (0.023)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.029) 
TONE*DEF -0.027*  -0.057   -0.009   0.036   
 (0.075)  (0.131)  (0.416)  (0.246)  
TONE_RES*DEF -0.032**  -0.057*  -0.012   0.042  
  (0.021)  (0.092)  (0.330)  (0.194) 
∆ MB -0.004  -0.005  -0.021* -0.021* -0.014  -0.012  -0.066*** -0.064*** 
 (0.748) (0.649) (0.099) (0.098) (0.373) (0.433) (0.001) (0.002) 
∆ Firm size 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 0.045  0.047  0.463*** 0.466*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.153) (0.137) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆ Tangibility 0.165  0.164  0.042  0.031  -0.041  -0.044  -0.169  -0.181  
 (0.308) (0.305) (0.869) (0.900) (0.765) (0.754) (0.523) (0.495) 
∆ Profitability -0.199** -0.188** -0.252*** -0.234** -0.129** -0.118* -0.544** -0.527** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.009) (0.013) (0.037) (0.055) (0.015) (0.017) 
Constant -0.006  -0.007  0.017  0.013  0.012** 0.014*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 
  (0.486) (0.345) (0.129) (0.209) (0.023) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Within R2 0.521 0.524 0.250 0.251 0.880 0.880 0.563 0.562 
Between R2 0.381 0.398 0.186 0.190 0.869 0.871 0.682 0.676 
Obs. 1141 1141 1141 1141 1142 1142 1142 1142 
Firms 291 291 291 291 212 212 212 212 
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Table 6.7 Comparison of the effects of industry-adjusted investment rate on pecking order preference for small and large firms 
This table examines whether the effect of industry-adjusted investment rate (including IAIR1_L4, IAIRD and IAIR2_L4) on the pecking order preference depends on firm size. 
We therefore compare the results from two subsamples divided by firm size. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is the subsample including 
small firms with firm size below its median and Panel B is the subsample including large firms with firm size above its median. All models are estimated using fixed effects 
within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Small firms (below median) (model 1-6) Panel B. Large firms (above median) (model 7-12) 
  DEF_BS (model 1-3) DEF_CF (model 4-6) DEF_BS (model 7-9) DEF_CF (model 10-12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DEF 0.414*** 0.444*** 0.430*** 0.237*** 0.254*** 0.229*** 0.718*** 0.747*** 0.748*** 0.585*** 0.604*** 0.594*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR1_l4 0.039    0.028**   0.109***   0.062***   
 (0.333)   (0.029)   (0.000)   (0.006)   
IAIRD  0.028    0.028***   0.064    0.020   
  (0.334)   (0.008)   (0.133)   (0.249)  
IAIR2_l4   0.111    0.134**   0.229***   0.080* 
   (0.238)   (0.015)   (0.001)   (0.091) 
IAIR1_l4*DEF 0.004    -0.079***   -0.030    0.076    
 (0.949)   (0.002)   (0.813)   (0.653)   
IAIRD*DEF -0.073    -0.127***   -0.139    -0.034   
  (0.387)   (0.000)   (0.258)   (0.727)  
IAIR2_l4*DEF  -0.109    -0.199***   -0.607***   0.051  
   (0.453)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.665) 
∆ MB 0.000  -0.002  -0.001  0.001  0.000  0.002  -0.009  -0.008  -0.002  -0.005  -0.005  -0.006  
 (0.988) (0.851) (0.935) (0.853) (0.965) (0.489) (0.548) (0.534) (0.857) (0.463) (0.376) (0.291) 
∆ Firm size 0.14*** 0.152*** 0.142*** 0.021  0.021* 0.011  0.053* 0.054  0.054  0.005  0.006  0.004  
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.105) (0.087) (0.453) (0.093) (0.113) (0.154) (0.794) (0.775) (0.832) 
∆ Tangibility 0.078  0.225  0.187  0.194* 0.220* 0.153  -0.165  -0.081  -0.135  -0.075  -0.013  -0.017  
 (0.659) (0.223) (0.282) (0.096) (0.052) (0.152) (0.280) (0.577) (0.325) (0.271) (0.837) (0.795) 
∆ Profitability -0.201** -0.183** -0.185** -0.086*** -0.077*** -0.081*** -0.095  -0.090  -0.128** -0.069  -0.069  -0.066  
 (0.021) (0.040) (0.040) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.117) (0.160) (0.028) (0.121) (0.132) (0.125) 
Constant -0.015* -0.016* -0.015** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.021*** 0.012** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.002  0.004  0.003  
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.005) (0.016) (0.291) (0.107) (0.244) 
Within R2 0.516 0.518 0.517 0.299 0.310 0.306 0.881 0.883 0.896 0.712 0.709 0.710 
Between R2 0.393 0.407 0.389 0.219 0.235 0.204 0.861 0.878 0.913 0.395 0.415 0.396 
Obs. 1141 1141 1141 1141 1141 1141 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 1142 
Firms 291 291 291 291 291 291 212 212 212 212 212 212 
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Table 6.8 Comparison of the effects of tone on pecking order preference for firms with high and low earnings volatility 
This table examines whether the effect of optimistic tone index (TONE) and orthogonalized tone index (TONE_RES) on the pecking order preference depends on earnings 
volatility. Earnings volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in the past five years (at least three years), scaled by the average book value 
of assets. We therefore compare the results from two subsamples divided by earnings volatility. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is the 
subsample including firms with earnings volatility above its median and Panel B is the subsample including firms with earnings volatility below its median. All models are 
estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that 
coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Firms with high earnings volatility (above median) (model 1-4) Panel B. Firms with low earnings volatility (below median) (model 5-8) 
  DEF_BS (model 1-2) DEF_CF (model 3-4) DEF_BS (model 5-6) DEF_CF (model 7-8) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DEF 0.471*** 0.485*** 0.629*** 0.658*** 0.754*** 0.754*** 0.800*** 0.798*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE 0.004   0.011   0.007**  0.022***  
 (0.455)  (0.143)  (0.023)  (0.003)  
TONE_RES  0.005   0.014*  0.007**  0.020*** 
  (0.376)  (0.068)  (0.023)  (0.009) 
TONE*DEF -0.016   -0.035   -0.004   0.026   
 (0.376)  (0.406)  (0.711)  (0.575)  
TONE_RES*DEF -0.030*  -0.056   -0.006   0.039  
  (0.068)  (0.143)  (0.584)  (0.374) 
∆ MB -0.002  -0.003  -0.023  -0.024  -0.017  -0.017  -0.049*** -0.044*** 
 (0.885) (0.804) (0.184) (0.145) (0.374) (0.393) (0.004) (0.008) 
∆ Firm size 0.148*** 0.142*** 0.214*** 0.208*** 0.024  0.025  0.706*** 0.712*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.689) (0.678) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ Tangibility -0.098  -0.112  -0.176  -0.184  -0.141  -0.140 0.016  0.001  
 (0.535) (0.464) (0.510) (0.481) (0.338) (0.344) (0.957) (0.997) 
∆ Profitability -0.163* -0.150* -0.240** -0.227** -0.059  -0.047  -1.234*** -1.198*** 
 (0.061) (0.070) (0.017) (0.020) (0.645) (0.712) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.001  -0.001  0.012  0.012  0.007  0.008  0.023  0.026  
  (0.918) (0.938) (0.222) (0.210) (0.180) (0.129) (0.144) (0.108) 
Within R2 0.574 0.578 0.363 0.368 0.895 0.895 0.519 0.519 
Between R2 0.517 0.522 0.182 0.187 0.850 0.849 0.436 0.418 
Obs. 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 
Firms 340 340 340 340 286 286 286 286 
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Table 6.9 Comparison of the effects of industry-adjusted investment rate on pecking order preference for firms with high and low earnings volatility 
This table examines whether the effect of industry-adjusted investment rate (including IAIR1_L4, IAIRD and IAIR2_L4) on the pecking order preference depends on earnings 
volatility. Earnings volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in the past five years (at least three years), scaled by the average book value 
of assets. We therefore compare the results from two subsamples divided by earnings volatility. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is the 
subsample including firms with earnings volatility above its median and Panel B is the subsample including firms with earnings volatility below its median. All models are 
estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that 
coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Firms with high earnings volatility (above median) (model 1-6) Panel B. Firms with low earnings volatility (below median) (model 7-12) 
  DEF_BS (model 1-3) DEF_CF (model 4-6) DEF_BS (model 7-9) DEF_CF (model 10-12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DEF 0.469*** 0.512*** 0.472*** 0.303*** 0.317*** 0.290*** 0.754*** 0.750*** 0.755*** 0.685*** 0.676*** 0.677*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR1_l4 0.052    0.030**   0.079***   0.045***   
 (0.243)   (0.038)   (0.001)   (0.006)   
IAIRD  0.028    0.030**   0.050**   0.023*  
  (0.430)   (0.026)   (0.038)   (0.068)  
IAIR2_l4   0.166**   0.099***   0.001    0.110** 
   (0.047)   (0.004)   (0.993)   (0.021) 
IAIR1_l4*DEF -0.028    -0.088**   -0.039    -0.141    
 (0.710)   (0.011)   (0.763)   (0.304)   
IAIRD*DEF -0.185*   -0.134***   0.000    0.001   
  (0.085)   (0.005)   (0.994)   (0.994)  
IAIR2_l4*DEF  -0.083    -0.161**   0.085    -0.075  
   (0.666)   (0.014)   (0.673)   (0.761) 
∆ MB 0.000  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.015  -0.015  -0.015  -0.014  -0.015* -0.015* 
 (0.980) (0.726) (0.963) (0.854) (0.986) (0.914) (0.444) (0.423) (0.426) (0.104) (0.084) (0.098) 
∆ Firm size 0.150*** 0.166*** 0.141*** 0.033** 0.032** 0.025* 0.018  0.023  0.016  -0.032  -0.028  -0.034  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.029) (0.027) (0.098) (0.778) (0.720) (0.765) (0.328) (0.399) (0.248) 
∆ Tangibility -0.135  0.038  -0.112  0.015  0.030  -0.014  -0.266  -0.206  -0.167  0.015  0.033  0.023  
 (0.415) (0.838) (0.523) (0.880) (0.772) (0.893) (0.104) (0.186) (0.273) (0.857) (0.653) (0.762) 
∆ Profitability -0.161* -0.123  -0.157* -0.098*** -0.093*** -0.104*** -0.003  0.005  0.002  0.029  0.021  0.014  
 (0.058) (0.145) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.979) (0.966) (0.983) (0.602) (0.709) (0.796) 
Constant -0.004  -0.004  -0.006  -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 0.006  0.006  0.008* 0.005  0.004  0.004  
  (0.536) (0.618) (0.370) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.225) (0.292) (0.080) (0.148) (0.210) (0.189) 
Within R2 0.574 0.589 0.574 0.410 0.416 0.403 0.895 0.895 0.894 0.776 0.773 0.774 
Between R2 0.534 0.544 0.520 0.247 0.253 0.235 0.852 0.850 0.853 0.622 0.622 0.627 
Obs. 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 1095 
Firms 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
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Table 6.10 Net purchase of CEO and CFO and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of value-based and volume-based net purchase ratio (NPR) of CEO and CFO on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction 
between net purchase ratios of CEO/CFO and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable 
is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is based on the full sample, while Panel B and C focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0) and 
financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0) respectively. All models are estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-
values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Full sample (model 1-4) Panel B. DEF_BS>0 (model 5-8) Panel C. DEF_BS<0 (model 9-12) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
DEF 0.582*** 0.685*** 0.570*** 0.698*** 0.609*** 0.697*** 0.594*** 0.689*** 0.238*** 0.291* 0.234*** 0.405** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.082) (0.002) (0.043) 
VA_CEO 0.001     -0.006     -0.003     
 (0.927)    (0.531)    (0.853)    
VA_CFO  0.006     0.018*    0.003    
  (0.513)    (0.073)    (0.825)   
VOL_CEO   -0.001     -0.009     0.000   
   (0.955)    (0.444)    (0.996)  
VOL_CFO    0.013     0.010     -0.006  
    (0.105)    (0.439)    (0.646) 
VA_CEO*DEF 0.025     0.052*    0.004     
 (0.446)    (0.063)    (0.956)    
VA_CFO*DEF -0.064     -0.098**    0.120    
  (0.116)    (0.015)    (0.475)   
VOL_CEO*DEF  0.044     0.072**    0.012   
   (0.203)    (0.021)    (0.869)  
VOL_CFO*DEF   -0.079*    -0.081     -0.016  
    (0.072)    (0.106)    (0.932) 
∆ MB -0.007  -0.002  -0.007  -0.001  0.009  0.012  0.008  0.009  -0.003  -0.002  -0.003  0.001  
 (0.498) (0.852) (0.469) (0.886) (0.457) (0.442) (0.480) (0.559) (0.872) (0.794) (0.877) (0.871) 
∆ Firm size 0.126** 0.135  0.127** 0.134  0.038  0.198  0.040  0.194  0.231*** 0.097* 0.231*** 0.092* 
 (0.017) (0.105) (0.016) (0.107) (0.454) (0.105) (0.423) (0.111) (0.000) (0.065) (0.000) (0.072) 
∆ Tangibility -0.279** 0.031  -0.278* 0.024  -0.152  0.316  -0.144  0.304  -0.148  -0.187  -0.144  -0.190  
 (0.05) (0.889) (0.051) (0.913) (0.341) (0.220) (0.367) (0.244) (0.671) (0.441) (0.678) (0.508) 
∆ Profitability -0.079  0.007  -0.076  0.006  -0.136  -0.265  -0.131  -0.268  -0.232* -0.204** -0.230* -0.203*** 
 (0.543) (0.976) (0.560) (0.981) (0.298) (0.176) (0.319) (0.177) (0.056) (0.012) (0.057) (0.010) 
Constant 0.000  -0.012  0.000  -0.016** 0.002  -0.019  0.004  -0.015  -0.061*** -0.054*** -0.062*** -0.045** 
  (0.964) (0.127) (0.984) (0.037) (0.832) (0.167) (0.712) (0.317) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.015) 
Within R2 0.706 0.756 0.708 0.757 0.741 0.774 0.743 0.771 0.218 0.511 0.218 0.495 
Between R2 0.417 0.517 0.42 0.513 0.366 0.495 0.368 0.495 0.063 0.006 0.062 0.007 
Obs. 1327 1071 1327 1071 843 680 843 680 484 391 484 391 
Firms 377 340 377 340 320 286 320 286 262 230 262 230 
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Table 6.11 Net purchase dummies and pecking order preference 
This table examines the effect of CEO/CFO net purchase dummies (i.e. CEO_DUM and CFO_DUM that are one if the net purchase ratio (NPR) of CEO and CFO are 1 and 
zero otherwise) on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction between CEO/CFO net purchase dummies and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is based on the full sample, while Panel B and C 
focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0) and financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0) respectively. All models are estimated using fixed effects within 
estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Full sample (model 1-2) Panel B. DEF_BS>0 (model 3-4) Panel C. DEF_BS<0 (model 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.579*** 0.705*** 0.584*** 0.697*** 0.257** 0.236  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.439) 
CEO_DUM 0.003   -0.001   -0.005   
 (0.680)  (0.905)  (0.677)  
CFO_DUM  0.003   0.004   -0.001  
  (0.719)  (0.651)  (0.960) 
CEO_DUM*DEF 0.022   0.076   -0.024   
 (0.691)  (0.131)  (0.863)  
CFO_DUM*DEF  -0.091*  -0.098*  0.170  
  (0.064)  (0.083)  (0.579) 
∆ MB -0.006  -0.002  0.009  0.009  -0.002  -0.002  
 (0.519) (0.825) (0.439) (0.547) (0.884) (0.808) 
∆ Firm size 0.127** 0.128  0.040  0.183  0.230*** 0.096* 
 (0.016) (0.126) (0.427) (0.136) (0.000) (0.065) 
∆ Tangibility -0.275* 0.028  -0.146  0.320  -0.151  -0.190  
 (0.054) (0.900) (0.362) (0.224) (0.668) (0.449) 
∆ Profitability -0.081  0.017  -0.142  -0.248  -0.236* -0.204** 
 (0.528) (0.941) (0.280) (0.207) (0.053) (0.011) 
Constant -0.001  -0.009  -0.001  -0.006  -0.060*** -0.051*** 
  (0.804) (0.216) (0.963) (0.669) (0.000) (0.002) 
Within R2 0.706 0.757 0.74 0.772 0.219 0.505 
Between R2 0.415 0.52 0.362 0.503 0.067 0.006 
Obs. 1327 1071 843 680 484 391 
Firms 377 340 320 286 262 230 
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6.5.4 Further robustness tests 
We conduct a battery of robustness checks to show that our main findings are robust to 
alternative model specifications, alternative measures and scaling of financing deficit 
(DEF) and exclusion of zero-leverage firms.  
 
6.5.4.1 Alternative definitions of DEF using cash flow data 
We use an alternative measure of DEF as a robustness check. The major empirical 
results are qualitatively similar when using cash flow data to construct financing deficit 
(DEF). In particular, tone dummies have negative and statistically significant impacts 
on the pecking order coefficient (see Panel A and B of Table 6.12). Industry-adjusted 
investment rates also have negative and highly significant effects on the pecking order 
coefficient (see Panel A and B of Table 6.13). These results are largely consistent with 
our main results in section 6.5.1-6.5.3 where the DEF is constructed using balance sheet 
data.  
 
6.5.4.2 Alternative specification to distinguish between firms with positive and 
negative DEF 
As an alternative way to test and compare the effects of managerial overconfidence on 
the pecking order coefficient of firms with positive and negative DEF respectively, we 
use the following modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) regression:  
 
∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡
∗ 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵6∆𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(6.6) 
 
where, ∆𝐷𝑖𝑡 is net debt issues as a percentage of beginning-of-year net assets. 𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 
equals 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡  if 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 < 0 and zero otherwise; 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡  equals 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡  if 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑖𝑡 > 0 and 
zero otherwise. 𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 is managerial overconfidence. The definitions of other variables in 
this equation are the same as in equation 6.5. In this alternative specification, the 
pecking order coefficients are not only heterogeneous but also asymmetric.  
 
We find that both TONE (see Panel A in Table 6.14) and industry-adjusted investment 
rate (see Panel B in Table 6.14) have negative and significant effects on the coefficient 
of PDEF, which confirms our earlier finding that tone has negative and significant 
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impacts on the coefficient of DEF especially in the subsample with positive DEF. On 
the other hand, both TONE and TONE_RES (see Panel A in Table 6.14) have positive 
and significant effects on the coefficient of NDEF, suggesting that overconfidence leads 
to a preference for equity over debt repurchase. Similar to our earlier findings, the 
effects of net purchase of CEO and CFO (see Panel C in Table 6.14) are also mixed: 
CEO net purchase has a positive and significant effect on the coefficient of PDEF, 
while CFO net purchase has a negative and significant effect on the coefficient of 
NDEF. In brief, two alternative specifications (i.e. equation 6.5 and 6.6) provide largely 
consistent results.  
 
6.5.4.3 Scaling of the DEF 
Although not required by the pecking order theory, the purpose of scaling is to control 
for the differences in firm size (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Furthermore, Frank and Goyal 
(2003) point out that the coefficient estimates can be highly sensitive to scaling if the 
denominator is correlated with some variables in the regression. We normalize the DEF 
by two alternative denominators including total assets and sales. The results are not 
sensitive to scaling.  
 
6.5.4.4 Exclusion of zero-leverage firms  
As a robustness check, we exclude from our analysis those firm-years with zero 
leverage
130
. The reason is that standard capital structure theories (e.g. trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory and market timing theory) are almost silent on the zero-leverage 
puzzle that some firms do not use any debt financing. Given that the main purpose of 
this study is to test pecking order preference, we exclude zero-leverage observations 
from our tests and the empirical results are qualitatively similar.  
 
 
                                                          
130
 Over 14 percent of the observations (i.e. 326 out of 2283 observations) have zero 
leverage in our sample.  
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Table 6.12 Alternative definition of financing deficit (DEF) using cash flow data: the effects of tone 
This table examines the effect of optimistic tone dummies (i.e. TONE_DUM and TONE_RES_DUM that are one if tone index and orthogonalized tone index are above their 
median respectively and zero otherwise) on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction between tone dummies and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is based on the full sample, while 
Panel B and C focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0) and financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0) respectively. All models are estimated using fixed 
effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
  Panel A. Full sample (model 1-2) Panel B. DEF_CF>0 (model 3-4) Panel C. DEF_CF<0 (model 5-6) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DEF 0.813*** 0.748*** 0.812*** 0.709*** 0.487** 0.296  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.318) 
TONE_DUM 0.043***  0.075***  0.021   
 (0.006)  (0.009)  (0.334)  
TONE_RES_DUM 0.042***  0.068**  0.044  
  (0.006)  (0.011)  (0.103) 
TONE_DUM*DEF -0.234***  -0.329***  -0.267   
 (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.332)  
TONE_RES_DUM*DEF -0.145*  -0.191*  0.088  
  (0.087)  (0.072)  (0.770) 
∆ MB -0.036*** -0.034*** -0.032** -0.030* -0.029  -0.024  
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.047) (0.063) (0.101) (0.161) 
∆ Firm size 0.301*** 0.311*** 0.313*** 0.331*** 0.450*** 0.457*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) 
∆ Tangibility -0.185  -0.182  -0.222  -0.209  0.049  0.049  
 (0.322) (0.334) (0.386) (0.427) (0.880) (0.880) 
∆ Profitability -0.389*** -0.398*** -0.529*** -0.571*** -0.349*** -0.346*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.008  0.010  -0.009  -0.001  0.002  -0.009  
  (0.386) (0.242) (0.682) (0.947) (0.915) (0.708) 
Within R2 0.384 0.379 0.370 0.356 0.16 0.157 
Between R2 0.175 0.189 0.240 0.272 0.137 0.134 
Obs. 2283 2283 1124 1124 1067 1067 
Firms 459 459 392 392 375 375 
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Table 6.13 Alternative definition of financing deficit (DEF) using cash flow data: the effects of industry-adjusted investment rate 
This table examines the effect of industry-adjusted investment rate (including IAIR1_L4, IAIRD and IAIR2_L4) on the pecking order preference by looking at the interaction 
between industry-adjusted investment rate and financing deficit (DEF) in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) financing deficit regression framework. The dependent 
variable is net debt issues scaled by net assets. Panel A is based on the full sample, while Panel B and C focus on firm-years observations with financing deficit (i.e. DEF>0) 
and financing surplus (i.e. DEF<0) respectively. All models are estimated using fixed effects within estimators. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 
P-values are given in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets 
 
Panel A. Full sample (model 1-3) Panel B. DEF_CF>0 (model 4-6) Panel C. DEF_CF<0 (model 7-9) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DEF 0.383*** 0.393*** 0.369*** 0.271*** 0.280*** 0.258*** 0.557*** 0.558*** 0.561*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IAIR1_L4 0.058***   0.053***   0.026*   
 (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.052)   
IAIRD  0.048***   0.062***   0.016   
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.163)  
IAIR2_L4   0.168***   0.144*   0.060  
   (0.000)   (0.053)   (0.170) 
IAIR1_L4*DEF -0.147***   -0.095***   -0.027    
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.917)   
IAIRD*DEF  -0.175***   -0.126***   0.016   
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.927)  
IAIR2_L4*DEF   -0.268***   -0.163***   0.937  
   (0.000)   (0.003)   (0.162) 
∆ MB -0.001  -0.001  0.001  0.001  0.002  0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  
 (0.760) (0.838) (0.856) (0.761) (0.605) (0.531) (0.415) (0.336) (0.324) 
∆ Firm size 0.026* 0.026** 0.016  0.040** 0.038** 0.027  -0.025  -0.020  -0.020  
 (0.051) (0.032) (0.236) (0.041) (0.032) (0.231) (0.173) (0.291) (0.319) 
∆ Tangibility 0.064  0.077  0.023  0.016  0.020  -0.033  0.048  0.063  0.072  
 (0.377) (0.306) (0.762) (0.885) (0.853) (0.751) (0.442) (0.280) (0.219) 
∆ Profitability -0.151*** -0.144*** -0.151*** -0.147*** -0.138*** -0.143*** -0.011  -0.011  -0.011  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.667) (0.670) (0.660) 
Constant -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 0.018** 0.016* 0.019** -0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.041) (0.078) (0.029) (0.072) (0.068) (0.073) 
Within R2 0.471 0.466 0.460 0.327 0.328 0.315 0.332 0.330 0.332 
Between R2 0.213 0.216 0.209 0.264 0.257 0.251 0.400 0.396 0.387 
Obs. 2283 2283 2283 1124 1124 1124 1067 1067 1067 
Firms 459 459 459 392 392 392 375 375 375 
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Table 6.14 Alternative specification: PDEF vs. NDEF 
This table presents fixed effect regressions with net debt issues as dependent variable. We use modified SSM (1999) financing deficit framework where managerial 
overconfidence and its interactions with positive and negative financing deficit (PDEF and NDEF) respectively are included to examine asymmetric pecking order behaviour. 
Financing deficit variables (including PDEF and NDEF) are measured using both aggregate cash flow (CF) and balance sheet (BS) data. Panel A, B and C present the effects 
of tone, industry-adjusted investment rate and net purchase of CEO and CFO on pecking order preference respectively. All the variables are defined in Appendix 6.A. 
Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. P-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Tone and pecking order preference 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets (model 1-4) 
Variables (1) CF (2) BS (3) CF (4) BS 
PDEF 0.285*** 0.588*** 0.302*** 0.601*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NDEF 0.843*** 0.368*** 0.817*** 0.362*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TONE 0.002 0.009**   
 (0.315) (0.015)   
TONE_RES   0.007*** 0.011*** 
   (0.001) (0.004) 
TONE×PDEF 0.016 -0.011   
 (0.275) (0.363)   
TONE_RES×PDEF   -0.012 -0.028** 
   (0.418) (0.022) 
TONE×NDEF -0.059* -0.020   
 (0.054) (0.444)   
TONE_RES×NDEF   0.021 -0.041 
   (0.561) (0.176) 
∆ MB -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.005 
 (0.773) (0.678) (0.803) (0.624) 
∆ Firm size 0.023* 0.138*** 0.022* 0.133*** 
 (0.054) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) 
∆ Tangibility 0.045 0.064 0.038 0.067 
 (0.525) (0.598) (0.587) (0.566) 
∆ Profitability -0.132*** -0.308*** -0.132*** -0.293*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant 0.012** -0.019** 0.011** -0.020** 
 (0.015) (0.025) (0.032) (0.018) 
Within R2 0.484 0.691 0.482 0.695 
Between R2 0.240 0.430 0.241 0.437 
Obs. 2283 2283 2283 2283 
Firms 459 459 459 459 
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Table 6.14 (Continued) 
Panel B. Industry-adjusted investment rate and pecking order preference 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets (model 1-6) 
Variables (1) CF (2) BS (3) CF (4) BS (5) CF (6) BS 
PDEF 0.337*** 0.603*** 0.323*** 0.613*** 0.345*** 0.640*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NDEF 0.792*** 0.375*** 0.809*** 0.370*** 0.791*** 0.358*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
INVEST_1 0.051*** 0.090***     
 (0.000) (0.006)     
INVEST_2   0.153*** 0.257***   
   (0.001) (0.006)   
INVEST_D     0.048*** 0.103*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
INVEST_1×PDEF -0.124*** -0.090     
 (0.000) (0.132)     
INVEST_2×PDEF   -0.234*** -0.325**   
   (0.000) (0.031)   
INVEST_D ×PDEF     -0.151*** -0.200*** 
     (0.000) (0.006) 
INVEST_1×NDEF -0.001  -0.088     
 (0.997) (0.660)     
INVEST_2×NDEF   1.423** -0.091   
   (0.014) (0.789)   
INVEST_D ×NDEF     0.213 0.081 
     (0.252) (0.663) 
∆ MB -0.001  -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.750) (0.762) (0.858) (0.880) (0.825) (0.764) 
∆ Firm size 0.025** 0.138*** 0.017 0.131*** 0.026** 0.146*** 
 (0.041) (0.000) (0.183) (0.001) (0.023) (0.000) 
∆ Tangibility 0.059  0.005 0.025 0.065 0.065 0.118 
 (0.396) (0.965) (0.720) (0.652) (0.360) (0.368) 
∆ Profitability -0.120*** -0.282*** -0.117*** -0.269*** -0.115*** -0.262*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Constant 0.006  -0.025*** 0.006 -0.029*** 0.004 -0.033*** 
 (0.224) (0.004) (0.218) (0.000) (0.398) (0.000) 
Within R2 0.502 0.694 0.497 0.701 0.499 0.702 
Between R2 0.237 0.435 0.234 0.426 0.246 0.456 
Obs. 2283 2283 2283 2283 2283 2283 
Firms 459 459 459 459 459 459 
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Table 6.14 (Continued) 
Panel C. Net purchase of CEO and CFO and pecking order preference 
Dependent variable: net debt issues scaled by net assets (model 1-8) 
Variables  (1) CF (2) BS (3) CF (4) BS (5) CF (6) BS (7) CF (8) BS 
PDEF 0.352*** 0.644*** 0.337*** 0.630*** 0.434*** 0.720*** 0.426*** 0.709*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NDEF 0.877*** 0.338*** 0.873*** 0.333*** 0.957*** 0.490*** 1.002*** 0.644*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
VA_CEO -0.008 -0.010       
 (0.124) (0.229)       
VOL_CEO   -0.010* -0.011     
   (0.075) (0.273)     
VA_CFO     0.002 -0.002   
     (0.753) (0.855)   
VOL_CFO       0.000 -0.006 
       (0.988) (0.579) 
VA_CEO×PDEF 0.057 0.046       
 (0.371) (0.154)       
VOL_CEO×PDEF   0.077 0.063*     
   (0.252) (0.073)     
VA_CFO×PDEF     -0.045 -0.044   
     (0.499) (0.410)   
VOL_CFO×PDEF       -0.027 -0.028 
       (0.778) (0.654) 
VA_CEO×NDEF 0.011 -0.069       
 (0.872) (0.443)       
VOL_CFO×NDEF   0.019 -0.053     
   (0.808) (0.568)     
VA_CEO×NDEF     -0.195 -0.105   
     (0.134) (0.549)   
VOL_CFO×NDEF       -0.249* -0.274** 
       (0.091) (0.032) 
∆ MB -0.009* -0.007 -0.010* -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.062) (0.480) (0.051) (0.467) (0.473) (0.859) (0.439) (0.865) 
∆ Firm size 0.036** 0.101** 0.037** 0.103** 0.006 0.124 0.006 0.122 
 (0.025) (0.034) (0.025) (0.030) (0.797) (0.128) (0.785) (0.134) 
∆ Tangibility -0.130* -0.146 -0.131* -0.146 -0.125* 0.081 -0.130* 0.090 
 (0.086) (0.361) (0.084) (0.358) (0.089) (0.720) (0.081) (0.690) 
∆ Profitability -0.070* -0.106 -0.068* -0.101 -0.027 -0.024 -0.033 -0.026 
 (0.063) (0.370) (0.073) (0.395) (0.641) (0.906) (0.584) (0.898) 
Constant 0.009 -0.029*** 0.011 -0.027*** 0.006 -0.031*** 0.007 -0.025** 
 (0.182) (0.003) (0.114) (0.007) (0.337) (0.004) (0.350) (0.018) 
Within R2 0.582 0.728 0.585 0.729 0.550 0.766 0.549 0.768 
Between R2 0.223 0.415 0.227 0.415 0.135 0.511 0.130 0.498 
Obs. 1327 1327 1327 1327 1071 1071 1071 1071 
Firms 377 377 377 377 340 340 340 340 
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6.6 Conclusions 
This study is motivated by contrasting theoretical predictions made by Heaton (2002) 
and Hackbarth (2008) that managerial overconfidence can be either positively or 
negatively related to the degree of pecking order preference. A closely related study by 
Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) provides empirical evidence that CEO 
overconfidence may lead to an enhanced pecking order preference. Our empirical 
strategies are not exactly the same as Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011). In particular, 
we use modified Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) regression that distinguishes between 
firms with financing deficits and surpluses. In addition, we also extend prior work by 
developing and using time-varying measures of managerial overconfidence.  
 
Our empirical findings are in contrast to Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) but supports 
Hackbarth’s (2008) proposition that managerial overconfidence can lead to reverse 
pecking order preference. More specifically, we find that managerial overconfidence 
weakens the preference of firms with positive financing deficit for debt over equity 
financing. This new evidence is consistent with Hackbarth’s (2008) model prediction 
that overconfident managers with “risk perception bias” (i.e. underestimation of the 
riskiness of earnings) prefer equity over debt financing because of the convexity of 
equity. Further support for this proposition (hypothesis 1b) is provided by showing that 
the overconfidence-induced reverse pecking order preference is more pronounced for 
firms with high earnings volatility. This finding suggests that “risk perception bias” is 
the underlying channel through which overconfidence weakens the pecking order 
preference. Interestingly, we further document that managerial overconfidence is more 
significantly associated with a reverse pecking order preference especially for small 
firms. This finding partly explains the pecking order puzzle (size anomaly): small firms 
exhibit weaker pecking order preference partly because overconfident managers in 
small firms appear to have a reverse pecking order preference.  
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Chapter 7. Empirical Study 3: Managerial Overconfidence and 
Corporate Debt Maturity Structure 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Recent finance literature examines the impact of 'managerial overconfidence' on firms' 
financing decisions.
131, 132
 Various theoretical (e.g., Hackbarth, 2008; Malmendier et al. 
2011) and empirical (e.g., Ben-David et al., 2013; Malmendier et al., 2011) studies 
argue that the degree of managerial overconfidence is positively linked to the amount of 
debt and to financial leverage. Building upon this literature, we propose and test the 
hypotheses that link managerial overconfidence to corporate debt maturity structure. 
Our study is related to recent literature that examines the link between managerial 
overconfidence and debt maturity in the US (Graham et al., 2013; Ben-David et al., 
2013) and France (Landier and Thesmar, 2009). However, these studies rely on time-
invariant survey-based measures of managerial overconfidence. In contrast, this study 
implements time-varying measures of overconfidence. Time-varying overconfidence 
measures allow us to make important contributions by testing the impact of changes of 
overconfidence on debt maturity. Our empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that 
managerial overconfidence is beneficial for the firm in terms of reducing the agency 
cost of debt. Our evidence complements the recent finding that managerial 
overconfidence can enhance firm innovation (Hirshleifer et al., 2012), while existing 
behavioural studies tend to focus on the adverse consequences of overconfidence. 
         
The existing empirical literature on the determinants of corporate debt maturity 
primarily focuses on firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, market-to-book, leverage, 
                                                          
131
 Managerial overconfidence is also found to be relevant to firm investment 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005), merger and acquisition (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), 
dividend policy (Burg, Scheinert and Streitz, 2012), management forecasts (Hribar and 
Yang, 2011), firm innovations (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011) and executive compensation 
(Keiber, 2005) and turnover (Campbell et al., 2011).  
132
 The managerial overconfidence literature builds upon one of the most robust 
findings in the psychological studies that people tend to be overconfident (Taylor and 
Brown, 1988). Overconfident people may overestimate their own abilities, the precision 
of their knowledge/information and the probabilities of good outcomes. In finance, 
overconfidence is often modeled as overestimation of mean future cash flow and 
underestimation of variance (e.g., Hackbarth, 2008). However, it should be noted that 
Roll (1986) highlighted the significance of managerial overconfidence (i.e. hubris) in 
mergers and acquisitions decisions over two decades ago. 
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liquidity, asset maturity, tax, abnormal earnings, earnings volatility) and debt and equity 
market conditions (e.g., term structure, interest rate volatility, stock price performance) 
(see, e.g., Barclays and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 1994; Johnson, 2003; Barclay et 
al., 2003; Antoniou et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2012). To date, very little empirical evidence 
exists on the impact of various managerial traits (e.g., managerial overconfidence) on 
debt maturity structure. Such empirical evidence is relevant for academics and 
practitioners in finance, because it is important to know whether a particular managerial 
trait could affect financial decision making and whether this has a positive or negative 
effect.  
         
Hypothetically, managerial overconfidence is associated with either a positive effect 
(e.g. reducing agency cost of debt) or biased beliefs (e.g. biased risk perceptions) and 
therefore can have a either positive or negative effect on debt maturity. A few indirect
133
 
empirical studies find mixed results. Ben-David et al. (2013) find that survey-based 
CFO overconfidence has a positive effect on debt maturity. Li (2010a) empirically 
examines the effect of self-attribution bias (SAB) (Hilary and Hsu, 2011)
134
, regarded as 
a dynamic counterpart of overconfidence (Hirshleifer, 2001) or “endogenous/acquired 
overconfidence”135, on firms’ financial decisions. He documents that self-attribution 
bias also has a positive effect on debt maturity. However, no formal hypothesis 
regarding the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relationship has been developed. 
Based on Hackbarth’s (2009) behavioural agency model of corporate borrowing, we 
articulate that managerial overconfidence can mitigate agency cost especially associated 
with long-term debt and therefore has a positive effect on debt maturity.  
         
In contrast, some behavioural financing models and evidence suggest that managerial 
overconfidence can be negatively related to debt maturity. Landier and Thesmar’s (2009) 
                                                          
133
 “Indirect” means that the primary purpose of their studies (e.g. Ben-David et al., 
2013; Graham et al., 2013) is not to examine the determinants of debt maturity structure. 
Put differently, their studies are not dedicated to the test of debt maturity determinants. 
Consequently, no formal hypotheses regarding the overconfidence-debt maturity 
relationship have been developed. Empirically, their control variables (i.e. standard 
determinants of debt maturity) are limited, which may lead to omitted variable bias.  
134
 The effect of the SAB has been empirically examined in the context of CEO turnover 
(Kim, 2011), managerial earnings forecast (Hilary and Hsu, 2011) and merger and 
acquisitions (Billett and Qian, 2008).  
135
 Hilary and Hsu (2011) use “endogenous overconfidence” to describe the dynamic 
self-attribution-induced overconfidence.  
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model shows that short-term debt is optimal for optimistic entrepreneurs. This 
prediction is supported by their empirical analysis based on surveys of French 
entrepreneurs. In addition, overconfident managers who are subject to “risk perception 
bias” (Hackbarth, 2008) may underestimate the liquidity risk associated with short-term 
debt and consequently use more short-term debt. Graham et al. (2013) find that survey-
based CEO overconfidence has a negative effect on debt maturity. In sum, existing 
studies use survey-based measures of managerial overconfidence but find mixed results. 
To test contrasting theoretical arguments, the effect of managerial overconfidence on 
debt maturity is an empirical question that needs to be further investigated using 
appropriate measures of overconfidence.  
         
Apart from proposing the positive effect of overconfidence on debt maturity from an 
agency perspective, our contributions also arise from using two time-varying words-
based measures and one action-based measure of managerial overconfidence. First, we 
develop two types of words-based overconfidence measures based on computational 
linguistic analysis of Chairman’s Statement in the UK annual reports. In particular, we 
use first person pronouns, regarded as “linguistic biomarkers of hubris” in a recent 
study on hubris syndrome (Garrard et al., 2014). The first person pronouns have also 
been used as a proxy for self-attribution bias (Li, 2010a). We also construct optimistic 
tone measures as another words-based proxy for overconfidence. To ensure the validity 
of tone measures, we form a tone index using principal component analysis (PCA). Our 
study is therefore the first empirical test of the impact of optimistic words in 
Chairman’s Statement on debt maturity. Methodologically, our study is also the first 
attempt to gauge time-varying managerial overconfidence based on managerial words in 
the Chairman’s Statement. Second, we use an action-based overconfidence measure 
based on how managers trade shares of their own firms.
136
 Insider trading data allows us 
                                                          
136
 Malmendier and Tate (2005) propose two overconfidence measures that are based on 
stock option and press portrayal. First, although the stock option-based proxy has been 
widely used in many US studies, it might not be suitable for the UK. Kyriacou et al. 
(2010) point out that “UK executives’ need to diversify is less pressing” because of the 
significant differences in the structure of executive remuneration and regulation. 
Therefore, this proxy may be especially weak for UK studies. Furthermore, Cao’s (2009) 
evidence suggests that CEO option exercise is more related to mispricing and growth 
opportunity and thus is not a valid measure of CEO overconfidence. Second, the press-
based proxy is subject to two major criticisms: (1) the press coverage might be biased, 
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to compare the influences of overconfidence of different directors (including Chairman, 
CEO and CFO) on debt maturity.  
         
Our detailed empirical analysis support the positive effect of overconfidence hypothesis. 
Firstly, first person singular pronouns (I), has a positive and significant effect on debt 
maturity, while the positive effect of first person plural pronouns (WE) is significant 
only when WE is below its median. In addition, the net purchase ratios (NPR), as a 
proxy for overconfidence, of executive directors and especially CEOs are significantly 
and positively related to debt maturity. Second, using first difference estimator we find 
that the changes of I and optimistic tone also have significant and positive effects on the 
change of debt maturity. These results are consistent with the US evidence provided by 
Ben-David et al. (2013) and Li (2010a). However, this study is the first to document 
that time-variations in overconfidence have a positive effect on the change of debt 
maturity.  
         
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the literature on 
the standard and behavioural determinants of debt maturity and develops hypotheses. 
Section 7.3 describes methodology and data. Section 7.4 discusses empirical results and 
section 7.5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
7.2 Related Research and Hypotheses 
7.2.1 Related research  
Most of the previous empirical studies test two major types of standard determinants of 
debt maturity including firm characteristics and equity and debt market conditions
137
. 
More recent studies examine the managerial impact (e.g., stock ownership (Datta et al., 
2005) and effect of executive compensation (Brockman et al., 2010)) on debt maturity. 
For a brief review of studies on the standard determinants of debt maturity, see 
Appendix 7.B. In behavioural finance, a few recent studies examine the role of 
managerial overconfidence. There are only one test using French survey data (Landier 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and (2) certain terms used in the press may not have exactly the same meanings as in 
psychology (Gider and Hackbarth, 2010).   
137
 For a brief review of the previous empirical debt maturity studies, please see 
Antoniou et al. (2006).  
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and Thesmar, 2009) and two indirect tests based on US survey data (Graham et al., 
2013; Ben-David et al., 2013). However, they report differing signs for the relationship 
between overconfidence and debt maturity.  
         
Two studies find managerial overconfidence is negatively related to debt maturity. 
Landier and Thesmar (2009) develop a model of financial contracting with optimists 
and their survey-based measure of optimism is found to be negatively related to debt 
maturity
138
. Also using a survey data approach, Graham et al. (2013) measure executive 
attitudes (mainly the U.S. based CEOs) including optimism and then relate them to 
acquisition and capital structure decisions. More specifically, they gauge optimism 
using well-established psychometric tests (i.e. Life Orientation Test-Revised (LOT-R) 
developed by Scheier and Carver (1994)). Consistent with the prediction of Landier and 
Thesmar’s (2009) model, they find that highly optimistic CEOs are more likely to use 
short-term debt.  
         
However, another US study finds a positive relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and debt maturity. Ben-David et al. (2013) test the impact of CFO 
overconfidence on corporate financial policies. Their measure of CFO overconfidence is 
constructed using over 6,500 quarterly stock market forecasts by US CFOs. Following a 
method widely adopted in laboratory experiments of overconfidence, the CFOs are 
asked to predict one- and ten-year stock market returns and the 10
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles 
of the market return distribution. The narrowness of individual probability distributions 
(i.e. imputed volatility
139 ) of market returns is used as a proxy for each CFO’s 
overconfidence. Their empirical results suggest that firms with overconfident CFOs use 
proportionally more long-term than short-term debt.  
         
In brief, the above two US empirical studies indicate that CEO and CFO overconfidence 
may have opposite influences on debt maturity. The results for CEO and CFO 
                                                          
138
 Landier and Thesmar’s (2009) empirical tests are based on the French data, while 
according to the French GAAP all leases are treated as operating lease. Therefore, the 
capitalized lease is not a concern. However, for the US and UK studies, capitalized 
lease may potentially drive the results. More discussions will be provided regarding this 
issue later.    
139
 This is calculated as the difference between the 90
th
 and 10
th
 percentiles divided by 
the number of standard deviations within the 80% confidence interval (i.e. 2.65).  
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overconfidence may partly reflect general differences in their psychological traits, in 
particular, CEOs tend to be more optimistic than CFOs (Graham et al., 2013). Further, 
although CEOs often dominate capital structure decisions in some firms (Graham et al., 
2013), the role of directors in debt maturity decisions may vary across companies. This 
study mitigates this problem by examining the role of different types of directors. In 
particular, we compare the effects of overconfidence of (1) the Chairman, CEO and 
CFO and (2) executive and non-executive directors.  
         
Li (2010a) finds that the SAB of managers is positively related to debt maturity, 
consistent with Ben-David et al. (2013). However, this is also an indirect debt maturity 
study with limited control variables, which may suffer from omitted variable bias. A 
more important limitation is that the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A)
140
 
is heavily regulated and “subject to auditor’s examination” (Li, 2010a) and 
consequently may not be a perfect source of narratives for the measurement of the SAB. 
This study uses an unaudited narrative (i.e. Chairman’s Statement) to measure the SAB 
of Chairman.  
 
7.2.2 Hypothesis development 
This section reviews several behavioural financing models that shed light on the impact 
of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity decisions. In particular, we hypothesize 
that managerial overconfidence may decrease debt maturity from financial contracting, 
perceived undervaluation and risk perception perspectives but increase debt maturity 
from an agency cost of debt perspective.  
 
7.2.2.1 Managerial overconfidence decreases debt maturity  
a. Financial contracting perspective  
Landier and Thesmar (2009) develop a financial contracting model that explains the 
relationship between entrepreneurial optimism and debt maturity. Their model shows a 
separating equilibrium in which short-term (long-term) debt is optimal for optimistic 
(realistic) entrepreneurs. Optimists prefer short-term debt for the following reason. In 
their model, a short-term debt contract allows the exchange of cash-flow rights in the 
bad states, in which case investors may impose “adaptation decisions” by choosing a 
                                                          
140
 Li’s (2010) measure of SAB is based on the content analysis of the MD&A. 
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safer investment strategy. However, from the perspective of optimistic entrepreneurs, 
the bad state that leads to the exchange of cash-flow rights will be very unlikely. Most 
importantly, the optimistic entrepreneurs believe that the short-term debt contract 
provides more upsides of the project at the expense of the bond holders. That is why 
firms with optimistic managers tend to use more short-term debt. Their model is 
supported by their empirical results. Therefore, according to Landier and Thesmar 
(2009), managerial overconfidence is expected to be negatively associated with debt 
maturity.      
 
b. Perceived undervaluation (perceived information asymmetry) 
Managerial overconfidence may also be related to debt maturity when there is a 
perceived undervaluation of debt with longer maturity. Heaton’s (2002) model shows 
more pronounced pecking order behaviour of firms with overconfident managers. 
Overconfident managers believe that equity and debt issued by the firm are 
systematically undervalued by outside investors. It is also important to notice that more 
risky securities are more sensitive to probabilistic beliefs and therefore are more subject 
to perceived undervaluation. Similarly, Malmendier and Tate (2005a) argue that 
Heaton’s Model provide a re-interpretation of the traditional Myers-Maljuf (1984) 
model with information asymmetry. In other words, the information cost of long-term 
debt might be perceived to be higher for overconfident managers. Empirically, 
Malmendier et al. (2011) provide evidence that managerial overconfidence is a potential 
driver of pecking order behaviour because it contributes to perceived information 
asymmetry.  
         
Furthermore, Heaton’s (2002) model implies that overconfident managers will always 
prefer to issue the security with the largest component of risk-free debt, in which case 
the cost of financing is minimized. To be specific, the risky debt is considered as a 
combination of risk-free debt and equity and thus the financing cost can be represented 
as a weighted average of cost of risk-free debt and equity. In the spirit of Heaton’s 
(2002) model, considering that long-term debt tends to be perceived by overconfident 
managers to be undervalued and associated with higher information cost relative to 
short-term debt, we may expect that firms with overconfident managers prefer short-
term debt to the informationally disadvantaged long-term debt. Thus, from this 
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perspective, managerial overconfidence is expected to be negatively related to debt 
maturity.  
 
c. Risk perception bias  
The risk perception argument posits that overconfident managers may underestimate the 
liquidity risk associated with short-term debt and therefore tend to use more short-term 
debt. In Hackbarth’s (2008) model, overconfidence managers may be subject to risk 
perception bias, meaning that they may underestimate the risk associated with future 
earnings. More specifically, overconfident managers underestimate the likelihood of 
financial distress because of risk perception bias. Therefore, in the light of trade-off 
theory, managerial overconfidence is positively related to debt issue. This prediction is 
supported by Ben-David et al.’s (2013) empirical finding that managerial 
overconfidence is positively related to the leverage ratio.  
         
Regarding debt maturity decisions, Jun and Jen (2003) construct a trade-off model of 
debt maturity structure. Their model suggests that firms’ debt maturity decision is based 
on the trade-off between the costs and benefits associated with short-term debt. In 
particular, short-term debt is less expensive but has higher refinancing risk. However, in 
the presence of the risk perception bias in Hackbarth’s (2008) model, we may argue that 
overconfident managers may overestimate their firms’ ability to repay the short-term 
debt and also underestimate the liquidity or refinancing risk associated with short-term 
debt. In this case, overconfident managers have more incentive to pursue the cost 
advantage of short-term debt. Thus, it is expected that managerial overconfidence, 
especially the risk perception bias, is also negatively associated with debt maturity.   
         
To sum up, consistent with Landier and Thesmar’s (2009) financial contracting model 
which suggests that short-term debt is optimal for overconfident managers, two 
behavioural capital structure models by Heaton (2002) and Hackbarth (2008) also imply 
that overconfident managers are more likely to use short-term debt due to their biased 
perceptions of information costs and liquidity risk, respectively. In brief, from the 
demand side, the above three perspectives suggest that overconfident managers are 
more willing to use short-term debt. Therefore, we propose the following 
overconfidence hypothesis:  
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        H1a: managerial overconfidence is negatively associated with debt maturity, 
ceteris paribus.  
 
 
7.2.2.2 Managerial overconfidence increases debt maturity  
a. Agency cost of debt hypothesis 
Managerial overconfidence may also increase debt maturity if it reduces the agency cost 
of debt. Overconfidence can be particularly favourable from the long-term bond 
investors’ perspective, which makes those firms with overconfident managers more 
easily raise long-term debt funds. This idea is consistent with Ben-David et al.’s (2007) 
argument that overconfident CFOs are able to convince lenders to provide long-term 
debt financing more effectively. More specifically, a particularly relevant type of 
favourable effect of overconfidence, as modelled by Hackbarth (2009), is related to the 
reduction of agency cost of debt (i.e. underinvestment problem).  
         
In the light of Hackbarth’s (2009)141 behavioural model of corporate borrowing, we 
articulate that managerial overconfidence can be positively related to debt maturity. 
Hackbarth’s (2009) model studies the agency conflicts between bondholders and 
shareholders in the presence of managerial overconfidence. His model shows that 
managerial overconfidence can play a positive role by mitigating the agency cost of 
debt (i.e. underinvestment problem), which in turn makes (especially long-term) debt 
less costly. In his model, he proposes the timing effect of overconfidence, meaning that 
overconfident managers tend to invest earlier and more than their rational counterparts. 
In a real-options framework, earlier investment can be viewed as an earlier exercise of 
the option to invest. The intuition is that overconfident managers, who have lower 
perceived uncertainty of new project, underestimate the value of the option to wait for 
more information about the project. Thus, the timing effect can reduce underinvestment 
problem. This prediction is in line with Goel and Thakor’s (2008) proposition that a 
rational risk-averse CEO underinvests under the optimal compensation contract, while 
moderate CEO overconfidence mitigates this underinvestment problem which in turn 
                                                          
141
 As pointed out in Hackbarth (2009), this is the first behavioural model related to the 
conflict between bondholders and shareholders, while previous theories (Gervais, 
Heaton, and Odean, 2011; Heaton, 2002; Hackbarth, 2008) focus on the conflicts 
between managers and shareholders.  
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enhances firm value. Similarly, Gervais et al. (2011) also show that overconfidence 
makes managers less conservative and therefore take more risky but value-enhancing 
projects. As summarized by Gider and Hackbarth (2010), managerial overconfidence 
and/or optimism
142
 “lead to more favourable corporate policies from the bondholders’ 
point of view” (i.e. less suboptimal future investment decisions). 
         
The major implication of Hackbarth’s (2009) model is that managerial overconfidence 
can mitigate the underinvestment problem. This insight sheds light on the relationship 
between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity, considering that 
underinvestment problem tends to increase with debt maturity (e.g. Myers, 1977; 
Johnson, 2003). In particular, we articulate that managerial overconfidence will make 
long-term debt less costly and thus increase debt maturity. In other words, in the light of 
Hackbarth’s (2009) model, firms with overconfident managers less suffer from 
underinvestment problem and are therefore able to use more long-term debt at a lower 
cost than firms with rational managers.
143
  
         
Put differently, managerial overconfidence provides an alternative solution to the 
underinvestment problem and therefore can increase debt maturity. In the traditional 
finance literature, Barnea et al. (1980) rationalize debt maturity structure as a 
mechanism to solve agency costs associated with Myers’s (1977) underinvestment/debt 
overhang problem. More specifically, shortening debt maturity is regarded as a standard 
way to reduce the conflict between bondholders and shareholders over the exercise of 
growth options (Myers, 1977). This conflict becomes more severe especially for firms 
                                                          
142
 Both managerial optimism and overconfidence lead to more favourable corporate 
policies from the bondholders’ point of view, that is, the timing effect that alleviates the 
conflicts between bondholders and shareholders.  
143
 It is recognized that underinvestment problem is a major concern of long-term debt 
holders. If long-term debt investors know which firms have overconfident managers and 
believe that overconfidence can mitigate underinvestment problem, those long-term 
debt investors will lend money to overconfident managers but not rational ones. This 
means that all the long-term debt financing in the market will be allocated to firms with 
overconfident managers. As a result, the debt maturity ratio of firms with rational 
managers is zero, while that of firms with overconfident managers must be above zero. 
In this extreme example, overconfidence leads to higher debt maturity.  
 219 
 
with greater investment opportunities.
144
 By using short-term debt, this conflict may 
largely disappear if the maturity of debt is so short that it matures before the investment 
options are to be exercised. However, from a behavioural agency perspective, 
Hackbarth’s (2009) model implies that firms with overconfident managers are subject to 
lower agency cost of debt (especially long-term debt), meaning that those firms have 
less need to shorten debt maturity.  
         
On the other hand, overconfidence is associated with higher level of agent’s effort 
(Larwood and Whittaker, 1977; Gervais et al., 2011). Higher effort level associated 
with overconfidence will improve firm performance and reduce default risk on debt and 
thus makes overconfident managers more attractive to firms relative to their rational 
counterparts (Gervais et al., 2011). This additional favourable effect of overconfidence 
also makes investors more willing to provide long-term debt financing to firms with 
overconfident managers because of reduced default risk. Taken together, managerial 
overconfidence can not only reduce the agency cost of (especially long-term) debt but 
also reduce the default risk of long-term debt by increasing manager’s effort. 145 
Therefore, the positive effect of managerial overconfidence hypothesis can be stated as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
144
 Consistent with this argument, our subsequent subsample analysis shows that the 
positive overconfident-debt maturity is more significant for firms with more growth 
opportunities.  
145
 Managerial overconfidence is also associated with other positive effects. In 
particular, overconfidence can be favourable for the firms on the following three aspects. 
First, overconfidence may mitigate moral hazard problem (Keiber, 2005). This is 
possible because, as suggested by Larwood and Whittaker (1977), overconfidence may 
lead to higher level of agent’s effort. Second, Goel and Thakor (2008) show that a 
certain level of overconfidence counteracts managers’ risk aversion and hence make 
them invest in more risky but value-enhancing projects. Third, overconfidence can also 
be productive for the whole organization. Gervais and Goldstein (2004) argue that 
overconfident agents may overestimate their own marginal productivity and therefore 
work harder, which in turn makes other team members work harder as well. In a similar 
vein, according to Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006), narcissistic managers are able to 
infuse their employees with self-confidence and enthusiasm. Therefore, managerial 
narcissism may enhance the perceived success of the firm, especially from outside 
stakeholders’ perspective (Bollaert and Petit, 2010). In brief, from the supply side, 
positive effect of overconfidence suggests that investors may be more willing to provide 
long-term financing. Therefore, managerial overconfidence can be positively related to 
debt maturity.  
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H1b: from an agency perspective, managerial overconfidence is positively 
associated with debt maturity, ceteris paribus. 
         
 
7.2.2.3 Managerial duty hypothesis: CEO versus CFO 
The discussion in this section is motivated by the fact that CEO and CFO have different 
core duties (Malmendier and Zheng, 2012). Most existing behavioural corporate finance 
studies focus on unbiased beliefs by CEOs.
146
 This is because CEO is often considered 
as the principal corporate decision maker (Graham et al., 2013). On the other hand, 
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) document that CFO’s biased beliefs also have 
significant influence on various corporate policies. However, as argued by Malmendier 
and Zheng (2012), some firm decisions are under the control of a manager but are not 
that manager’s core duties. Therefore, personal traits of the CEO and CFO are likely to 
have different impacts on different corporate decisions. However, these studies 
construct overconfidence measures in a different manner, which makes it difficult to 
compare CEO and CFO effects across studies. 
         
To facilitate the comparability of CEO and CFO effects, several recent empirical studies 
examine the influences of both CEO and CFO on corporate polices using same 
measures of managerial traits. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) compare the influences 
of the risk-taking incentives of CEO and CFO on corporate polices. They document that 
CEO risk-preferences are more related to capital structure and cash holdings, while 
CFO risk-preferences have stronger impacts on debt maturity. Malmendier and Zheng 
(2012) compare the roles of CEO and CFO overconfidence. They find that only CEO 
overconfidence has significant impacts on non-financing decisions including 
investment, mergers and acquisitions and R&D, while CFO overconfidence has a 
stronger influence on some financing decisions (i.e. debt and equity issuance). 
However, they do not examine the debt maturity decision. This study fills this gap by 
developing a hypothesis on the different impacts of CEO and CFO overconfidence on 
the debt maturity decision, namely managerial duty hypothesis.  
                                                          
146
 Existing evidences show that CEO overconfidence has significance impacts on a 
wide range of corporate financial decisions including investment (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005), mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), capital structure 
(Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011) and debt maturity (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). 
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Next, we develop this managerial duty hypothesis based on (1) the duties of CEO and 
CFO as suggested by previous studies on managerial effects and (2) the underlying 
mechanism of the positive overconfidence-debt relationship (i.e. Hackbarth’s (2009) 
timing effect). The above studies on managerial effects seem to suggest that CEO, as 
key corporate decision-maker, has a strong effect on financing and especially 
investment decisions. On the other hand, those studies also suggest that CFO has a 
strong influence on financing and especially debt maturity decisions. Therefore, it is 
difficult to argue whether CEO or CFO has a stronger impact on debt maturity decision, 
because existing evidence seems to suggest that neither of them dominate financing 
decisions. However, recall our hypothesis 1b (H1b), the positive overconfidence-debt 
maturity relationship is driven by overconfident manager’s earlier exercise of 
investment options. From this behavioural agency perspective, CEO, who often 
dominant investment decisions, is expected to play a more significant role in increasing 
debt maturity. Therefore, considering that the CEO dominates investment decisions 
which is the key channel through with managerial overconfidence can have a positive 
effect on debt maturity (i.e. Hackbarth’s (2009) timing effect), we form the managerial 
duty hypothesis as follows:  
 
H2: CEO overconfidence has a more significant and positive effect on debt 
maturity relative to that of the CFO. 
 
 
7.3 The Methodology and Data 
7.3.1 The empirical model 
Following the vast US literature (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs and Mauer, 
1996), we use the following empirical model:  
 
𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑘=1 𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                             (7.1) 
 
where, 𝐷𝑀𝑖𝑡  is a measure of the debt maturity of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡. 𝑋 is the vector of 
explanatory variables. 𝜐𝑖  represents time-invariant unobservable firm-specific effects. 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  
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Our debt maturity measure (DM) is the long-term debt ratio, which is calculated as the 
ratio of debt matures in more than one year to total debt. Previous studies also use debt 
matures in over three and five years as a measure of long-term debt.
147
 Fortunately, 
existing empirical results do not seem to be particularly sensitive to the choice of 
various measures of debt maturity. However, as mentioned in Antoniou et al. (2006), 
different accounting treatments and the potential creative accounting problems make the 
measurement of debt maturity difficult.
148
 
 
We choose our control variables based on previous debt maturity studies
149
. Major 
standard theories of debt maturity are related to agency cost, liquidity risk and 
signalling, maturity matching and tax (see Appendix 7.C). Key variables that represent 
different theories and their predicted signs are outlined as follows
150
: market-to-book (-) 
measuring growth opportunity, asset maturity (+) controlling for maturity matching, 
size (+) measuring liquidity risk, liquidity (+) measuring liquidity risk, earnings 
volatility (-) measuring liquidity risk, leverage (+) measuring liquidity risk, abnormal 
earnings (-) measuring firm quality, tax (+) accounting for tax hypothesis, stock price 
performance (+) accounting for market timing. All these variables are defined in 
Appendix 7.A.  
 
7.3.2 Measurement of managerial overconfidence  
7.3.3.1 Words-based measure of managerial overconfidence  
We construct two words-based measures of overconfidence based on a computational 
linguistic analysis of UK Chairman’s Statement. Linguistic analysis of financial 
                                                          
147
 Early UK debt maturity studies (e.g., Ozkan, 2000) use the ratio of debt that matures 
in over five years to total debt as the dependent variable. Unfortunately, the following 
data items, including debt due in 2-5years (WC18283), 6-10 years (WC18284) and over 
10 years (WC18285), become unavailable in the Worldscope database after 2004.    
148
 For example, some firms may treat the recurrent component of short-term debt as 
long-term debt. In terms of creative accounting, Gramlich et al. (2001) document that 
firms classify short-term obligations to long-term debt and subsequently reclassify that 
debt with the purpose of smoothing the reported measure of liquidity. 
149
 For a review of standard debt maturity hypotheses, see Stohs and Mauer (1996) and 
Antoniou et al. (2006).  
150
 It is true, however, that some variables can be explained by multiple theoretical 
perspectives and may even have opposite predicted signs. For a summary of the 
standard debt maturity determinants and their predicted signs, see Table 1 in Antoniou 
et al. (2006). 
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narratives is becoming increasingly widely used.
151
 Recent accounting and finance 
studies use several content analysis softwares (e.g., Diction, LIWC and General Inquirer) 
to analyse various language dimensions of different narratives
152
 (e.g., personal 
pronouns, optimistic vs. pessimistic, forward-looking).  
 
a. First person pronouns 
Our first words-based overconfidence measure is related to first person pronouns. 
Recent study on the hubris syndrome (Garrard et al., 2014) considers first person 
pronouns as “linguistic biomarkers of hubris”. In addition, previous accounting (Hyland, 
1998; Clatworthy and Jones, 2006) research suggests that the presence (absence) of first 
person pronouns may indicate the messengers’ intention to internalise (distance 
themselves from) good (bad) performance or news. Li (2010a) proposes a measure of 
self-attribution bias based on the content analysis of MD&A by LIWC software. In 
particular, he uses the ratio of first person pronouns to second- and third-person 
pronouns in the MD&A as a proxy for self-attribution bias.
153
 Clatworthy and Jones 
(2006) point out that the potential for self-attribution bias, as measured by first person 
pronouns, is enhanced by the unaudited nature of the Chairman’s Statement. Therefore, 
the UK Chairman’s Statement is more suitable than the US MD&A for capturing 
managerial biased beliefs.
154
 In brief, first person pronouns can be regarded as proxies 
for dynamic self-attribution-induced overconfidence. Following Li (2010a), we use 
                                                          
151
 This is partly because of the development of content analysis software and the 
availability of digital financial narratives.  
152
 Various texts analysed in the finance and accounting literature include MD&A 
(Kothari et al., 2009; Li, 2010a), CEO interviews (Kim, 2013) and earnings 
announcement (Rogers et al., 2009). For a more comprehensive summary of textual 
analysis studies, see Appendix A2 in Li (2010b).  
153
 Li (2010a) uses the percentage of first person pronouns as an alternative proxy for 
the SAB and finds similar results.  
154
 One may ask why our linguistic analysis only focuses on Chairman’s Statement, 
given that other narratives, e.g., CEO review, financial review, business review, 
operational review, might also be available in the annual report. It would be desirable to 
capture the overconfidence of CEO and CFO for the purpose of our study. However, the 
problem is that those reviews are relatively less standard, meaning that (a) not every 
firm provides statements made by CEO and CFO separately and (b) the structure and 
content of their statements vary greatly from firm to firm. Another type of narrative that 
is available for all the firms is Directors’ Report. However, it is regulated under the 
Companies Act 1985 and 2006 and therefore is not perfectly suitable for our analysis of 
overconfidence. 
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LIWC software to measure the proportion of first person pronouns (𝐹𝑃𝑃_𝐿𝐼𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡) in the 
Chairman’s Statement as our first words-based overconfidence measure:  
 
𝐹𝑃𝑃_𝐿𝐼𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑡
× 100 
(7.2) 
 
where, 𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑡 represents either first person singular pronouns (𝐼) (e.g., I, me, mine) or 
first person plural pronouns (𝑊𝐸) (e.g., we, us, our) as defined by LIWC.  
         
The reason why we test the effects of 𝐼 and 𝑊𝐸 separately is that previous empirical 
studies use the sum of I and WE and the ratio of I to WE as proxies for self-attribution 
bias (Li, 2010a) and narcissism
155
 (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) respectively, both 
of which contribute to managerial overconfidence. Based on the above two operational 
definitions, the variable I is positively related to both constructs, however, variable WE 
is positively related to self-attribution bias but negatively related to narcissism. In brief, 
the relationship between WE and managerial overconfidence might be ambiguous. 
Therefore, the results for the variable WE are expected to be more mixed given its 
differing relationship to the components of managerial overconfidence.
156
 
 
b. Optimistic tone 
Following chapter 5, we form a composite index of optimistic tone of Chairman’s 
Statement using principal component analysis. We define 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  as the first 
principal components of the correlation matrix of six raw tone measures.
157
  
 
                                                          
155
 A narcissistic personality is considered as a contributor to hubris (i.e. exaggerated 
self-confidence) (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007). More 
specifically, narcissism is associated with “relative optimism and confidence about 
positive outcomes” (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007).  
156
 We find that neither the first person pronouns (i.e. the sum of I and WE) nor the ratio 
of I to WE is statistically significantly related to debt maturity.  
157
 The first component, with an eigenvalue of 2.59, explains 43.2 percent of our sample 
variance. The eigenvalue of second component is close to one.  
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𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 =∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
6
𝑗=1
= 0.489𝐸𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 0.162𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛1𝑖𝑡 + 0.452𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡
+ 0.002𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛2𝑖𝑡 + 0.481𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 0.547𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝐿𝑀𝑖𝑡 (7.3) 
 
where, 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡  represents individual tone measure j of firm i in fiscal year t. 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗 is the loading for individual tone measure j. The loading for Certain1 and 
Certain2 is much lower compared with other tone measures. However, our empirical 
results are qualitatively similar when we exclude those two measures of certainty tone 
from the composite index.  
 
In addition, similar to chapter 5, to address the concern that the raw tone might be 
contaminated by firm-specific variables
158
, a composite index of the orthogonalized 
tone measures is constructed as follows. First, we regress each individual tone measure 
on standard determinants of debt maturity. Next, a composite index (𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡
⊥) is 
formed based on the first principal component of six residuals (i.e. 𝑇𝑜𝑛𝑒_𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
⊥ = 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡) 
from the above regressions.
159
 In brief, our empirical analysis is based on raw tone 
index (TONE) and orthogonalized tone index (TONE_RES) and several individual tone 
measures including Optimism and Tone_LM.  
 
7.3.3.2 Action-based measure of managerial overconfidence 
a. Net purchase ratio 
We construct the valued-based and volume-based net purchase ratio (NPR) using the 
value and volume of open market purchases and sales respectively as follows: 
 
                                                          
158
 In terms of the determinants of tone (e.g., current performance, growth opportunities, 
operating risks and complexity), Huang, Teoh and Zhang (2011) find that tone, as 
measured using Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist, is positively related to 
market-to-book and volatility of stock returns and negatively related to firm size, age 
and number of business segments. Our orthogonalized tone measure (TONE_RES) 
controls for all standard determinants of debt maturity. 
159
 The first component explains 41.3 percent of the sample variance. The eigenvalues 
of first and second components are 2.48 and 1.16 respectively.  
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𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 =
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡
 
(7.4) 
 
where, 𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the value-based (or volume-based) NPR of directors of firm 𝑖 in fiscal 
year 𝑡. 𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the aggregate value (or volume) of insider purchases and 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the 
aggregate value (or volume) of insider sales. Besides, the value-based and volume-
based NPRs for individual directors including Chairman, CEO and CFO are also 
constructed. The NPR ranges from -1 to 1 and higher NPR indicates higher managerial 
overconfidence. 
 
7.3.3 Estimation methods  
One major limitation of previous corporate finance studies is that they often ignore the 
bounded nature of the dependent variables (e.g., leverage ratio
160
, debt maturity ratio). 
Most standard estimation methods used in the debt maturity literature may generate 
biased results due to the fractionality (i.e. bounded between zero and one) of debt 
maturity ratios. Given that our debt maturity measures are fractional, we use a RE-Tobit 
estimator which is suitable for censored data (as discussed in section 4.2 of chapter 4). 
In addition, to facilitate comparison with the prior debt maturity literature, we also use 
pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects estimators.  
 
7.3.4 The sample 
This study uses data from the following sources. The UK firms’ financial data is 
obtained from Thomson Worldscope database. Insider trading data is sourced from 
Hemmington Scott database. Chairman’s Statements are manually collected from the 
company annual reports which are downloaded either through Northcote website or 
directly from company websites. Our sample of unbalanced panel data is constructed as 
follows. The selection of sample period is guided by data availability. All financial and 
utility firms and firm observations with missing financial data are excluded. Firms in 
our sample must have at least three consecutive annual observations to examine the role 
of time-varying words-based overconfidence.  
                                                          
160
 Limited attention has been paid to the biases associated with the fractional dependent 
variable in corporate finance. Recent study by Elsas and Florysiak (2012) proposes a 
“doubly-censored Tobit” model to explicitly account for the censoring issue of leverage 
ratio.  
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To construct words-based measures of overconfidence, we require the digital version of 
the UK company annual reports, so that the Chairman’s Statement can be readable by 
the content analysis software (i.e. LIWC 2007 and Diction 6).
161
 In addition, to 
construct insider trading-based measure of overconfidence, only those firms with insider 
transactions (i.e. open market purchases and/or sales) for at least three consecutive years 
are selected. Besides the NPRs of executive and non-executive directors, we also 
construct the NPR of individual directors including Chairman, CEO and CFO. Those 
directors with joint positions (e.g., CEO duality) or without job title information are 
excluded from our sample.
162
 All the NPRs are constructed according to firms’ fiscal 
year end.  
 
In terms of initial sample sizes and the impacts of various data filters, for financial and 
accounting information we obtain a list of UK public firms (3,318 firms) from 
Worldscope. A list of firms (2,024 firms) with insider trading data is from Hemmington 
Scott. We exclude financial and utility firms. We then merge the above two datasets 
using the SEDOL. The merged dataset includes 1,099 firms. Firms with less than three 
consecutive years’ data are dropped and the sample size is reduced to 290 firms. Firms 
without machine-readable Chairman’s Statements are also excluded. Firm-years with 
digital annual reports before the year 2000 are limited and are therefore excluded. To 
eliminate the effect of extreme values, all independent variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles. The final sample comprises 192 firms and 865 firm-year 
observations over the period of 2000-2010.
163,
 
164, 165
 
                                                          
161 In terms of the procedure of content analysis, we first extract Chairman’s Statements 
from annual reports. Next, we detect transformation errors in the combined text file 
using the Spelling & Grammar function in Microsoft Word 2010. Finally, various types 
of errors (examples are available upon request) are corrected before the texts are 
inputted in the LIWC 2007.  
162
 Due to data availability, the tests of the roles of the NPR of individual directors are 
based on a smaller sample.  
163
 The Hemmington Scott database provides insider trading data from 1994. However, 
our sampling procedure ends up with very few observations between 1994 and 1999. 
That is why our sample period starts in 2000.  
164
 In terms of initial sample sizes and the impacts of various data filters, for financial 
and accounting information we obtain a list of UK public firms (3,318 firms) from 
Worldscope. A list of firms (2,024 firms) with insider trading data is from Hemmington 
Scott. We exclude financial and utility firms. We then merge the above two datasets 
using the SEDOL codes and the merged dataset includes 1,099 firms. Firms with less 
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7.3.4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Panel A in Table 7.1 shows descriptive statistics of our main dependent and 
independent variables. The mean of the debt maturity ratio (i.e. LTD/TD) is 0.664, 
which is somewhat higher than previous UK samples (e.g., 0.460 in Antoniou et al., 
2006; 0.538 in Dang, 2011). In terms of behavioural variables, the means of first person 
singular (I) and plural (WE) pronouns are 0.432 (percent of total words) and 2.743 
(percent of total words) respectively. The total percentage of first person pronouns is 
therefore 3.175. This figure is much higher than the percentage of first person pronouns 
in the MD&A (i.e. 1.27) in Li (2010a). This could be attributed to the fact that the 
MD&A is more heavily regulated and subject to auditor’s examination (Li, 2010a) 
while the Chairman’s Statement is unaudited. From this perspective, the Chairman’s 
Statement seems to be a more suitable type of financial narrative from which to measure 
overconfidence. The mean of Henry’s (2008) tone measure, Tone_H (mean=0.705), is 
higher than that of Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) tone measure, Tone_LM 
(mean=0.545). This is because Loughran and McDonald’s (2003) wordlist includes a 
more comprehensive list of negative words than that of Henry (2008). For the insider 
trading-based measure of overconfidence, on average, the NPRs of Chairman are the 
highest, while CEOs’ NPRs are much lower compared with those of Chairman and 
CFO.
166
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
than three consecutive years’ data are dropped and the sample size is reduced to 290 
firms. Firms without machine-readable Chairman’s Statements are also excluded. Firm-
years with digital annual reports before the year 2000 are limited and are therefore 
excluded. Our final sample has 192 firms.  
165
 This sample is smaller compared with the sample used in the previous two empirical 
chapters for the following two main reasons: (1) this study has more independent 
variables (e.g. Abnormal Earnings, to construct which we need next year’s earnings per 
share data) and (2) all the firms have at least three consecutive years’ data.  
166
 In unreported results, both the means of value-based and volume-based NPRs of 
non-executives are much higher than those of executives This might be attributed to the 
fact that executive directors have more stock options as part of their personal portfolios. 
Suppose both executive and non-executive directors in the same firm are overconfident 
and therefore believe their firms’ stocks are undervalued. To do market timing 
(probably, mistiming), executive directors can delay the option exercise, while for non-
executive directors open market purchases become the major (if not only) way to trade 
on the basis of their perceived mispricing.  
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7.3.4.2 Correlation analysis  
Table 7.1 Panel B shows positive and statistically significant relationships between the 
debt maturity ratio and several independent variables including firm size, asset maturity, 
leverage and price performance, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions. 
The first person pronouns, i.e. I and WE, are positively correlated. Both I and WE are 
positively related to price performance.
167
 Both I and WE are positively correlated with 
most tone measures. Most of the tone measures (except Certain2) are positively 
correlated with each other. For example, Optimism is positively correlated with all other 
tone measures. Regarding the correlations between various NPRs, we find that (1) 
value-based and volume-based NPRs of the same individual are highly correlated, (2) 
the correlation between the NPRs of CEO and CFO is also high and (3) the correlation 
between the NPRs of Chairman and those of CEO is relatively low, while the 
correlation between Chairman and CFO is even lower. These correlation coefficients 
suggest that Chairman’s trading activities are far from fully aligned with CEO and 
especially CFO. Finally, correlations between explanatory variables are not high and 
therefore multicollinearity is not a major concern.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
167
 Stock price is found to be interrelated with the presence of the self-attribution. Staw 
et al. (1983) document that good prior stock performance may lead to more enhancing 
attributions, followed by subsequent stock price increases. 
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Table 7.1 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
I 865 0.432 0.310 0.453 0.000 3.430 
WE 865 2.743 2.730 1.738 0.000 8.400 
Net emotion 865 0.731 0.749 0.166 0.069 1.000 
Certain1 865 0.991 0.920 0.418 0.000 3.270 
Optimism 865 53.334 53.140 2.141 41.080 72.420 
Certain2  865 45.606 46.000 3.284 22.550 54.530 
Tone_H 865 0.705 0.754 0.241 -1.000 1.000 
Tone_LM 865 0.545 0.575 0.296 -1.000 1.000 
TONE 865 -0.000 0.192 1.611 -6.560 5.947 
VA_CH 448 0.592 1.000 0.778 -1.000 1.000 
VA_CEO 445 0.456 1.000 0.836 -1.000 1.000 
VA_CFO 407 0.547 1.000 0.795 -1.000 1.000 
VOL_CH 448 0.642 1.000 0.709 -1.000 1.000 
VOL_CEO 445 0.498 1.000 0.791 -1.000 1.000 
VOL_CFO 407 0.603 1.000 0.733 -1.000 1.000 
LTD/TD 865 0.664 0.758 0.300 0.000 1.000 
Tax 865 0.211 0.266 0.391 -1.717 2.046 
Abnormal earnings 865 0.048 0.011 0.323 -0.858 1.917 
Firm size 865 12.148 12.125 1.821 8.446 17.132 
Liquidity  865 1.484 1.285 0.931 0.376 6.063 
M/B asset 865 1.525 1.323 0.738 0.553 4.691 
Asset maturity 865 9.388 6.659 11.041 1.318 95.028 
Earnings volatility 865 0.114 0.060 0.212 0.003 3.183 
Leverage 865 0.208 0.196 0.144 0.002 0.620 
Price performance 865 -0.034 0.059 0.563 -1.911 1.213 
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Table 7.1 
Continued. 
Panel B: Pairwise correlation matrix 
 Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. I 1         
2. WE 0.104 1        
3. Net emotion 0.128 0.101 1       
4. Certain1 0.177 0.088 0.145 1      
5. Optimism 0.183 0.112 0.445 0.246 1     
6. Certain2  0.044 0.019 -0.044 0.127 0.063 1    
7. Tone_H -0.021 0.057 0.458 0.047 0.372 -0.025 1   
8. Tone_LM 0.071 0.072 0.612 0.097 0.520 -0.022 0.670 1  
9. TONE 0.126 0.112 0.788 0.261 0.728 0.004 0.774 0.881 1 
10. VA_CH 0.053 -0.053 -0.110 0.050 -0.093 -0.014 -0.064 -0.077 -0.100 
11. VA_CEO 0.032 -0.052 -0.068 -0.071 -0.116 0.005 -0.133 -0.139 -0.147 
12. VA_CFO 0.051 -0.056 -0.081 -0.001 -0.020 -0.083 -0.083 -0.127 -0.098 
13. VOL_CH 0.089 -0.042 -0.097 0.063 -0.065 0.004 -0.065 -0.071 -0.085 
14. VOL_CEO 0.029 -0.041 -0.041 -0.071 -0.119 -0.030 -0.124 -0.129 -0.134 
15. VOL_CFO 0.054 -0.075 -0.069 0.008 -0.027 -0.089 -0.096 -0.126 -0.099 
16. LTD/TD -0.000 0.044 0.092 0.086 0.116 0.002 0.046 0.076 0.109 
17. Tax -0.043 0.005 0.070 -0.001 0.014 -0.048 -0.011 0.038 0.035 
18. Abnormal earnings 0.031 -0.071 -0.096 -0.007 -0.052 0.023 -0.093 -0.113 -0.111 
19. Firm size 0.039 0.141 0.107 0.222 0.117 0.038 -0.021 0.049 0.098 
20. Liquidity  -0.039 -0.025 -0.098 -0.097 -0.056 0.035 0.020 -0.008 -0.052 
21. M/B asset 0.006 0.032 0.172 0.057 0.182 0.025 0.283 0.235 0.273 
22. Asset maturity -0.008 0.000 0.033 0.096 0.019 -0.008 -0.070 -0.000 0.004 
23. Earnings volatility -0.071 -0.052 -0.096 -0.070 -0.032 -0.035 0.053 -0.023 -0.037 
24. Leverage  0.007 0.040 -0.094 0.099 0.011 -0.004 -0.107 -0.086 -0.077 
25. Price performance 0.037 0.059 0.232 0.019 0.168 -0.005 0.337 0.308 0.324 
 Variable  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17  
10. VA_CH 1         
11. VA_CEO 0.477 1        
12. VA_CFO 0.401 0.763 1       
13. VOL_CH 0.951 0.505 0.405 1      
14. VOL_CEO 0.498 0.958 0.758 0.527 1     
15. VOL_CFO 0.432 0.756 0.959 0.446 0.788 1    
16. LTD/TD -0.035 -0.032 -0.043 -0.009 -0.009 -0.033 1   
17. Tax -0.024 -0.077 -0.056 -0.027 -0.074 -0.049 -0.007 1  
18. Abnormal earnings 0.025 0.114 0.0705 0.021 0.113 0.066 -0.051 -0.065  
19. Firm size -0.099 -0.214 -0.232 -0.076 -0.190 -0.212 0.291 0.149  
20. Liquidity  -0.015 -0.024 0.025 -0.038 -0.044 0.004 0.113 -0.038  
21. M/B asset -0.229 -0.295 -0.226 -0.220 -0.311 -0.237 0.053 -0.010  
22. Asset maturity -0.092 -0.192 -0.222 -0.113 -0.105 -0.182 0.179 0.052  
23. Earnings volatility 0.086 -0.006 0.112 0.084 -0.021 0.112 -0.015 -0.114  
24. Leverage  0.004 0.016 -0.056 0.051 0.063 -0.038 0.199 0.003  
25. Price performance -0.140 -0.166 -0.154 -0.134 -0.157 -0.165 0.089 0.080  
 Variable 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25  
18. Abnormal earnings 1         
19. Firm size -0.048 1        
20. Liquidity  -0.043 -0.161 1       
21. M/B asset -0.065 0.055 0.277 1      
22. Asset maturity -0.058 0.301 -0.061 0.004 1     
23. Earnings volatility 0.024 -0.187 0.040 0.047 -0.062 1    
24. Leverage  0.074 0.300 -0.307 -0.107 0.286 -0.056 1   
25. Price performance -0.209 0.066 0.023 0.336 0.056 -0.038 -0.094 1  
Notes:  
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the main dependent and independent variables. 
Panel B shows Pearson correlation coefficients between all pairs of our main variables. 
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7.4 Empirical Results 
We estimate fixed effects, random effects and RE-Tobit models. Several diagnostic tests 
are conducted to decide which estimator is more suitable for our data. First, we use 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test to decide between random effects and 
pooled OLS. The null hypothesis of the LM test (i.e. no significant difference across 
firms) is rejected at 1% significance level in all specifications. This suggests that pooled 
OLS estimator is not valid for our data. Next, Hausman test is conducted to decide 
between random effects and fixed effects. The null hypothesis of Hausman test is that 
random effects model is more valid. In most of the specifications, Hausman test 
suggests that we should use fixed effects.  
         
Furthermore, the likelihood ratio (LR) tests reject the null in all the specifications, 
suggesting that the RE-Tobit is more valid than the pooled Tobit. The RE-Tobit is 
estimated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature and the quadrature approximation may 
depend on the number of integration points. We find that our results are robust to 
quadrature sensitivity
168
. In brief, fixed effects and RE-Tobit seem to be the appropriate 
estimators in most of the specifications. Next, we discuss the statistical and economic 
significance of our explanatory variables. 
 
7.4.1 The role of words-based managerial overconfidence: first person 
pronouns 
Table 7.2 examines the impact of first person pronouns (I and WE), as proxies for 
managerial overconfidence, on debt maturity. The coefficient estimates on the first 
person singular pronouns (I) are positive and statistically significant (p-value=0.027) in 
fixed effects regressions. The economic significance of the variable I is also large. In 
particular, model 1 shows that a 1 percent increase in I will increase the debt maturity 
by 0.046 percent. In brief, the above evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
overconfidence has a positive effect on debt maturity (H1b). Results for the first person 
plural pronouns (WE) are more mixed. We find the coefficient estimate on WE is 
positive but statistically insignificant. The economic significance of the WE coefficient 
is also modest. The stronger results for I compared to WE likely reflects that I is 
                                                          
168
 We use the “quadchk” command in STATA 12 to check whether the coefficients 
change substantially when using different numbers of integration points. We use 100 
integration points (the default is 12) to make sure the relative difference is less than 0.01.           
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positively associated with narcissism but WE is negatively associated with narcissism 
(Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), which contributes to overconfidence
169
. 
         
Table 7.2 Words-based measures of overconfidence and debt maturity: the roles of 
first person pronouns 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measure on first person pronouns and control 
variables, as defined in Appendix 7.A. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using fixed effects (FE). p-values are 
given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE 
I 0.046**      
 (0.027)      
WE  0.003     
  (0.686)     
Ln(I+1)   0.071*    
   (0.066)    
Ln(WE+1)    0.021   
    (0.386)   
I_NON-ZERO     0.051***  
     (0.004)  
WE_NON-ZERO      -0.002 
      (0.786) 
Tax -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.631) (0.598) (0.624) (0.596) (0.563) (0.530) 
Abnormal earning -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 0.012 0.001 
 (0.745) (0.846) (0.771) (0.853) (0.732) (0.971) 
Firm size 0.058** 0.058** 0.059** 0.058** 0.057 0.058* 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.106) (0.064) 
Liquidity 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.154*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B asset 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.023 0.011 
 (0.748) (0.782) (0.762) (0.762) (0.401) (0.625) 
Asset maturity -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.823) (0.827) (0.806) (0.801) (0.797) (0.823) 
Earnings volatility 0.094 0.092 0.094 0.092 0.074 0.087 
 (0.170) (0.176) (0.169) (0.178) (0.252) (0.222) 
Leverage 0.353** 0.352** 0.349** 0.355** 0.394** 0.404** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) 
Price performance 0.030* 0.031* 0.031* 0.031* 0.009 0.027 
 (0.068) (0.058) (0.066) (0.059) (0.612) (0.114) 
Constant -0.358 -0.348 -0.369 -0.362 -0.380 -0.350 
 (0.307) (0.312) (0.296) (0.302) (0.384) (0.359) 
Obs. 865 865 865 865 685 795 
Firms 192 192 192 192 180 184 
𝑅2 (within) 0.143 0.137 0.142 0.138 0.139 0.151 
 
 
Next, by taking a closer look at the distribution of I and WE, we find that some firms do 
not use first person (especially singular) pronouns in their Chairman’s Statement. Over 
20% of I in our sample are zero. More importantly, those zero values of I tend to be 
                                                          
169
 We also find that neither the first person pronouns (i.e. the sum of I and WE) nor the 
ratio of I to WE is statistically significantly related to debt maturity. 
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consecutive, in which case there is no within-firm variation in the number of I used. 
Therefore, excluding firm-years with zero I from the sample will make the fixed effects 
estimator perform better. As expected, the positive coefficient on I_NON-ZERO is 
highly significant at 1% level (p-value=0.004) after excluding firm-years with zero I. In 
addition, around 8% of WE in our sample are zero. We also exclude those firm-years 
with zero WE. However, the relationship between WE_NON-ZERO and debt maturity is 
still insignificant. To conclude, the highly significant positive effect of I_NON-ZERO 
on debt maturity provides strong support for the hypothesis of positive overconfidence-
debt maturity relationship (H1b). 
         
To sum up, the positive and significant effects of I (model 1), Ln (I+1) (model 3) and 
I_NON-ZERO (model 5) on debt maturity support the prediction of the positive effect of 
overconfidence hypothesis (H1b). These findings are consistent with overconfidence 
being beneficial from long-term debt holders’ perspective because overconfidence can 
ameliorate the agency cost of debt (Hackbarth, 2009). Thus, consistent with our 
hypothesis 1b overconfident managers have a longer debt maturity than realist 
managers.  
 
7.4.2 The role of words-based managerial overconfidence: optimistic 
tone 
Table 7.3 examines the impacts of various measures of the optimistic tone of the 
Chairman’s Statement on debt maturity. Considering that the tone-debt maturity 
relationship might be potentially driven by unobserved time-invariant firm fixed effects, 
we present results from fixed effects estimators. Panel B shows that the coefficient 
estimates on all individual and composite tone measures are positive but statistically 
insignificant. However, in pooled OLS regressions (see Appendix 7.D), OPTIMISM and 
TONE_LM have positive and statistically highly significant impacts on debt maturity (p-
value=0.004 and 0.028 respectively). In addition, the coefficients on two composite tone 
indices, TONE and TONE_RES, are also positive and statistically highly significant at 
the 1% level (p-value=0.002 and 0.001 respectively) without controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
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Table 7.3 Words-based measures of overconfidence and debt maturity: the roles of 
optimistic tone 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measure on various tone measures of 
Chairman’s Statement and control variables, as defined in Appendix 7.A. The dependent 
variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated 
using fixed effects (FE). p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that 
coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE 
Optimism 0.003    
 (0.393)    
Tone_LM  0.021   
  (0.548)   
TONE   0.002  
   (0.708)  
TONE_RES    0.002 
    (0.714) 
Tax -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.605) (0.588) (0.599) (0.597) 
Abnormal earning 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (0.688) (0.670) (0.681) (0.683) 
Firm size 0.059** 0.059** 0.059** 0.059** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) 
Liquidity 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B asset 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.013 
 (0.552) (0.576) (0.566) (0.522) 
Asset maturity -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.723) (0.696) (0.716) (0.716) 
Earnings volatility 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.072 
 (0.229) (0.218) (0.223) (0.223) 
Leverage 0.358** 0.352** 0.352** 0.349** 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Price performance 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.022 
 (0.211) (0.236) (0.223) (0.181) 
Constant -0.560 -0.357 -0.342 -0.344 
 (0.197) (0.291) (0.320) (0.315) 
Obs. 865 865 865 865 
Firms 192 192 192 192 
𝑅2 (within) 0.157 0.156 0.156 0.156 
 
 
To summarise, the positive tone-debt maturity relationship is statistically highly 
significant in the OLS regressions but appears to be insignificant after controlling for 
firm fixed effects in the fixed effects regressions. This interesting observation indicates 
the existence of managerial fixed effects that may drive firm financial policies as 
documented in Bertrand and Schoar (2003). Furthermore, Davis et al. (2012) find that 
the tone of earnings conference calls is also influenced by managerial “style” (i.e. 
manager-specific factors such as gender and early career experiences). Taken together, 
the positive tone-debt maturity relationship seems to be driven by firm/managerial fixed 
effects. The implication of this observation is that it is important to control for firm 
fixed effects when examining the effect of tone on firm policies. (In our subsequent 
 236 
 
analysis (see section 7.4.5), we examine the effects of changes of optimistic tone using 
first difference estimator which also controls for firm fixed effects.) 
 
7.4.3 The role of NPRs of CEO, CFO and Chairman 
This section is motivated by the fact that directors have different core duties 
(Malmendier and Zheng, 2012). Most existing studies focus on biased beliefs of 
CEOs.
170
 This is because the CEO is often considered as the principle corporate 
decision maker (Graham et al., 2013). On the other hand, Ben-David, Graham, and 
Harvey (2013) document that CFO’s biased beliefs also have significant influence on 
various corporate policies. Malmendier and Zheng’s (2012) empirical analysis suggests 
that CEOs have the most influence upon investment decisions, while the CFO has a 
greater effect on equity issuance. If the positive overconfidence-debt maturity 
relationship is driven by reducing the agency cost of debt (i.e. underinvestment 
problem) then the overconfidence of the director who has greatest influence over 
investment decisions, the CEO, should play a more significant role in increasing debt 
maturity.  
         
Table 7.4 reports the empirical results regarding the impact of NPRs of Chairman, CEO 
and CFO on debt maturity. The coefficients on both value-based and volume-based 
NPRs of CEO are positive and statistically significant (p-value=0.062 and 0.076 
respectively). However, the NPRs of the CFO are insignificant. We also find that the 
NPRs of Chairman are insignificant; this is perhaps not surprising considering the fact 
that most UK Chairmen are non-executive directors. These results suggest that the 
Chairman’s Statement in the annual reports does not only reflect Chairman’s 
overconfident belief but also that of the senior management team, especially the 
CEO
171
; this interpretation is consistent with prior research (Clatworthy and Jones, 
2003, 2006; Schleicher and Walker, 2010). The positive significant relationship found 
for the CEO (only) is consistent with the agency cost of debt hypothesis given that of all 
                                                          
170
 Existing evidences show that CEO overconfidence has significance impacts on a 
wide range of corporate financial decisions including investment (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005), mergers and acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), capital structure 
(Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011) and debt maturity (Graham, Harvey and Puri, 2013). 
171
 In particular, results for CEO are positive (consistent with all words-based measures) 
and significant (consistent with some words-based measures); in contrast the results for 
CFO and Chairman do not even have the same sign as those for the words-based 
measures. 
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the directors, the CEO has the greatest influence upon investment policy (Malmendier 
and Zheng, 2012). In brief, the evidence based on CEO NPRs supports the hypothesis 
that overconfidence can have a positive effect on debt maturity (H1b).
172, 173
  
         
However, one may argue that the insider trading activities may reflect directors’ private 
information, meaning that insiders with positive private information tend to purchase 
more their own firm’s shares and are reluctant to sell, which in turn makes the NPR 
close to one. This alternative interpretation is not consistent with our empirical results. 
Based on the signalling model, managers will signal the quality of their firms by issuing 
short-term debt (Flannery, 1986). In this case, managers with positive private 
information, as indicated by high NPR, should use more short-term debt. This 
prediction, from the signalling model, is contradicted by the observed positive and 
significant relation between the NPR and debt maturity for the CEO and the 
insignificant results for the CFO and Chairman. Therefore, we tentatively suggest our 
results based on NPRs are not driven by private information.  
 
Another potential driver of the insider trading activities is hyperbolic discounting. 
According to Laibson (1997), hyperbolic discounting is characterised by “a relatively 
high discount rate over short horizons and a relatively low discount rate over long 
                                                          
172
 In unreported results we examined the NPRs of all the Executive directors. These 
results confirm a positive relationship between executive directors’ overconfidence and 
debt maturity supporting hypothesis 1b. This suggests the executive directors have an 
important influence on the firm’s financial decision making.  
173
 Uncontrolled heterogeneity in the debt contract designs may also explain our 
observed positive relation between overconfidence and debt maturity. Debt contracts are 
highly complex with various features and provisions. However, this significant 
heterogeneity has often been ignored in the empirical capital structure literature. Much 
of the existing studies take the existence of debt security as given (Roberts and Sufi, 
2009). A recent study by Burg, Scheinert and Streitz (2012) examines the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on the use of performance-sensitive debt (PSD). Under PSD 
contract, the interest payment depends on the future performance of the firm. This 
performance-pricing provision refers to a contracting feature that interest rates fluctuate 
with the measures of firm performance (e.g., accounting measures or debt ratings) 
(Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). In particular, lower (higher) interest payments are 
associated with good (poor) performance. Overconfident managers overestimate the 
probability of good performance and hence prefer to use PSD to reduce financing costs. 
As expected, they find that overconfidence managers are more likely to use PSD over 
straight debt. It is likely that our measure of long-term debt also includes some debt 
with similar contract design as PSD. Therefore, this finding may provide a potential 
explanation for our empirical result. 
 238 
 
horizons”. The hyperbolic discounting might be particularly relevant to the debt 
maturity decisions. This is because our insider-trading based measure of managerial 
overconfidence, namely net purchase ratio (NPR), is likely to be driven by hyperbolic 
discounting rather than managerial overconfidence. The intuition is that hyperbolic 
managers discount future less and therefore believe that their own firms’ shares are 
undervalued by the market, which in turn increases insider purchase of the shares. In 
addition, a hyperbolic manager tends to use a relatively high discount rate to estimate 
the present value of short-term bond but use a relatively low discount rate to estimate 
the present value of long-term bond. As a result of the different discount rates used to 
value bonds with different maturities, the hyperbolic manager tend to underestimate the 
value of short-term debt but overestimate the value of long-term debt. Therefore, the 
hyperbolic manager, as indicated by high NPR, is expected to prefer short-term debt to 
long-term debt, because they believe that short-term debt is overvalued by the market 
while long-term debt is undervalued by the market. In other words, if NPR is considered 
as a proxy for hyperbolic discounting, the NPR is expected to be negatively related to 
debt maturity. Nevertheless, the prediction is not consistent with our observation that 
NPR is positively related to debt maturity. Thus, the observed positive relation between 
managerial overconfidence and debt maturity seems unlikely to be driven by hyperbolic 
discounting.  
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Table 7.4 Action-based measures of overconfidence and debt maturity 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on the NPRs of Chairman, CEO and 
CFO and control variables, as defined in Appendix 7.A. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using fixed effects 
(FE). p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE (6) FE 
VA_CH -0.016      
 (0.274)      
VA_CEO  0.032*     
  (0.062)     
VA_CFO   -0.015    
   (0.456)    
VOL_CH    -0.012   
    (0.505)   
VOL_CEO     0.037*  
     (0.076)  
VOL_CFO      -0.014 
      (0.533) 
Tax -0.035 -0.014 -0.009 -0.035 -0.013 -0.009 
 (0.199) (0.556) (0.666) (0.202) (0.563) (0.657) 
Abnormal earning -0.030 -0.067 -0.067 -0.030 -0.068 -0.067 
 (0.384) (0.127) (0.140) (0.386) (0.123) (0.140) 
Firm size 0.132*** 0.065* 0.035 0.131*** 0.063* 0.037 
 (0.001) (0.080) (0.435) (0.001) (0.088) (0.412) 
Liquidity 0.157*** 0.192*** 0.185*** 0.156*** 0.193*** 0.185*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
M/B asset 0.029 -0.021 0.010 0.031 -0.020 0.011 
 (0.332) (0.593) (0.756) (0.303) (0.606) (0.737) 
Asset maturity 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.003 0.005 0.000 
 (0.445) (0.414) (0.900) (0.448) (0.393) (0.901) 
Earnings volatility 0.040 0.050 0.219 0.040 0.050 0.221 
 (0.355) (0.332) (0.299) (0.365) (0.321) (0.301) 
Leverage 0.118 0.595*** 0.527** 0.119 0.592*** 0.524** 
 (0.490) (0.007) (0.017) (0.491) (0.008) (0.017) 
Price performance 0.018 0.052** 0.037 0.017 0.052** 0.037 
 (0.501) (0.040) (0.141) (0.504) (0.044) (0.142) 
Constant -1.257*** -0.540 -0.151 -1.245*** -0.517 -0.176 
 (0.007) (0.255) (0.792) (0.007) (0.274) (0.760) 
Obs. 448 445 407 448 445 407 
Firms 162 156 141 162 156 141 
𝑅2 (within) 0.179 0.233 0.144 0.178 0.234 0.143 
 
 
7.4.4 The role of NPRs of executive vs. non-executive directors  
In unreported results
174
,
 we examine the impact of the aggregate NPRs of all a firm’s 
directors on debt maturity. The reason why we examine the aggregate NPRs is that debt 
maturity decisions may be influenced by a group of executive or non-executive 
directors. The empirical results are somewhat mixed. Specifically, the volume-based 
NPRs of executive directors have significantly positive impacts on the debt maturity in 
all the regressions. However, the NPRs of non-executive directors are statistically 
                                                          
174
 This is for the purpose of brevity and the tables are available upon request.  
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insignificant. Our results indicate that the overconfident beliefs of executive directors 
play a more important role than those of non-executives in increasing their firm’s debt 
maturity. This finding is intuitively acceptable since it is mainly the executive directors’ 
duty to make firm financial policies which should in principle be monitored and 
approved by the non-executive directors. In this case, the executive directors, especially 
the CEO and CFO, much more heavily engaged in the financial decision makings than 
the non-executive directors. To conclude, the significant and positive impact of the 
NPRs of executive directors supports the proposition that managerial overconfidence is 
positively related to debt maturity (H1b).  
 
7.4.5 Change of managerial overconfidence and change of debt 
maturity 
Prior behavioural corporate finance literature focuses primarily on static overconfidence 
measures. Recall that overconfidence can vary over time because of self-attribution 
bias, thus time-variations in managerial overconfidence is potentially extremely 
important. However, perhaps surprisingly, static overconfidence measures predominate 
in the behavioural corporate finance literature. Malmendier and Tate's (2005, 2008) 
option-based and press-based overconfidence measures are widely used, both of which 
are static measures. Graham et al. (2013) examine the relationship between static 
survey-based overconfidence measure and debt maturity. Landier and Thesmar (2009) 
find that their survey-based optimism measure (i.e. expectation errors) tends to persist 
over the two time periods (i.e. year 1994 and 1998) they examine and do not provide 
evidence on the effect of changes of optimism on debt maturity. Thus, the effect of 
time-variation in overconfidence is largely under-researched.  
         
Here we provide, to our knowledge, the first extensive test of the effect of changes of 
overconfidence on the change of debt maturity.
175
 This is an important and novel 
extension of the existing literature on behavioural corporate financing. We need time-
varying measures of overconfidence, such as the words-based measures examined in 
                                                          
175
 Words-based overconfidence measures (including first person pronouns and 
especially tone measures) are quite volatile. Specifically, for example, the within, 
between and overall standard deviation of Tone_LM are 0.216, 0.195 and 0.290 
respectively and the mean and standard deviation of the yearly average of Tone_LM are 
0.533 and 0.084 respectively. 
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this study to conduct this analysis. We can therefore shed initial light on the question: 
how sensitive are changes in debt maturity to changes in overconfidence?  
         
In Table 7.5, we examine the changes of words-based overconfidence measures on the 
change of debt maturity using a first difference estimator. In particular, we run OLS 
regressions with first differenced data, which also controls for firm fixed effects. 
Consistent with our main result in Table 7.2 that I has a significantly positive effect on 
debt maturity, ∆ I also has a positive and highly significant effect (p-value=0.011) on 
the change of debt maturity. In addition, we find that the changes of several tone 
measures including ∆ TONE_LM and ∆ TONE_RES have positive and statistically 
significant impacts on the change of debt maturity (p-value=0.078 and 0.100 
respectively).
176
 In brief, the above evidence shows that the increase in the level of 
words-based managerial overconfidence is significantly associated with increases in 
debt maturity. This observation supports the agency cost hypothesis of a positive 
relationship between overconfidence and debt maturity (H1b). More broadly, we 
provide new and novel evidence that time-variation in managerial overconfidence can 
have an important impact on corporate financing; thus the impact of time-variation in 
managerial overconfidence in other corporate finance contexts would be a fertile line for 
future research. 
 
7.4.6 Control variables  
Next, we briefly discuss empirical evidence related to the impacts of the following 
control variables on the standard debt maturity measure.  
         
Market-to-book ratio: The coefficient for the market-to-book ratio is either positive or 
negative and insignificant, providing no support for the agency cost hypothesis. This 
result is consistent with prior studies controlling leverage (see, e.g., Stohs and Mauer, 
1996; Antoniou et al., 2006). This finding may suggest that the underinvestment 
problem is not a major concern of the UK firms. 
 
                                                          
176
 The NPRs display relatively little time variation and hence we do not report the 
impact of a change in NPR here. For example, over 60% of the NPRs take the value of 
one. 
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Asset maturity: The coefficient estimates on asset maturity are either positive or 
negative, depending on model specifications. They are statistically and economically 
insignificant. Antoniou et al. (2006) also find the similar result and further point out that 
the joint insignificance of both market-to-book ratio and asset maturity is consistent 
with the life cycle theory.  
 
Table 7.5 Changes of words-based measures of overconfidence and  
change of debt maturity 
This table presents regressions of change of debt maturity measure on the changes of various 
tone measures of Chairman’s Statement and control variables, as defined in Appendix 7.A. The 
dependent variable is the change of ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. ∆ LTD/TD). All the 
models are estimated using first difference (FD) estimator (i.e. first-differenced data with OLS 
regression). p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) FD (2) FD (3) FD (4) FD (5) FD (6) FD 
∆ I 0.049**      
 (0.011)      
∆ WE  0.001     
  (0.841)     
∆ Optimism   0.004    
   (0.288)    
∆ Tone_LM    0.059*   
    (0.078)   
∆ TONE     0.010  
     (0.108)  
∆ TONE_RES      0.009* 
      (0.100) 
∆ Tax 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (0.424) (0.489) (0.484) (0.491) (0.521) (0.533) 
∆ Abnormal earnings -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.756) (0.837) (0.871) (0.941) (0.923) (0.920) 
∆ Firm size -0.014 -0.011 -0.007 -0.012 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.835) (0.864) (0.907) (0.847) (0.857) (0.864) 
∆ Liquidity 0.161*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.158*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ M/B asset 0.025 0.024 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.023 
 (0.339) (0.351) (0.387) (0.450) (0.460) (0.372) 
∆ Asset maturity 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.787) (0.854) (0.868) (0.916) (0.888) (0.886) 
∆ Earnings volatility 0.075* 0.073* 0.071* 0.066* 0.066 0.065 
 (0.077) (0.087) (0.089) (0.096) (0.102) (0.104) 
∆ Leverage 0.160 0.162 0.171 0.172 0.184 0.172 
 (0.294) (0.291) (0.269) (0.262) (0.242) (0.266) 
∆ Price performance -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012 -0.004 
 (0.569) (0.618) (0.600) (0.461) (0.504) (0.781) 
∆ Constant 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.516) (0.556) (0.560) (0.478) (0.482) (0.481) 
Obs.  663 663 663 663 663 663 
𝑅2 0.150 0.142 0.144 0.148 0.146 0.147 
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Firm size: The coefficient estimates on firm size are positive and significant in almost 
all the regressions. This could be explained by the fact that the larger firms are 
associated with lower transaction costs, lower information asymmetry and less agency 
problems.  
         
Liquidity: The relationship between liquidity and debt maturity is positive and highly 
significant in all the regressions. This is probably because the long-term debt investors 
prefer those firms that have more highly liquid assets and hence find it easier to meet 
debt payment from their cash flows. 
         
Earnings volatility: The effect of earnings volatility on debt maturity is positive and 
significant in only a few regressions. This finding indicates that firms with highly 
volatile earnings want to avoid long-term commitment and therefore may not use long-
term debt to reduce liquidity risk.  
         
Leverage: Leverage has positive and significant impacts on debt maturity. This finding 
is consistent with previous US and UK studies (see, e.g., Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Datta 
et al., 2005; Antoniou et al., 2006). This observed positive relation is in line with the 
argument that highly leveraged firms use more long-term debt to control liquidity risk 
and financial distress cost.  
         
Abnormal earnings: The coefficient estimates on abnormal earnings are negative and 
statistically significant in some random effects and RE-Tobit models. This finding 
provides weak evidence that some UK firms may use short-term debt as a signal of their 
high quality.  
         
Effective tax rate: The coefficient estimates on the effective tax rate are either negative 
or positive, depending on model specification and estimation methods, and statistically 
insignificant. This finding is consistent with previous UK studies (Ozkan, 2000; 
Antoniou et al., 2006).  
         
Share price performance: The coefficient estimates on the share price performance are 
positive and statistically significant in many regressions. This finding is consistent with 
the proposition of the issuance of informationally disadvantaged securities (e.g., long-
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term debt) following a past share price runup (Lucas and McDonald, 1990). It is also 
consistent with the positive effect of managerial overconfidence argument that good 
past firm performance, as indicated by the increase of share price, enhances managerial 
overconfidence, which then leads to longer debt maturity.  
 
7.4.7 Further analysis 
7.4.7.1 Subsample analysis  
We perform subsample analysis to examine the sensitivity of overconfidence-debt 
maturity relationship to several firm characteristics. The goal here is to examine if there 
is further support for the agency cost of debt mechanism that we hypothesise to have 
been driving the observed positive relationship between overconfidence and debt 
maturity. Table 7.5 presents subsample analysis where the full sample is split into two 
subsamples based on measures of investment opportunities (market-to-book value of 
asset and market-to-book value of equity) and a measure of long-term debt capacity 
(leverage). This subsample analysis can shed light on the underlying mechanisms of the 
overconfidence-debt maturity relationship by looking at the sensitivity of 
overconfidence-debt maturity relationship to the above firm characteristics. Our 
subsample analysis focuses on three overconfidence measures: first person singular 
pronouns (I) and the NPRs of CEO (CEO_VA and CEO_VOL) which have positive and 
significant impacts on debt maturity in our main tests in Table 7.2 and 7.4 
respectively.
177
  
         
a. Market-to-book value 
Firms with more investment opportunities, as indicated by higher market-to-book value 
of asset or equity, have more severe agency problems of underinvestment (i.e. debt 
overhang). Put differently, the fewer investment opportunities, the less severe the 
potential conflict over the exercise of those investment options. If overconfidence 
influences debt maturity through the agency channel, we expect that the 
overconfidence-debt maturity relationship will be stronger for high growth firms which 
are associated with more underinvestment problem. Our empirical findings are 
consistent with this conjecture. As we can see in Table 7.6 that the coefficients on both I 
and NPRs of the CEO are more significant for firms with higher market-to-book value 
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 Other overconfidence-related measures (e.g., WE and NPRs of Chairman and CFO) 
remain to be insignificant in the subsample analysis.  
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of asset. These results are generally robust to an alternative measure of investment 
opportunities that is market-to-book value of equity.
178
 
         
Table 7.6 Subsample analysis: sensitivity of overconfidence-debt maturity 
relationship to firm characteristics 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measures on first person pronouns and NPRs of CEO and control 
variables, as defined in Appendix 7.A. Subsamples split based on the medians of market-to-book value of asset 
(Panel A), market-to-book value of equity (Panel B) and leverage (Panel C) are estimated to examine the impacts of 
the above firm characteristics on the overconfidence-debt maturity relationship. To make the results comparable, 
medians of the full sample (865 obs.) are also used to divide the smaller sample (445 obs.) used to analyse the effects 
of the NPRs of CEO, which is why the sample sizes in columns 5-8 are slightly different. All firm level control 
variables are included in all models but not reported to save space. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term 
debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using fixed effects (FE) or first difference (FD) 
estimator. p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) FE (2) FE (3) FD (4) FD (5) FE (6) FE (7) FE (8) FE 
Panel A: M/B asset High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.055* 0.014       
 (0.095) (0.634)       
∆ I   0.049** 0.069*     
   (0.030) (0.052)     
CEO_VA     0.049** 0.018   
     (0.046) (0.412)   
CEO_VOL       0.056* 0.018 
       (0.069) (0.445) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
𝑅2 (within) 0.162 0.163 0.166 0.125 0.250 0.269 0.252 0.268 
Obs. 433 432 321 342 209 236 209 236 
Panel B: M/B equity High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.065* 0.057       
 (0.058) (0.111)       
∆ I   0.060** 0.054*     
   (0.014) (0.093)     
CEO_VA     0.048* 0.042**   
     (0.067) (0.046)   
CEO_VOL       0.054* 0.042* 
       (0.088) (0.088) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
𝑅2 (within) 0.179 0.146 0.159 0.133 0.321 0.238 0.322 0.237 
Obs. 432 433 324 339 219 226 219 226 
Panel C. Leverage  High Low High Low High Low High Low 
I 0.043 0.060**       
 (0.186) (0.049)       
∆ I   0.045* 0.067**     
   (0.061) (0.032)     
CEO_VA     0.008 0.066*   
     (0.619) (0.070)   
CEO_VOL       0.011 0.067* 
       (0.614) (0.095) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
𝑅2 (within) 0.389 0.088 0.322 0.073 0.404 0.205 0.405 0.203 
Obs. 433 432 333 330 222 223 222 223 
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 Note that market-to-book value of equity will be affected by the firm’s leverage and 
thus may not be as good an indicator of growth opportunities as market-to-book value 
of assets. 
 246 
 
b. Leverage 
If a firm’s leverage is high, according to trade-off theory of capital structure, the firm 
will be reluctant to use more debt. In other words, only firms with relatively low 
leverage will use debt and thus have to make a debt maturity decision. Consistent with 
this reasoning, the positive overconfidence-debt maturity relationship is found to be 
stronger for firms with lower leverage (see Table 7.6). Thus, we find that the 
overconfidence-debt maturity relationship is intensified for firms that do not face long-
term debt capacity constraints.  
 
To summarise, our major finding is that the effect of managerial overconfidence is 
stronger when the firm has high growth opportunities. This supports our main agency 
cost hypothesis (that builds on the timing effect from Hackbarth’s (2009) model), which 
posits that managerial overconfidence can reduce the underinvestment problem, in a 
novel scenario where the underinvestment problem is exacerbated, i.e. for firms with 
more growth opportunities. In addition, high leverage makes firms less likely to use 
debt, which in turns weakens the positive overconfident-debt maturity relationship.  
 
7.4.8 Robustness tests 
7.4.8.1 Dummies of first person pronouns and NPRs 
In Table 7.7 we regress debt maturity on binary variables based on first person singular 
pronoun (I) and net purchase ratios (NPRs) of Chairman, CEO and CFO. I_DUMMY is 
coded as 1 if I is in the top decile and 0 otherwise. CH_NPD, CEO_NPD and 
CFO_NPD are net purchase dummies which take the value of 1 if the NPRs of 
Chairman, CEO and CFO respectively are above zero and 0 otherwise. Consistent with 
our main findings, I_DUMMY has a positive and significant effect (p-value=0.053) on 
debt maturity in fixed effects regressions. In addition, the coefficients on CEO_NPD are 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, the positive relationship 
between overconfidence and debt maturity is robust to alternative measures of I and 
NPRs of CEO. Finally, the WE_DUMMY and the CFO_NPD and CH_NPD are 
insignificant as consistent with our earlier results and could be attributed to the negative 
association of WE with narcissism (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007) that diminishes 
overconfidence. 
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Table 7.7 Dummies of first person pronouns and NPRs and debt maturity 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measure on first person pronouns dummy 
(I_DUMMY is coded as 1, if I is in the top decile and 0 otherwise) and net purchase dummies of 
Chairman, CEO and CFO (CH_NPD, CEO_NPD and CFO_NPD are coded as 1 if the net 
purchase ratios are above zero and 1 otherwise) and control variables, as defined in Appendix 
7.A. The dependent variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the 
models are estimated using fixed effects (FE). p-values are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Variable (1) FE (2) FE (3) FE (4) FE (5) FE 
I_DUMMY 0.047*     
 (0.053)     
WE_DUMMY  -0.013    
  (0.745)    
CH_NPD   -0.028   
   (0.377)   
CEO_NPD    0.068**  
    (0.011)  
CFO_NPD     -0.009 
     (0.813) 
Tax -0.007 -0.008 -0.036 -0.018 -0.010 
 (0.655) (0.614) (0.195) (0.460) (0.672) 
Abnormal earning -0.009 -0.005 -0.031 -0.067 -0.069 
 (0.733) (0.845) (0.380) (0.131) (0.136) 
Firm size 0.057** 0.060** 0.132*** 0.068* 0.041 
 (0.041) (0.034) (0.001) (0.066) (0.373) 
Liquidity 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.157*** 0.191*** 0.184*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
M/B asset 0.005 0.005 0.031 -0.020 0.013 
 (0.803) (0.803) (0.310) (0.599) (0.705) 
Asset maturity -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.001 
 (0.865) (0.816) (0.448) (0.410) (0.908) 
Earnings volatility 0.094 0.094 0.040 0.054 0.222 
 (0.176) (0.171) (0.361) (0.303) (0.303) 
Leverage 0.356** 0.346** 0.116 0.594*** 0.519** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.500) (0.007) (0.019) 
Price performance 0.031* 0.032* 0.018 0.054** 0.038 
 (0.059) (0.056) (0.512) (0.036) (0.135) 
Constant -0.331 -0.357 -1.240*** -0.608 -0.214 
 (0.337) (0.305) (0.008) (0.199) (0.710) 
Obs. 865 865 448 445 407 
Firms 192 192 162 156 141 
𝑅2 (within) 0.140 0.140 0.149 0.236 0.142 
 
 
7.4.8.2 Alternative estimator: Random Effects Tobit (RE-Tobit) 
As a further robustness test, in Table 7.8 we use random effects Tobit (RE-Tobit) 
estimator that controls for the fractional nature of our dependent variable (i.e. the debt 
maturity ratio is bounded between zero and one). The likelihood ratio (LR) tests reject 
the null, suggesting that the RE-Tobit is more valid than the pooled Tobit.
179
 Consistent 
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 The RE-Tobit is estimated using Gauss-Hermite quadrature and the quadrature 
approximation may depend on the number of integration points. We find that our results 
are robust to quadrature sensitivity. In particular, we use the “quadchk” command in 
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with our main findings, the coefficients on I and both value-based and volume-based 
NPRs of CEO are positive and statistically significant (p-value=0.090, 0.052 and 0.047 
respectively).  
 
Table 7.8 Alternative estimator: random-effects Tobit model 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measure on first person pronouns and NPR of Chairman, 
CEO and CFO and control variables, as defined in Appendix 7.A. The dependent variable is the ratio of 
long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated using random-effects Tobit (RE-
Tobit). p-values are given in parentheses. Log-likelihood values are reported as measures of goodness-of-
fit. The p-values of likelihood ratio (LR) test are reported, comparing pooled Tobit against RE-Tobit. ***, 
**, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) RE-
Tobit 
(2) RE-
Tobit 
(3) RE-
Tobit 
(4) RE-
Tobit 
(5) RE-
Tobit 
(6) RE-
Tobit 
(7) RE-
Tobit 
(8) RE-
Tobit 
I 0.034*        
 (0.090)        
WE  0.000       
  (0.913)       
VA_CH   -0.007      
   (0.642)      
VOL_CH    -0.002     
    (0.887)     
VA_CEO     0.031*    
     (0.052)    
VOL_CEO      0.034**   
      (0.047)   
VA_CFO       0.003  
       (0.862)  
VOL_CFO        0.008 
        (0.655) 
Tax 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 0.004 
 (0.885) (0.900) (0.589) (0.588) (0.678) (0.683) (0.678) (0.719) 
Abnormal 
earning 
-0.009** -0.009** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.026 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.233) 
Firm size 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.043*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Liquidity 0.090*** 0.089*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.129*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B asset -0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.015 -0.038* -0.038 -0.038* -0.015 
 (0.959) (0.908) (0.517) (0.473) (0.096) (0.103) (0.096) (0.563) 
Asset maturity 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 
(0.372) (0.371) (0.366) (0.361) (0.296) (0.319) (0.296) (0.773) 
Earnings 
volatility 
0.081 0.079 0.030 0.029 0.028 0.030 0.028 0.080 
(0.110) (0.123) (0.577) (0.588) (0.647) (0.634) (0.647) (0.523) 
Leverage 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.228* 0.227* 0.445*** 0.441*** 0.445*** 0.575*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.065) (0.067) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Price 
performance 
0.026* 0.027* 0.019 0.019 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.055** 
(0.068) (0.058) (0.312) (0.311) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) 
Constant -0.133 -0.117 -0.146 -0.152 -0.103 -0.107 -0.103 -0.143 
 (0.253) (0.309) (0.321) (0.303) (0.477) (0.461) (0.477) (0.385) 
Obs. 865 865 448 448 445 445 407 407 
Left-censored 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Right-censored 31 31 11 11 23 23 15 15 
Firms 192 192 162 162 156 156 141 141 
Log-likelihood -36.418 -37.850 -13.136 -13.234 -33.736 -33.640 -31.439 -31.354 
LR test 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
STATA 12 to check whether the coefficients change substantially when using different 
numbers of integration points. We use 100 integration points (the default is 12) to make 
sure the relative difference is less than 0.01.  
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7.4.9 Summary and further discussions 
We conduct an extensive analysis of the relationship between time-varying measures of 
managerial overconfidence and debt maturity. To sum up, there is evidence that both 
words-based managerial overconfidence (i.e. first person singular pronouns) and action-
based CEO overconfidence have positive impacts on debt maturity in the UK. 
Interestingly, we provide new evidence that the changes of words-based overconfidence 
(including both first person singular pronouns and optimistic tone) also have positive 
effects on the change of debt maturity. Thus we document an important new dynamic 
effect in the relationship between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity that has 
not been investigated in prior literature. 
         
Our initial findings are generally consistent with a previous US study on managerial 
self-attribution bias (Li, 2010a), however we extend this paper in important directions. 
In contrast to existing studies on the overconfidence-debt maturity relationship, our 
study contributes to this line of literature by (1) proposing a specific mechanism through 
which overconfidence leads to longer debt maturity, namely in terms of reducing 
agency cost of debt (Hackbarth, 2009), (2) empirically verifying the proposed positive 
overconfidence-debt maturity relationship using multiple managerial words-based and 
action-based overconfidence measures, while earlier studies rely on survey-based 
measures of overconfidence, (3) empirically verifying that the overconfidence-debt 
maturity relationship intensifies when the agency cost of debt is exacerbated, i.e. when 
firms have high growth opportunities, (4) documenting that overconfidence of the CEO 
has a stronger influence on debt maturity than that of CFO consistent with the CEO 
being most influential for investment decisions and thus most important for reducing the 
agency cost of debt (i.e. underinvestment problem) and (5) showing that time-variations 
in the level of overconfidence also has a significant and positive effect on the change of 
debt maturity.  
 
 
7.5 Conclusions 
This study examines the influence of managerial overconfidence on corporate debt 
maturity structure. We are the first to explain that since managerial overconfidence can 
mitigate the agency cost of (especially long-term) debt (Hackbarth, 2009) this can have 
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important implications for debt maturity. In particular, it can lead to a lengthening of 
debt maturity, i.e. managerial overconfidence can be positively related to debt maturity. 
The intuition is that managerial overconfidence can help more closely align managers’ 
and debtholders’ preferences over the firm’s investments (thus it mitigates the agency 
cost of (long-term) debt), leading to lenders being more willing to lend to overconfident 
managers and providing overconfident managers with less need and less incentive to 
shorten debt maturity in order to control for this agency problem. Thus, we hypothesise 
that from this agency cost perspective managerial overconfidence is positively 
associated with debt maturity. 
         
This study has three major findings, supporting the agency cost of debt hypothesis of a 
positive overconfidence-debt maturity relationship. First, we confirm that there is in 
general a positive covariance between overconfidence and debt maturity using a wide 
range of time-varying overconfidence measures and especially for changes in 
overconfidence. For example, first person singular pronouns (I) has a significant and 
positive impact on debt maturity. We also find positive relationships between optimistic 
tone measures and debt maturity are highly significant in OLS but become insignificant 
after controlling for firm fixed effects using within transformation. In addition and 
novelly, using first difference estimator we find the changes of I and several tone 
measures (Tone_LM and TONE_RES) have positive and significant effects on the 
change of debt maturity. The above evidence is consistent with the agency cost of debt 
proposition that firms with overconfident managers tend to use more long-term debt 
(H1b).  
         
Second, we examine a scenario where the agency cost of debt is exacerbated. For firms 
with high investment opportunities the underinvestment impact from the agency issue is 
greater. Consistent with the agency cost hypothesis, we find the positive relationship 
between overconfidence and debt maturity is intensified for firms with high investment 
opportunities. This is because managerial overconfidence can be a substitute to a 
standard way of reducing agency cost of debt (i.e. “shortening debt maturity”).  
         
Third, we examine the role of different directors’ overconfidence. If the agency cost 
hypothesis holds, we anticipate the overconfidence of the director who has most impact 
on investment decisions, i.e. CEO, to be crucial. Consistent with this conjecture, we find 
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the net purchase ratios (NPRs) of CEOs have significantly positive effects on debt 
maturity, while the coefficients on the NPRs of CFOs and non-executive directors (e.g., 
Chairman) are insignificant.  
         
In summary, we develop an agency cost hypothesis which builds on and extends 
Hackbarth’s (2009) insight that managerial overconfidence can mitigate the 
underinvestment problem which is the major concern of long-term debt investors. We 
explain that this can make firms with overconfident managers more easily raise long-
term debt financing at a lower cost (because of the reduced agency cost of debt). 
Overall, we provide substantial empirical evidence that is consistent with this 
hypothesis.  
         
Our study has important implications for future studies. We highlight the importance of 
recognizing and empirically capturing the time-variations in managerial overconfidence. 
Time-varying overconfidence measures have two benefits. One is that it allows us to 
examine the effect of the change of overconfidence. The other is that it makes it easier 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity by using fixed effects estimators. However, the 
observed effect of static overconfidence measures (e.g. option-based and press-based 
measures) in prior studies could be driven by unobserved heterogeneity. To avoid this 
potential spurious relationship, future studies can utilise time-varying overconfidence 
measures in other contexts.  
 252 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 253 
 
Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes this thesis by first highlighting the major contributions to the 
relevant finance and accounting literature in Section 8.1. In particular, new insights 
provided by each empirical study will be summarized. Section 8.2 outlines potential 
limitations and Section 8.3 provides key implications and directions for future research.  
 
8.1 Major Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the growing behavioural corporate finance literature by 
examining the effects of time-varying managerial overconfidence on various corporate 
financing decisions (see section 2.4 of chapter 2 for a review of behavioural capital 
structure theories). Theoretically, we propose a more comprehensive version of market 
timing theory (namely “Market Timing Matrix” (MTM)) by incorporating managerial 
overconfidence into market timing framework. Empirically, we develop a time-varying 
measure of overconfidence based on computational tone analysis of accounting 
narratives (i.e. Chairman’s Statement). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that establishes the link between tone and corporate financing decisions. More 
detailed new insights offered by three empirical studies on capital structure, pecking 
order preference and debt maturity will be summarized in the following subsections.  
 
8.1.1 Theoretical contributions 
A more complete market timing theory: This thesis proposes a more complete market 
timing theory, namely “Market Timing Matrix (MTM)”. This market timing framework 
is more complete in the sense that it is an important complement to Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2002) market timing theory. More specifically, we relax Baker and 
Wurgler’s (2002) assumption that managers are rational and are able to take the benefit 
of market mispricing. Instead, our market timing theory assumes that managers are 
irrational in general and overconfident in particular. In the market timing framework, 
managerial overconfidence is associated with perceived (not real) mispricing of firm 
stocks. This perceived mispricing will lead to market mistiming, meaning that 
overconfident managers “buy high”. This thesis also provides a review on behavioural 
capital structure theories.  
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8.1.2 Methodological contributions  
Time-varying words-based measure of overconfidence: One of the major challenges of 
behavioural corporate finance is the measurement of behavioural biases. This thesis 
articulates the importance of using a time-varying measure of managerial 
overconfidence, while most of the existing studies use static measures of 
overconfidence. We develop a time-varying words-based overconfidence measure by 
capturing the optimistic tone of corporate disclosure (i.e. UK Chairman’s Statement) 
using computational linguistic analysis software. To ensure the validity of the tone 
measure, we form a composite tone index based on six individual tone measures. This 
time-varying measure allows us to examine the impact of the change of managerial 
overconfidence on financing decisions (i.e. the change of leverage and debt maturity). 
In addition, our overconfidence measures also make it possible to compare the effects of 
overconfidence of CEO and CFO.  
 
8.1.3 Empirical contributions (new economic insights) 
This thesis contributes to the behavioural corporate finance literature by showing that 
time-varying managerial overconfidence is an important driver of firm financing 
decisions. Our studies do not simply replicate existing (mostly US) studies using UK 
data, but more importantly offer new empirical insights. In particular, our work leads to 
a better understanding of capital structure puzzle, low leverage puzzle, pecking order 
puzzle (i.e. size anomaly) and debt maturity decisions. This section summarizes major 
new economic insights provided by each empirical study. 
 
Managerial overconfidence and low leverage: Empirical study 1 (chapter 5) suggests 
that managerial overconfidence is an important determinant of capital structure, which 
sheds light on the well-known capital structure puzzle (i.e. how firms make capital 
structure decisions). More importantly, different from the US evidence that managerial 
overconfidence leads to higher leverage (Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011), we 
document that managerial overconfidence is associated with lower leverage. Our study 
provides the first evidence that supports Malmendier, Tate and Yan’s (2011) 
proposition that managerial overconfidence may lead to debt conservatism. In other 
words, our finding suggests that managerial overconfidence might be a potential 
explanation of why some firms have low leverage (i.e. low leverage puzzle).  
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Managerial overconfidence and reverse pecking order preference: Empirical study 2 
(chapter 6) shows that managerial overconfidence is an alternative driver of pecking 
order preference (while information asymmetry is probably the most commonly cited 
driver of pecking order behaviour). However, different from the US evidence that 
managerial overconfidence enhances pecking order preference (Malmendier, Tate and 
Yan, 2011), we document that managerial overconfidence leads to reverse pecking 
order preference. Importantly, our empirical analysis distinguishes between firms with 
financing deficit and surplus. Our study provides initial and robust evidence for an 
overconfidence-induced reverse pecking order preference, which is particularly 
pronounced for small firms and firms with high earnings volatility. Our evidence partly 
explains the pecking order puzzle: overconfident managers with reverse pecking order 
preference make small firms exhibit weaker pecking order preference relative to large 
firms.  
 
Managerial overconfidence and higher debt maturity: Empirical study 3 (chapter 7) 
first hypothesizes that managerial overconfidence can reduce the agency cost of debt 
(underinvestment problem) (Hackbarth, 2009) and therefore may lead to higher debt 
maturity. Our proposition is confirmed by our empirical result that managerial 
overconfidence increases debt maturity. This study implies that managerial 
overconfidence does not always cause suboptimal decisions but is favourable especially 
from long-term debt investors’ perspective.  
 
Overall, this thesis shows that managerial overconfidence plays an important role in 
firms’ financing decisions. In particular, managerial overconfidence may cause biased 
financing decision but is also likely to have a favourable effect in terms of reducing 
agency cost of debt. Importantly, our initial empirical findings shed light on two 
important puzzles in the traditional corporate financing literature, namely low leverage 
puzzle and pecking order puzzle (or “size anomaly”).  
 
On the other hand, the thesis is not only of interest to academics but also practitioners. 
In particular, practitioners (e.g. corporate managers and investors) may learn from this 
thesis that managerial overconfidence is value-relevant. More specifically, managerial 
overconfidence leads to lower debt level and a weakened preference for debt over 
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equity. Consequently, overconfident managers are likely to forgo tax benefits, which 
reduces firm value. Furthermore, managerial overconfidence is likely to increase debt 
maturity by reducing the underinvestment problem associated with long-term debt. In 
this case, managerial overconfidence is favourable in the sense that it mitigates the 
agency cost of debt which in turn may reduce firms’ cost of debt and make investors 
more willing to provide long-term debt financing. In addition, the words-based 
measures of overconfidence receive considerable attention in press. For example, in a 
recent Financial Times article, Tett (2013) suggests that “savvy investors should screen 
executives’ statements for signs of arrogance … investors would dearly love to see: 
real-time analysis of whether the language of chief executives at banks (or anywhere 
else) is starting to display linguistic biomarkers of hubris”. Therefore, the time-varying 
words-based measure of managerial overconfidence proposed in this thesis can be used 
by investors to detect potential overconfidence bias of senior managers of companies. 
To conclude, our key findings related to the effects of managerial overconfidence on 
financing policies and our measures of time-varying overconfidence would be useful for 
both corporate managers and investors.  
 
 
8.2 Potential Limitations 
Next, we outline several potential limitations of this thesis.  
 
(1) data availability: This thesis uses accounting data (e.g. leverage ratio, net debt 
issuance, debt maturity ratio) as proxies for corporate financial policies. However, one 
may use corporate event data (e.g. equity offering, share repurchase) to test the effect of 
managerial overconfidence on financing decisions. In addition, more detailed 
information on the maturity of each individual corporate debt might be useful to 
construct more accurate measures of debt maturity. Furthermore, our study does not 
control for heterogeneity in the debt contract designs, although debt contracts are highly 
complex with various features and provisions.  
 
(2) measurement of overconfidence: Overconfidence has many facets and is often used 
interchangeably with several closely related constructs, e.g. optimism and 
miscalibration. It is particularly important, although highly challenging, to try to 
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empirically distinguish between overconfidence and optimism which have differing 
impacts on some aspects of financing decisions (e.g. pecking order preference). Future 
studies should develop better ways to gauge different facets of overconfidence 
especially when they have different theoretical implications.  
 
(3) alternative explanations of our overconfidence measures: Our tone-based and 
insider trading-based measures of managerial overconfidence are both subject to 
alternative interpretations, especially information asymmetry. It is important to justify 
that our empirical findings are not driven by information asymmetry. Our empirical 
tests can be improved by using better proxies to control for information asymmetry. For 
example, one may develop market microstructure-based measure of information 
asymmetry. 
 
(4) the use of Chairman’s Statement: Our key measure of managerial overconfidence is 
based on content analysis of UK Chairman’s Statement. However, it is ideal to have 
narratives provided by CEO and/or CFO who are key financial decision makers, e.g. 
CEO speech.  
 
(5) comparability: To make our empirical results more comparable to previous literature 
(e.g. Malmendier, Tate and Yan, 2011), we can use two commonly used proxies for 
overconfidence (i.e. stock option-based and press-based measures) as a robustness 
check, although as we discussed in Chapter 3 that those two measures might not be 
suitable for our study.  
 
(6) formal theoretical modelling: Although this thesis focuses on empirical testing of 
the role of managerial overconfidence, we provide new economic insights that shed 
light on development of behavioural theories. For example, more formal behavioural 
models can be developed regarding the positive relationship between managerial 
overconfidence and debt maturity from the agency perspective.  
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8.3 Implications and Directions for Future Research 
Finally, we summarize the major implications of this thesis and suggest several 
promising areas for future research.  
 
(1) corporate governance and debiasing: Have documented the effects of managerial 
overconfidence on corporate financing decisions, future studies may explore the role of 
corporate governance mechanisms in debiasing (i.e. mitigating the negative effects of 
managerial overconfidence). For example, the proportion of female directors and 
independent directors may have influences on the impact of managerial overconfidence. 
In addition, proper design of executive compensation may also have an effect on the 
level of managerial overconfidence.  
 
(2) comparing different executives/directors: Using insider trading-based measure of 
overconfidence, we document that CEO and CFO overconfidence do not always have 
same impact on various aspects of financing decisions. Future studies may develop 
better proxies that capture CEO and CFO overconfidence. More interestingly, one may 
compare the impacts of behavioural biases of different firm directors on financial 
decisions. For example, overconfidence of firms’ R&D directors might be more relevant 
to firm innovation activities relative to CEO or CFO.  
 
(3) interaction between managerial and investor irrationalities: Our empirical analysis 
is based on the assumption that managers are irrational and investors are rational. 
However, future studies may take both managerial and investor irrationalities into 
consideration. For example, one may formally model and empirical test the interaction 
between managerial overconfidence and investor sentiment, which represent two 
separate strands of current literature.  
 
(4) joint effects of multiple managerial biases: This thesis focuses on a single 
behavioural bias of managers, namely overconfidence. However, psychological studies 
suggest that people are subject to multiple biases (e.g. anchoring, regret aversion, etc.). 
Therefore, future studies may have to consider the joint effects of multiple managerial 
biases and the potential interactions among them.  
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(5) time-varying managerial overconfidence and other corporate financial decisions: 
The time-varying managerial words-based measure of managerial overconfidence (i.e. 
the tone index) developed in this thesis can be used in many future studies on the effects 
of time-varying managerial overconfidence. For example, future study can i) 
empirically examine the impacts of managerial overconfidence on the speed of capital 
structure adjustment, ii) empirically examine the effects of managerial overconfidence 
on cash holding and more specifically test the conjecture that managerial 
overconfidence increase retained earnings which can be used to finance future 
investment, which in turn leads to lower debt level and iii) empirically test the impact of 
managerial overconfidence on dividend policy, among many other corporate activities.  
 
(6) non-linear effect of overconfidence: Although we do not find evidence for the non-
linear effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate financing decisions, future 
studies on overconfidence should try to empirically distinguish between the effects of 
mild overconfidence and extreme overconfidence (the latter is often detrimental to firm 
performance). In this case, a continuous measure of overconfidence is necessary and 
therefore our time-varying measures of overconfidence can be used.  
 
(7) interaction between financing and investment: This thesis only investigates 
financing decisions using single-equation method. However, there might be interactions 
between financing and investment activities. Future studies may examine the effects of 
managerial overconfidence in a framework where leverage, investment and debt 
maturity decisions are modelled simultaneously. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 3.A description of content analysis software: Diction 6 vs. LIWC 2007 
This table describes two content analysis software used in this thesis.  
 Diction 6 LIWC 2007 
Basic 
description 
Diction 6 provides a scientific 
way to measure the tone of 
verbal language that mainly 
includes five semantic features.  
 
LIWC 2007 counts number of 
times certain list of words (i.e. 
internal default dictionary) appear 
in the target text files. The default 
dictionary is composed of around 
4,500 words and word stems.  
Default 
dictionary 
Diction 6’s default dictionary 
has five main master variables: 
Activity, Optimism, Certainty, 
Realism and Commonality.  
 
LIWC 2007 provides 
approximately 80 output variables: 
4 general descriptor categories, 22 
standard linguistic dimensions, 32 
word categories tapping 
psychological constructs, 7 
personal concern categories, 3 
paralinguistic dimensions, and 12 
punctuation categories.  
Support for the 
use of user-
defined 
dictionary 
Yes Yes 
Norm Yes (compare results to 40 
normative categories) 
No 
Relevant 
language 
dimensions for 
this study 
Optimism 
Certainty 
Positive emotion 
Negative emotion 
Certain 
Previous 
studies using 
the software 
E.g. press release (Davis, Piger 
and Sedor, 2005); earnings 
announcement (Rogers, Buskirk 
and Zechman, 2009) 
E.g. 10 K report (Li, 2008); 
conference calls (Matsumoto, 
Pronk and Roelofsen, 2008) 
Notes: for more detailed description of Diction 6 and LIWC 2007, see the user manuals by Hart and 
Carroll (2012) and Pennebaker et al. (2007) respectively.  
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Appendix 5.A Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Standard dependent and independent variables 
DEF_CF Financing deficit measured using aggregate cash flow data (i.e. 
ΔD+ΔE)  
Net debt issues (ΔD) Long term borrowings minus reduction in long term debt 
Net equity issues 
(ΔE) 
Net proceeds from sale/issue of common and preferred stocks  minus 
common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted  
PDEF PDEF equals DEF if the deficit is positive and zero otherwise 
NDEF NDEF equals DEF if the deficit is negative and zero otherwise 
Firm size Natural logarithm of sales 
M/B The ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus 
market value of equity to book value of total assets  
Profitability Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by total assets 
Tangibility  Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
Price performance  The difference of natural logarithm of fiscal year-end share prices 
Book leverage Total debt divided by total assets 
Market leverage Total debt divided by (total assets minus common equity plus market 
capitalization) 
Net assets Total assets minus current liabilities  
Firm age The natural logarithm of the number of months since the incorporation 
date 
Panel B: Measures of managerial beliefs 
a) Optimistic tone measures (based on computational content analysis of Chairman’s Statement) 
Net emotion Positive emotion minus negative emotion including (anxiety, anger 
and sadness) as defined by LIWC 
Certain1 Measure of certainty (e.g. always, never) as one aspect of cognitive 
processes as defined by LIWC 
Net optimism [praise+satisfaction+inspiration]-[blame+hardship+denial] as defined 
by Diction 
Certain2  [tenacity+leveling+collectives+insistence]-[numerical 
terms+ambivalence+self reference+variety] as defined by Diction  
Tone_H (positive-negative)/(positive+negative), using Henry’s (2008) word list  
Tone_LM (positive-negative)/(positive+negative), using Loughran and 
McDonald’s (2011) word list 
TONE Composite tone index (see section 5.3.2.1 for more descriptions) 
TONE_RES Orthogonalized tone index (see section 5.3.2.1 for more descriptions) 
b) Insider trading-based measures (i.e. net purchase ratio=(buy - sell)/(buy + sell)) 
VA_CEO  The value-based net purchase ratio of CEO  
VA_CFO  The value-based net purchase ratio of CFO  
VOL_CEO  The volume-based net purchase ratio of CEO  
VOL_CFO  The volume-based net purchase ratio of CFO  
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Appendix 6.A Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Measures of self-attribution bias and managerial overconfidence  
a) Content analysis-based measures (using Chairman’s Statement) 
Net emotion Positive emotion minus negative emotion including (anxiety, anger and 
sadness) as defined by LIWC 
Certain1 Measure of certainty (e.g. always, never) as one aspect of cognitive processes 
as defined by LIWC 
Optimism [praise+satisfaction+inspiration]-[blame+hardship+denial] as defined by 
Diction 
Certain2  [tenacity+leveling+collectives+insistence]-[numerical 
terms+ambivalence+self reference+variety] as defined by Diction  
Tone_H (positive-negative)/(positive+negative), using Henry’s (2008) word list  
Tone_LM (positive-negative)/(positive+negative), using Loughran and McDonald’s 
(2011) word list 
TONE Composite tone index (see section 5.3.2.1 for more descriptions) 
TONE_RES Orthogonalized tone index (see section 5.3.2.1 for more descriptions) 
b) Insider trading-based measures (i.e. net purchase ratio=(buy - sell)/(buy + sell)) 
VA_CEO  The value-based net purchase ratio of CEO  
VA_CFO  The value-based net purchase ratio of CFO  
VOL_CEO  The volume-based net purchase ratio of CEO  
VOL_CFO  The volume-based net purchase ratio of CFO  
c) Investment-based measures 
IAIR1 Industry-adjusted investment rate defined as the ratio of capital expenditure to 
the beginning of year property, plant and equipment  
IAIR2 
 
IAIRD 
 
Industry-adjusted investment rate the ratio of capital expenditure to the 
beginning of year sales 
A dummy variable that takes the value of one if the IAIR1 is in the top 
quintile in a particular fiscal year and zero otherwise  
 
Panel B:Dependent variable and measures of financing deficit (DEF) 
DEF_CF Financing deficit measured using aggregate cash flow data (i.e. ΔD+ΔE)  
Net debt issues 
(ΔD_CF) 
Long term borrowings minus reduction in long term debt  
Net equity issues 
(ΔE_CF) 
Net proceeds from sale/issue of common and preferred stocks minus 
common/preferred redeemed, retired, converted 
DEF_BS Financing deficit measured using balance sheet data (i.e. ΔD+ΔE =ΔA- ΔRE) 
Net debt issues 
(ΔD_BS) 
Change in total assets minus change in book equity  
Net equity issues 
(ΔE_BS) 
Change in book equity minus change in retained earnings  
PDEF PDEF equals DEF if the deficit is positive and zero otherwise 
NDEF NDEF equals DEF if the deficit is negative and zero otherwise 
Panel C: Firm characteristics 
Firm size Natural logarithm of sales 
MB The ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus market 
value of equity to book value of total assets  
Profitability Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation divided by total assets 
Tangibility  Net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets 
Net assets (NA) Total assets minus current liabilities  
Earnings volatility The standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in the past five years 
(at least three years), scaled by the average book value of assets 
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Appendix 7.A Variable definitions 
Variables Definition 
Panel A: words-based measure of overconfidence: first person pronouns 
I The percentage of first person singular pronouns in the Chairman’s 
Statement 
WE The percentage of first person plural pronouns in the Chairman’s 
Statement 
Panel B: words-based measure of overconfidence: optimistic tone 
Net emotion Positive emotion minus negative emotion including (anxiety, anger and 
sadness) as defined by LIWC 
Certain1 Measure of certainty (e.g. always, never) as one aspect of cognitive 
processes as defined by LIWC 
Optimism [praise+satisfaction+inspiration]-[blame+hardship+denial] as defined by 
Diction 
Certain2  [tenacity+leveling+collectives+insistence]-[numerical 
terms+ambivalence+self reference+variety] as defined by Diction  
Tone_H (positive-negative)/(positive+negative), using Henry’s (2008) word list  
Tone_LM (positive-negative)/(positive+negative), using Loughran and McDonald’s 
(2011) word list 
TONE Composite tone index (see section 7.3.3.1 for more descriptions) 
TONE_RES Orthogonalized tone index (see section 7.3.3.1 for more descriptions) 
Panel C: action-based measure of overconfidence: net purchase ratio (NPR), defined as the 
difference between insider purchases and sales divided by the sum of insider purchases and 
sales of own firm’s shares 
VA_CH The value-based net purchase ratio of Chairman 
VA_CEO The value-based net purchase ratio of CEO 
VA_CFO The value-based net purchase ratio of CFO 
VOL_CH The volume-based net purchase ratio of Chairman 
VOL_CEO The volume-based net purchase ratio of CEO 
VOL_CFO The volume-based net purchase ratio of CFO 
Panel D: firm characteristics  
LTD/TD The ratio of long-term debt that matures in more than one year to total 
debt 
Tax The ratio of income taxes to pre-tax income 
Abnormal earnings The difference between next year’s and this year’s earnings per share, 
scaled by this year’s stock price 
Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Liquidity  The ratio of current assets to current liability 
M/B asset The ratio of book value of total assets minus book value of equity plus 
market value of equity to book value of total assets 
M/B equity The ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity 
Asset maturity The ratio of net property, plant and equipment to depreciation expense 
Earnings volatility The standard deviation of the first difference in EBITD in the past five 
years (at least three years), scaled by the average book value of assets 
Leverage The ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets 
Price performance The difference of natural logarithm of fiscal year-end share prices 
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Appendix 7.B Empirical studies on standard determinants of debt maturity 
Empirical studies on the determinants of debt maturity are relatively limited compared 
with the vast capital structure literature. Early evidences on debt maturity are from a 
few indirect studies. Titman and Wessels (1988) report that short-term debt ratios are 
negatively related to firm size. They attribute that inverse relation to the high 
transaction costs associated with long-term debt especially for small firms. Therefore, 
smaller firms tend to use shorter-term debt. Mitchell’s (1993) empirical results strongly 
support the monitoring hypothesis that firms uses debt maturity to make the monitoring 
of outsiders easier. Kim et al. (1995) report that corporate debt maturity is positively 
associated with interest rate volatility and the slope of the term structure. 
       
More comprehensive test is conducted by Barclays and Smith (1995) on the 
contracting-cost hypotheses, signalling hypotheses and tax hypotheses of debt maturity. 
They find that debt maturity is positively related to firm size, regulation dummy which 
equals one if the firm belongs to a regulated industry and is negatively related to growth 
options as measured by market-to-book ratio. However, the term structure of interest 
rates has no significant effect on debt maturity.  
       
However, Stohs and Mauer (1996) argue that the Barclays and Smith (1995) regressions 
are misspecified because they do not include leverage as a control variable. Stohs and 
Mauer (1996) test the determinants of debt maturity using a more comprehensive 
measure of debt maturity that covers all debt, debtlike obligations and current liabilities. 
Their results show that firms with larger size, longer asset maturity and high leverage 
use more long-term debt. In contrast, firms with higher earnings volatility, higher 
effective tax rate and higher quality (i.e. abnormal earnings) tend to use shorter-term 
debt. In addition, they find a nonmonotonic relation between bond rating and debt 
maturity (i.e. firms with high or very low ratings shorten their debt maturity), which is 
consistent with the model of Diamond (1991). However, the prediction of Myers’s 
(1977) underinvestment model, that is the inverse relationship between growth 
opportunities (i.e. market-to-book ratio) and debt maturity, receives mixed support.    
       
Different from the balance sheet measure of debt maturity used by Barclays and Smith 
(1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996), Guedes and Oplers (1996) adopt incremental 
approach which measures the maturity of incremental debt issues rather than all 
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liabilities on the balance sheet. Agency theories of debt maturity are also supported. In 
particular, firms with more growth options use more short-term debt. However, the 
signalling and tax-based theories receive little support. Consistent with Diamond’s 
(1991) liquidity risk hypothesis, their major finding is that larger and less risky (i.e. 
good bond ratings) firms tend to borrow at the two ends of the maturity spectrum. 
However, risky firms borrow in the middle of that spectrum because those firms are 
screened out of the long-term debt market and are also reluctant to use short-term debt 
due to liquidation risk.  
       
The above studies mainly focus on the effects of firm characteristics. More recent 
studies examine the managerial impact on debt maturity. In particular, managerial stock 
ownership and compensation are also found to be relevant to debt maturity. Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005) test the impact of managerial stock ownership on 
debt maturity. They document an inverse relationship between managerial stock 
ownership and debt maturity. Brockman, Martin and Unlu (2010) investigate the 
influence of executive compensation on debt maturity. They find that executives’ 
portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices and stock return volatility are positively 
and negatively related to debt maturity respectively.  
       
Regarding non-US debt maturity studies, Ozkan (2000) tests the debt maturity 
determinants of UK firms. He finds that growth opportunity and firm size are negatively 
associated with debt maturity, while asset maturity has a positive effect. However, tax is 
found to be insignificant. Leverage is not controlled in Ozkan’s (2000) study. Antoniou 
et al. (2006) empirically compare the determinants of debt maturity of French, German 
and British firms. They find that most of the theories, including those related to tax, 
information asymmetry and agency problems, are applicable for the UK firms but not 
for French and German firms.  
       
Besides, Antoniou et al. (2006) also examine the impact of equity market conditions, in 
particular share price performance and equity risk premium, on debt maturity. They 
document that the relationship between changes in stock prices and debt maturity is 
positive, especially for German and the UK firms. In terms of the effect of equity risk 
premium, they find that firms in the market-oriented economy, especially the UK, use 
more long-term debt when the equity risk premium is higher. However, the equity 
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market conditions have no significant effect on the debt maturity decisions of French 
firms. They conclude that the debt maturity decisions not only depend on firm-specific 
factors but also stock market conditions as well as country-specific financial and 
institutional environment.  
       
A recent study by Fan, Titman and Twite (2012) examines the effect of institutional 
environment on capital structure and debt maturity decisions of firms in 39 countries. 
They find that debt maturity is positively related to asset tangibility, firm size and 
profitability, which is consistent with prior studies. However, market-to-book ratio is 
insignificant for the developed countries. In addition, institutional factors (e.g. legal 
system, tax, corruption) play a significant role in explaining cross-country differences. 
One limitation of their debt maturity test is that leverage is not controlled.  
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Appendix 7.C Standard theories of debt maturity 
Three standard theories of debt maturity are related to agency cost, information 
asymmetry and tax, which have been the main focus of the existing debt maturity 
literature. Key variables that represent different theories will be outlined.  
 
1. Agency cost hypothesis 
Growth opportunities  
Myers (1977) argues that the underinvestment problem of firms with high growth 
opportunities can be mitigated by shortening debt maturity. The conflict between equity 
holders and bondholders over the exercise of growth options becomes greater as the 
increase of those options. However, this conflict does not exist if the maturity of debt is 
so short that it matures before the investment options are to be exercised. Thus, firms 
with more growth opportunities should use more short-term debt.  
       
Barnea et al. (1980) also rationalize debt maturity structure as a mechanism to solve 
agency costs associated with Myers’s underinvestment problem. Furthermore, their 
model suggests that shortening debt maturity and issuing long-term debt with a call 
provision can resolve agency problems related to not only suboptimal future investment 
decisions but also information asymmetry and managerial risk incentives.  
       
However, a recent model developed by Diamond and He (2014) shows that maturing 
risky short-term debt may be associated with a stronger overhang effect. That is, short-
term debt is no longer a free solution to debt overhang. Moreover, their model predicts 
that firms with high growth opportunities will use more long-term debt because the 
potential early default is more costly for those growth firms. Therefore, their model 
suggests that the relation between debt maturity and growth opportunities can be 
positive, which is opposite to the prediction of Myers (1977). In sum, theoretical 
relationship between growth opportunity and debt maturity can be either negative or 
positive.   
 
Matching Hypothesis 
From agency perspective, Myers (1977) argues that matching the maturities of debt and 
assets, as an attempt to make the debt repayments correspond to the decline in the value 
of assets in place, can reduce the agency costs of debt. Hart and Moore’s (1994) model 
 268 
 
shows that there should be a match between the assets and liabilities. Specifically, the 
liabilities (i.e. debt repayments) should be matched either with project return stream or 
with the asset depreciation rate. Therefore, the matching hypothesis predicts that debt 
maturity is positively associated with asset maturity.  
 
2. Information asymmetry: signalling and liquidity risk  
Liquidity risk hypothesis  
Diamond’s (1991) model shows an optimal debt maturity structure based on a trade-off 
between the liquidity risks associated with short-term debt and its expected lower 
borrowing costs. The liquidity risk of short-term debt arises when the lenders are not 
willing to refinance and consequently the firm is forced to be liquidated. However, 
short-term debt may allow the firms to reduce financing costs when receiving good 
news. Considering that the firm insiders are better informed about firm quality than 
bond investors, firms with favourable private information about future prospects may 
choose short-term debt that can be refinanced when good news arrive.  
 
Signalling hypothesis 
Given the information asymmetry between the firm and bond market investors, the 
signalling model of debt maturity suggests that debt maturity can serve as a signal about 
the firm quality. In particular, in Flannery’s (1986) model, high-quality firms believe 
that their long-term debt is undervalued. In addition, they are less concerned about 
refinancing risk and hence want to signal their quality by issuing short-term debt. In 
contrast, low quality firms avoid rolling over short-term debt because of positive 
transaction costs. In brief, high (low)-quality firms are more likely to issue short (long)-
term debt. Therefore, we expect that firm quality is negatively related to debt maturity.  
 
3. Tax Hypothesis  
Kane, Marcus and McDonald (1985) provide a continuous-time model of debt maturity 
which incorporates taxes, bankruptcy costs and debt issue flotation costs. The optimal 
debt maturity is determined by comparing the tax benefits of debt and the bankruptcy 
and flotation costs. They predict that optimal debt maturity is positively related to the 
flotation costs and negatively correlated with tax benefits of debt and the volatility of 
firm value.  
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Brick and Ravid’s (1985) model focuses on the tax implications of debt maturity 
allowing for default. Their model predicts that an increasing (decreasing) term structure 
of interest rates makes long (short) term-debt optimal in the sense that the expected tax 
liability is reduced, which increases the firm value. Therefore, the tax hypothesis 
implies that firms issue more long-term debt when there is an increasing term structure. 
However, Brick and Ravid’s model is based on the assumption that firm’s decision on 
leverage is made before the debt maturity decisions. As Lewis (1990) points out, taxes 
may be irrelevant to debt maturity structure especially if firm’s leverage and debt 
maturity structures are determined simultaneously. 
 
4. Equity market conditions 
Equity market conditions are also relevant to debt maturity decisions (Antoniou et al., 
2006). The valuation of long-term debt is more sensitive to new information and it is 
also more likely to be undervalued. Market timing theory suggests that firms should 
issue securities with high information costs, especially equity and long-term debt, 
following stock price run-up. In addition, signalling theory also predicts that firms will 
use short-term debt as a signal to the market if firms stocks are believed to be 
undervalued. Therefore, we expect that share price performance is positively related to 
debt maturity.  
 
5. Leverage as a control variable  
Some earlier studies do not include leverage as a control variable. However, leverage 
should be included for the following two reasons. First, some explanatory variables may 
have endogeneity problem related to leverage. Early studies (e.g., Barclay and Smith, 
1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996) do not control for leverage and find a negative relation 
between growth opportunity and debt maturity. This finding may be subject to 
endogeneity problem, considering that leverage is positively related to debt maturity 
and growth opportunity is negatively related to leverage. In contrast, after controlling 
for leverage, Stohs and Mauer (1996) find opposite result. In terms of our key variable, 
managerial overconfidence may also be endogenous. Similarly, if leverage is omitted, 
positive relation between managerial overconfidence and debt maturity could be due to 
that 1.) managerial overconfidence is positively associated with leverage and 2.) 
leverage is positively associated with debt maturity. Therefore, this study will also 
control for leverage.  
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Second, theoretically, leverage is expected to have either positive or negative impact on 
debt maturity. On one hand, Diamond (1991) shows that highly leveraged firms should 
use more long-term debt to minimize liquidation risk. Therefore, there is a positive 
relation between leverage and debt maturity. On the other hand, agency theory suggests 
that underinvestment problem can be mitigated by lowering either leverage or debt 
maturity (Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe, 2000). In this case, reducing leverage and 
shortening debt maturity are substitutes, meaning that leverage and debt maturity is 
negatively related. Thus, leverage is also relevant to debt maturity decisions, while the 
sign of the coefficient on leverage is an empirical question.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 271 
 
Appendix 7.D Tone and debt maturity: OLS 
This table presents regressions of debt maturity measure on various tone measures of 
Chairman’s Statement and control variables, as defined in Appendix 7.A. The dependent 
variable is the ratio of long-term debt to total debt (i.e. LTD/TD). All the models are estimated 
using ordinary least square (OLS) with robust standard error. p-values are given in parentheses. 
***, **, and * indicate that coefficient is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS 
Optimism 0.012***    
 (0.004)    
Tone_LM  0.074**   
  (0.028)   
TONE   0.020***  
   (0.002)  
TONE_RES    0.019*** 
    (0.001) 
Tax -0.039 -0.040 -0.039 -0.040 
 (0.104) (0.106) (0.106) (0.102) 
Abnormal earning -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.861) (0.913) (0.939) (0.925) 
Firm size 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Liquidity 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.075*** 0.070*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B asset -0.015 -0.014 -0.018 -0.010 
 (0.331) (0.370) (0.243) (0.524) 
Asset maturity 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.036) (0.033) 
Earnings volatility 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.036 
 (0.228) (0.240) (0.224) (0.234) 
Leverage 0.434*** 0.443*** 0.452*** 0.430*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Price performance 0.036* 0.032 0.028 0.042** 
 (0.063) (0.108) (0.162) (0.032) 
Constant -0.632*** -0.002 0.050 0.032 
 (0.010) (0.971) (0.475) (0.651) 
Obs. 865 865 865 865 
Firms 192 192 192 192 
𝑅2 0.164 0.161 0.167 0.167 
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